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Abstract 
Recent academic scholarship has resulted in the production of a broad body of 
interdisciplinary research that explores the representation of different political and spatial 
phenomena within popular culture, often focussed upon the analysis of film and television. 
Whilst video games now rival the popularity of these more established media forms, the 
different spaces that are represented within this medium have remained comparatively 
under-explored. This thesis addresses this lacuna and will show that military-themed video 
games are constitutive of particular spatial and political  imaginaries, and that analyses of the 
medium can be used to illuminate broader critical debates. Such an engagement makes three 
specific contributions to knowledge. Firstly, a theoretical contribution is made through the 
increasing imbrication of approaches originating within International Relations and critical 
geopolitics. Whilst the former field addresses the relationship between political theory and 
popular culture, critical geopolitical analyses examine the process through which the 
surrounding world is spatialized. In offering an interdisciplinary perspective, therefore, this 
analysis highlights not only the production of a form of political power, but also the everyday 
mechanisms through which the associated assumptions, biases and cultural tropes are 
reproduced as commonsense spatial “knowledge”. Secondly, a methodological contribution 
is achieved through the provision of a framework for an object-focussed analysis of the video 
game medium. This approach, which encompasses both structural and thematic aspects, 
addresses the limitations that are associated with exclusively ludological or narratological 
approaches and provides an important middle ground. Finally, an empirical contribution is 
achieved through the detailed examination of the urban, rural and temporally-inflected forms 
of spatiality that are represented within military-themed video games. Here, a focus on 
twelve high-profile video game titles is used to highlight the ways in which the medium can 
work to produce or preclude different geopolitical imaginaries. The video game world is 
shown to be a source of political meaning – one which is used to naturalise different claims 
about the “reality” of our contemporary geopolitical experience, including what the world 
looks like and what our place within it might be. These analyses are also shown to provide a 
means by which it is made possible to illuminate – and even destabilise – the foundations of 
prevailing critical frameworks, offering the potential for introspection and future growth.  
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Chapter One: Going Cultural 
1.1  Introduction  
In March 2017, Ubisoft Paris released Ghost Recon: Wildlands, the latest in a series of video games 
that are loosely inspired by the work of the late techno-thriller writer Tom Clancy. In this game the 
player becomes a member of The Ghosts, a US Elite Operations team who are tasked with disrupting 
the machinations of a Mexican drug cartel that has seized control of Bolivian coca production. As a 
part of simulating the Bolivian space in which the game is set, members of Ubisoft’s artistic team 
travelled to the country to document the environment and to speak to people about the realities of 
their daily lives. This process not only facilitated the realistic reproduction of key Bolivian landmarks 
in the game (see, for example, Figure 1), but also allowed for the inclusion of a series of subtle details 
that added a sense of authenticity to the simulation. These included, for example, the depiction of the 
“scarecrows” that are used to warn off unwanted visitors, as well as the perennially unfinished nature 
of Bolivian housing that allows its residents to evade property tax.    
The desire for authenticity was made particularly explicit during some of the promotional interviews 
that surrounded the game’s launch, including one in which lead artist Benoit Martinez emphasised 
that ‘it was very important for us, from the beginning, to be truthful to whatever we’ve seen… We’ve 
been very touched by what we’ve seen, the people we’ve met, the beautiful country we’ve been able 
to discover… I hope they’ll realise that we treat all this material with a lot of respect – for Bolivian 
people, for this country, and for everything’ (Martinez, 2017). Although aiming to offer a suitably 
authentic and respectful simulation of its host country, Ghost Recon: Wildlands caused political 
 
 
 
 
This image has been removed by the author of this thesis for copyright reasons. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Real and Digital Images of Laguna Colorada, near Potosoi, Bolivia (Hall, 2016) 
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controversy as a result of its underlying narrative. In an appeal to the French consulate, 
representatives of the Bolivian government argued that the game’s representation of their country as 
a lawless, corrupt narco-state – though clearly a work of fiction – had served to undermine its political 
standing in the real-world (Ramos, 2017). These sorts of concerns, pertaining to the role of video 
gaming in the scripting of national identity, are not confined to this particular title. In 2007, for 
example, Ghost Recon: Advanced Warfighter 2 was targeted for governmental seizure in Ciudad 
Juárez, as its representation of Mexican border towns was deemed ‘despicable, xenophobic and 
harmful to children’ (Penix-Tadsen, 2016). In 2010, meanwhile, the parliamentary committee member 
Pavel Zyryanov announced plans to fund a Russian games industry, citing broad concerns about the 
portrayal of the country within Western produced titles: -  
‘The foreign games depicting the Great Patriotic War are sticking to the old Cold War 
images of Russia as a bunch of villains… In other genres, the games tend to simply ridicule 
Russia with images of bears riding unicycles down the street, and I mean, come on, this 
just doesn’t correspond to reality’ (Shuster, 2010) 
In 2011, Battlefield 3 was banned in Iran, as a result of its portrayal of an invasion of Tehran (Stuart, 
2011). The following year saw the withdrawal of both Medal of Honor: Warfighter (Electronic Arts, 
2012) and Call of Duty: Black Ops II (Activision, 2012) in Pakistan, as officials reportedly argued that 
these games had ‘been developed against the country’s national unity and sanctity (Pakistan Today, 
2013). Similar anxieties also prompted the banning of Battlefield 4 (2013) in China, as officials there 
argued that the game was tantamount to a ‘cultural invasion… that smears China’s image’ (Tassi, 
2013). Such concerns suggest a broader acknowledgement that control over the representation of 
space, including the construction of state identity, cannot be confined to the people and practices that 
are associated with elite forms of political discourse.  
As highlighted in Chapter Two, this perspective resonates within the ongoing critical debates 
within both International Relations (IR) and critical geopolitics. Each of these fields has explored a 
multiplicity of different ways in which the relationship between popular culture and world politics can 
be understood to be important. In IR there has been a growing acceptance of an aesthetic, rather than 
mimetic, understanding of the nature of representation: -  
 ‘The latter [approaches], which have dominated IR scholarship, seek to represent politics 
as realistically and authentically as possible, aiming to capture world politics as-it-really-
is. Aesthetic approaches, by contrast, assume that there is always a gap between a form 
of representation and what is represented therewith. Rather than seeking to ignore or 
minimise this gap, as mimetic approaches do, aesthetic insight recognises that the 
13 
 
inevitable difference between the represented and the representation is the very 
location of politics’ (Bleiker, 2001, p. 510) 
Some such analyses reflect on the role of popular culture as an accessible form of political knowledge. 
Doucet, for example, suggests that children’s films ‘contribute to reinforcing the prevailing 
interpretations of real-world events that children receive from elsewhere, such as television, the 
internet or other mass media sources’ (2005, p. 291; see also Dittmer, 2010, p.21). Other research has 
tracked the pedagogical value of popular culture. Doucet, for example, reflects that ‘films are 
pedagogically powerful not only because they can help us teach IR, but also because they help 
highlight how particular forms of IR are taught outside the ivory towers of academe. They bridge 
“high” and “low” culture, and help to popularise particular worldviews while excluding others, thereby 
enabling certain theories of IR to acquire footing in what appears as popular “common sense” about 
the way the world is’ (2005, p. 290; see also Blanton, 2013, pp. 12-13; Ruane & James, 2008, p.392).  
This thesis highlights a complementary approach that is evident within critical geopolitics, a 
subfield of political geography that has aimed to ‘highlight the use of geographical language and to 
underline the fact that, rather than being an apolitical and natural aspect of international politics, 
geography is a discourse and as such is a form of power/knowledge itself’ (Sharp, 2000, p. 333; see 
also Dalby 1991; Dittmer 2010, O’Tuathail & Agnew 1992; O’Tuathail, 1996, p.61). This approach 
makes room for a specifically popular form of geopolitics, which ‘refers to the geographical politics 
created and debated by the various media-shaping popular culture. It addresses the social 
construction and perpetuation of certain collective national and transnational understandings of 
places and peoples beyond one’s own borders’ (O'Tuathail, 1999, p. 110). It is a form of geopolitics 
which accounts for the accessibility of popular culture and the potential political influence that its 
different artefacts can be seen to have. As Dittmer surmises, the study of ‘geopolitics is fundamentally 
about who “we” are, and what other people are like. Much to the chagrin of geographers and other 
academics who feel they can answer those questions best, those lessons are increasingly taught via 
everyday popular culture, whether through films such as 300 (2007) or the user-driven content of the 
so-called Web 2.0 (blogs, YouTube, Facebook, Myspace, etc.)’ (2010, p. 21).  
These different literatures suggest that popular culture can, therefore, be understood as a vital 
terrain for the construction and exchange of political meaning, offering an important forum within 
which we tell, and are told, the stories from which we are then able to construct our sense of Self and 
through which we are made able to make sense of the world around us (Saunders, 2012, p. 82; 
Shepherd, 2013, pp. 1-12; Weber, 2005, p. 4). Such meanings can take a variety of different forms, 
which ‘may be explicit or implicit, conscious or unconscious, they may be felt as truth or as fantasy, 
science or commonsense; and they may be conveyed through everyday speech, elaborate rhetoric, 
14 
 
high art, TV soap operas, dreams, movies or Muzak; and different groups in a society will make sense 
of the world in different ways’ (Rose, 2016, p. 2). These meanings may also serve different functions, 
fulfilling different cultural roles, and may act to influence the so-called “real-world” in a myriad of 
different ways. They may, for example, provide a unified group identity, such as that seen in the 
profound influence of the science-fiction series Star Trek upon the lives and behaviours of its fans: 
‘they actually talk about it and write about it’ (Weldes, 1999, p. 133). These shared identities also have 
the potential to influence real-world politics. Nexon and Neumann, for example, note that NASA 
yielded to ‘demand prompted by a Star Trek fan letter-writing campaign to change the name of the 
first [space] shuttle from Constitution to Enterprise’ (2006, p. 23). These pop-culture discourses can 
also provide a means by which to confront and combat shared fears. Jason Dittmer, for example, notes 
that ‘the first edition of Captain America Comics came out in December 1940 and features Captain 
America on the cover, punching Hitler right in the jaw’ (2008, p. 407). Popular culture can also be used 
in the advancement of subaltern cultural discourses. Shapiro, for example, suggests that popular 
culture can function as a collective memory bank, ensuring that ‘the worlds of pain, suffering and 
grievance remain readily available for reflection and recognition, even where those with actual 
experiential memories are no longer around to tell their stories’ (2009, p.155). These cultural 
discourses can also function as a space of political contestation and dissent, providing a sphere within 
which elite narratives can safely be challenged: -    
‘Popular culture can, in the way it offers forms of identity, become engaged with politics, 
in particular with the politics of citizenship, the right to belong and the right to be 
recognised. Popular culture can also become a form of resistance, a weapon with which 
to deny power’ (Street, 1997, p. 12; see also Shapiro, 2009, p. 48) 
This thesis echoes the need for continued critical attention to the involvement of popular culture in 
the process of scripting specific understandings of politics and political spaces, noting the close 
scrutiny of the spatialized and spatializing worlds that are created and recreated within cultural 
artefacts such as cartoons, television programmes, magazines and popular culture (see, for example, 
Boggs & Pollard, 2008; Crownshaw, 2011; Dalby, 2008; Spigel, 2004; Van Veeren, 2009; Weldes, 1999). 
It is, however, notable that there has been a more limited critical treatment of the function of video 
game space in the manufacture of political imaginaries (although, see Graham & Shaw, 2010; Schulzke, 
2013; Robinson, 2015a). Aiming to address this imbalance, this thesis will focus on the different ways 
in which the simulation of space within military-themed video games (i.) works to construct and 
maintain specific geopolitical imaginaries, and (ii.) serves to illuminate our broader critical 
understandings of particular forms of spatiality and spatial phenomena. Such an engagement will 
make three specific contributions to knowledge, offering theoretical, methodological and empirical 
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insight.  This thesis makes a theoretical contribution to the analysis of the politics of popular culture 
through the increasing imbrication of approaches originating within International Relations (IR) and 
critical geopolitics. As Chapter Two will show, these two fields vary in their primary emphasis. Whilst 
IR focuses upon the relationship between political theory and popular culture, critical geopolitical 
analyses address the varied processes through which the surrounding world is spatialized. In offering 
an interdisciplinary perspective, therefore, this analysis highlights not only the production of a form 
of political power, but also the everyday mechanisms through which the associated assumptions, 
biases and cultural tropes are reproduced as commonsense spatial “knowledge”. This thesis also 
makes a methodological contribution through the provision of a framework for an object-focussed 
analysis of video games. This approach – which encompasses both the structural and thematic 
characteristics of the video game form (see Section 4.2, pp.113-115) – addresses the limitations that 
are associated with the polarising ludology-narratology debate and provides an important middle 
ground between these two extremes. Such an approach properly acknowledges the complexity of the 
video game medium, highlighting the myriad of different elements that influence the player’s 
encounter with the gameworld and its associated narratives, systems and structures. This 
methodological framework is used to facilitate the subsequent empirical contribution, which arises 
from the examination of urban, rural and temporally-inflected forms of spatiality within video games. 
The representation of these key geographical and political frameworks is not regarded as simple 
mimesis, nor is this merely the background for the narrative. Instead, the representation of different 
forms of space within video games is regarded as being fundamentally constitutive of politics and 
prevailing geopolitical imaginaries (Nexon & Neumann, 2006, p.19; see also Chapter Two). Understood 
in such a way, the video game world is regarded as a source of political meaning – one which is used 
to naturalise different claims about the ‘reality’ of our contemporary geopolitical experience, including 
what the world looks like and what our place within it might be. These video games demonstrate that 
there is no single filter through which we construct our notions of political and cultural identity, 
emphasising the myriad of smaller spatial sites at which we formulate notions of the Self and the 
Other. In addition, these different analyses are used to further our understandings of the established 
frameworks through which urban, rural and temporally-inflected spaces are analysed. Here, the 
encounter with video games is utilised as a means by which it is made possible to illuminate – and 
potentially destabilise – the foundation of the critical lens itself. The analysis of video games, 
therefore, is shown to offer the potential for critical introspection and future growth.  
1.2 Playing Games  
In her analysis of cult science-fiction, Jutta Weldes argued that ‘there might be more going on when 
an audience sits down to watch television than students of international relations have previously 
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assumed. Until at least some of us go cultural and join them, then we can only speculate as to what 
that something more might be’ (1999, p. 134). This thesis extends this focus to video games, 
suggesting that - as a part of this process of ‘going cultural’ - the researcher should also be called upon 
to pick up a video game console controller. There are several reasons underpinning such an 
engagement.   
 In the first instance, it should be highlighted that this is a culturally pervasive form of 
entertainment that reaches large audiences (Graham & Shaw, 2010, p. 790; Schulzke, 2013, p. 587). 
Recent figures released by the Entertainment Software Association (2018, p. 4) suggest that 60% of 
Americans play video games on a daily basis. Also, contrary to the common stereotype that video 
game players are antisocial teenagers, their research also found that the average age of a player is 
actually 34 (ESA, 2018, p. 4).   
The available data implies that similar trends are evident in the UK, where ‘there are 31.6m players, 
approximately 50% of the total population’ (UKIE, 2018). As Egenfeldt-Nielsen et al highlight, ‘one 
obvious way in which this matters is financial. The rising popularity of games translates into astounding 
amounts of cash. The game industry is quickly becoming a financial juggernaut’ (2016, p. 7; see also 
Figure 2). Major video game releases – such as the Call of Duty games that are discussed within 
Chapter Five – can consistently produce high revenues, rivalling even blockbuster movies such as 
Avatar (Graham & Shaw, 2010, p. 790).  These games can also be seen to be having an increasing level 
of intertextual significance, as their ‘explosive evolution of creative possibility is beginning to influence 
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Figure 2: Annual US Video Game Content Spend 2010-2017 (ESA, 2018, p. 10)   
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significantly other types of expression. It is clear by now, after the Matrix trilogy, after the Grand Theft 
Auto, Uncharted, and Red Dead Redemption games, that movies and games are borrowing from each 
other’s arsenals’ (Egenfeldt-Nielsen, et al., 2016, p. 7). The film industry is not only drawing upon the 
aesthetics of video games, recreating their look and feel, but is also incorporating the associated 
characters and worlds into its output. According to the film industry website IMDb (2018), there is a 
film adaptation of the Call of Duty series scheduled for release in 2018/2019, which intends to ape the 
success of the Marvel Comics adaptions, whilst other forthcoming releases will draw inspiration from 
The Division, Ghost Recon and Splinter Cell franchises.  It is, however, important to acknowledge the 
aesthetic elements that are particular to video games or game genres. Schulzke, for example, suggests 
that counterterrorism ‘video games present information in a unique way. Television programs and 
movies usually adopt a detached, third-person viewpoint on events that shows multiple perspectives, 
and that may even provide a glimpse into the terrorist point of view. By contrast, counterterrorism 
games restrict players to a first-person view1. Players are only able to see the game world from the 
perspective of the counterterrorist operatives they control, thereby concealing the terrorist Other, 
which can only be seen as an anonymous opponent’ (2013, p. 587). This focus on video game 
aesthetics should also account for the specific role that the recreation of space plays in the experience 
of a video game. As Chapter Four will show, video games spend less time engaging in conventional 
forms of oral narrative, depending instead upon practices of ‘environmental storytelling’ (Jenkins, 
2004) to progress the player’s understanding of the world around them.  
 Artefacts of popular culture will often also draw from the discursive economy that is provided 
by international relations. As Nexon and Neumann reflect, these products can be tied to the political 
environments within which they were created and the different forms of political discourse that were 
in circulation during the relevant period: -  
‘Anti-Tutsi propaganda in Rwanda, D.W. Griffith’s Birth of a Nation, American protest 
music of the 1960s, Errol Morris’s The Fog of War, and Tom Clancy’s techno thrillers can 
all be analysed as causes and effects of political phenomena’ (2006, p. 11) 
In drawing on a familiar political mise-en-scène, artefacts of popular culture can frame the issue at 
hand in a way that is instantly intelligible to its audience. With this in mind, it is worthwhile to note 
that the military and combat-themed genres of video games have proven to be particularly popular in 
the post-9/11 political environment (Graham & Shaw, 2010, p. 790; Ouellette, 2008; Stahl, 2006, p. 
                                                          
1 There are some exceptions to this. The Ghost Recon and Rainbow Six video game franchises, which 
depict counterterrorism operations, all default to a third-person (“over the shoulder”) viewpoint.   
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118). Indeed, as Schulzke notes, ‘the popularity of these games has consistently increased, even as 
interest in other entertainment about terrorism has subsided’ (2013, p. 587). Such games will 
commonly reflect the prevailing political discourse of this period and can largely be seen to ‘celebrate 
America’s War on Terror as a grave, but necessary and patriotic undertaking’ (Payne, 2014, p. 265). 
These video games also act to validate a post-modern imaginary of warfare, mirroring ‘the US 
military’s self-transformation to a global police force that functions secretly, with small rapid 
deployment teams in the context of a low-intensity warfare’ (Stahl, 2006, p. 118). Whilst this depiction 
of present and forthcoming warfare ought not to be the most comfortable of subjects to serve as 
entertainment, our consumption of these ‘proleptic, or anticipatory, histories’ (Smicker, 2010, p. 113), 
provides the player with the hands-on, interactive opportunity to ‘take satisfaction in dishing out the 
kind of fantasy justice that the Bush administration promised but could never deliver’ (Annandale, 
2010, p. 100). These games aim to evoke feelings of interactivity and participation, rather than of 
distance and disengagement, making the player into ‘a virtual recruit in a war consumed’ (Stahl quoted 
in Power 2007, p.273). This is not just a simple matter of these video games seeking to represent or 
somehow “gamify” reality, but an acknowledgment that the medium can potentially offer a space for 
the excision of national and personal trauma – this virtual space makes it possible to “play through” 
the anxiety, uncertainty and pain of the real world’ (Leonard, 2004, p. 1; Power, 2007, p. 271). These 
video games also, as I argue in Chapter Seven, provide a space which allows for our participation in 
the pre-emptive confrontation (and conquest) of potential sources of future instability and danger. 
Graham and Shaw have noted that, as a result of the ‘bleeding between reality and virtuality, 
it is hard to know whether video games are becoming more like war, or if war is becoming more like 
video games. Certainly, for millions of players across the globe, war is a game’ (2010, p. 790). As we 
continue to straddle this almost invisible ‘thin line between entertainment and war’ (Turse, 2003), we 
occupy highly political spaces that are rendered culturally knowable and finite, but which are also 
sufficiently removed from the theoretical vagaries of our “real world” to act as a valuable alternate 
arena for political study.  
1.3  Aims, Objectives and Research Questions 
As discussed above, the purpose of this thesis is to provide a detailed examination of the simulation 
of space within military video games, empirically exploring the ways in which different practices of 
representation, narrative and gameplay are used to reinforce or challenge particular geopolitical 
imaginaries. To this end, this thesis will offer detailed textual readings of the simulation of space within 
a series of ‘insurgent-hunting’ (Stahl, 2006, p. 118) or ‘proleptic’ (Smicker, 2010, p. 113) types of these 
games, engaging with the specific ways in which they script national, rural and temporal forms of 
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spatiality (see Chapter Three for a discussion of these different spatial types). There are two main 
motivations for this intervention. In the first instance, this thesis will contribute to a growing body of 
critical literature which has demonstrated sustained interest in the nature of the relationship between 
popular culture and political phenomena (see Chapter Two). This thesis calls attention to the 
geopolitical imaginaries evoked through the consumption of video game space, highlighting the 
importance of a medium that has been underexplored in comparison to the similar analyses of film, 
television and literature. A second, broader focus is to facilitate the continuing unification of 
approaches within critical IR theory and critical geopolitics, highlighting the commonalities that are 
shared by these two fields. This thesis is underpinned by a series of research questions: -   
Question One: In what ways does the simulation of space in console military video 
games serve to create specific geopolitical imaginaries?  
As Chapter Two will highlight, research within both IR and critical geopolitics suggests that the various 
practices of representation that are evident within popular cultural artefacts should not be considered 
to be simple, benign acts of mimesis. As Sharp surmises, ‘geopolitics does not simply “trickle down” 
from elite texts to popular ones’ (1993, p. 493). Instead, it is suggested that these different practices 
should be treated as a ‘source of micro-politics where political subjectivities, geopolitical and security 
imaginations, identities, and imagined communities are (re)produced at the level of the everyday’ 
(Caso & Hamilton, 2015, p. 2). This means that the (re)creation of space and place should be regarded 
as an act of political power. Popular culture facilitates the creation and maintenance of constructed 
and contingent geopolitical scripts - naturalised and taken-for-granted frameworks for seeing the 
world, which are then constitutive of our ideas of identity and difference without direct reliance on 
elite discourse. Such a process is driven by practices of inclusion and exclusion, meaning that it is 
possible to examine the extent to which video games are productive of specific forms of space and 
place by tracing the presence or absence of different character types, settings, actions, narrative 
devices and visual tropes. This first research question works to expose the different ways in which the 
process of geopolitical scripting can be seen to operate within video games, accounting for some of 
the specific forms that the simulation of space in video games can be seen to take. This thesis 
differentiates between practices of representation, narrative and gameplay. The associated emphases 
of these different aspects, which are explored in greater detail in Chapter Four, are broadly outlined 
below: -  
i. How is political space represented within video games? 
One approach to the analysis of the geopolitical imaginaries contained within video games is to focus 
on specific practices of representation. This thesis considers the following areas: -  
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(A) Setting: Is the game set in a recognisable part of the ‘real world’ or does it rely on a fictional 
backdrop?  
(B) Scale: Does the game engage with the portrayal of space at a local level, or does it expand to 
cover a national or international scope?  
(C) Type: What types of space are represented with these game? Is the game set in towns and 
cities (see Chapter Five), or does it depict villages and countrysides (see Chapter Six)? Are 
there identifiable official buildings and institutions, or does the game centre on more everyday 
environments and local dwellingscapes?   
As a part of the process of representation, this thesis will also consider who is shown to be a part of 
these different environments: -  
(A) What roles does the player adopt? What does the enemy look like? Does this vary between 
different types of space?  
(B) How do the different characters interact with one another? How do the different characters 
interact with the landscape? Does this change when the surrounding environment changes?  
(C) What characters are excluded from the representation of different landscapes?  
In focussing on the practices of representation in video games, it is also important to call attention to 
the practices of signification. These aspects are the ‘signs, ornaments, or game structures that have 
originally been used in other media or other games, and which have been put to use in the game we 
are about to analyse’ (Konzack, 2002, p. 96). This should, for example, include the use of genre 
conventions and tropes: -  
(A) Do the game adhere to/subvert the ‘shooter’ genre conventions?  
(B) Do the environments that are represented serve any metaphoric or symbolic purpose? How 
are these alternative textualities manifested within the games?  
As Chapter Three highlights, analyses of video games have tended to go beyond the examination of 
representational elements, and have debated the relative utility of narrative and ludic approaches to 
the study of the medium. Proponent of ludology suggest that the analysis of video games needs to 
account for the fact that video games are played, rather than watched, as the non-linear nature of this 
gameplay confounds the importation of the narrative methods that are used in the study of other 
forms of entertainment media (see, for example, Frasca, 2003; Juul, 2001). Proponents of narrative 
suggest that there is a need to adapt, rather than replace, these conventional approaches, allowing 
for forms of narrative that are unveiled through storytelling or spatial exploration (see, for example, 
Jenkins, 2004; Kirkland, 2005). In the creation of a method for this analysis of video game space, this 
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thesis aims to account for both narrative and ludic factors. These different approaches prompt the 
following questions, and their associated analytical foci: -  
ii. How are the different forms of space utilised or subverted within particular narratives?  
A focus on narrative engages with the ways in which game space is used in the creation of storied 
meaning. This form of enquiry invites consideration of the following aspects: -  
(A) How does the game seek to script the world that it presents? To what extent is this narrative 
congruent with ‘reality’?  
(B) What practices of narration are present in the game? What is shown to happen within these 
different spaces?  
This thesis also examines the ways in which conventional notions of narrative form can be adapted to 
apply to video game content. Such a process is particularly influenced by Jenkins, who suggests that 
video games ‘fit within a much older tradition of spatial stories, which have often taken the form of 
hero’s odysseys, quest myths, or travel narratives’ (2004, p. 122). This process of environmental 
storytelling accounts for a variety of different forms of narrative, as these stories ‘can evoke pre-
existing narrative associations; they can provide a staging ground where narrative events are enacted; 
they may embed narrative information within their mise-en-scène; or they provide resources for 
emergent narratives’ (Jenkins, 2004, p. 123). 
iii. What forms of action and interaction are promoted and subverted within particular 
spaces? 
This final sub-question considers the role of the ludic aspects of video games, with a series of different 
emphases that are used to account for the fact that this is a medium that is specially played: -   
(A) What are the interactions that are afforded to the player? What are interactions are not 
available? What level of agency is afforded to the player? 
(B) What is the player being asked to do in order to advance the game, or bring the game to a 
conclusion? Are there certain actions which are rewarded or, conversely, which are subjected 
to punishment/penalty? 
(C) Do the actions of the player change the surrounding game world in a meaningful way? Do 
different actions have different effects?  
(D) How does the game represent space? What role, if any, is played by maps, objective markers 
or the ‘HUD’ (‘Heads-Up-Display)? What other visual aspects, if any, control the nature of the 
player’s engagement? What is the role of cutscenes and FMVs in the game’s content?  
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It is also important to engage with the broader significance of these structures, as detailed below: -  
Question Two: To what extent do these positions serve an ordering function of relevance to 
international geopolitics? 
Whilst the foremost of these research questions examines how video game space engages in the 
manufacture of geopolitical imaginaries, it is also important to examine what such imaginaries might 
imply politically. Here, I argue that the different forms of militarised space that are encountered within 
video games can be coupled to broader issues of order, power and belonging. As Jason Dittmer 
highlights, ‘popular culture conveys information about places, and also originates in certain contexts 
only to be consumed in various others. In this way, it is doubly geographical, conveying ideas about 
places from one place to another. Identity and power are thus invoked in multiple dimensions. 
Similarly, geopolitics is about the assignment of values to places, and it constructs hierarchies of 
people and places that matter and those that do not’ (2010, pp. xvii-xviii). Video games are similarly 
productive of certain suppositions about the nature of political space and its occupants, answering 
questions such who belongs, who has power, and what the ‘proper’ forms of behaviour are in different 
spaces and places. In offering such an analysis I do, however, echo Shepherd’s observation that ‘no 
cultural artefact lends itself to single, authoritative readings. I cannot claim that this collection of 
chapters represents the definitive readings of the texts with which I engage’ (2013, p. 5). Whilst there 
are many different ways in which spatiality could potentially be ‘read’ in games, this analysis is 
necessarily focused on just a few prevalent forms and the geopolitical imaginaries that are prompted 
by each.  
Question 3: How can video games be used to force ‘reflection’ on the ways in which we 
theorise political spaces? 
Some analyses of popular culture have noted its utility in the theorisation of IR and politics, 
highlighting its potential ability to ‘reveal key dynamics underpinning contemporary politics that might 
not register properly if expressed through the formal conventions of academia or political 
argumentation, even as it is complicit in reproducing them’ (Grayson, 2013, p. 380). This final research 
question offers a similar emphasis, exploring the potential value of studying video games as a means 
by which we can then reflect on the ways in which we theorise space. As Shepherd reflects in her 
analysis of the representation of violence and gender, a politically engaged examination of popular 
culture ‘can attend to the “conceptual” apparatus that structures knowledge in any given society and 
investigate not only how we (think we) know what we (think we) know – and mostly take for granted 
– but also what this means for who ‘we’ are. The categories we use to think with, those categories 
that are frequently assumed to be descriptive, such as ‘white’, ‘female’, ‘heterosexual’, and so on, are 
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constituted politically and are constitutive rather than reflective of identity. That is to say, such 
categories are always normative, rather than purely technical’ (2013, pp. 2-3). Such a perspective is 
not limited to the ways in which we engage with personal identity, but can also be used to think about 
the ways in which we imagine particular spatialities. This can be at a broader level, such as the ways 
in which we think about the Netherlands, or in more technical terms, such as the ways in which we 
conceive of particular forms of space. In undertaking a “reading” of the spatial imaginaries created 
within video games, we are also provided with a means by which to expose some of the theoretical 
suppositions and internal conflicts that are used to create our critical lens. This thesis reflects on three 
key ways in which we understand the political space around us – engaging with the themes of urbanity, 
rurality and temporality (see Chapter Three) – utilizing an engagement with video games as a means 
by which to reflect upon the manner in which these particular spatial forms are commonly theorized.  
1.4 Thesis Structure and Chapter Outlines  
The remainder of this thesis is divided into a further seven chapters, which are structured into two 
broad parts. The first of these sections, comprising of Chapters Two, Three and Four, serves to provide 
the conceptual, theoretical and methodological bases on which this analysis of video game geopolitics 
is grounded. These chapters are produced through an engagement with a diverse range of different 
disciplinary literatures, drawing from fields such as rural geography and critical terrorism studies. In 
the second section, Chapters Five, Six, Seven and Eight offer an examination of some of the different 
ways in which military video gaming has engaged in the construction of particular spaces. These 
chapters not only use different bodies of theory to “read” video games, but also argue that their 
representations of different forms of spaces are co-constitutive of our broader geopolitical 
imaginaries. These chapters also draw upon video games as a means by which to potentially contribute 
to the formation of the critical “lens”, exposing alternative or subverted approaches. The final of these 
chapters will serve as a conclusion, acting to unify this material and identify directions for potential 
future research into this area. 
1.4.1 Chapter Outlines 
Chapter Two focuses on the role of popular culture in the study of International Relations (IR), offering 
an overview of some of the different ways in which the existing literature has conceived of its 
analytical utility. Such a process draws upon the analytical frameworks that are provided by Nexon 
and Neumann (2006), Ruane and James (2008) and Robinson (2015a). These analyses go beyond the 
overly simplistic cause-and-effect framework, also conceptualising popular culture as a “mirror” of 
politics, as constitutive of political phenomena, and as a source of political data. This chapter will also 
aim to demonstrate the utility of critical geopolitics, a field of research which has been stimulated by 
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the recent re-militarisation of politics and the development of a neo-Reaganite foreign policy that is 
focussed on ‘military build-ups and nefarious military doings in foreign places’ (Dalby, 2008a, p. 414). 
Such an approach notably creates room for the study of popular culture as a site at which political 
discourse can circulate. Chapter Three then provides the theoretical basis for the analysis, providing 
an exploration of the different forms of political spatiality that are utilised within the subsequent 
chapters. Here, I focus specifically on the representation of urban and rural spaces, as well as a more 
future-orientated process of spatial representation. This chapter details the common theoretical 
approaches within each of these different areas, opening room for subsequent theoretical 
introspection. In Chapter Four, meanwhile, I begin by discussing some of the prevalent methodological 
strategies that are used in the analysis of popular culture and video games. This process is not limited 
to the literatures from within IR, but also draws from a series of related methodological approaches 
that have originated from within both Literature and Game Studies. Informed by these approaches, I 
outline a series of interrelated foci that account for the role of both the narrative and ludic aspects of 
the video game medium. Chapter Five is the first of the analytical chapters, engaging with the 
formation of different national imaginaries through the representation of different forms of urban 
spatialities. Here, I distinguish between “monumental” and “mundane” forms of space, which are 
shown to result in either collective or more individual modes of spatial attachment. Chapter Six 
engages with the other side of this spatial binary, focussing on the use of rural imaginaries within 
military video games. Developing on the literature discussed in Chapter Three, this chapter examines 
the formation of idyllic, backwoods and wilderness spatialities within video games, exploring the 
consequences of each for the formation of the individual identity. Of a particular prevalence within 
this section is the notion of the “Ghost” identity, which is used to denote the hyper-masculine warrior 
figure that is a commonplace part of popular culture. Chapter Seven concludes the analytical chapters 
of this thesis by exploring the temporal articulation of space, examining the extent to which 
geopolitical identity is produced through both forwards and backwards looking processes of 
mediation. Chapter Eight, finally, will then unify the different foci of these previous chapters. Here, I 
also outline some of the potential approaches that could be used in future research, including the 
examination of other video game genres and the broader surrounding cultural intertext.  
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Chapter Two: Popular Culture, Geopolitics and International Relations 
Introduction  
The previous chapter introduced the focus of this thesis, which examines the representation of 
different forms of space within military-themed video games. This chapter aims to provide a broader 
theoretical context for this endeavour, examining the ways in which both International Relations (IR) 
and related subfields within critical geopolitics have engaged with the study of popular culture. These 
literatures form the basis for my own analysis of the politics of popular culture, demonstrating the 
value of thinking critically about the role of spatializing imaginaries. In support of this objective, the 
remainder of this chapter is subdivided into two sections, as well as a conclusion.  
 The first of these sections examines the ways in which the relationship between popular 
culture and IR theory has been characterised, drawing upon the theoretical frameworks that are 
offered by Nexon and Neumann (2006), Ruane and James (2008), Weldes and Rowley (2015), and 
Robinson (2015a). These approaches suggest several ways in which popular culture can claim 
relevance to the study of political phenomena, highlighting a variety of analytical, conceptual and 
pedagogical functions. In reflecting on the utility of these frameworks for my own analysis, drawing 
upon the research questions outlined in Chapter One, I note the particular utility of the “constitutive” 
and “mirroring” roles that are afforded to popular culture.  
 In the following section, I offer a consideration of the insights that are advanced by critical 
geopolitics. This approach engages with the ways in which particular ideas of space are naturalised, 
suggesting that specific imaginaries are rendered commonsensical through their discursive 
(re)construction with a variety of formal, practical and popular sites (Dittmer & Dodds, 2008, p. 441; 
O'Tuathail, 1999, p. 110). Of a particular relevance for this analysis is the notion of a popular form of 
geopolitics, which examines the role of popular culture in the production of specific understandings 
of political spatiality (see, for example, Dittmer 2010; Sharp, 1993). Popular geopolitics suggests that 
the construction of space, even within cultural fiction, is a manifestation of political power and is 
contributory to the formation of a broader geopolitical imaginary (Dalby, 1991; Dittmer, 2010; 
O'Tuathail & Agnew, 1992; O'Tuathail, 1996). As Dittmer notes, this is a perspective which can be seen 
to share some objectives and methodological approaches with the research that has been undertaken 
within the fields of geography, cultural studies and IR theory: - 
‘Scholars in these fields often produce work that is easily aligned with the project of 
popular geopolitics, even if they would never label themselves as scholars of popular 
geopolitics’ (2010, p. xviii; see also Dodds, 2008; 2015, p.53)  
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Unlike the literature arising within IR theory, which focuses on the relationship between political 
theory and popular culture, critical and popular forms of geopolitical analysis focus more specifically 
on the processes through which the surrounding world is spatialized. This section offers an 
examination of some the ways in which this is believed to be achieved, addressing concepts such as 
the ‘imagined community’ (Anderson, 2006) and banal nationalism (Billig, 1995). These concepts are 
used to demonstrate the utility of popular geopolitics for the engagement with video games that will 
follow within the subsequent chapters of this thesis.   
 Following the completion of these analyses, a brief conclusion then introduces the discussion 
of the different forms of spatiality that are examined within Chapter Three.  
2.1 Popular Culture and World Politics (PCWP) 
Within the social sciences, there has been a ‘tendency to privilege the big, the macro and the 
structural’ (Dittmer, 2015, p. 47). This has been reflected in the mimetic approach to the study of IR 
theory, which can be seen to ‘focus on the mechanisms, institutional arrangements, interests, 
bureaucracies and decision-making practices that constitute relations among states, business and civil 
society actors’ (Grayson, et al., 2009, p. 155; see also Nexon & Neumann, 2006, p. 17; Saunders, 2012; 
Weldes, 2006, pp. 177-178). Such analyses view the examination of these formal, macro-level sites as 
the practice of a ‘real, serious politics’ (Weldes, 2006, p. 178), drawing upon scientific forms of analysis 
in an attempt to access the world “as it is” and free from interpretation. The study of popular culture, 
meanwhile, is viewed as a relative triviality, as it seems to represent ‘ostensibly everything that world 
politics isn’t: fiction, entertainment, illusion [and] distraction’ (Rowley, 2010, p. 309; emphasis in 
original). This approach arguably has had a theoretical impact, evident in the distinction that is drawn 
between “high” and “low” forms of data: -    
‘[A]ppropriate, serious – that is “high” – data are those that circulate among elite 
institutions, be they states, international organisations, multinational corporations 
(MNCs), NGOs, or the media. Eschewed as irrelevant, or worse, as inappropriately 
frivalous are “low data”, particularly from popular or mass culture. Serious analyses of IR 
do not busy themselves with novels, films, television programs, computer games, 
advertising, and the like’ (Weldes, 2006, p. 178; see also Caso & Hamilton, 2015, p. 3; 
Shepherd, 2013, p.2; Weldes & Rowley, 2015, p.2) 
This approach has, however, been undermined by the development of an aesthetically-orientated 
form of scholarship, challenging this distinction between factual and fictive sources of political 
knowledge (Bleiker, 2001). Such an approach highlights the diffusion of representative power, which 
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is traditionally held to reside within “high” forms of discourse, down into more everyday sites 
(Neumann, 2001, p. 604; Weldes, 1999, p. 118). This suggests that, rather than continuing to treat 
popular culture and world politics as separate fields, we might instead think of these as being parts of 
a continuum in which ‘each is implicated in the practices and understandings of the other’ (Grayson, 
et al., 2009, p. 158; see also Clapton and Shepherd, 2017; van Veeren, 2009; Weldes, 2006). Such a 
perspective has prompted an increase in research that explores the connections between popular 
culture and IR theory, including examinations of film (Doucet, 2005; Weber, 2005; 2006), television 
(Buus, 2009; Carpenter, 2012; Weldes, 1999) and popular literature (Blanton, 2013; Nexon & 
Neumann, 2006). These analyses of popular culture have served to broaden the remit of IR, allowing 
the field to ‘move away from stagnant macro-political analyses focussed on systemic relations 
between states to find new referents and highlight new dynamics of power’ (Caso & Hamilton, 2015, 
p. 2; see also Nexon & Neumann, 2006, p. 6; Weldes & Rowley, 2015, p. 24). Nonetheless, it is 
important to remain attentive to the ways in which we might characterise the nature of the 
relationship between politics and popular culture. Kangas (2009), for example, has highlighted some 
limitations in the language that is used to talk about popular culture within the discipline of IR: -  
‘[I]t has become characteristic for the existing literature to simply argue that popular 
culture reflects pre-existing ideas of international or world politics, provides a site for the 
reproduction or contestation of official state narrative, or is becoming increasingly 
intertwined with international relations and world politics. Such a choice of wording 
creates an impression that international relations and popular culture belong to different 
ontological categories’ (Kangas, 2009, p. 318, emphasis in original; see also Grayson, et 
al. 2009, p.155) 
Weldes and Rowley (2015) offer a similar reflection, drawing on their experiences of teaching IR 
through the study of popular culture. Their analysis highlights an apparent “stuckness” in the ways in 
which their students perceived the interrelationship between politics and popular culture, noting the 
lingering assumption that ‘there is/ought to be a simple, perhaps even singular way to grasp how one 
“thing” – popular culture – “relates” (preferably causally) to another “thing” – world politics’ (2015, p. 
12). Whilst such a conceptualisation can be linked to the “disciplining” of knowledge within IR (Clapton 
& Shepherd, 2017, p. 9; Weldes & Rowley, 2015, p. 12), the recent interest in popular culture has 
served to highlight that, ‘from the rise of “celebrity politicians” to the new political economies 
generated by online video games like “World of Warcraft”, something significant is occurring with 
respect to popular culture, world politics and the perceived bandwidth of political possibility… The 
vexing question is precisely what that might be’ (Grayson, et al., 2009, p. 156). Whilst there is no 
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convenient, linear answer to that question, a number of analyses have sought to classify the different 
dimensions of this relationship.  
In introducing analyses of the Harry Potter franchise, Nexon and Neumann distinguish 
between the concepts of (i.) politics and popular culture; (ii.) popular culture as a mirror; (iii.) popular 
culture as a form of data, and (iv.) popular culture as constitutive of politics (2006, pp. 9-17). Weldes 
and Rowley (2015), meanwhile, can also be seen to differentiate between a range of different sites at 
which popular culture and world politics can be seen to interact: (i.) in the use of popular culture by 
the state; (ii.) within the surrounding political economy; (iii) within global flows/practices; (iv) in 
representative, intertextual practices and (v) in consumptive and cultural practices. Some further 
insights are drawn from the works of Ruane and James (2008) and Robinson (2015a), whose analyses 
expand on the potential pedagogical or “mirroring” utility of popular culture. Ruane and James 
examine The Lord of the Rings franchise, arguing that this cultural artefact ‘can be used as a 
pedagogical light to illustrate the historical context and current debate within both problem-solving 
and critical forms of IR theory. In addition, it can be used as a pedagogical mirror to elucidate how 
paradigms provide a form of tunnel vision that both illuminate and restrict understandings of our 
world’ (2008, p. 377). Robinson, meanwhile, differentiates between analyses that serve either ‘theory-
capturing’ or ‘foundation-revealing’ objectives (2015a, pp. 454-455). These approaches not only 
outline popular culture’s significance as a pedagogical resource, but also suggest that cultural artefacts 
can be used to create space for critical reflection and theoretical growth. 
 It is important to note that, whilst these frameworks ‘can contribute to understanding the 
world… they also simplify it, including the actors, the acts and the relationship between them’ (Ruane 
& James, 2008, p. 392; see also Weldes & Rowley, 2015, p.24). As a result, it is important that these 
literatures are not treated as rigid frameworks, and that it is acknowledged that any examination of 
popular culture will likely criss-cross between these different models. Nonetheless, it is notable that 
Nexon and Neumann reflect within their own analysis that ‘the distinction between these models are 
imperfect [but] they have served us well as a starting point for thinking and writing’ (2006, p. 9). The 
various attempts to model the relationship between popular culture and world politics will serve the 
same role within the following subsections of this chapter: - 
2.1.1 Popular Culture as Data 
One approach to the analysis of popular culture is to use the various artefacts as an accessible source 
of data. Such an analysis can, for example, be used to provide ‘evidence about [the] dominant norms, 
ideas, identities or beliefs in a particular state, society or region. This approach draws on insights from 
hermeneutics, forms of content analysis, and ethnography, in which cultural texts and images are seen 
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as storage places for meaning in a particular society' (Nexon & Neumann, 2006, pp. 13-14; see also 
Kangas, 2009, pp. 323-324; Towns & Rumelili, 2006). One example of this process is evident in the 
work of Towns and Rumelili, whose analysis suggests that the Harry Potter franchise can be used to 
‘provide excellent data [with which] to analyse the construction of Swedish and Turkish national 
identities in relation to Others’ (2006, p. 62). Their analysis traverses the themes of gender 
relationships and economics, noting that there is a difference of focus between the Swedish and 
Turkish national consciousness. 
 This approach to the examination of popular culture is not limited to the production of 
evidence about cultural values and norms, however, and can be used in order to generate data about 
political processes. Weldes and Rowley (2015), for example, posit that this interrelationship can be 
extended to examine the contested nature of global flows, whether these are referred to as the 
processes of homogenisation, hybridisation, cultural imperialism or globalisation. They highlight ‘the 
ubiquity of these flows and the recognition that most of what flows is popular cultural… For example, 
Americanisation might be experienced through the pervasiveness of the US TV show Dallas, while 
modernisation might be experienced through the ubiquity of television in general’ (Weldes & Rowley, 
2015, p. 17; emphasis in original). In examining popular culture, we can more easily track the form of 
such ‘flows’, whilst also examining the ways in which they may act to shape the world. Weldes and 
Rowley, for example, not only track the spread of English through popular culture (e.g. within 
advertising and music, as well through encounters with tourists), but also note the extent to which we 
privilege certain forms of speech as the ‘proper’ modes of commerce, finance and governance (2015, 
p. 17). Such an analysis might permit us to challenge conventional understandings of the ways in which 
these ‘flows’ function, undermining their perceived linearity and contemporary temporality. 
 The use of popular culture as a form of data is not limited to any specific approach, and will 
form the basis for other types of analysis. Some of the objectives of these different approaches are 
discussed within the following sections: -    
2.1.2 Politics and Popular Culture 
Nexon and Neumann argue that ‘one of the most straightforward ways to study the intersection 
between popular culture and world politics is to treat popular culture (and its artefacts) as causes and 
effects of the kinds of political processes familiar to any student of international relations’ (2006, p. 
11). This approach suggests not only that popular culture is influenced by political processes, but also 
suggests that artefacts of popular culture can potentially influence the course of political discourse, 
debate and action.  
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One aspect of this interrelationship is evident in the extent to which ‘popular culture is 
influenced by events central to international relations, such as wars, terrorist attacks, political 
movements and the like’ (Nexon & Neumann, 2006, p. 11). We can, for example, see the influence of 
the binary structure of the Cold War within the content of film (Power & Crampton, 2007, p. 194) and 
popular magazines (Sharp, 1993). A similar influence is evident within more contemporary culture, in 
which the lingering discourses of counter-terrorism and the ‘War on Terror’ remain clear thematic 
influences within artefacts of film (e.g. The Kingdom, 2007; The Hurt Locker, 2008; Four Lions, 2010), 
television (e.g. 24, 2001-2010; Homeland, 2011; Quantico, 2015) and a broad ‘raft of redemptive 
military entertainment’ (Payne, 2014, p. 265)’. Many contemporary video games also portray these 
themes, offering visions of proleptic conflict in place of the prior focus on the recreation of historical 
events. Annandale, for example, reflects on the extent to which contemporary video games have 
‘mirrored, tracked and questioned the dreams and nightmares that have shaken the American psyche 
in the wake of 9/11 – dreams and nightmares that have birthed dramatic actions in the areas of 
domestic and foreign policy’ (2010, p. 97). This is not a linear relationship, however, as artefacts of 
popular culture can also act to ‘shape the broader terms of political discourse, influence debates about 
specific politics and galvanise movements’ (Nexon & Neumann, 2006, p. 11). This is particularly 
evident in times of trauma, when popular culture may provide an easy referent. It is, for example, 
often noted that those that witnessed the 9/11 attacks referred to them as being ‘like a movie’ 
(Dittmer, 2010, p. 2). A more complex example of this process is examined by Holland (2011), who 
notes the creation of a non-cannon episode of The West Wing in the weeks that followed these 
attacks. He argues that, ‘as the official narratives and policy of the Bush administration were put 
forward, the West Wing gave credence to the particular and contingent vision they offered, helping 
contextualise the terror threat and naturalise the response that they entailed for the American public’ 
(Holland, 2011, p. 106). 
Popular culture can also be seen to have political effects on the occasions on which its content 
becomes the subject of political, religious or moral controversy. Gemmill and Nexon, for example, 
reflect on the controversy surrounding the portrayal of magic in the Harry Potter franchise, suggesting 
that this fiction is perceived to contribute ‘contribute to a broader assault on Christian beliefs found 
in popular culture and society at large’ (2006, p. 93). As highlighted in Chapter One, there are similar, 
well-documented controversies that surrounded the content of video games. In addition to the 
fervour that surrounds the depiction of violence in the medium, video games are often made the 
subject of political scrutiny for perceived attacks on the national identities of foreign nations, or for a 
disparaging depiction of prominent political figures (see, for example, Gabbatt, 2010). A useful 
reflection on the role of cultural controversies is offered by Hansen (2011), whose analysis examines 
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the publication of cartoon images of the Prophet Muhammad in the Danish newspaper Jyllands-
Posten in 2005. The examination of these cartoons, which sparked international protests, death 
threats and reprisal attacks, prompts Hansen to reflect that visual imagery ‘does not enter into the 
political without being the subject of the debate, or engaging with the discourses already in place’ 
(2011, p. 53). This salient observation emphasises that the mere existence of a cultural artefact, taken 
in isolation, is an insufficient indicator of political potency. Cultural artefacts may enter political 
discussion because of their interaction with pre-existent, externally imposed discursive frameworks, 
rather than the original ‘meaning’ that may have been intended by an author or creator.   
The interrelationship between politics and popular culture may also extend beyond the 
artefact itself, placing popular culture amidst broader political systems. This might, for example, 
include an examination of issues such as marketing, copyright law, and localised media regulations 
(Nexon & Neumann, 2006, p. 11; Street, 1997, p. 6; Weldes & Rowley, 2015). An alternative approach 
is to consider a particular cultural artefact as a representative microsystem, examining the myriad of 
different political processes that are brought to bear upon it. Weldes and Rowley outline some of the 
numerous political dimensions to the manufacture of ‘sneakers’, concluding that a focus on this 
artefact ‘allows us to get at multiple dynamic intersections of (gendered) economics, politics and 
popular culture’ (2015, p. 16). 
This conceptualisation of a cause-and-effect relationship is not without critical issues. Kangas, 
for example, highlights that whilst this framework offers a compelling means by which to identify the 
tangible “effects” of this interrelationship, it also ‘reduces popular culture to a simple trigger of 
political events. The content of artefacts is left with little attention. Either specific products of popular 
culture are just assumed to set off particular international relations events, or events in international 
relations are argued to prompt the production of specific artefacts. The question over the complex 
ways in which popular culture actually comes to produce effects is left with little elaboration’ (2009, 
p. 323). Whilst it is unclear whether the different aspects of this interrelationship can ever be fully 
disaggregated, some of the other frameworks examined within this section can be seen to explore 
some other potential linkages.  
2.1.3 Popular Culture as Reflective  
As Weldes and Rowley note, our conceptualisation of the relationship between popular culture and 
world politics ‘often hinges on a “reflection” metaphor, in which popular culture (whether news 
media, film or TV) is interrogated on (and frequently judged by) the extent to which it mirrors the real 
world’ (2015, p. 18). This conceptualisation implies an authentic, mimetic process of replication, 
through which popular culture potentially ‘captures and reflects back some essential or important 
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features or dynamics of international relations and world politics’ (Kangas, 2009, p. 323). This has 
implications for the study of IR theory: - 
‘Using popular culture in our teaching and research, we can illuminate different 
representations; produce different forms of knowledge about the issues, actors, events 
and theories that we seek to understand and explain; and recognise different claims to 
knowledge in the academic study of IR. We can stop requiring students to leave what 
they know about the international from popular culture and other sites of analysis that 
remain marginalised in the discipline ‘at the door’, and together learn new ways of seeing 
world politics, across the largely arbitrary disciplinary divides and in the spaces between’ 
(Clapton & Shepherd, 2017, p. 15) 
Both Ruane and James (2008) and Robinson (2015a) differentiate between the illustrative, 
pedagogical value of popular culture and its use in identifying and challenging our theoretical 
assumptions. Whilst Rune and James (2008) differentiate between these uses of popular culture as, 
respectively, a “light” and a “mirror”, Robinson (2015a) distinguishes between “theory-capturing” and 
“foundation-revealing” analytical approaches.  
Popular Culture as ‘Theory-Capturing’/as a ‘Light’ 
As Blanton notes, the study of popular culture is now afforded a significance as ‘an undeveloped, 
though potentially fruitful vein of pedagogy. Indeed, the ready availability of engaging and amusing 
resources, ranging from horror and fantasy films to satirical sources such as The Daily Show and The 
Onion, provides great opportunities for making our classrooms engaging and relevant to new 
generations of students’ (2013, pp. 12-13; see also Grayson, et al., 2009, p. 156; Ruane & James, 2008, 
p.392). The accessible nature of popular culture has prompted pedagogically-orientated analyses of a 
wide variety of cultural artefacts, including examinations of film (Engert & Spencer, 2009; Giglio, 2005; 
Gregg, 1998; Weber, 2005), television (Beavers, 2002; Carpenter, 2012; Drezner, 2011b; Salter, 2012; 
Weldes, 2003), and literature (Blanton, 2013; Nexon & Neumann, 2006; Ruane & James, 2008). 
Utilised in such a way, artefacts of popular culture provide an analogy for our own world and permit 
us to visualise the theories of IR more clearly. Ruane and James, for example, utilise The Lord of the 
Rings in their analysis of IR theory, noting that ‘each approach has a different worldview, with different 
ontological, epistemological, and normative assumptions, and as such can be illustrated by specific 
characters or races’ (2008, p. 379). Another prominent body of research has aimed to capitalise on 
the resurgent cultural interest in zombies as a means by which to illustrate the various theories of IR 
in an engaging and accessible manner (see, for example, Blanton, 2013; Drezner, 2011a; Hall, 2011; 
Hannah & Wilkinson, 2016). This “zombie IR” centres on the extent to which ‘the transnational 
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challenge that an outbreak of the undead poses is very much akin to the threat of the “here and now” 
– terrorism, climate change, infectious disease’ (Hannah and Wilkinson, 2016, p.6; see also Blanton, 
2013, p. 9). Drezner, for example, utilises a hypothetical zombie outbreak in order to examine ‘what 
the different theories of international relations predict would happen if the dead began to rise from 
the grave and feast upon the living’ (2011a, p. 1). Blanton, meanwhile, draws upon World War Z: an 
Oral History of the Zombie Wars (Brooks, 2006) as an exaggerated analogy for the political 
characteristics of the world around us: -  
‘China represses news of the outbreak and virtually collapses, Russia practices similar 
brutality and becomes a religious/nationalist state, Israel becomes a zombie-free garrison 
state, Japan finds itself overrun with zombies and evacuates its entire population, and 
North Korea goes (literally) underground’ (Blanton, 2013, p. 5) 
This zombified, fictional world is used to explore issues of consequence to IR, including the role of fear 
and panic in the Iran-Pakistan conflict (2013, p. 3), the extent of one’s moral responsibilities in times 
of trauma (2013, pp. 4-5), and the formation of the zombie identity as a proxy for the political Other   
(2013, p. 8). This approach to the study of popular culture is, however, potentially problematic, as it 
‘maintains disciplinary boundaries unchallenged, affirming current analytical priorities surrounding 
nationhood, gender and suchlike, and undermines our potential for critical thought’ (Hannah & 
Wilkinson, 2016, p. 6; see also Clapton & Shepherd, 2017, p. 6). This means that it is increasingly 
desirable to go beyond this analogical use of popular culture, using these artefacts in order to disturb 
the bounded, “disciplined” presentations of knowledge that are common in IR analyses (see, for 
example, Clapton & Shepherd, 2017, p.15; Dixit, 2012, p.290; Grayson, et al., 2009, p.156; Hannah & 
Wilkinson, 2016, p.6; Ruane and James, 2008, p.378). This approach allows us to expose the core 
assumptions of the various IR theories to a closer scrutiny, potentially facilitating access to something 
that may be absent, taken-for-granted, or otherwise inaccessible. Such a perspective is described by 
Ruane and James as the use of popular culture as a “mirror”, with the analysis of cultural artefacts 
used to allow us to ‘reflect on our theoretical and pedagogical assumptions’ (2008, p. 388). Robinson, 
meanwhile, refers to a “foundation-revealing” form of analysis within which cultural artefacts are used 
‘in order to open up gaps and reveal the foundation upon which [the] theory is based’ (2015a, p. 454). 
Such a perspective is explored in more detail below: -  
Popular Culture as “Foundation Revealing”/as a ‘Mirror’ 
The previous section highlighted the increasing role of popular culture in pedagogical practices, noting 
that cultural artefacts – used as forms of political analogy – can mediate IR theory in a more engaging 
manner than conventional approaches. The analysis of cultural artefacts can, however, also create a 
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level of ontological displacement, which allows us to expose bias or challenge the preconceived, 
“common-sense” ways in which we are accustomed to seeing the world around us (Juneau & 
Sucharov, 2010, p. 173; Nexon & Neumann, 2006, p. 12). Such engagements can provide space for 
theoretical inspiration, introspection and innovation, often transgressing otherwise rigid disciplinary 
boundaries, meaning that there is the potential for the generation of new terminologies or alternative 
theoretical approaches to real-world issues (Clapton & Shepherd, 2017, p. 15; Nexon & Neumann, 
2006, p. 11). We can also challenge the foundations of common theoretical concepts, utilising analyses 
of popular culture in order to ‘shed light on that which has been previously marginalised or hidden, 
including those things that we in the discipline often take for granted’ (Clapton & Shepherd, 2017, p. 
15). Dixit (2012), for example, examines the extent to which the Doctor Who television series can be 
used in order to destabilise the conventional ways of understanding difference and danger within IR. 
Her analysis aims to demonstrate the extent to which ‘popular culture can play a role in alternative 
ways of imagining our relations with those considered different or alien, rather than seeing them as 
threats to be eliminated’ (Dixit, 2012, p. 290). She observes that whilst the perceived sources of 
“danger” are commonly assumed to be external to the core body politic – providing targets for the 
practices of state securitisation – the science-fiction series instead places an outside “Other” as its 
central protagonist. Whilst the earth is shown to depend on the protection of this (literal, and 
figurative) “alien” figure, the conventional sites associated with state securitisation – including the 
government, police force and the army – are often shown to be inept, ill-equipped or corrupt. Such a 
depiction is used to invite closer scrutiny of the ways in which we construct the notions of “safe” and 
“threatening” identities, suggesting that a willingness to engage with those deemed to be ”different” 
could prove to be transformative of the ways in which we conceptualise security: -   
‘By acknowledging insecurity is not external to the body politic of the state, Doctor Who 
acknowledges that the state (and individual) selves are actually constituted in relations 
with those considered different and alien. Reviewing self-other encounters from the 
perspective of the alien “others”… allows us to note different meanings of security and 
danger when seen from an alien (often marginalised) standpoint’ (Dixit, 2012, p. 303) 
The show also serves to undermine the externalisation of the “threat”, through the transformation of 
everyday objects into sources of insecurity. These adversaries – which include robotic store Santa 
Clauses and animated store mannequins – serve to demonstrate ‘how danger may be present in 
everyday life and not just during crises or exceptional situations, which is a view of (in)security that 
feminist and postcolonial IR scholars have emphasized’ (Dixit, 2012, pp. 296-297).  Such analyses of 
popular culture have not been limited to the marshalling of our understandings of difference. Salter 
(2012), for example, utilises the reality-television show Survivor in order to highlight the role of 
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emotion in the Prisoner’s Dilemma. Deviating from the common preoccupation with supposedly 
rational decision-making processes, he suggests that IR – like Survivor – can be understood as a social 
game. He notes that the show’s contestants ‘voted in anger, frustration, upset, admiration, and love’ 
(2012, p. 370), suggesting that the practice of IR ought to incorporate an analysis of such emotion in 
the pursuit of better critical practices.  
 Other analyses have emphasised the extent to which the otherwise marginalised role of 
gender in world politics can be exposed through the study of artefacts of popular culture, such as Buffy 
the Vampire Slayer, Firefly and Game of Thrones (see, for example, Clapton & Shepherd, 2017; Ruane 
& James, 2008). Clapton and Shepherd, for example, suggest that the Game of Thrones television 
series ‘provides us with representations of the fundamental function of gendered logics in the 
processes by which authority and power are constituted, performed and reproduced’ (2017, p. 14). 
These include the overt masculinisation of warfare through the violation of female and feminised 
bodies (pp. 11, 13-14), as well as the extent to which the acquisition of political power by women 
necessitates the internalisation of masculinising traits of confidence, ferocity and the willingness to 
utilise violence (pp. 12-13).  
Ruane and James (2008, p. 388) meanwhile, suggest that a focus on The Lord of the Rings can 
be used to facilitate a closer exploration of the role of gender, race, sexuality, class or development in 
world politics, moving the focus away from a more conventional engagement with elite or 
bureaucratic interests: -  
‘[M]ost IR approaches illustrated by male characters in LOTR (Elves, Orcs, Humans, 
Hobbits, and Dwarves) prioritise the problems of “states” as the most important, whereas 
feminist approaches represented by female characters in LOTR prioritise the individual 
and collective problems of women and other non-dominant groups as both most 
important and inadequately addressed by “state” security’ (Ruane & James, 2008, p. 389)  
These analyses serve to highlight the limitations of conventional theoretical approaches, exposing 
where the disciplining of knowledge may act to conceal specific groups or approaches. As Ruane and 
James note, ‘the world is not always perfectly explained by our theories, and there are frequently 
ambiguities and rough edges that exist and must be studied’ (2008, p. 388). Popular culture can be 
used to call attention to these inconsistencies, allowing us to learn from the ways in which different 
aspects of IR theory may conflict or fail to inform.  
2.1.4 Popular Culture as Constitutive  
Whilst artefacts of popular culture have often sought to represent the world in a plausible manner, 
these imaginaries have not always been accepted as a part of politics. Indeed, as Muller notes, ‘the 
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pages of Tom Clancy’s (1996) Executive Orders tell of civilian aircraft being used as weapons, and 
Edward Zwick’s (1998) film The Siege places suicide bombers on the streets of New York City. These 
prescient accounts from 1990s popular culture were widely read, viewed – and dismissed, if regarded 
at all, as simply entertainment’ (2008, p. 201). In conceptualising popular culture as constitutive of 
politics, however, we can relax the boundaries between the first and second order forms of 
representation, examining the ‘role of shared understandings, rules, norms and codes of 
interpretation as constraining and enabling factors of international relations’ (Kangas, 2009, p. 323; 
see also Muller, 2008, p.200; van Veeren, 2009, p.365). This perspective invites a focus on the 
intersections between our cultural fictions and the broader ‘political myths’ (Weber, 2005) or 
‘founding stories’ (Kangas, 2009, p. 324) that influence our day-to-day conceptualisations of the world 
around us. Nexon and Neumann (2006, p. 17) highlight four particular ways in which popular culture 
can be seen to have a constitutive effect on international politics, detailing determining, informing, 
enabling and naturalising influences. 
  Popular culture is described as having had a determining influence when it is used by 
individuals to fill in the gaps in their own knowledge, acting as a referent for decision-making on the 
occasions when no other information about a given situation is available. Nexon and Neumann (2006, 
pp. 17-18) acknowledge that there is little real-world evidence of pure determining effects, offering 
only the apparent ties between elite decision-making practices during the 1960s Congo crisis and the 
representations of the region that are contained within cultural artefacts such as Tarzan and Tintin.  
A focus on the informing influence of popular culture, meanwhile, suggests that these 
artefacts can have an ‘effect on political thought or action, by priming societies to think in specific 
ways about social categories such as robots or space travel’ (Carpenter, 2016, p. 56). Here, popular 
culture is understood to offer a particular frame through which the consumer can see the world. This 
approach has, for example, been particularly evident in discussions of the relationship between the 
NASA space programme and televised science-fiction series (see Chapter One). Although such 
representations are argued to be more widespread, it remains difficult to disaggregate the specific 
impact of popular culture from other potential influences (Carpenter, 2016, p. 57; Nexon & Neumann, 
2006, p. 18).  
The concept of enabling effects refers to the familiar narrative forms that are co-opted by 
politicians in order to generate a relatable narrative or provide strength for a political policy 
(Carpenter, 2016, p. 56; Nexon & Neumann, 2006, pp. 18-19). Van Zoonen, for example, reflects on 
the likening of politics to television soap operas, concluding that the metaphor has been deployed to 
signify scandal, conflict and incompetence (2005, pp. 25-28). Dodds (2008a), meanwhile, highlights 
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the prolific use of science-fiction and action film imagery by the former US-Presidents Ronald Reagan 
and George W. Bush: -  
‘One well-known example would be the so-called ‘Top-Gun’ moment when [George W. 
Bush] was a passenger on a plane that landed on the USS Abraham Lincoln in 2003… 
Bush’s naval outfit and flying performance was interpreted as a deliberate attempt to 
align the President with the armed forces and to use his announcement that “major 
combat operations in Iraq have ended” to convey the impression that the USA was in 
control of its own destiny once again’ (2008a, pp. 478-489) 
The final constitutive model, which addresses naturalising effects, suggests that popular culture can 
be used in order to make ‘a particular way of looking at the world appear to be a part of the natural 
order, just the way things are, and hence difficult to argue against’ (Nexon & Neumann, 2006, p. 19). 
The television series 24 (2001-2010), for example, is argued to have had implications for the ways in 
which we perceive acts of terrorism and extra-legal force, evoking ‘a Schmittian understanding of 
politics: that “authentic” politics is a fatal confrontation between friend and enemy, and is 
consequently beyond legal regulation. Though the packaging of 24 may be new and exciting, the 
underlying message remains the same – that America is open, innocent, and law-abiding, but that 
extra-legal force is needed to maintain these qualities when confronted by an existential threat’ (van 
Veeren, 2009, pp. 362-362).  
Other analyses have highlighted similar connections between popular culture and hegemonic 
political narratives. De Goede, for example, emphasises the inflated role of the “sleeper-cell” narrative 
within popular, political and legal discourse, describing this as ‘a juridical fiction that enables 
unprecedented legal action to be taken’ (2008, p. 162). Muller (2008), meanwhile, focusses on the 
film Children of Men (2006) and the novel Surveillance, arguing that these cultural artefacts act to 
engender particular perspectives on contemporary risk management and the emergence of the 
biometric state.  
2.1.5 Importing IR Frameworks 
Whilst the above frameworks provide a useful means by which to think about the interrelationship 
between popular culture and world politics, they also expose that there is no one, single “correct” way 
in which to interpret a popular cultural text and highlight that each individual analysis will utilise the 
study of popular culture for specific analytical ends (Carpenter, 2016; Shepherd, 2013, p. 5). To 
conclude this subsection, therefore, I focus on the consequences of the above approaches for my own 
engagement with video game space. Whilst an exhaustive analysis of video game space would 
necessitate an examination of each of these different interactions (Robinson, 2015a, p. 453; Weldes, 
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1999, p. 122), I offer a narrower focus that correlates with the objectives of this particular 
engagement. Building on the research questions that are outlined in Chapter One, this thesis will pay 
particular attention to the ‘constitutive’ (Nexon & Neumann, 2006, p. 17) and the reflective, 
‘mirroring’ (Ruane & James, 2008, pp. 388-392) functions of popular culture. 
 As outlined earlier in this chapter, the foremost of these perspectives – the notion of popular 
culture as ‘constitutive’ of politics – focuses, in part, on the ways in which the production and 
dissemination of cultural artefacts can serve to normalise specific ideas about global spaces. Indeed, 
as Nexon argues, ‘popular culture seldom has a direct effect on international politics. Instead, it 
supplies common referents that shape our understanding of events; its images, narratives and ideas 
intrude into the “common sense” of its consumers’ (2011). This approach correlates with two of the 
research questions that are outline in Chapter One, which engage specifically with the production and 
organisation of supposedly commonsensical geo-spatial orders: -  
Question One: In what ways does the simulation of space in console military video games 
serve to create specific geopolitical imaginaries?  
Question Two: To what extent do these positions serve an ordering function of relevance 
to international geopolitics? 
In this thesis, I argue that the simulation of political space within video games facilitates specific 
understandings of political identity and national geography that appear to be natural and authentic. 
As Neumann reflects, ‘geography is not simply something that exists outside of the signs we use to 
communicate about it. The techniques we use to categorise space – maps being a key example – and 
the languages we use to discuss it – for example, dividing space into “regions” – are inseparable parts 
of our experience of space’ (2006, pp. 157-158). The content of military-themed video games provides 
one key site, replete with visual, aural and ludic languages, at which political spaces are discursively 
constructed and reconstructed. This is achieved through the simulation of spaces that are instinctively 
familiar (see, for example, Chapter Five on the role of the suburban dwellingscapes) or a hazard (see, 
for example, Chapter Six on the role of the wilderness). Each of these acts of interpretation is a 
recirculation of familiar spatial tropes as “knowledge” of the nature of the world around us. In Call of 
Duty: Ghosts (2013), for example, entry into peripheral, rural space become analogous for the ‘loss’ 
of one’s national identity and the commensurate sense of civilised Selfhood. 
 These research foci will also benefit from a consideration of the contribution of critical and 
popular forms of geopolitics, subfields of political geography which have sought to destabilise the 
formation of our taken-for-granted conceptualisations of space and place. Popular geopolitics, like the 
critical approaches to IR theory, offers an analytical perspective which decentres the role of the state 
39 
 
and points to the manifestation of political power within a range of banal, quotidian products and 
practices of consumption (see, for example, Sharp, 1993 on The Reader’s Digest magazine). This 
literature is discussed in more detailed within the following subsection.  
 Within this analysis of popular culture, I also echo the suggestion that ‘it is interesting to 
explore not only the specific lessons that can be learned from interrogating the form of 
representational practice that it employs, but also the more general possibilities that it can engender 
new ways of thinking about popular culture, global politics and the discipline of IR’ (Clapton & 
Shepherd, 2017, pp. 5-6; see also Dixit, 2012; Hannah & Wilkinson, 2016). As such this analysis will 
also engage with some of the different ways in which video games can force “reflection” on the ways 
in which we theorise the nature of our surrounding political spaces: -  
Question Three: How can video games be used to force ‘reflection’ on the ways in which 
we theorise political spaces? 
As detailed within this chapter, the idea that popular culture is “reflective” of politics has two primary 
practical applications – its use as a “light” and its use as a “mirror” (Ruane & James, 2008). These ideas 
are influential in conceptualising the nature of the relationship between video games and popular 
culture within this thesis. In treating video games as a “light”, this thesis will examine the ways in 
which the medium can be used, quite literally, in order to “illuminate” the player’s understanding of 
particular forms of theory. Chapter Five for example, which centres on the representation of national 
spaces in video games, will use the medium to demonstrate the extent to which a sense of belonging 
is reproduced through the recreation of familiar urban landscapes.  
 The use of popular culture as a “mirror”, meanwhile, centres on the use of these video games 
as a means by which to access hidden or subverted aspects of the surrounding theory. This has 
potential consequences for the ways in which we engage in the production of spatial and political 
knowledges, as concepts such as “national”, “rural” and “temporal” can be shown to be culturally and 
politically constructed. These concepts are not merely the product of theory, but are also continually 
produced and reproduced in one’s engagement with video games – through the characters that we 
play and encounter, through the places that we experience, and through the actions that we are 
expected to take.  
As a result, this analysis of video game space does not simply isolate different forms of spatial 
representation, but also examines the ways in which these games may potentially influence the nature 
of our critical lens. Some pertinent critical approaches are discussed in Chapter Three, which engages 
with the literatures pertaining to the creation of urban, rural and temporal spatialities. In the following 
subsection, however, I focus on the contribution of geopolitics to this analytical process: -    
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2.2 Geopolitics 
Since the mid-1970s, the terminologies that are associated with “geopolitics” have enjoyed a steady 
resurgence in use (Mamadouh, 1998, p. 137; Mamadouh & Dijkink, 2006, p. 350). These concepts have 
attained a particularly privileged status within the media, where they are used as a ‘discursive resource 
[that is] able to generate insights into the geographical and resource dimensions of world politics’ 
(Dittmer & Dodds, 2008, p. 498). For O’Tuathail, this is because the evocation of geopolitics ‘promises 
uncanny clarity and insight in a complex world. It actively closes down an openness to the geographical 
diversity of the world and represses questioning and difference’ (1999, p. 113). Dittmer offers a similar 
reflection, noting that the various terminologies of geopolitics offer a ‘veneer of tremendous 
explanatory power… it sounds so helpful, so powerful – like a key opening a lock. It seems like 
understanding geopolitics could lead to understanding the world’ (2010, p. 2).  Despite this renewed 
popularity, it is notable there is no single definition of the concept of “geopolitics” that would be 
recognisable to the myriad of different disciplines that claim to engage in such research (Kelly, 2006, 
p. 26; Mamadouh, 2010, p. 320). Of a particular value here, however, is the distinction between the 
neoclassical and critical approaches to geopolitical analysis. As Bassin surmises, ‘the two faces of 
contemporary geopolitics are clear. The renaissance of geopolitics has involved a return to the 
traditional modes and spirit of classical geopolitics, paradoxically at the very same time that it has 
produced a radically different alternative to them in the form of “critical” geopolitics’ (2004, p. 624). 
Where a revived, neoclassical form of geopolitics aims to capture the ‘reality’ of the global political 
system, focussing on the analysis of high political discourse, an emergent “critical” form of analysis 
instead suggests that our understandings of spatiality are constructed. Whilst this thesis engages 
primarily with this later perspective, as it has created space for the analysis of popular culture, it must 
be acknowledged that this approach cannot be considered in isolation from that which it has sought 
to critique (Bassin, 2004, p. 625; Kelly, 2006, pp. 27-28). In order to properly introduce the role of 
critical and popular form of geopolitical analysis, it is necessary to begin by more broadly examining 
the roots of geopolitical analysis and the theoretical assumptions that have been associated with its 
different phases: -   
2.2.1 Classical Geopolitics  
The classical conceptualisation of ‘geopolitics’ – or ‘Geopolitik’ in its original Germanic form – saw 
formal inception in the late-1890s, discussed by Kjellén alongside the notions of demopolitik, 
ekonomipolitik, sociopolitik and kratopolitik (Dittmer, 2010, p. 3; Mamadouh, 1998, p. 237). The term 
was used to emphasise the key characteristics of the state, including its ‘topopolitik’ (the location of a 
state in relation to other states), ‘morphopolitik’ (the form of the territory within a state) and 
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‘physiopolitik’ (the surface and physical characteristics of this particular territory). The concept of 
‘Geopolitik’ held an implied double-meaning, used to refer to both the existence of these 
characteristics and the act of studying these characteristics (Mamadouh, 1998, p. 237). Noting the 
subsequent interest in a biological theory of the state, key to German geography in the early 1900s, 
Mamadouh surmises that ‘the basic elements of the classical geopolitical are resumed in a few words: 
the state is conceived of as a living organism, therefore borders are conceived as flexible (they change 
in the course of the ‘life’ of a state, in other words a state enlarges its territory when its strengths are 
growing at the expense of older states in decline); finally, following social Darwinism, the evolution of 
the political organism is determined by its environment’ (1998, p. 238).  
The proponents of this classical geopolitics take on a modernist approach, one which aims to 
objectively represent ‘the world as it is, not being intent upon radical revision, but instead focussing 
upon simplifying reality by examining facts neutrally and assembling these where possible into theory 
as their method for facilitating reform’ (Kelly, 2006, pp. 32-33). It does not aim to judge the prevailing 
institutions and power relations that characterise international politics, but seeks instead to resolve 
the problems that occur within them (Kelly, 2006, p. 34). To this end, it is assumed that there is a 
single, pre-existing world with fixed spatial parameters that exists ‘out there’, separate from the 
observer, which can be objectively captured and reported upon (Kelly, 2006, pp. 34-37). This approach 
has been evoked as an aid to the practice of statecraft, facilitating the division of the world into zones 
of innate identity and difference. It is an approach which allows for the creation of ‘timeless truths’ 
(O'Tuathail, 1999, p. 113) about the world around us, as part of a master narrative which ‘contains not 
only details of who belongs to the nation, but also what belonging means and what the relationship is 
between those who belong and those who do not’ (Dittmer, 2007, p. 405; see also Dittmer, 2005, 
p.626; 2010, p.16). It places a value on ‘high’ political discourses, offering ‘the illusion that these ‘high 
elite cultures provide a realistic, natural view of what is real’ (Rech, 2012, p. 52). This process of 
spatialisation identifies a clear Other, facilitating the creation of policy responses that are rendered 
‘common-sense’: -   
‘[Geopolitics] takes the existing power structures for granted and works within these to 
provide conceptualisation and advice to foreign policy decision-makers. Its dominant 
modes of narrative are declarative (‘this is how the world is’) and then imperative (‘this 
is what we must do’). ‘Is’ and ‘we’ mark its commitment to, on the one hand, a 
transparent and objectified world and, on the other hand, to a particular geographically 
bounded community and its cultural/political version of the truth of that world. Its 
enduring 'plot' is the global balance of power and the future of strategic advantage in an 
anarchic world’ (O'Tuathail, 1999, p. 107; see also O’Tuathail & Agnew, 1992, p.192) 
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Epistemologically, the proponents of classical geopolitics offer a positivist approach. They begin from 
‘the premise that the methodologies of the natural sciences can be applied to social sciences, that 
value-free or objective results will derive from these and other methodologies, and that humans 
including our leaders will usually act according to the expected utility or reward in selecting the most 
appropriate policies and actions’ (Kelly, 2006, p. 34). As it is believed to be rational to assume that 
leaders would act in the interests of the state, it is assumed that we can bypass the level of the 
individual decision-makers and instead focus upon the analysis of international and global “realities” 
(Kelly, 2006, p. 31). Such an approach rendered geopolitics prone to ideological capture, including an 
association with the radical ideologies of Nazism and National Socialism, as it allowed these extremist 
groups to advance their ideology as a natural, immutable truth (Bassin, 2004, p. 621; Dittmer, 2010, 
p. 4; Dittmer & Dodds, 2008, pp. 339-340). Because of this association, geopolitics largely disappeared 
from academic and public discourse following the end of the Second World War. 
 The eventual rehabilitation of geopolitics was prompted both by a strategic shift in NATO in 
the 1970s, which emphasised the importance of Europe taking an active role in the defence of its own 
border, as well as the sudden decline of the Soviet bloc and reunification of Germany (Bassin, 2004, 
pp. 621-624). The concept of geopolitics - perceived as vital to understanding this changing world - 
began to permeate back into academic and political parlance, resulting in the formation of the 
International Institute of Geopolitics in 1982 and the publication of the accompanying journal 
Geopolitique. This revived, neoclassical form of geopolitics marks a return to the conceptual categories 
of the prior, classical form and, as a result, can be seen to correspond to ‘what the layman expects 
geopolitics to be. It is about the effects of geographical location and other geographical features on 
the foreign policy of a state and its relations with other states. It is also concerned with the strategic 
value of geographical factors (resources, access to the sea, etc.)’ (Mamadouh, 1998, p. 238; see also 
Bassin, 2004, p. 625). Aligned with a right-leaning politics, this neoclassical geopolitics denies that 
space is a malleable or discursive subject and instead suggests that meaning ‘inheres in it as an 
essential quality, and [that] the task of geopolitics is precisely to identify and analyse it’ (Bassin, 2004, 
p. 621). This approach contrasts starkly with that of critical geopolitics, a poststructuralist intervention 
that began in the 1980s. Although it is to be acknowledged that ‘there is not one meaning… that all 
advocates of a “new” or “critical” geopolitics would share’ (Agnew, 2004, p. 637), the following section 
aims to highlight some common areas of critical concern within this competing approach: -  
2.2.2 Critical Geopolitics 
Whilst proponents of a classical form of geopolitics have sought to provide an objective mediation of 
political spatiality, critical geopolitics ‘interrogates how and why we have come to think of the world 
(or parts of it) in a certain way’ (Dittmer, 2010, p. 11). This approach contests the appearance of 
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objectivity, as well as the ascription of supposedly commonsensical spatial characteristics to particular 
places, proposing instead that the process of “geo-graphing” or “writing” global space should be 
considered to be an interpretative, subjective act of political power (Bassin, 2004, p.620; Dalby, 1991; 
Dittmer, 2010, p.11; Kelly, 2006, p.36; O’Loughlin et al. 2004, p.5; O’Tuathail, 1996, p.61). Geopolitics, 
understood in such a way, does not merely provide the setting within which international politics can 
occur, but is also considered to be a ubiquitous part of the international political process in its own 
right: -    
‘Geopolitical reasoning begins at a very simple level and is a pervasive part of the practice 
of international relations. It is an innately political process of representation by which the 
intellectuals of statecraft designate the world and ‘fill’ it with certain dramas, subjects, 
histories and dilemmas. All statespersons engage in the practice; it is one of the norms of 
the world political community’ (O'Tuathail & Agnew, 1992, p. 194) 
Political space is not perceived as a real and actually-existing entity within critical geopolitics, but 
instead ‘becomes a discursive subject, and whatever meaning or significance it may possess is not 
inherent or a priori, but is projected onto it… by political or geopolitical discourse’ (Bassin, 2004, p. 
621; see also Bohland, 2013, p. 98; Sharp, 1993, p.492). Critical geopolitics has made this discourse 
the object of study, aiming to denaturalise the construction and projection of power that occurs within 
a variety of otherwise taken-for-granted framings of space and place (Sharp, 1993, pp. 492-493). 
Critical geopolitical analysis identifies a myriad of different sites at which our “knowledge” of the 
surrounding world can be seen to be produced, ranging ‘from the classroom to the living-room, the 
newspaper office to the film studio, [and] the pulpit to the presidential office’ (O'Tuathail & Agnew, 
1992, pp. 194-195). Initially, critical forms of analyses focused primarily on two particular sites for the 
circulation of geopolitical logics, juxtaposing a “formal” form of geopolitics against a “practical” variety 
(see, for example, O'Tuathail & Agnew, 1992). The concept of a formal geopolitics is used in reference 
to ‘the construction, production and circulation of geopolitical theories and perspectives produced by 
so-called intellectuals of statecraft’ (Dittmer & Dodds, 2008, p. 441). The term is applied to both the 
classical forms of geopolitical analysis, discussed earlier in this chapter, as well as the work of other 
academics and government think tanks (Dittmer, 2010, p. 13). Practical geopolitics, in contrast, ‘is 
concerned with the geographical politics involved in the everyday practices of foreign policy. It 
addresses how common geographical understandings and perceptions enframe foreign policy 
conceptualisation and decision-making’ (O'Tuathail, 1999, p. 110; see also O'Tuathail & Agnew, 1992, 
p.194). This approach might, for example, consider the particular spatial assumptions that underpin 
the ways in which political leaders communicate information to the electorate. Dalby (2007), for 
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example, examines the spatial discourse of the War on Terror, highlighting the economic integration 
of peripheral global spaces.  
 Whilst the study of the geopolitics of popular culture met with some initial criticism (see, for 
example, O'Tuathail, 1996, p. 95), subsequent analyses have nonetheless begun to demonstrate a role 
for popular culture that extends beyond the simple, mimetic replication of the supposed “reality” of 
international politics. Whilst IR has focussed primarily on the intersections between popular culture 
and political theory, this “popular geopolitics” instead focuses on the role of popular culture in the 
spatialisation of political identity and our prevailing geopolitical imaginaries. Cultural products and 
practices are not perceived to be value-neutral in nature, but rather are assumed to embed specific 
presentations of social values and political ideas within a spatialized, oppositional framework.  
One particularly important intervention within popular geopolitics is the work of Joanne Sharp 
(1993; 1996; 2000), whose analyses focus on the role of The Reader’s Digest in the creation of a 
spatialized discourse of American Cold War identity. She suggests that the practices of spatial 
representation that are contained within the magazine ‘should be regarded as part of a Gramscian 
notion of hegemony – which explains, legitimises and at times challenges the dominant understanding 
by pulling it through the lens of popular discourse’ (Sharp, 1993, p. 493). Such an approach serves to 
challenge the prior exclusion of cultural institutions and practices, displacing the centrality of political 
elites and academics within meaning-making processes (Sharp, 1993, p. 493; 1996, pp. 557-558). She 
also challenges the suggestion that popular culture simply serves to reproduce the perspectives of the 
political elite, suggesting that these elite explanations must first appeal to the cultural values and 
discourses that are already in circulation if they are to connect with the lived realities of the 
consumer:-  
‘Geopolitics pulls out themes learned in school and reproduced in the media. The media 
gain acceptance and power because they are generally perceived as providing knowledge 
of the world: geopoliticians cannot ignore it. If geopolitics were to be created 
independently of the lived reality of its readership, it would face an insurmountable crisis 
of representation’ (Sharp, 1993, p. 493) 
The scope of popular geopolitics has now broadened, including analyses of a range of films (Dodds, 
2008; Dodds & Kirby, 2014; Power & Crampton, 2007); comic books and cartoons (Dittmer, 2005; 
Dodds, 1998), and television series (Buzan, 2010; Glynn & Cupples, 2015). These analyses address a 
variety of different ways in which our understandings of political space are structured. Dittmer, for 
example, focusses on the Captain America comics, examining the ways in which the series engages in 
the construction of geopolitical “reality” through its description of the USA’s role in the world.  Here, 
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an insider/outsider dialectic is shown to create a global political order, which is split between a ‘war-
mongering’ Europe and a ‘peace-loving’ America’ (Dittmer, 2005, p. 629). Dodds and Kirby (2014), 
meanwhile, focus on the filmic resurgence of the figure of the paternal vigilante, evident in the Taken 
franchise, suggesting that this character is analogical for the contemporary role of the American nation 
in foreign affairs. Video games have also attracted the attention of geopolitical analyses (see, for 
example, Power, 2007; Salter, 2011). Power, for example, focuses on the extent to which military-
themed video games are ‘imbricated in wider military networks of materials, technologies, markets 
and geopolitical contexts’ (2007, p. 274). Salter, similarly, suggests that an analysis of the medium can 
be used in order to reflect on ‘social and cultural practices of militarism and the construction and 
contestation of the popular international geopolitical imaginary’ (2011, p. 359). This approach is also 
useful for my own analysis of video games, which aims to examine the ways in which the 
representation of different forms of space acts to produce specific forms of political order (see Chapter 
One). It is, therefore, important to examine some of the key ideas pertaining to the formation of 
spatial imaginaries that are discussed within critical and popular forms of geopolitics. The following 
sections address the role of popular culture in the formation of spatial imaginaries, including the 
foundational notion of the imagined community (Anderson, 2006), as well as the role of popular 
culture as a form of banal nationalism (Billig, 1995): - 
Forming Spatial Imaginaries    
The critical approach to geopolitics suggests that there can be no single, objective mediation of the 
“reality” of the real world. The practices associated with classical geopolitics are, therefore, 
understood as an act of power, one which allows for the international arena to be ‘actively spatialized, 
divided up, labelled, [and] sorted out into a hierarchy of places of greater or lesser importance. This 
process provides the geographical framing within which political elites and mass publics act in the 
world in pursuit of their own identities and interests’ (Agnew, 2003, p. 3; see also Debrix, 2008, p. 9; 
Dittmer, 2010, pp. xxvii-xvii). One the most prominent of these frameworks is evident in the division 
of the world into ‘discrete nation-states, each one ostensibly independent, sovereign, equal and 
occupied by a discrete culture or nation’ (Dittmer, 2005, p. 626; see also Debrix, 2008, p.9; Dittmer, 
2007, p. 403; Dittmer & Dodds, 2008, p. 441; Edensor, 2002, p. 65). Such structures have played a key 
role in the formation and maintainance of collective identity. Indeed, as Calhoun notes, an individual 
‘does not require the mediations of family, community, region or class to be a member of the nation. 
Nationality is understood precisely as an attribute of the individual... the trump card in the game of 
identity’ (1997, p. 46; see also Edensor, 2002, p. 28). For Anderson (2006), meanwhile, the universaility 
of the national identity is best understood as a form of imagined community: -   
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‘It is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of 
their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives 
the image of their communion… In fact, all communities larger than primordial villages of 
face-to-face contact (and perhaps not even these) are imagined. Communities are to be 
distinguished, not by their falsity/genuineness, but by the style in which they are 
imagined’ (Anderson, 2006, p. 6; emphasis in original) 
Anderson emphasises the role of the newspaper in the formulation of this sense of shared selfhood, 
suggesting that the medium serves to provide both a shared set of interests and a common 
consumptive experience through which its readers are addressed as members of a collective (2006, p. 
36; see also Dittmer, 2010, p.17). As Edensor highlights, however, this conceptualisation could 
meaningfully be extended beyond this initial focus on the role of the written word: -   
‘[The] excessive focus on literacy and printed media proffers a reductive view of culture. 
While the historical importance of print is important, it is curious that there is no 
reference to the multiple ways in which the nation is imagined in, for instance, music halls 
and theatre, popular music, festivities, architecture, fashion, spaces of congregation, and 
in a plenitude of embodied habits and performances, not to mention more parallel 
cultural forms such as film, television, radio and information technology’ (2002, p. 7) 
In acknowledging alternative sites for the formulation of nationalistic attachment, we can potentially 
generate a better understanding of the spatial frameworks that marshal our understandings of the 
world at a sub-state level. These are often experienced as a commonsensical script or shared 
imaginary - predicated on particular generalisations and assumptions - which ‘appeals through the 
obviousness of its claims; it makes the world simple and manageable. This is facilitated through a 
silencing of complexity, of problems which do not produce “right or wrong”, “true or false” 
conclusions’ (Sharp, 1993, p. 494). This is a process of inclusion and exclusion, not mimetic recreation, 
which emphasises certain perspectives and forecloses upon others (Dodds, 2008a, p. 486; Sharp, 1993, 
p. 494). As Dittmer surmises, the generation of these geopolitical imaginaries offers ‘a frame through 
which the world can be viewed, which then enables the reader (or viewer, or consumer) to adopt that 
frame and act based off it’  (2005, p. 631; see also Dittmer, 2010; O’Tuathail, 1999). Such a framework 
can also change and evolve, taking into account new experiences and events (Herb, 2004, p. 141). It is 
possible to ascertain two specific ways in which these spatial discourses might function, refered to as 
territorial bonding and territorial differentiation (Dittmer, 2005, p. 633; Herb, 2004, p. 141). 
 The process of territorial bonding aims to create a collective sense of belonging, derived from 
one’s sense of attachment to a particular national territory (Dittmer, 2005, p. 633; Herb, 2004, p. 144). 
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This is particularly evident within the Germanic concept of Heimat which, although lacking a single 
definition, can be understood as ‘a deep-seated emotional attachment to the area of descent, which 
provides a feeling of womb-like security’ (Herb, 2004, p. 153). One’s own experience of the nation is 
understood to be both natural, and widely shared with one’s fellow nationals, placing each individual 
person securely amidst a larger, territorially-bounded collective. This sense of belonging is shown to 
be widely reproduced in German culture, including the ways in which children are taught about the 
world around them: -  
‘When children learn about place names, historical events, folklore, and other “facts” of 
their local area, when they celebrate its splendour through activities such as hiking, 
painting and singing, they are taught to recognise (and love) its “German” essence. In 
other words, they are made aware that what they feel is not personal or local, but 
thoroughly German’ (Herb, 2004, p. 153) 
Whilst there is no direct English analogue for the concept of Heimat, some analyses of popular culture 
emphasise the mediation of a similarly mythicized national identity. Sharp, for example, highlights that 
our understandings of “Americanness” are more than simply a territorial referent, becoming ‘an idea 
transcendent of national borders’ (1993, p. 498). It is a concept, evocative of certain codes, morals 
and belief structures, which can be promoted, marketed and exported. “Americanness” becomes a 
universal measure, providing a shared fiction against which all encounters with “other” places and 
peoples can be judged: -    
‘[B]y referring to its definition of morality as an apparently ‘universal’ measure, the Digest 
recreates America by continually comparing others to it. This morality and the 
transcendental knowledge of “common sense” structure the constant repetition of these 
others as places of simulacrum, referring to an original which does not exist, The Reader’s 
Digest’s mythos of America’ (Sharp, 1993, p. 501)  
This sense of Self is not, however, purely a social measure and can also be tied to specific landscapes 
or territories (Herb, 2004, p. 142). This can lead to particular places or landscapes becoming privileged 
over others, ascribing these spaces a greater significance within the national narrative (Dittmer, 2005, 
p. 634). Edensor, meanwhile, reflects on the extent to which some specific forms of iconic rural 
landscapes are privileged in the construction of national identity: -  
‘Ireland has become synonymous with its West Coast… Argentina is inevitably linked with 
images of the pampas: gauchos riding across the grasslands. Morocco is associated with 
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palm trees, oases and shapely dunescapes, and the Netherlands with a flat patchwork of 
polders and drainage ditches’ (2002, p. 39) 
Similar processes are evident in the construction of specific national spaces within popular culture. 
Dittmer, for example, suggests that the representation of the fictional town of Centerville – featured 
in the Captain America comics – serve to facilitate a close political identification with the American 
heartland (2005, p. 634) 
 The concept of territorial bonding can also be extended to encompass the different ways in 
which popular culture acts to produce the “national” citizen, sculpting the values that are associated 
with such a figure. Sharp, for example, notes that The Reader’s Digest magazine would often ‘present 
important questions and problems, which they answer by offering a factual account of how a group 
of individuals (either Western or disaffected Soviet) has overcome this problem by applying enduring 
American values such as honesty, family values and charity’ (1993, p. 500). The reader, therefore, is 
taught what values one needs to hold in order to be a valuable member of the American citizenry. 
Dittmer (2005), similarly, highlights the extent to which the character of Captain America can be seen 
to “perform” the values of the American national citizen. He notes that whilst the character is shown 
to have benefitted from a chemical serum supplied by the US government, his successes in combat 
are attributed to individual values such as teamwork, strong leadership and hard work (2005, pp. 629-
630). His analysis traces the differing representations of this character over time, noting that Captain 
America has, variously, been ‘a tool of the establishment and a proxy for foreign policy’ (2005, p. 631), 
has been the ‘Commie Smasher’ of the Cold War (2005, p. 631), and has battled poverty, racism and 
pollution (2005, p. 632). Each of these different forms functions ‘as a truth claim regarding the 
characteristics that define America against a backdrop of otherness… Captain America has become a 
dynamic character over the last four decades, changing in time to the shifting politics of the question, 
what does “America” mean?’ (Dittmer, 2005, p. 633). This again calls attention to the ways in which 
popular culture represents the values associated with the national citizenry. 
 Whilst this process of belonging is useful in accessing the construction of the political Self, it 
is also useful to reflect on the manner in which an internally cohesive national “Self” is produced 
through the estrangement of outsiders and “other” political spaces. This process, through which we 
are made able to distinguish the outermost parameters of the nation, is one of territorial 
differentiation – ‘this defines who is included and who is excluded and makes the Us-Them distinction 
that is so fundamental to national identity visible’ (Herb, 2004, p. 144). Such an approach suggests 
that one’s own political identity is created through the comparison of one’s own, shared 
characteristics against a perceived lack of such characteristics in the Other: -  
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“Their’’ space is often seen as the inverse of ‘‘our’’ space: a sort of negative, in the 
photographic sense that ‘‘they’’ might ‘‘develop’’ into something like ‘‘us,’’ but also the 
site of an absence, because ‘‘they’’ are seen somehow to lack the positive tonalities that 
supposedly distinguish ‘‘us’’ (Gregory, 2004, p. 17) 
Popular culture often utilises such a narrative in order to create identity positions. Young, for example, 
notes that the film 300 ‘evokes familiar principles of right and wrong, good and bad. As Greeks, the 
Spartans represent all the straightforward values cherished by the West’ (Young, cited in Dodds, 2008, 
p. 485). This is also evident in the Star Wars films, which contrast the values of the protagonist – and 
by extension the viewer – against those of the ‘Dark Side’ (Dodds, 2008a, p. 485). Popular culture, and 
the exaggerated binaries that often exist within it, can be therefore be used to highlight the specific 
values that we claim for ourselves and those that we ascribe to Others. 
 These different approaches demonstrate that popular culture offers an accessible, although 
often unremarkable, site at which we can explore the construction and proliferation of political 
identity. Dittmer, for example, reflects that ‘if identity is a performance, then American identity has 
been performed monthly since 1964 in Captain America comic books’ (2005, p. 629). Such an approach 
correlates with the notion of banal nationalism (Billig, 1995), which suggests that our national 
identities are perpetually bolstered at a variety of unnoticed everyday sites: - 
Banal Nationalism 
Billig coins the term banal nationalism in order ‘to cover the ideological habits which enable the 
established nations of the West to be reproduced. It is argued that these habits are not removed from 
everyday life, as some observers have supposed. Daily, the nation is indicated or ‘flagged’ in the lives 
of its citizenry’ (1995, p. 6). This process of ‘flagging’ nationalism can exist in a ‘hot’ (Hearn, 2007) or 
‘exotic’ (Law, 2001) form, which refers to the overt, visible and easily identifiable manifestations of 
national identity and territorial belonging. The use of the metaphor of ‘flagging’ is useful here for, as 
Dittmer notes, ‘if you see a crowd on television at a rally, all waving national flags, you recognise that 
as nationalism’ (2010, p. 19). Such nationalistic sentiment is commonly invoked in support of national 
representatives, such as the competitors at the Olympics or the Euro 2016 football tournament. This 
overt ‘flagging’ of national identity has also become an increasingly common means by which to 
demonstrate a collective solidarity in times of trauma, during which the flags of the affected nations 
are now often projected onto iconic national landmarks.  It is often these overt displays of nationalism 
that attract attention, at the expense of the more innocuous, ‘cooler’ (Hearn, 2007, p. 660) forms of 
nationalistic practice that commonly pervade our day-to-day lives: -    
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‘People in established nations overlook the routine flagging of nationhood. The flags melt 
into the background, as ‘our’ particular world is experienced as the world. This routine 
absent-mindedness, involved in not noticing unwaved flags or other symbols of 
nationhood, has its reflection in academic theory’ (Billig, 1995, pp. 49-50) 
These sites are duly exposed by Billig (1995), whose work suggests that the ‘traces left by banal signs, 
barely comprehensible and largely repressed from the national consciousness, perform the necessary 
and constant work of undergirding the nation’ (Law, 2001, p. 300). They are the result of covert, 
unremarkable2 performances that allow for the perpetuation of the nation and national identity when 
overt, flag-waving expression is less necessary (Dittmer, 2010, p. 20; Hearn, 2007, p. 660). As Hearn 
concludes, ‘Billig’s argument is not that banality reveals the true nature of nationalism, but rather that 
the explicit ideological form, the stirring call to die for one’s country, is rendered more plausible by 
nationalism’s banal presence’ (Hearn, 2007, p. 660; see also Law, 2001, p.301). This cooler, banal 
presence can be as simple as the flags that are seen in daily life, but which go unnoticed because they 
are ‘unwaved’, including ‘those on public buildings, postages stamps, used car lots, bumper stickers, 
t-shirts, politicians’ lapels and television maps’ (Dittmer, 2010, p. 19). These banal sites do not have 
to refer to the presence of flags however, but can reference ‘any instance when citizens are 
encouraged to think of themselves using national categories’ (Dittmer, 2007b, p. 20). It is particularly 
common for such nationalistic expression to be regarded as banal when it is ‘articulated from outside 
the sphere of the formal politics of interest groups, parties and the state’ (Hearn, 2007, p. 662). These 
are sites which are important ‘because of, not despite, their rhetorical dullness’ (Billig, 1995, p. 93). 
Hearn argues that ‘nationalism abides in the little things, jokes, advertisements, street names, 
weather reports, and so on, which assume the presence of nations’ (2007, p. 660). Other analyses 
offer further sites for the banal scripting of national identity, including car licence plates (Lieb, 2011), 
the architecture of state buildings (McNeil & Tewdwr-Jones, 2003), the language used by newspapers 
(Law, 2001), currency (Penrose, 2011) and stamps (Raento & Brunn, 2005; 2008). 
 These sites provide the opportunity for the concepts of national identity and nationhood to 
be embedded within everyday processes of thought, speech and action – they produce a form of 
common-sense, but one which will often evade conscious reflection or challenge. In the case of 
stamps, for example, the chosen image is a way in which ‘the state visually presents (or misrepresents) 
                                                          
2 Although it is worthwhile to note that banality ought to be considered to be a matter of personal 
perception. As Lieb notes, ‘just because one signifier of the nation may be mundane and unremarkable 
to some, does not mean that it is not controversial and a potential site of contestation to others’ 
(2011, p. 39).  
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its history, culture, society, and their place in the world’ (Raento & Brunn, 2005, p. 145). The use of 
currency provides a similar demarcation of territorial belonging and difference, establishing the 
boundaries between nations within the everyday context. It is one of the ‘plethora of everyday, 
mundane signifiers which are noticeably not present when we go abroad’ (Edensor, 2002, p. 51). These 
sites invite an unconscious reflection upon one’s place within the state, which can inspire feelings of 
loyalty and unity: -  
‘[B]y making these ideas so natural as to be unassailable, the process, practices and 
language of banal nationalism work to construct and reproduce specific nations and 
nation-states as indispensable corner-stones of international geopolitical order’ 
(Penrose, 2011, p. 429)  
We take on these national identities not because of an unfilled psychological need, but rather because 
we are adapting to a surrounding social environment that has rendered nationalism and national 
belonging as an imperative, objective reality (Hearn, 2007, pp. 600-661). In highlighting the existence 
of the more banal signs of nationalistic expression, we expose the myriad of different and interlinked 
ways in which national identity is constructed and maintained: -  
‘Part of grasping the ubiquity and tenacity of national identity, and how people are 
attached to such identities, lies in appreciating that it is not something sustained by a few 
key carriers – state discourse, political ideologies, the media – that can be knocked off 
their perches with the right argument. It is more like Velcro. Not one big hook and eye, 
but a multitude of small ones, tiny, daily points of attachment that together can bind very 
tightly’ (Hearn, 2007, p. 672) 
Popular culture is implicated in the production and reproduction of national space, as the centrality 
of the state-system ‘remains an unchallenged premise of popular discourse’ (Dittmer, 2005, p. 626). 
It is one of a number of different sources (alongside a myriad of formal discourses and political 
statements) that contributes to the creation of the broader discursive structures and scripts that, in 
turn, facilitate the construction of a narrative through which a region’s place within the wider world 
is rendered understandable and legible. This has meant that the ways in which we are made able to 
understand the world around us are changing, as the ‘traditional cultural forms and practices of the 
nation are supplemented, and increasingly replaced in their affective power, by meanings, images and 
activities drawn from popular culture’ (Edensor, 2002, p. 12). We draw upon the representations that 
are offered within popular culture in order to augment our ‘real-world’ knowledge and experience, 
meaning that it can sometimes be difficult to separate our understanding of ‘real’ places and people 
from their various mediations within the cultural products that we consume. One example of this is 
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identified by Watkins (2015),  who highlights the way in which the film Skyfall manipulates the way in 
which we conceive of Chinese city spaces: -   
‘[W]hile most people have never visited a Chinesse city, most probably have an idea of 
what Chinesse cities are like. Spatial imaginaries aid the formation of such ‘non-firsthand’ 
conceptions of places and spaces. Take the 2012 James Bond film Skyfall. It depicts 
Shanghai as a metallic wonder. The audience barely sees a Chinese person, only 
impressive architecture. A spatial imaginary of Chinese cities exists, essentialising them 
as a specific kind of built environment representing the city of the future. The film 
reproduces this story through how it depicts Shanghai. Some aspect of the city are 
emphazised while others, like the city’s colonial legacy of aging brick buildings, are 
avoided’ (2015, p. 509) 
Our national identity is not imposed on us, whether by formal or political discourse, nor is it the 
product of some timeless, territorially linked ‘essence’. It is, however, representative of a broader 
struggle to control the perception of space. This is, as Said highlights, a struggle which affects us all, 
as ‘the earth is in effect one world, in which empty, uninhabited spaces do not exist. Just as none of 
us is outside or beyond geography, none of us is completely free from the struggle over geography. 
That struggle is complex and interesting because it is not only about soldiers and cannons but also 
about ideas, about forms, about images and imaginings’ (2003, p. 7). This thesis aims to trace some of 
the ways in which the representations of space within video games can be seen to be contributory to 
this process.  
Conclusion  
The preceding sections have examined the analytical contribution of geopolitics, charting the 
emergence of ‘critical’ and ‘popular’ modes of analysis. These approaches – which seek to destabilise 
the creation of supposedly ‘commonsensical’ forms of knowledge about the world around us – are of 
an increasing saliency, as contemporary global issues are ‘frequently framed and explained within the 
media and polity through seductive, yet often troubling, spatial registers’ (Jones & Sage, 2010, p. 315; 
see also Dittmer, 2005, p.630; Newman, 2004, p.628). This representation of political spatiality is 
shown to be an attempt to police social boundaries – usually through the identification of the types 
of peoples and behaviour that “belong” within a given locale - allowing for the promotion of specific 
ideas of the Self and the Other. As Sharp surmises, geopolitical representation is ‘not… simply a 
manipulative tool, although it can have a similar effect. Instead, it is a historically constructed way of 
understanding the world. By imposing narrative closure, in the form of reference to commonly 
accepted truisms, the complexities of life are presented in easy to manage chucks, the conceptual 
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apparatus for their interpretation already having social existence’ (Sharp, 1993, p.494). Whilst critical 
geopolitics initially focussed on the proliferation of spatial discourse within academic (‘formal’) and 
political (‘practical’) sites, popular geopolitics centres on the formation of such imaginaries within 
artefacts of popular culture. Such an approach has been shown to decentre the role of political elites, 
allowing for the examination of the production of political meaning at more everyday sites. Whilst 
such analyses have more commonly focussed on film and television, these spatial rhetorics are also 
evident within military-themed video games – the medium often utilises a spatialized, geopolitical 
framework as a means by which to interpolate the player into its core conflict. For example, in 
Homefront: the Revolution (2016) – which is discussed in detail in Chapter Seven – the core narrative 
is centred on the innate resiliency of an occupied America: -   
‘[I]n the badlands of the Red Zone, in the bombed out street and abandoned subways, a 
Resistance is forming. A guerrilla force, determined to fight for their freedoms despite 
overwhelming odds and ignite the second American Revolution’ (Deep Silver, 2017) 
In this thesis, I argue that our understandings of this framework – and others like it – depend on the 
recreation and mediation of different forms of spatiality and ‘common-sense’ spatial narrative. I aim 
to explore the ways in which these are used within video games to engender naturalised, authentic-
feeling forms of engagement that are predicated on the sense that particular values and ideals can be 
‘rightly’ associated with different parts of the world and specific types of space. As outlined in Chapter 
Three, this is achieved with reference to three of the common ways in which we are invited to think 
about space within these games – as the urban “national” core, as the rural hinterland, and as a 
plausible future temporality. In Chapter Five, for example, I examine some of the ways in which the 
representation of particular forms of urban and built spaces acts to mediate a sense of either 
territorial attachment or estrangement. In addition to focussing on the mythologisation of 
monumental spaces, I also examine the representation of more familiar-feeling, everyday 
environments. Such an approach suggests that these games are not merely themselves forms of banal 
nationalism, but also suggests that the medium often depends on the recreation of banal spaces to 
serve as the connective tissues for the games’ narrative structures. They serve to reinforce the broader 
geopolitical imaginary, showing us the places and peoples that are either at risk or already lost – they 
serve to establish the ‘way of life’ and political order that we are invited to identify with and defend. 
Other chapters address comparable spatialized structures, including the conflict between modernity 
and rurality (Chapter Six) and the mediation of the ‘post-event’ national identity (Chapter Seven).  
 It should, however, be highlighted that this approach is not an attempt to capture a singular, 
‘correct’ interpretation of the cultural artefacts that are considered herein. As Dittmer surmises, 
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‘critical geopolitical scholars try to avoid grand, sweeping statements about the way the world works. 
Instead these scholars try to show how the world looks differently from these different perspectives, 
and how those with greater cultural power shape the overall geopolitical order’ (2010, p. 12; see also 
Dittmer, 2005, p. 12). In examining the representations of space with video games, I do not attempt 
to ascribe any direct cause-and-effect to the relationship between the representations contained with 
cultural fictions and the behaviours of the end consumer. Rather, this analysis will aim to demonstrate 
prevailing imaginaries and key themes with the video games, suggesting that these provide a fluid, 
changeable site at which political identity can be created, undermined and contested.  
As detailed in the preceding sections, my own analysis focusses specifically on the 
“constitutive” and “reflective” potential of popular culture. I examine not only the representation of 
political spatiality and identity within these games, together with their consequences for the ways in 
which we perceive the geo-spatial order, but also the extent to which such an analysis might prompt 
critical self-reflection. We can use the analysis of popular culture – here, video games – as a means by 
which to examine the extent to which the ways in which we interpret the world are reliant on familiar, 
yet often unchallenged, assumptions, biases, and tropes. The following chapter introduces three 
forms of spatiality that will serve as the basis for this thesis, examining the ways in which notions of 
urban, rural and temporal spaces are commonly theorised.  
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Chapter Three: Making Space 
Introduction  
The opening chapter of this thesis provided a broad rationale for a focus on the representation of 
space within the video game medium, outlining an analysis which engages with the different ways in 
which these virtual environments can act to promote or subvert specific forms of geopolitical order. 
This approach was developed further within Chapter Two, which explored the varied theoretical 
interest in the relationship between popular culture and the study of political phenomena. Drawing 
from amongst a range of approaches developed within both International Relations (IR) and popular 
geopolitics, this prior analysis was used to highlight my own focus upon the ‘constitutive’  and 
‘reflective’ potentials of the video game medium (see Nexon and Neumann, 2006, pp.9-17). This 
chapter, meanwhile, provides an overview of the different theoretical literatures that are used in 
support of this undertaking, differentiating between urban, rural and temporal emphases. Whilst 
these are not the only theoretical frameworks through which the representational of political 
spatiality could potentially be addressed, these aspects will serve as accessible examples of some of 
the different ways in which the video game medium can be operationalised within political and 
geopolitical research. In support of this objective, the remainder of this chapter is divided into a 
further three subsections, as well as a conclusion. 
 The first of these subsections examines the formation of the urban imaginary, distinguishing 
between the role of an overtly symbolic “monumental” form of spatiality and that of the more 
mundane or “vernacular” urban environment. As Stangl emphasises, these different forms of spatiality 
‘address very different aspects of urbanism. The vernacular centres on the relation of spatial forms to 
everyday life, with representation playing a supporting role. The monumental sustains collective 
values, linking the past and the present, which is traditionally achieved through representation’ (2008, 
p. 245). The literature surrounding this distinction, which will form the basis for Chapter Five, is used 
to demonstrate how different forms of urban spatiality (including even fictionalised representations 
of urban spaces) can create a sense of nationalistic attachment or estrangement in very different ways.  
 The following subsection then examines the notion of rural space, outlining the process by 
which the term has become detached from its material, real-world referent and is made accessible for 
use in the analysis of popular culture. Guided by some of the attempts to classify the study of rural 
geographies (Cloke, 2006; Halfacree, 1993; 2006), this subsection advances a post-structuralist 
conceptualisation of rurality as a fluid and contingent cultural imaginary. Such an approach suggests 
that the notion of rurality is not merely a simple spatial designation, but rather that it can be 
understood as a manifestation of cultural and political power – one which can be examined and 
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exposed through its representation within different cultural artefacts (see, for example, Murphy, 2013 
on film; Robinson, J. 2016 on theatre; Horton, 2008a on children’s fiction). This subsection – which 
forms the basis for Chapter Six – also outlines some of the different ways in which rural spaces are 
commonly understood, focussing specifically on the concepts of the rural idyll, the backwoods and the 
wilderness (see, for example, Murphy, 2013; Short, 1991).  
 The final section of this literature review chapter focuses on the role of temporality, engaging 
with some of the ways in which the mediation of the traumatic and/or terroristic “Event” can serve to 
discipline political identity. This section begins by offering an overview of some of the different 
theoretical perspectives that have emerged from within the field of terrorism studies, noting the 
development of a more critical perspective which seeks to examine the construction of the “terrorism” 
discourse (see, for example, Gunning, 2007; Holland & Jarvis, 2014; Jarvis, 2009). This review 
subsequently highlights two specific forms of cultural mediation – ‘remediation’ (Bolter & Grusin, 
2000) and ‘premediation’ (Grusin, 2004; 2010; 2011; 2014) – which are used to frame an engagement 
with the temporalities of video game space in Chapter Seven. These ideas facilitate an examination of 
the ways in which our imaginaries of future space are constructed and consumed within video games, 
including the extent to which such representations act to premediate specific responses to shared 
trauma. 
 Following the completion of this final theoretical section, a short conclusion is then used to 
introduce the focus on method and methodology in Chapter Four. This subsequent chapter explores 
the role of narrative and ludic approaches to the analysis of the video game medium, aiming to provide 
a framework which reconciles these disparate aspects.    
3.1 Producing National Space: Monuments and the Mundane 
This subsection examines the role of different forms of urban spatiality in the creation of our broader 
geopolitical identity, emphasising the different roles of “monumental” and “mundane” environments 
in the formation and maintenance of collective memory. Such a framework differentiates between 
the forms of space which function as an overt appeal to one’s membership of a collective and those 
which draw their strength from a more unreflexive evocation of self-identity and spatial situatedness  
(Edensor, 1997, p. 175; 2004, p. 108; Mitchell, 2003, p. 444; Stangl, 2008, p. 245). This subsection 
outlines the prevalent theoretical characterisation of each of these different forms of space, which 
are then used as a framework through which to conduct an analysis of the representation of similar 
environments within military-themed video games (see Chapter Five). Whilst these varying spatial 
practices are only a few of the ‘seething mass of cultural elements’ (Edensor, 2002, p. vii) which 
contribute to the formation of the broader geopolitical imaginary, the examination of such spaces 
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nonetheless provide a means by which it can be made possible to expose and interrogate some of the 
taken-for-granted ways in we conceive of the world around us and our place within it.   
3.1.1 Monuments and Collective National Identity 
As Atkinson highlights, the production and maintenance of collective memory was once considered to 
be a ‘serious, formal, scholarly affair… [O]fficial, state-sanctioned memory was often dictated to us in 
the public realm; it was encapsulated in figurative statuary and monuments, and in the names and 
titles of streets and squares that told us who to commemorate and what we should remember about 
them’ (2008, p. 382). Many of these official, curated expressions of collective memory can be seen to 
share familiar physical and formal properties that are ‘universal and enduring, typically great size, 
durability and decoration’ (Stangl, 2008, p. 246). In some cases, these characteristics are also read as 
representative of either particular social movements or forms of national identity. Mitchell, for 
example, notes the apparent reliance of Soviet-era architecture upon ‘a grandness of scale, and on 
spars, abstract and highly symbolic forms’  (2003, p. 448). Analyses of Central and Eastern European 
spatiality, meanwhile, have focussed on the various forms of architecture that correspond to 
prevailing political expectations, including castles, industrial sites, and Soviet-style monuments 
(Alpenc, 2005, p.2). 
 The contemporary significance of monumental spatiality has grown, however, as the various 
different local authorities, regions and nations – each facing global competition – must devise 
increasingly creative ways in which to ‘mark each locale as a distinctive, characterful candidate for 
inward-investment, leisure-spending, and high-earning migrants’ (Atkinson, 2008, p. 384). As a result 
the form and utility of monumental spatiality has become increasingly diverse, in order to appeal to 
the wide range of different values and motivations of modern-day migrants, travellers and tourists. 
Edensor, for example, notes that such individuals might potentially be drawn to ‘former homes or 
birth places, sites of romantic trysts, sporting venues… grand festivals, sites of celebrity death… and 
fan worship… world wonders, and a host of others that shape the composition of the modern bucket-
list’  (2015, p. 201). There are a number of different ways in which this place-promotion is achieved 
through the use of monumental forms of spatiality.   
One particularly distinctive form of place-promotion has aimed to achieve a sense of spatial 
distinctiveness through the creation of a connection to past history, providing visitors with tangible 
“evidence” of the enduring and primordial nature of the nation-state and a connection to their 
national, ethnic or cultural ancestors (Atkinson, 2008, p. 384; English, 2002, p. 1). These historical and 
heritage sites have often served as visual representations of the values and ideals that are deemed to 
be particularly important within a particular nation, creating a connection between a shared national 
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or historical narrative and a particular place (Edensor, 1997, p. 175; 2002, p. 45; Mitchell, 2003, p. 
445).  The site of Stonehenge, for example, is marketed as a key part of English heritage: -   
‘Walk in the footsteps of your Neolithic ancestors at Stonehenge – one of the wonders of 
the world and the best-known prehistoric monument in Europe. Explore the ancient 
landscape on foot and step inside the Neolithic Houses to discover the tools and objects 
of everyday Neolithic life. Visit the world-class exhibition and visitor centre with 250 
ancient objects and come face to face with a 5,500 year-old man’ (English Heritage, 2018) 
The site has become a popular tourist destination, attracting 1.58 million visitors in 2017 (Statista, 
2018). It is also a site of considerable religious significance within the Druidic and Pagan traditions, as 
well as providing a meeting point for the members of the traveller community (English, 2002, p. 4). 
The associated sense of heritage and ancestry that surrounds Stonehenge, as well as other similar 
ancestral sites, has also permeated into popular culture, within which it is commonly used as either a 
form of spatial shorthand for the primordial British identity (see, for example, Dittmer, 2011 on the 
genesis of the Captain Britain comic book character) or in order to evoke the sense of mysticism 
associated with paganism and the occult (see, for example, Saunders, 2014 on the representation of 
polytheistic religion in Game of Thrones and Vikings). 
 The label of “monument” can also be applied to those spaces which are specifically created to 
aid in the construction and reconstruction of national history and identity. Whilst some sites are used 
to commemorate aspects of a nation’s history (for example, the Statue of Liberty or Nelson’s Column) 
others serve to provide a more forward-looking celebration of a nation’s contemporary political 
power, modernity, culture or future aspirations (for example, the Empire State Building or the Sydney 
Opera House). These sites are often experienced as part of broader regional or national spatial 
networks, which are used to symbolically present the national identity to both residents and foreign 
visitors. Edensor, for example, notes that a tourist’s visit to Paris might incorporate ‘a number of 
emblematic places, including the Eiffel Tower, the Place de Concord, Notre Dame Cathedral, the Arc 
de Triomphe, the Champs Élysées and the Louvre. These are significant both as signifiers of France for 
outsiders and as ideological statements about Frenchness and the republic within France’ (2002, p. 
46). The representation or evocation of these symbolic sites can, as a result, be seen to play a role 
within the broader processes of signification that are used within both politics and popular culture, 
serving as a form of visual shorthand for both a particular region or country and its associated way of 
life. It is this symbolic connection between particular forms of spatiality and the hegemonic national 
identity that can serve to provide terrorist attacks with their broader potency. The 9-11 attacks, for 
example, were not simply experienced as attacks against a series of buildings – the Twin Towers and 
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the Pentagon – but were described as an attack on “our” assorted freedoms: ‘our freedom of religion, 
our freedom of speech, our freedom to vote and assemble, and [to] agree and disagree with each 
other’ (Bush, 2001).  
Within popular culture, meanwhile the representation of a national landmark can serve to 
simply establish the setting for the narrative, or can be used in order to show a tangible threat to the 
prevailing political and cultural norms. The action film Olympus Has Fallen (2013), for example, 
represents the White House in order to convey both the physical location of America and an attack on 
American values (Figure 3).   
A further connection between monumental spatiality and national memory is evident in the use of 
such spaces in the practices of commemoration that have accompanied acts of warfare or high-profile 
disasters. There can be some architectural variations between these different sites. The forms of 
monument that are used to denote shared victories (including those which mark both moments of 
triumph and the associated, venerated individuals) are often placed in areas of high visibility, whilst 
those which act as sites of mourning are more likely to be afforded a level of spatial seclusion or 
separation (Donohoe, 2002, p. 235; Mitchell, 2003, p. 445; Stangl, 2008, pp. 246-247). Each of these 
commemorative sites works to obscure the more personal sense of death and individual loss that 
would force the recognition of our own human mortality. This is achieved through the imposition of a 
nationalistic rhetoric, which obscures personal mortality throught the veneration of national identity 
and its associated value systems. This is, for example, reflected in the level of nationalistic 
sentimentality that is extended to the tombs of Unknown Soldiers. These are a form of 
commemorative monument that has come to represent all national subjects that fall in battle, to the 
exclusion of specific individual fighters: -  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This image has been removed by the author of this thesis for copyright reasons. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Olympus Has Fallen Official Trailer (YouTube, 2013) 
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‘The public ceremonial reverence accorded these moments, precisely because they are 
either deliberately empty or no one knows who lies inside them, has no true precedents 
in earlier times. To feel the force of this modernity, one only has to imagine the general 
reaction to the busy-body who “discovered” the Unknown Soldier’s name or insisted on 
filling the tomb with some real bones. Sacrilege of a strange, contemporary kind’ 
(Anderson, 2006, p. 9; see also Donohoe, 2002, p. 237) 
A similar process is also evident in the integration of monumental spatialities into the broader process 
of commemoration and lamentation that follows terrorist attacks. As Heath-Kelly notes, this 
commemorative practice is ‘almost exclusively a human pursuit. The tree and animals which perish in 
disaster events are not commemorated. Memorials enact the presence of lost human lives upon public 
space so that the dead are not forgotten’ (2018, p. 63; emphasis in original). This use of monumental 
spatiality is also a relatively recent practice, tied to both the high-profile nature of the 9-11 terrorist 
attacks and the loss of the Cold War “Other” that had previously served to discipline American notions 
of national identity and spatial situatedness  (Heath-Kelly & Jarvis, 2017, pp. 247-248). The creation of 
public monuments serves as a form of spatial control and organisation, restoring a sense of rationality 
and order to a place that would otherwise be defined by memories of chaos and trauma: -  
‘By remaking a site of death and tragedy as a sacred place of memory… it is cleansed of 
the more horrific and alienating memories of human loss and finitude. It instead takes on 
national and civic “lessons” about sacrifice, heroism and resilience’  (Heath-Kelly, 2018b, 
p. 69) 
Such a process is particularly evident in the contemporary use of survivor trees, artificially-created 
natural monuments which are often ‘anthropomorphised, provided individual ability and given the 
ability to speak’  (2018b, p. 64). One such tree was “rescued” from under the wreckage of the World 
Trade Center and, following its recovery and replanting was heralded as a symbol of America 
resilience, strength and recovery3. Saplings from this particular tree were sent to other regions that 
were subsequently stricken by disasters and attacks as a symbol of solidarity, with the direct genetic 
replication of the “resilient” tree serving a symbol of the collective national identity deployed by 
“attacked” peoples and places (Heath-Kelly, 2018b, p. 67). The inclusion of a natural aesthetic in acts 
                                                          
3 Heath-Kelly (2018b, p. 66), for example, notes that this particular survivor tree was given the voice 
of Whoopi Goldberg during a televised poetry performance.   
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of post-terror memorialisation4 serves other, broader forms of symbolism. At the one level, the use of 
both survivor trees and memorial groves can serve to mark a particular site as removed from the 
banal, everyday environment, signifying to future generations that this is a place where something of 
a particular significance has happened. This is a form of commemorative practice which shares a 
system of signification with the process of burial: -  
‘[T]he past is made passed by depositing it underground; the present is made present 
through place-making above ground; and the future is anticipated through the 
positioning of markers for future generations to consider and admire’  (Heath-Kelly, 
2018b, p. 71) 
As this suggests, however, the inclusion of natural forms can also provide a means by which to mark 
the passage of time, allowing for the collective consciousness to heal and – in some cases – for the 
afflicted spatial site to be reclaimed for everyday use: -  
‘[M]emorial trees make both a figurative representation of the individuals lost, and a 
collective simulation of resilience and recovery. They represent the past event, and the 
time passed thereafter’  (Heath-Kelly, 2018b, p. 64) 
The use of a more natural form of monumentalisation allows for the symbolic recovery of a site, 
transforming the trauma and immediacy experienced during the attacks into a more fleeting and 
transitory moment of darkness  (Heath-Kelly, 2018b, p. 67). 
There are, however, a range of issues that problematize the use of these different forms of 
“monumental” spatiality in the process of commemoration and the formation of collective memory. 
Such a process can, for example, be seen to create a tension between the desire to protect a site for 
the future and the demand for continued public access to it in the present day. As English surmises, 
‘preservation does indeed secure sites for the future, but it also takes them out of use in the present… 
[T]herefore a balancing act has to take place between preservation and access’ (2002, p. 12). This is 
particularly common in the case of historical and heritage sites, which are often legally designated as 
                                                          
4 Other forms of commemorative practice have also relied upon natural symbols. The Poppy, for 
example, is instantly recognisable for its role in the commemoration of wartime losses. As Iles 
observes, ‘its association with battlefield deaths arose during the First World War when wild red 
poppies flourished in the churned up mud of the Western Front battlefields of Northern France and 
Belgium’ (2008, p. 201). Such a symbol, however, is rarely confined to a single static space, in the way 
that one might experience the survivor trees that are discussed here.   
62 
 
places of particular national or global interest that cannot be either significantly altered or destroyed. 
For example, the 1972 UNESCO Convention for the Protection of World Cultural and Natural Heritage 
calls upon national authorities to ‘integrate the protection of the cultural and natural heritage into 
regional planning programmes, set up staff and services at their sites, undertake scientific and 
technical conservation research and adopt measures which give this heritage a function in the day-to-
day life of the community’ (UNESCO, 2018). Stonehenge, for example, has historically served as the 
site for a wide variety of different forms of religious, social and banal practices, hosting everything 
from family picnics through to fairs, concerts and sports events (English, 2002, p. 6). The 
implementation of protective measures, however, places restrictions on the individuals and groups 
that can be afforded the right of access to this monumental spatial site, as well as restricting the uses 
to which they might reasonable expect to put the space. For example, whilst some allowances were 
made in order to accommodate the Pagan and Druidic traditions, which were perceived as harmless 
and eccentric, the use of the site by the traveller community in the 1980s led to significant levels of 
policing and protection (English, 2002, p. 11). Whilst the ancient religious practices were viewed as 
being in keeping with the values and heritage of the site, including one group in the site, the 
experience of intrusion and disorder necessitated the use of physical and legal restrictions in order to 
exclude another.   
 Other analyses have focussed specifically upon the apparent role of monumental spatiality in 
the narration of a singular form of memory or identity. As Schmidt notes, these are sites which can 
often ‘seem to possess a finality of meaning. They might be understood as pure representation, 
manifesting a single point of view in such a way that they prevent any other use or interpretation’  
(2010, p. 283). As a result, these different spaces can seem to be responsible for the creation, 
recreation and conveyance of a series of static and fixed understandings, which function by ‘carrying 
the past to the present in order to “remind” people to remember and prevent them [from] changing 
historical facts and events’ (Erbas Gurler & Ozer, 2013, pp. 858-859). These representations are, 
however, more productively viewed as an attempt to distil down and control the conveyance of 
national history, as ‘the identity of places is very much bound up with the histories which are told of 
them, how those histories are told, and which history turns out to be dominant’ (Massey, 1995, p.186; 
see also Osbourne, 1998, p. 432; Schmidt, 2010, p.283). Such a practice has been particularly 
commonplace within the representation of history and identity within heritage sites, such as stately 
homes, which can obscure the commensurate practices of class oppression, exploitation and exclusion 
that accompanied the initial construction of such structures (Atkinson, 2008, p. 383). Bender, 
meanwhile, reflects on the extent to which the limitations that were placed on the level of public 
access to Stonehenge also served to limit the available interpretations of this particular historical site:-  
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‘While the stones remained “open” right through to the beginning of this century and 
people could come to them with their different understandings, they are now “closed” 
and Stonehenge has become a museum which attempts to “sell”, not always successfully, 
a particular sort of experience, a particular interpretation of the past’ (Bender, quoted in 
English, 2002, p.4; see also Atkinson, 2008, p.382; Edensor, 2005, p.831) 
The formation of collective accounts of identity or memory - whether at historical or more 
contemporary sites – is a practice of inclusion and exclusion, which can be seen to ‘focus on the 
positive, the distinctive and the heroic, while eliding the unpopular, the dirty and the unsavoury’ 
(Atkinson, 2008, p.384). This can mean that one’s engagement with particular forms of collective 
remembrance or shared heritage can act to obscure conflicting practices of memorialisation and 
alternative potential sites of memory formation, as well as the perspectives, practices and narratives 
that are associated with marginalised, powerless, or otherwise subaltern groups (Edensor, 1997, p. 
176; 2005, pp. 832-833; Schmidt, 2010, p. 284; Stangl, 2008, p. 245). The constructed nature of these 
sites is particularly apparent on those instances at which the formation of an “official” version of a 
local or national identity through monumental, shared acts of commemoration is challenged or 
subverted by a shift in the prevailing identity, politics, culture or morality (Edensor, 2005, p. 832; 
Krzyżanowska, 2016, p. 468; Osbourne, 1998, p. 433; Osbourne, 2017, p. 164).  Edensor (1998, p. 38), 
for example, notes that many Eastern European countries have removed statuary that 
commemorated communist leaders, reasoning that this form of monumentality conflicts with more 
contemporary values. Atkinson (2008, pp. 384-385), meanwhile notes the example of the 1996 
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Figure 4: Damaged Confederate Statuary - West Palm Beach, USA (Chavez, 2017) 
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Festival of the Sea, which was held in Bristol, UK. He observes that the festival’s primary narrative of 
a proud and sea-faring past, which centred upon a large replica ship, was widely critiqued for its elision 
of black history and the role of the port in the slave trade. A similar process is also evident in the more 
recent counter-monumental movement that has opposed the continued public display of Confederate 
statuary within the USA. These monuments - which had been a somewhat normalised part of 
American culture (see, for example, Johnson, 1995, p.55) – had offered a revisionist understanding of 
the role of the key members of the confederacy, which ‘transformed the advocates of treason into 
chivalrous aristocrats from a romantic antebellum era and converted its military leaders into American 
heroes’ (Osbourne, 2017, p. 169). Reinterpreted in the wake of contemporary racial violence, 
however, the statues instead became the target of sustained protests and acts of vandalism (see 
Figure 4).     
Other sites have failed to retain their “monumental” status as the result of a more basic 
neglect and a lack of public engagement. This is, for example, particularly evident in the case of the 
Millennium Dome. This large event space - which was completed in 1999 - was used to mark the turn 
of the century, containing a series of attractions referred to as the “Millennium Experience”. The 
various different zones, which centred on the themes of Who We Are, What We Do and Where We 
Live, were intended to be a bold and declarative statement of British identity. Tony Blair, for example, 
argued that the Millennium Dome project ‘embodies at once the spirit of confidence and adventure 
in Britain and the spirit of the future in the world… [We] will say to ourselves with pride: this is our 
Dome, Britain’s Dome. And believe me, it will be the envy of the world’ (Blair, quoted in McGuigan, 
2003; p.671). The cost of the Millennium Dome, however, reportedly ran to £789million over its 
lifetime (including £28million of costs incurred after the project’s eventual closure at the end of 2000), 
and the project attracted just 5.5million of the expected 12million visitors (Hencke, 2002). As these 
figures suggest, the wide range of sponsored exhibits failed to connect with the public, meaning that 
the project was rendered unable to properly disseminate its celebratory narrative of identity and 
national values. Even before its opening, one commentator concluded that ‘it’s impractical, 
extravagant, and useless – a great European monument’ (Goldberger, 1998). The project also became 
the focus of intense political discussion, serving as the focus for ‘more than 1,200 parliamentary 
Questions, eight debates… five Select Committee inquiries, a National Audit Office report and a PAC 
inquiry’ (UK Government, 2000). Though responsible for the germination of the original project, the 
subsequent Conservative Party manifesto described the project as having been ‘banal, anonymous 
and rootless. It lacked a sense of Britain’s history or culture’ (Tempest, 2001). In 2005, some years 
after the closure of the Millennium Dome, the site was redeveloped as the ‘O2 Arena’ – a process 
which completed the transition from a widely ridiculed monument to national identity into a site for 
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vernacular, quotidian congregation. With such a transformation came a change in perception, with 
the site serving as a successful outlet for cultural and artistic expression.     
 Whilst we are often most conscious of the formalised, regulated sites of national 
remembrance, including landmarks and memorials, it is important to acknowledge that the continued 
maintenance of such spaces ‘requires the removal of clutter, which might generate a profusion of 
matter and meaning’ (Edensor, 2005, p. 832; see also Johnson, 1995). Not all appeals to collective 
memory and identity require the presence of physical monumentality (see, for example, Raento & 
Brunn, 2005; 2008 on the representational role of postage stamps; Penrose, 2011, on the 
representational role of national currency), whilst even sites which do display recognisably 
“monumental” physical characteristics may be either devoid of any broader cultural or political 
significance  (Stangl, 2008, p. 246) or else will serve as the site for a myriad of different forms of banal 
spatial practice. To focus exclusively upon monumental sites would exclude the broader regions in 
which these structures sit, spaces which form the banal sites for social gatherings, commuting to work, 
journeys to school and so on. In seeking to account for the ways in which one’s political sensibilities 
are produced by the surrounding environment, it is also important to account for the role of every day 
“clutter”. The following literature, therefore, examines the ways in which we can create an individual 
and imaginative connection to the nation through the representation of a series of other-than-
monumental forms of spatiality.   
3.1.2 Hunting Ghosts? Everyday Encounters with the Mundane Landscape 
As already noted, the broader aim of this subsection is to examine the extent to which memory and 
identity is produced through our encounters with different forms of space. The previous section 
focussed specifically on sites at which identity and memory can be seen to be regimented and ordered 
for collective consumption, referring to these as “monumental” spatial sites. A number of different 
forms of monumental space were considered, including historical sites, national monuments and the 
creation of post-terrorist sites of memorialisation and lamentation. Such sites were seen to be 
moulded by political, social and intellectual elites, producing normalised modes of shared perception 
and interaction that are not dissimilar to our engagement with conventional5 forms of museum space 
(Atkinson, 2008, p. 382; Edensor, 2005, p. 832). This is, however, also shown to be a contested and 
controversial process, which ‘evokes a broader tension between contradictory modern desires: the 
                                                          
5 Although, as Edensor acknowledges, some forms of “post-modern” museum space offer ‘wider 
scope for interpretative licence, decentring traditional, authoritative, and expert narratives’ (2005, p. 
832).  
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uneven conflict between the yearning for order and the simultaneous longing for disorder or 
transgression’ (Edensor, 2005, p. 829). Whilst this can reinforce the idea that there are specific sites 
where the national memory is made, there has been a broad diversification of both the sites and the 
practices that are associated with the formation of memory and identity. Atkinson, for example, 
suggests that ‘increasing numbers of Britons are identifying, consuming and producing articulations 
of history and heritage themselves… [T]hey are also shifting their gaze from the great stories of 
traditional historiography towards more commonplace social, industrial and cultural histories and 
learning to see and identify heritages all around them in their mundane, ordinary, everyday space’ 
(2008, p. 381). Such an approach serves to problematize the potential privileging of the production of 
collective memory and identity at “monumental” sites, as it is made apparent that the formal 
processes that are deployed within such spaces necessitate the removal of the everyday “clutter” that 
would otherwise allow for the creation of a multiplicity of different individual interpretations (see, for 
example, Edensor, 2005).   
This section, as a result, engages with the formation of identity and memory through an 
engagement with these “mundane” spaces. This type of space can be conceptualised in a number of 
different ways. Stangl, for example, refers to the existence of ‘a historically-evolved, regionally-based 
tradition that stands in contrast to the homogenising powers of global modernity’  (2008, p. 246). Such 
a perspective emphasises the instances upon which different types of urbanity are afforded a 
particular territorial specificity, drawing upon the way of life that is believed to be characteristic of 
such areas. Some such spaces might include, for example, our conceptualisation of ‘New England 
villages, Main Street of American and California suburbs’ (Edensor, 2002, p. 63; see also Dittmer, 2005, 
pp. 639-641). Our shared understandings of these particular, regional form of space can be seen to 
have influenced urban development elsewhere in the world, which have attempted to recapture these 
characteristics. Edensor (2002, p.62), for example, reflects on attempts to recreate forms of “British” 
spatiality in India.  
These urban imaginaries are also commonly used as a form of visual shorthand within film and 
television programmes, including locations such as the fictional regions of ‘Cabot Cove, Maine’ 
(Murder She Wrote, 1984-1996) and ‘Midsummer County, UK’ (Midsummer Murders, 1997 – Present). 
Dittmer, meanwhile, highlights the representation of specific forms of urban spatiality within the 
Captain America comics, arguing that these ‘invocations of “all-American” quotidian landscapes 
(urban centre, small town, Fourth of July celebration) serve to construct an American form of Heimat 
through which individuals come to understand their common connection to the nation’ (2005, p. 634). 
Mundane urban spaces are, however, also experienced as static and taken-for-granted parts of our 
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everyday lives, consisting of the various modes of habituation that are both familiar and yet 
unremarkable. This is apparent, for example, in the ways in which we conceive of the “home”.  
 Many Westernised conceptualisations of the home can be seen to privilege the role of the 
“house” – the physical structure which represents the juxtaposition between the private and personal 
interior and the more public, political exterior. The inside of the house is usually regarded as a safe 
and comfortable space, which offers its occupant a sense of freedom, control and security, as well as 
scope for creativity, relaxation and regeneration (Edensor, 2002, pp. 57-58; Mallett, 2004, pp. 71-72). 
This becomes the location for everyday actions and routines, which are shaped by our shared 
understandings of ‘what particular activities should be carried out in which spaces – where we should 
eat, cook, watch television – and where the inhabitants of the house should be located in terms of 
bedrooms and so on’ (Edensor, 2002, p. 58). Our understandings of the nature of such a space are not 
static, however, and are produced by a number of different personal and familial experiences, 
including ‘shifts in the distribution of wealth, transformations in people’s ideas about community, 
family [and] even the good life’ (Mallett, 2004, pp. 67-68). These spaces are also produced through an 
engagement with different forms of popular culture, including the wide variety of different magazines 
and trade shows that are devoted to the notion of the “ideal” home  (Mallett, 2004, p. 67). 
The creation of the house serves as a process of inclusion and exclusion, keeping perceived 
dangers at a distance. Indeed, as Edensor reflects, ‘the erection of domestic walls against potential 
external terror inadvertently produced a home that might subsequently be invaded by the apparently 
excluded abject and disruptive’ (2005, p. 835). The house cannot, however, always be thought of as a 
safe and secure place, and may instead by experienced as a site of fear, estrangement or isolation 
(Dupuis & Thorns, 1998; Giddens, 1984; Giddens, 1990). Such a concern is made particularly evident 
within the production of horror fiction, within which the ghosts that “haunt” the home space are literal 
rather than figurative. Murphy (2009), for example, reflects on the disruption of the sanctity of the 
“home” in the production of a ‘Suburban Gothic’ narrative form, evident within films such as The Last 
House on the Left (1972) and Fido (2006): -   
‘[T]he Suburban Gothic is a sub-genre concerned, first and foremost, with playing on the 
lingering suspicion that even the most ordinary-looking neighbourhood, or house, or 
family, has something to hide, and that no matter how calm and settled a place looks, it 
is only ever a moment away from a dramatic (and generally sinister incident. The trope 
of the peaceful-looking suburban house with a TERRIBLE SECRET within is one so familiar 
as to have passed into cliché’ (Murphy, 2009, p. 2) 
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As this suggests, the space outside the boundaries of the house can also be ‘perceived as an imposing, 
if not threatening or dangerous space. It is more diffuse, less defined. Different performative 
expectations exist for people in this outside space. There are different rules of engagement with 
people, places and things’  (Mallett, 2004, p. 71). One’s encounter with this space is, however, seen 
as a both a masculine and nationalistic imperative, ‘as it is to preserve and enrich the home that men 
go out to confront monsters, raw nature and other perils’  (Edensor, 2002, p. 61). This relationship 
between the interior and exterior zones is further codified in popular culture, within which it forms a 
key stage of the ‘hero’s journey’. Here, the first stage of this mythical voyage - described as the ‘call 
to adventure’ - necessitates the abandonment of the safety of one’s home, as ‘destiny has summoned 
the hero and transferred his spiritual centre from within the pale of his society to a zone unknown. 
This fateful region of treasure and danger may be variously represented: as a distant land, a forest, a 
kingdom underground, beneath the waves, or above the sky, a secret island, lofty mountaintop, or 
profound dreamscape; but it is always a place of strangely fluid and polymorphous beings, 
unimaginable torments, superhuman deeds, and impossible delight’ (Campbell, 2008, p. 48). Within 
these narratives - whether cultural or national - this departure is shown as an undeniable part of one’s 
responsibilities and a necessary stage in personal fulfilment.  
 Not all exterior zones, of course, take on such dramatic forms and the space outside of the 
home often simply provides the backdrop to our individual lives and routines. As this everyday form 
of space is commonly experienced unreflexively, it is often implied that it ‘apparently does not contain 
the exciting moments in which decisions are made [and] identities are enacted and displayed. Because 
the everyday tends to be contrasted with the time of celebrity, of holidays, of exceptional and 
symbolic events, it is believed to be static’ (Edensor, 2002, p.54; see also Stangl, 2008, p.247). The 
importance of these dwellingscapes is, however, constructed through a myriad of different objects, 
institutional and infrastructural systems, and spatial practices – each of which can contribute to the 
various familiar-feeling, common-sense form of spatial interaction that constitute a broader sense of 
individual “belonging”. These environments may, for example, include spaces such as coffee shops, 
restaurants and bars, where we meet to talk and share stories. They may also provide the sites for 
more individual rituals, such as the early-morning dog-walk or the commute to work. As Stangl 
surmises, these are landscapes which ‘exist to provide a complex array of spatial forms to support 
everyday life, and the world of lived experience, with representation in a supporting role’ (2008, p.251; 
see also Alpenc, 2005, p.3; Edensor, 2002, p.54). It is a form of space which is more commonly felt, 
rather than consciously apprehended, unless specific aspects of it are threatened or changed.  
Memory and identity can also be produced through a variety of other unremarkable and 
marginalised spaces, including areas such as ‘the unadorned backsides of the city, the alleys, culverts, 
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service areas and other microspaces, along with wastelands railway sidings, spaces behind billboards, 
and unofficial rubbish tips’ (Edensor, 2005, p.833). These are experienced as sites of uncontrolled and 
unregulated urban excess which, through their creation of a multiplicity of individual meanings and 
uses, call into question the level of discursive closure that is often imposed upon more formal, 
“monumental” spatial sites (Edensor, 2005, pp. 833-834; Holloway & Kneale, 2008, p. 303). This 
disruption of otherwise normalised spaces and their commensurate forms of spatial practice is 
experienced as a ghostly haunting (Edensor, 2005, pp. 835-837; Holloway & Kneale, 2008, pp. 303-
306). These are not, however, the wailing phantoms or malevolent spirits that are evoked within 
horror films. Instead, as Edensor surmises, we might think of the “ghost” as being ‘a disembodied 
entity which can provoke memories that are strangely familiar through the empathic contact it makes’ 
(2005, p. 835). These ghosts, and the traces that they leave upon our present, generate ‘instances 
wherein the habitual and the seeming mundanity of the everyday becomes marvellous, strange and 
uncanny’ (Holloway, 2010, p.618; see also Edensor, 2005, p.835). Whilst the experience of these 
ghosts can be sought out6, the memories are also unconsciously stimulated by our encounters with a 
range of familiar sights, sensations or patterns of movement. 
 One particularly productive site for the analysis of such “ghostly” encounters has been the 
ruins of former industrial sites (see, for example, Edensor, 2005; DeSilvey & Edensor, 2012). Through 
a series of encounters with non-specific7 ruined spatial sites, it is made possible to examine how these 
forms of mundane space can still discipline our modes of interaction and create a personal, yet often 
unreflexive sense of belonging. In encountering everyday environments, such as places of work, our 
‘habits and habituation reproduce space and render it comfortable, as the unquestioned backdrop to 
daily tasks, pleasures and routine movement. Bodily dispositions become embedded over time 
through routine industrial procedures and the use of particular objects in particular places at particular 
times’ (Edensor, 2005, p.840). The memory of these routine forms of interaction is not limited to the 
former inhabitants of these spaces, however, as it remains evident in the space that is left behind. 
Different forms of space are arranged in different ways, having served different purposes, and can 
cause the visitor to recall aspects of other similar spaces and routines encountered over the course of 
                                                          
6 Holloway (2010), for example, highlights the increased popularity of organised ghost walks and 
paranormal investigations.  
7 As Atkinson notes, Edensor’s examination of industrial ruins ‘fails to name or locate any of the 
derelict industrial sites he photographs or describes; his point is that these are ubiquitous features of 
post-industrial societies… [T]hey are haunted by the ghosts of their past occupations, as well as 
providing a liminal space for invention, play, excitement and other activities’ (2008, p. 388). 
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a lifetime. We can, for example, instinctively differentiate between the car park, canteen and locker 
room environments, because we instinctively “remember” what these different forms of space look 
like and how we are expected to behave within each. Within the urban ruins, each of these different 
spaces – although now stripped of their prior banal and everyday uses – still seek to impose particular 
forms of spatial performance upon visiting bodies, ‘cajoling them into particular manoeuvres and 
conveying a sense of corporeal empathy about what it was like to dwell and work within such a space’ 
(Edensor, 2005, p.840; see also DeSilvey & Edensor, 2012, p.476). This association between the visiting 
body and the surrounding space may be deepened by our encounter with the residual environmental 
clutter, including familiar clothing, tools or furniture. We can, for example, imagine what is must have 
been like to make and receive calls in a specific office environment, as the arrangement of the desks 
and phones serves to call to mind what it is like to make calls in any office. The connection may also 
be strengthened through the existence of more personal ephemera – such as posters, photographs or 
stickers – or through the common forms of social interaction that are evident in scribbled jokes, 
discarded notes and scrawled obscenities (Edensor, 2005, pp. 842-843). These allow for the otherwise 
ruined environment to be at least partly reenergised, animating environments and bodies that have 
not been fully disposed of by the passage of time (Edensor, 2005, p. 842; Holloway & Kneale, 2008, p. 
303). 
 Both structured monumental sites and everyday environments can be seen to rely on a 
pervasive and powerful process of spatial regulation, which defines which forms of action and 
interaction are considered to be appropriate within a given locality. One’s movement through urban 
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Figure 5: Looters target the Packard Automotive Plant in Detroit, USA (Requiem for Detriot, 
2010) 
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ruins, however, also allows for the transgression of these broader social or cultural norms. These can, 
for example, become the sites of childish games and experimentation, spaces within which it is 
possible to ‘clamber over machines, slide down chutes, climb up ladders, [or] lounge on the 
boardroom table’ (Edensor, 2005, p. 838). They can also become the site for more adult forms of 
“play”, including alcohol and drug use, sexual encounters and a range of other illicit events (DeSilvey 
& Edensor, 2012, p. 476). They may also be targeted by those who seek commercial gain, stripping 
these locations of anything of value (see Figure 5). 
Whilst active urban sites are haunted by the possibility of their eventual closure and 
subsequent environmental decline, the inherent disorder of the urban ruin heightens one’s awareness 
of the systems that would once have sought to delay this eventuality. Although the imprint of these 
former process of spatial regulation, segregation or securitisation may remain evident within these 
environments, ‘these regulatory forms… are deconstructed by decay as walls erode and rooms belong 
to formless labyrinths’  (Edensor, 2005, p. 841). These spaces can often seem abandoned, as though 
their former occupants simply left. In Detroit, for example, which experienced significant levels of 
urban decay, one resident reflected that it was as though there ‘was a mass exodus – as if a phone call 
was made, a warning was thrown out – and everyone left what they were doing at that moment and 
walked away for good’ (Requiem for Detriot, 2010). These are no longer spaces that are structured 
around human systems, often generating the abiding sensation they have been the target of a 
malevolent and inhuman force that has ‘gleefully violated the order of things. Water and heating pipes 
are stripped of cladding and broken, electric wiring is severed, sewers are blocked with detritus, 
telephones are detached from connections, roads and rail lines disappear under banks of earth, 
radiators and lights are smashed and disconnected’ (Edensor, 2005, p. 842).  
3.1.3 Examining Urban Space in Video Games 
The preceding analyses have explored the role of different forms of urban space, examining the 
process by which a sense of identity and belonging can be mediated through different aspects of the 
surrounding environment. This has been shown to be a varied social, political and cultural process, as 
the formation of national memory is grounded in our interactions with both monumental and 
everyday forms of space (Edensor, 2005, p. 830; Stangl, 2008, p. 245).  
 Section 3.1.1 examined the production of national identity through one’s engagement with 
regimented spaces of collective memory, including the sites of monuments, memorials and museums. 
The section first examined the role of such spaces, examining the connection between “monumental” 
spaces and the formation of common understandings of national values and histories. The 
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representation of these symbolic structures within video games is the focus of Chapter Five, which 
examines how the process of spatial encounter is used both to situate the player and to justify the 
deployment of specific forms of violence. It should, however, be highlighted that this section also 
problematizes the prevailing focus on memorial sites, emphasising that ‘sites of reified memory, like 
other overcoded spaces, are haunted by ambiguity and multiplicity’ (Edensor, 2005, p. 835). These 
sites are not a benign mediation of past histories and events, but rather serve as an active and evolving 
index of changing values and ideologies. As a result, it is also important to consider the creation of a 
space at the more individual, everyday scale. 
 As a result, therefore, Section 3.1.2 focussed specifically on mundane sites. Here, the 
connection to the surrounding environment is generated through one’s interaction with familiar 
spaces. This chapter began by exploring the interrelated notions of “house” and “home”, before 
broadening to include the local environment. Such a focus provides a valuable means by which to 
highlight the more unreflexively apprehended spaces and routines that generate a more personal 
sense of spatial situatedness. Chapter Five examines the representation of these different forms of 
mundane, domestic spaces within video games, examining the ways in which these environments are 
used to privilege specific nations and national citizenries.   
This section also addressed the presence of spatial “ghosts” and explored the extent to which 
national identities and a sense of territorial connection can be evoked through one’s encounter with 
the environments and assorted ephemera that are encountered within our everyday lives. Such a 
focus resonates with the earlier discussion of banal nationalism (see Chapter Two), which suggests 
that ‘nationalism abides in the little things, jokes, advertisements, street names, weather reports, and 
so on, which assume the presence of nations’ (Hearn, 2007, p. 660).  This analysis engaged specifically 
with ruined sites, examining the ways in which the structure of these environments may imprint upon 
visiting bodies. Whilst this work has often focussed upon industrial sites (see, for example, Edensor, 
2005), such a framework can also be applied to representations of mundane landscapes that have 
been similarly stripped of their associated civilian bodies and everyday flows.  
 It is also important to acknowledge that this encounter with urban spatiality is not the only 
site at which it is possible to examine the scripting of influential forms of political spatiality. Our 
understandings of the world are also connected to the ways in which we encounter peripheral rural 
sites. The following section, as a result, addresses the manner in which “rural space” is commonly 
theorised, ahead of a discussion of the representation of such spaces within Chapter Six.  
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3.2 Representing Rural Space  
The term “rural” has long been utilised in a process of territorial differentiation, used to signify the 
material existence of an open and peripheral form of spatiality that lies beyond the borders and 
protections that are associated with the city (Edensor, 2002, p. 49; Perkins, 2006, p. 243). Whilst this 
broad distinction remains familiar and intuitive today, it is notable that we often still struggle to 
consciously articulate our understandings of the precise distinction between urban and rural forms of 
space. As Woods surmises, ‘we could probably all instinctively say whether any given place was rural 
to use, rather than urban, but explaining why it was rural, not urban, and drawing a boundary line 
between urban and rural spaces are altogether more difficult tasks’ (2011, p. 2). Whilst this has also 
been a problematic theoretical issue, resulting in a notable lack of overall critical unity (see, for 
example, Halfacree, 2006, p. 45; Hoggart, 1990, p. 246; Woods, 2011, p. 1), the study of rural 
geographies can be divided into a series of broad critical emphases: descriptive or functional 
approaches, a political-economic approach, and the notion of an “imagined” rurality (see Cloke, 2006; 
Halfacree, 1993; 2006). The distinction between these different approaches provides a means by 
which it is possible to situate my own analysis.  
 Much of the early research into rural geographies sought to identify the specific spatial 
characteristics that constituted the designation of rurality. One of the most wide-ranging 
engagements of this nature sought to develop ‘an index of rurality for England and Wales’ (Cloke, 
1977; 1978; Cloke & Edwards, 1986), calculating a region’s perceived level of rurality from 
characteristics such as population density, housing conditions and land use patterns. Such approaches 
often suggested that rural settlements were smaller in size and lower-order in nature (Cloke, 2006, p. 
20). 
 Other similar research sought to ascertain the specific socio-cultural characteristics that are 
associated with rural space, engaging with the extent to which different spatial characteristics can be 
seen to affect the behaviours, attitudes and way of life that is associated with the various different 
individuals and communities that are found in these areas (see, for example, Heley & Jones, 2012). As 
Halfacree reflects, such research suggested that urbanism could be characterised as ‘dynamic, 
unstable, mobile in stratification and impersonal, with contacts being determined by one’s precise 
situation at the time (work, home, leisure)’ (1993, p. 25). Rural spaces, in contrast, were argued to 
engender a way of living which facilitates the formation of a cohesive group identity – one which was 
believed to be characterised by both shared values (such as a respect for the environment) and 
common forms of spatial practice (Cloke, 2006, p.20). The nature of the rural space was, as a result, 
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often believed to be closely tied to the practices of agriculture, horticulture, forestry or environmental 
conservation (Cloke, 2003, p. 2; 2006, p. 20; Perkins, 2006, p. 243). 
Whilst the close examination of the descriptive or socio-cultural characteristics that are 
associated with an individual region may provide a useful means by which to examine the structure of 
that specific rural space, the associated claims to have accessed the characteristics of a distinctive and 
separate material “rurality” are more problematic. These attempts to provide a “definition” of rural 
space imply a fundamental homogeneity, obfuscating the role of some such areas in a varied range of 
different entrepreneurial, capitalist and consumptive activities (Cloke, 2006, p. 18; Hoggart, 1990, p. 
245; Perkins, 2006, p. 244; Woods, 2011, p. 7). These attempts to define “rurality” can, as a result, 
often be seen to have reproduced prior assumptions about the nature of “urban” and “rural” regions 
and do little to develop our broader critical comprehension: - 
‘The “definitions” are better seen as research tools for the articulation of specific aspects 
of the rural than as ways of defining the rural. Their methods involve trying to fit a 
definition to what we already intuitively consider to be rural, in the absence of any other 
justification as to why they should be regarded as representing the rural. In other words, 
they are trying to put the cart before the horse, the rural having already been “defined” 
by those doing the classifying’ (Halfacree, 1993, p. 24; see also Cloke, 2006, p.20)  
This means that they serve to simply reproduce existing and commonly-held spatial dichotomies, 
without either demonstrating that there are specific characteristics that are intrinsically and 
exclusively “rural” in nature, or explaining how such characteristics have shaped the lived realities of 
rural life (Cloke, 2006, p. 20; Woods, 2011, p. 7). 
 Whilst these descriptive and socio-cultural approaches were initially bolstered by a 
romanticist defence of “rural” cultures and traditions – which suggested that such spaces were 
emblematic of a ‘stable harmonious community [including] everything “positive” that urban life seems 
to lack’ (Halfacree, 1993, pp.25-26) – subsequent “political-economic” forms of analysis have sought 
to deemphasise the supposed material specificity of rural space. Unlike descriptive or socio-cultural 
approaches, which aimed to uncover the specific characteristics of rural spaces and societies, the 
political-economic approaches highlight the role of external, extra-rural influences upon such regions 
(see, for example, Buttel & Newby, 1980; Cloke, 1989; 2006; Perkins, 2006, p.243). These may take 
the form of specific regional or national pressures, resulting from the influence of specific practices of 
economic regulation or governance, or may be the result of globalised practices of deindustrialisation, 
free-trade, corporatisation, or privatisation (Cloke, 2006, p. 20; Perkins, 2006, pp. 243-244). This 
conceptualisation suggests that the nature of rural space will inevitably be varied in form and function, 
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as a result of the different forces that act upon it, and that it will always frustrate attempts to provide 
a singular definition (Newby, 1986, p. 209). This prompted some calls to entirely abandon the concept 
of “rurality” as an analytical term: -    
‘Failure to do so is like putting together a football team whose players are drawn from 
Australian rules, gridiron, rugby and soccer, and not telling any of them which set of rules 
apply on the field’ (Hoggart, 1990, p. 246) 
Such analyses were not, however, sufficient to entirely eliminate the focus on a material rurality. 
Whilst some political-economic analyses emphasise the changing conditions of production and 
consumption, suggesting that these prohibit the possibility of a distinctive material rurality (see, for 
example, Hoggart, 1990), other analyses suggest that these influences act to produce specific 
structural coherences – identifiable as “rurality” – that exist within particular places and at particular 
moments in time (Cloke & Goodwin, 1992; 1993; Harvey, 1985). Rather than seeking to identify 
uniform characteristics, such analyses argue for the formation of a “rural dimension” that is defined 
by broader traits: -  
‘(1) A pleasant environment which will attract the willing or unwilling unemployed; (2) A 
“spaced-out” geographical structure which leads to accessibility problems and costly 
public services; (3) A distinctive local political ideology which favours the market, the 
volunteer and the self-helper rather than public sector intervention’ (Cloke, 2006, p. 21) 
It is also notable that, despite the attempts to ‘do away with [the] rural’ (Hoggart, 1988; 1990) as an 
analytical concept, the term has nonetheless retained a clear cultural traction (Cloke, 2006, p. 18; 
Woods, 2011, p. 8). Recent research has, as a result, acknowledged the extent to which our 
understandings of “rural” spaces are produced through their continued manufacture and 
(re)presentation within different forms of cultural discourse (see, for example, Robinson, J. 2016 on 
theatre; Horton, 2008a; 2008b on children’s fiction; Fish, 2007; Murphy, 2013 on film). Such an 
emphasis is representative of the extent to which the sign of rurality has become increasingly 
disconnected from its meanings (or processes of signification), partly due to the variety of different 
meanings that circulate within political and popular discourse (Cloke, 2006, pp. 21-22; Halfacree, 1993, 
pp. 31-34). These different imaginaries can also be used in order to highlight the extent to which both 
the sign and the signification have become detached from their original referent, meaning that the 
notion of “rurality” can be detached from real-world, actually-existing spaces and can instead be 
understood as a ‘category of thought’ (Mormont, 1990, p.40; see also Cloke, 2006, p.22; Halfacree, 
1993, pp.29-31; Woods, 2011, p.16). The notion of “rurality”, conceived of in such a way, is understood 
to refer to the fluid, constructed and imaginative notions of rural space that act to produce and 
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reproduce the values, objects, practices and places that we have come to associate with the 
experience of non-urban, peripheral regions (Cloke, 2006, p. 21; Woods, 2011, p. 9). The nature of the 
rural imaginary can thus take a wide variety of different forms, with no single representational practice 
necessarily dominant either within a given society or at a particular moment in time (Casstree & Braun, 
2006, p. 161; Murphy, 2013; Robinson, 2016; Woods, 2011). As Halfacree notes, a list of “rural” spatial 
imaginaries ‘could include [the] countryside, wilderness, outback, periphery, farm belt, village, hamlet, 
bush, peasant society, pastoral, garden, unincorporated territory [and] open space’ (2006, p.45; see 
also Bunce, 1994; Fish, 2007; Short, 1991). This analysis will engage with three of the constructed 
conceptualisations of rural space that are particularly common within Western culture: the rural idyll, 
the backwoods, and the wilderness (see Murphy, 2013, p.6; Woods, 2011, p.18). Each of these 
imaginaries offers a specific conceptualisation of both rural space and the peoples that live in rural 
regions, providing a descriptive framework through which it is possible to analyse the representation 
of rural spatialities within video games. The following subsections examine how each of these 
imaginaries are commonly constructed, as well as the different aspects of rural life that they might 
deny or exclude. 
3.2.1. The Rural Idyll and the Backwoods: Opposing Imaginaries of Rural Life  
Each rural imaginary is temporally and culturally-specific, as ‘each generation of country-dwellers and 
observers sees what it wants to see in the land: romantic beauty, nostalgic traces of the rustic past, 
peace, tranquillity, despoiled landscapes, brutal intrusions of modernisation, hurry, noise [and] 
pollution’ (Mingay, 1989, p.6; see also Bell, 2006, p.150; Bunce, 1994, pp.5-35; Short, 2006, pp.133-
142). The “idyllic” imaginary envisages rural spaces to be ‘simple, innocent and virtuous’ (Woods, 
2011, p.17), offering a more authentic and wholesome way of life than one could hope to enjoy within 
the confines of the city (Cloke, 2003, p. 1; Perkins, 2006, p. 244; Short, 1991, p. 31). Such an imaginary 
holds the “rural” space to be representative of the various social and cultural values that have been 
lost to urbanism, as each generation views their own histories as ‘unsettled and subject to disruptive 
change. They will compare this with the past, sometimes only a generation before, when things were 
stable and ordered or, in the more glowing accounts, an Eden or a golden age’ (Eldridge & Eldridge, 
1994, p.178; see also Edensor, 2002, p.43; Short, 1991, p.31). Our understandings of these “idyllic” 
rural imaginaries are continually disciplined by the production and reproduction of a series of different 
visual and linguistic signifiers. Bunce, for example, suggests that the idyllic imaginary is evoked through 
‘the aesthetics of pastoral landscapes, of humans working in harmony with nature and the land and 
with each other, of a whole scene of contentment and plenty’ (2004, p.14; see also Bell, 2006, p.149 
on the Catalonian countryside; Edensor, 2002, p.41 on the British countryside). These precepts serve 
to create a powerful association between national values and rurality, creating a space which serves 
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as a ‘repository of [the] norms, values and treasures which both illustrate and shape what is precious 
in a nation, a region, or a locality’ (Cloke, 2003, p. 1; see also Short, 1991, p.35). Whilst there has been 
no single universal or static conceptualisation of the rural idyll, different variations on these precepts 
can be seen to be produced and maintained within the content of popular cultural artefacts. Bunce 
refers to this cultural evocation of the idyllic rural imaginary as the development of an ‘armchair 
countryside’ (1994, pp. 37-76), highlighting the role of different groups of middle-class urban dwellers 
in establishing the values that are to be associated with rurality and rural space. Bell offers a similar 
observation, arguing that ‘the genealogy of the rural idyll shows it to be an urban construction, the 
country cannot exist without the city to be its “not-a”. So the place to find the rural idyll is in the city, 
since that is where it is made’ (2006, p. 150). This is, for example, evident in the widespread role of 
natural imaginaries within the different forms of literature, poetry and painting that were in 
circulation at the end of the eighteenth century. This widespread creation and distribution of images 
of a natural, aesthetically-pleasing environment to a mass market provided an effective contrast to 
the industrial lifestyle, functioning as an escapist and aspirational ideal: -  
‘Poetry and art combined to foster an enthusiasm for scenic landscapes. Painting or 
picturesque scenes became the dominant fashion for patrons of art, who rushed to buy 
landscapes of Claude, Reynolds, Gainsborough and Gilpin to decorate the walls of their 
country houses and urban villas’ (Bunce, 1994, p. 37) 
This contrast between rural and urban spaces remains evident within a number of different forms of 
contemporary popular culture and mass media, which draw upon the “idyllic” rural precepts and their 
associated cultural or social values. There are, for example, a range of rural-themed magazines that 
market the rural lifestyle as a commercially-available, aspirational lifestyle goal for the urban dwelling 
individual. These releases include, but are not limited to, titles such as Country Life, Country Living, 
Country Homes & Interiors, and This England. These magazines showcase a wide-range of commercial 
products that are designed to appeal to a broader sense of rural nostalgia, including ‘William Morris 
prints, pine furniture, dried flowers, wicker baskets, patchwork quilts and earthen pottery’ (Bunce, 
1994, p. 59). These depictions create the sense that, through their potential purchase of such items, 
the would-be consumer ‘buys (into) the countryside’ (Short, 2006, p. 143) and the values and life-style 
that are associated with such regions.  
 This vicarious, urban-based consumption of rural life is also evident within the ‘geography-
genre’ (Thompson, 2010) of television programming, which includes series such as Countryfile, River 
Cottage and Countrywise. These different, country-themed forms of programming can take a range of 
different forms, incorporating formats such magazine-style reporting, travelogues, or wildlife 
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programming (Thompson, 2010, pp. 58-61). These forms of programming, as Thompson (2010) 
highlights, have a two-fold role in creating our conceptualisations of the “idyllic” rural periphery. 
Firstly, such programming offers its audience ‘immediately available images of a countryside, its 
produce, the livestock and wildlife that are not otherwise visible in a suburban life, and its open spaces 
where such things as swimming in rivers can be tried out’ (Thompson, 2010, p. 62). At the time of 
writing, for example, recent episodes of the BBC series Countryfile – which aims to access ‘the people, 
places and stories making news in the British countryside’ (BBC, 2018) – have highlighted rural crafts 
(such as reed cutting), have taken the viewer on coastal walks, and have gone on the hunt for the 
Easter bunny. These programmes also serve to highlight rural issues, mediating some of the challenges 
to our conventionally-held imaginaries of idyllic rurality. In the Countryfile episode dedicated to rural 
crafts, for example, the programme emphasised the contemporary fragility of the various different 
traditional pursuits that it featured.       
The idyllic rural imaginary also serves a broader role as the backdrop for a range of both radio 
and television programmes, as well as films. These include both classic fictions such as All Creatures 
Great and Small (1978-1990), The Archers (1950- ) and Heartbeat (1992-2010), and more recent fare 
such as Happy Valley (2014- ) and Father Brown (2013- ). Such dramatizations also serve to relay 
different aspects of the mythology that surrounds rural life. Bunce, for example, reflects on the extent 
to which the television series All Creatures Great and Small (which was based on the books of the 
veterinary surgeon Alf Wright) can be seen to reinforce a sense of shared nostalgia, through its 
inclusion of idyllic signifiers ranging from ‘rustic farm characters and earthy agricultural customs to 
eccentric squirearchy and the parochial village community’ (1994, p. 49). This level of idyllic 
sentimentality was particularly evident in the level of tourist traffic driven to visit the locations of these 
dramas, including regions such as the North York Moors (so-called “Heartbeat country”) and Holmfirth 
(the setting for Last of the Summer Wine). Following the death of Peter Walker, the author behind the 
Heartbeat series, one Goathland resident reflected that ‘people would have moved… if it weren’t for 
the jobs in tourism he created with the books and the series. He kept quite a few youngsters here – 
the hotels are a lot busier because of Heartbeat’ (Flanagan, 2017). 
A similar level of rural nostalgia is evident in children’s fictions, through which ‘we are 
brainwashed from birth by representational values which present a cumulative foundation for both 
reflexive and instinctive reactions to rurality’ (Cloke, 2003, p.1; see also Bunce, 1994, pp.51-56; 
Horton, 2008b, p.390; Jones, 2007, pp.179-183). In many such fictions, including particularly those 
that are targeted at very young readers, the “idyllic” rural regions are almost entirely stripped of 
human life. Instead, as Bunce notes, such narratives suggest that the ‘animals are the country folk – 
the real inhabitants of villages, woods, fields, and river banks’ (1994, p.53; emphasis in original). This 
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anthropomorphism is evident within a number of enduring examples of children’s fiction, including 
works such as Winnie the Pooh, The Wind in the Willows, and The Animals of Farthing Wood. Where 
adults and urban activities collide with these harmonious worlds, however, they are represented as a 
source of danger and disruption:-  
‘Never mind that in the wild the weasel would kill the rabbit and the fox would gobble 
the mole. The moral message is clear. Man has a monopoly of cruelty. Wild animals left 
to themselves form a peaceful, harmonious, caring community’ (Ridley, 1998, p. 142)  
In other forms of children’s fiction, meanwhile, rural spaces are represented as “idyllic” human 
communities, often through the inclusion of a series of stereotypical characters and visual cues. 
Horton, for example, reflects that that the village of Greendale (the setting for the Postman Pat series) 
is represented as a ‘picturesque and evocative countryscape of (traffic-free) winding country lanes, 
ivy-clad stone cottages (inhabited by “locals”, not commuters), hedgerows, dry stone walls, stone 
bridges over gentle streams, farmhouses, and free-range livestock, set against an (unindustrialised) 
backdrop of rolling hills, patchwork fields, and distant mountain scenery’ (Horton, 2008a, p. 390; see 
also Horton, 2008b, p. 400). This representation of the rural idyll provided a straightforward and 
formative narration of the “realities” of rural life, devoid of any of broader social, cultural or political 
issues, rendering its associated imagery a normalised, taken-for-granted part of what the rural is and 
looks like (Horton, 2008b, pp. 396-397). 
In other forms of children’s fictions, directed at an older audience, the representation of the 
countryside offers ‘a familiar and yet at the same time imaginary world which serves as a retreat from 
adult-dominated everyday experience’ (Bunce, 1994, p.51; see also Jones, 2007, p.178). In such works, 
the rural periphery is represented as a space of freedom, adventure and exploration. Examples of such 
fictions include the enduring Enid Blyton series The Famous Five and the Secret Seven, which offer 
their young readers ‘a place where children can still feel secure within a modern version of the old 
social order, yet at the same time roam free across an accessible countryside’ (Bunce, 1994, pp. 55-
56). This has the effect of tying the “natural” freedoms associated with childhood – including play, 
exploration and encounter – to the heart of the national identity, represented through the “natural” 
imagery associated with the rural countryside.  
In each of the above examples, the evocation of the rural idyll provides a representation of the 
rural countryside that is designed to fulfil specific narrative or commercial objectives through the 
evocation of specific values and attributes. Indeed, as Jones notes, ‘the countryside can easily be 
reconstructed to provide suitable setting for these stories. There is a kind of spiralling logic at work 
here in which these discourses build up momentum’ (2007, p.181; see also Horton, 2008b, p.396). The 
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various different forms of “idyllic” cultural narrative draw their strength from the continued 
circulation and recirculation of the values, images and ideals that are already prominent within the 
broader cultural consciousness. Whilst this means that the rural idyll can be afforded potency as a 
cultural mythology, insofar as it acts in opposition to the broader processes of urbanisation and social 
change, it means that it is also often reductive in its characterisation of rural regions and the lived 
realities within such spaces. The countryside, as Bunce notes, risks becoming ‘no more than a series 
of distorted impressions of nature and country life which only serve to perpetuate the mythology of 
the countryside ideal’ (1994, p. 62). Whilst the valorisation of the rural life can serve to elevate it above 
everyday urban life, it can also – for example – cause us to overlook the frequency with which its 
associated pursuits are experienced as being suffocating and ritualistic: -    
‘The idealised view of the countryside… originally developed from the depiction of 
shepherd life, a rural pursuit closer to hunter-gathering and less connected with the 
backbreaking labour of ploughing, sowing and harvesting. Shepherds can more easily be 
shown as standing around watching the wool grow on the back of sheep. Nature does 
most of the work’  (Short, 1991, p. 38) 
The image of a virtuous and spiritually-filling rural life can also be used to obfuscate the connections 
between rural and urban areas, as well as any associated consequences. Such an imaginary can, for 
example, be seen to have masked ‘the exploitation and oppression of the countryside, first through 
the brutality of feudalism and later through the appropriation of the rural life for capitalist production 
in the agrarian revolution’ (Woods, 2011, p. 18). More recently, this representation of the rural as 
“idyll” has served to mask the pace and scale of contemporary rural change, with such areas now 
serving as multifunctional spaces with a role in both productive activities (such as forestry or 
agriculture) and consumptive activities (such as the tourism and outdoor leisure industries) (da Silva, 
et al., 2016, p. 78; Woods, 2011).  
Whilst the idyllic imaginary has helped to draw urban peoples to the countryside, integrating 
them into such practices, an increase in both tourist activity and counter-urban migration has meant 
that the needs of rural communities are brought into conflict with both the expectations of their 
visitors and the stresses that are associated with an increased population. The idyllic imaginaries held 
by tourists, for example, may be destabilised by the realities of rural practice, including the noises and 
smells associated with machines and farm animals, the use of fences and pesticides, and the 
environmental degradation associated with the demands of agribusiness (Bell, 2006, p. 149; Short, 
2006, p. 143). An influx of new rural residents, meanwhile, may also necessitate the creation of new 
buildings or roadways in order to cope with the increased demand, which may act to undermine the 
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tranquillity that brought these people into such regions in the first place (Bell, 2006, p. 149). These 
new rural “residents” may also only be present for a part of the year - treating their countryside 
properties as holiday homes - meaning that some buildings may stand empty and that local economies 
may suffer8.  
Whilst the “idyllic” rural may have only a limited relationship to the realities of rural life, an 
examination of this imaginary provides a valuable means by which to identify and interrogate 
culturally-specific nations of “rural space” and “rural values”. In examining the Postman Pat series, for 
example, it is possible to detect some groups and behaviours that are excluded from the “idyllic” rural 
imaginary: -  
‘[An attentive viewer] might notice an absence of non-white, non-Christian, homosexual, 
homeless, poor, disabled, criminal or unhappy characters in the village. Moreover, 
industrialisation, unemployment, poverty, social exclusion, inequality, consumerism, and 
other than patriarchal nuclear family life might be identified as not part of life in 
Greendale’  (Horton, 2008b, p. 390) 
Whilst “idyllic” rural imaginaries will often simply exclude the negative aspects of rural life, other forms 
of popular “rural” discourse have sought to amplify both the sense of idyll-disturbance and the 
disconnection between the “imagined” rural and the contemporary lived experience of rural regions. 
One example of this is evident in the folk music album The Imagined Village (The Imagined Village, 
2007). During the song Hard Times of Old England Retold – an adaptation of the original Hard Times 
of Old England (Steeleye Span, 1975) – the artists reflect on the often-unseen issues that accompany 
the practices of farming and the supposedly “idyllic” rural lifestyle. One verse, for example, reflects on 
the extent to which the acceleration of counter-urban migration has impacted upon the character of 
rural communities: - 
‘More and more of our village gets sold every day, to folks from the city who are happy 
to pay, for their holiday cottage to stand empty all day. Singing oh the hard times of Old 
England - In Old England very hard times’ (The Imagined Village, 2007) 
The accompanying album cover (Figure 6) also serves to problematize our understandings of “idyllic” 
rurality, utilising a distinctive visual style – one that is normally seen in porcelain depictions of 
conventional idyllic images – to show the encroachment of the city upon the “natural” rural space.  
                                                          
8 For a broader overview of the debate surrounding the role of second homes in rural areas, see Rye 
2011. 
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Jones, meanwhile, reflects on the subversion of the “idyllic” discourse with film. Drawing upon the 
example of the French film Will It Snow at Christmas? (1996), he argues that ‘the idea of the idyll is 
overshadowed by the oppression of poverty and child labour, the corrosive patriarchal power, and the 
predatory sexual aggression of the father’ (2007, p. 183). Within such narratives, one’s position within 
the countryside – and enjoyment of its freedoms – serves only to compensate its residents for the 
drudgery and dangers of everyday life. Woodward and Winter, offer a similar reflection on the extent 
to which ‘British cinema in the post-war period still manages to sneak rural suggestions under the 
wire, to help consolidate links between Britishness, “character”, wartime endurance and (ultimately) 
military victory’ (2007, p. 100). The evocation of conventional “British” rurality, evident in films such 
as A Town Like Alice and The Bridge on the River Kwai, is made synonymous with the experience of 
personal strengths, even whilst the surrounding environment may actually be dangerous or degrading.  
Other examples of critical or counter-idyllic discourse are, however, much more extreme in 
their depiction of rural regions, which are shown to be ‘dangerous locations, places where urban 
people are at high risk of being savagely killed and tortured by demented, in-bred locals without 
conscience or constraint’ (DeKeseredy et al, 2014, p.179; see also Bell, 1997, p.93; Murphy, 2013, p.11; 
Woods, 2011, p.18). Contrasting his own approach to the ‘twee pastoralisms’ that are associated with 
Bunce’s notion of the armchair countryside, Bell advances his own notion of ‘the behind the sofa 
countryside, a place far, far from idyllic’ (1997, p.95; emphasis in original). This form of counter-idyllic 
imaginary, which can also be referred to as the ‘backwoods’ (Murphy, 2013), is also produced by the 
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Figure 6: The Imagined Village Album Cover (2007) 
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contrast between rural and urban spaces, as well as their associated values. This is commonly a realm 
in which the “normal” and “civilised” values that are associated with urban spaces and peoples are 
shown to be invalidated by the hostility and violence of the rural world and rural people (Bell, 1997, 
p. 96; DeKeseredy, et al., 2014, p. 183). This representational practice is particularly common within 
the horror genre, within which this juxtaposition is established through the representation of 
‘deserted mansions (in countless vampire films); the cottage in the country which urban travellers 
(lost, or let down by their car) take futile refuge… whole villages in which evil runs amok, and into 
which witless urbanites stumble or are ensnared… and endless permeations of city folk transplanted 
to the country on camping trips, or out hiking, touring or exploring, or at summer camps’ (Bell, 1997, 
p.96). Within the long-running Wrong Turn franchise, for example, the various groups of travellers all 
encounter the archetypal hillbilly cannibals due to one single poor decision, whether a poorly chosen 
travel route, an ill-chosen sanctuary, by hosting an event in the wrong place, or simply by venturing 
too far from the city. This notion of the lost or displaced urban traveller has become a familiar genre 
trope, to the extent that it is openly parodied within films such as The Cabin in the Woods (2012)9. The 
website TV Tropes, for example, which tracks the recurrence of different genre mechanisms across 
multiple cultural artefacts, refers to this as the ‘Don’t Go into the Woods’ trope: -  
‘Two or more people, often a group of teenagers, go for a casual hike or a vacation at a 
secluded retreat… Horrible things ensue. The soon-to-be-not-so-happy campers get 
stalked through the trees by psychotic killers; they run afoul of tribes of inbred hillbillies; 
ghosts, werewolves, witches, druids, fairies and other such beings toy with 
them; malevolent eyes gaze at them from every shadow; perhaps even the trees 
themselves attack them; they hear strange noises in the night; people disappear; people 
go insane’ (Tv Tropes, 2018) 
This collision between urban and rural spaces is often disciplined by the representation of particular 
gender norms (Bell, 1997, pp. 98-99; Clover, 1992, pp. 124-127; DeKeseredy, et al., 2014, p. 180; 
Murphy, 2013, p. 8). The rural locations in which these films are set are, for example, often shown to 
be occupied by a particular caricature of rural masculinity, variously referred to as the hillbilly, redneck 
or mountain man (Bell, 1997, p. 96). The characterisation of these figures, such as those depicted in 
                                                          
9 In The Cabin in the Woods, the group of teenage travellers encounter the “Harbinger” – a seemingly 
mad old man, who offers a vague warning about proceeding on their journey to the titular “cabin”. 
Later, when it transpires that the group have been chosen as human sacrifices for an all-powerful God 
figure (implied to be the viewer), it is revealed that the group had to have chosen to ignore a warning 
not to leave civilisation in order to fulfil their assigned roles.  
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Two Thousand Maniacs (1964), Deliverance (1972) and the Texas Chainsaw Massacre franchise (1974-
2017), portrays them as a group ‘who do not observe the civilised rules of hygiene or personal habit… 
Country people snort when they breathe, snore when they sleep [and] drool when they eat’ (Clover, 
1992, pp.125-126). These rural men are depicted as emblematic of a counter-modern and backwards 
culture, and are often shown to be ‘carrying muzzle-loaded rifles and drinking moonshine or some 
other intoxicant. The men… often have names that imply that they are illiterate or nearly so, like Clem, 
Zeke, or Jethro’ (DeKeseredy et al., 2014, p.180; see also Murphy, 2013, p.8). In some instances, it is 
implied that urban spaces and values are the causal factors in the acts of aggression that are 
perpetrated by rural men. Sharrett, for example, suggests that the Texas Chainsaw Massacre film 
serves to show ‘the violent disruption of the security and stability of rural and suburban life’ (Sharrett, 
cited in Bell, 1997, p.97; see also Clover, 1992, p.129 on the role of capitalism in The Hill Have Eyes; 
DeKeseredy et al, 2014, p.185 on the role of capitalism in Shark Night 3D). More commonly, however, 
such behaviours are linked to the choice of rural men to dwell in rural regions, where it is implied that 
they can indulge broader behavioural tendencies ‘of inbreeding, insularity, backwardness [and] sexual 
perversion (especially incest and bestiality)’ (Bell, 1997, p.182). 
Rural women, in contrast, are represented – if at all – as ‘either hardened, asexual 
grandmothers, or sexual objects with large breasts, curvaceous hips, halter tops, and skimpy, frayed 
denim short-shorts’ (DeKeseredy, et al., 2014, p. 180). In the latter of these two archetypes, rural 
women are transformed into the object of the urban fetish: the highly sexualised, scantily-clad, 
promiscuous caricature that is common in so-called “gonzo” pornographic videos and cartoons 
(DeKeseredy, et al., 2014, p. 179). This gendered social structure is also evident in the ways in which 
rural horror films depict the interaction between the urban dweller and the rural environment, as this 
genre will ‘often show as female victims those more likely to have had sexual relations, and as 
survivors those females who abstained from sex’ (DeKeseredy, et al., 2014, p. 183; see also Clover, 
1992, p.34). This depiction of rural gender roles seems to validate a patriarchal social structure, within 
which rural women – or women who enter into rural regions - are controlled and used by men.  
The representation of the so-called “final girl”10, meanwhile, offers a direct subversion of 
these implied patriarchal norms. Clover, for example, notes the frequency with which the patriarchal 
male rescuer is ‘blown away for their troubles, leaving the girl to fight her own fight. Policemen, 
fathers, and sheriffs appear only long enough to demonstrate risible incomprehension and 
incompetence’ (1992, p. 44). The character of the final girl is shown to have the characteristics that 
                                                          
10 The representational trope of the ‘final girl’, which is common in horror fictions, refers to those 
instances when a would-be victim (usually the last such character left alive) turns on her assailant.   
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the urban dweller would seek for themselves, which are denied to both the peripheral Other and the 
other, usually more morally-ambiguous characters: ‘[t]he practiced viewer distinguishes her from her 
friends minutes into the film. She is the Girl Scout, the bookworm, the mechanic’ (Clover, 1992, p. 39). 
The audience, who might root for the killer for much of the movie, are expected to root for the return 
of this specific character to the civilised urban core, in order that she might leave the violence of the 
rural regions both literally and figuratively behind.  
 Whilst the representation of the “backwoods” can therefore serve a symbolic value, pointing 
to the dangers of going beyond the civilised urban core, the associated imaginary can also be used in 
order to structure what civilised behaviours actually are. Such a process allows for a particular group 
or region, whilst still technically a part of the broader national whole, to be excluded from the default 
protections that are extended by the state-system. Eriksson, for example, examines the 
representational practices evident in The Hunters, arguing that the film plays a key role in the 
construction of Norrland (northern Sweden) through continued ‘modifications to themes such as not 
only rurality, out-migration and regional subsidies, but also backwardness and xenophobia’ (2010, p. 
95). In showing the Norrland regions to be occupied by violent, animal-killing rapists and murders, the 
film is shown to maintain “our” values by showing “us” what we cannot allow ourselves to be – the 
national space becomes fundamentally ‘gendered, racialized and classified’ (Eriksson, 2010, p. 95). 
3.2.2. The Wilderness 
The final formulation of rurality that is offered in this chapter is that of the wilderness, an imaginary 
that is rooted in the transition from a hunter-gather economy to an agricultural society. As Short 
highlights, the term wilderness ‘emerges then, because it is only with settled agriculture that a 
distinction is made between cultivated and uncultivated land, savage and settled, domesticated and 
wild animals’ (1991, p. 5; see also Woods, 2011, p. 18). The notion of the wilderness is used to faciliate 
a distinction between managed space, whether these are urban centres or productive agricultural 
lands, and the untamed areas that lie outside of this human control. Such a distinction is evident in 
the way in which these external zones are described with political legislation. In the USA, for example, 
the 1964 Wilderness Act states that the ‘wilderness, in contrast with those areas where man and his 
works dominate the landscape, is hereby recognised as an area where the earth and its community of 
life are untrammeled by man, where man himself is a vistor who does not remain’ (cited in Murphy, 
2013, p.6). Whilst the UK government does not operationalise the term “wilderness” in this way, the 
charitable organisation ‘The Wilderness Foundation UK’ (2016) argues that ‘the wilderness is an 
irreplaceable catalyst for personal transformation and growth. In the wild, people experience a deep 
sense of belonging, centredness and peace’. Understood in this way, the “wilderness” is to be 
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regarded as an exterior zone that is somehow beyond the “civilising” effects of urban life – it is 
somewhere where humans are either absent, or else are present only on a transitional basis. 
 As an analytical measure, however, the concept of the wilderness is more problematic. As 
Cronon highlights, ‘the trouble is that our cultural traditions and our very language encourage us to 
think that wilderness and nature are, well, natural’ (1996a). We are encouraged to think of the 
existence of the wilderness as somehow self-evident – as an actually-existing zone that can be defined 
and characterised through critical investigation. It is this that means that the concept of the wilderness 
‘has a deceptive concretness at first glance. The difficulty is that while the word is a noun, it acts like 
an adjective. There is no specific material object that is wilderness’ (Nash, 2014, p. 1). Like the broader 
notion of “rurality”, the “wilderness” can usefully be thought of as a social and cultural construction. 
It is not a space that is somehow separate from urbanised society, but rather is a manifestation of 
such a society and its associated value systems (Cloke, 2006, pp. 7-8). The wilderness is the product of 
our individual, subjective interpretations of the landscapes that surround us, and our relationships 
with them, and does not exist in a single broad form: -  
‘One man’s wilderness may be another’s roadside picnic ground. The Yukon trapper 
would consider a trip to northern Minnesota a return to civilisation, while for the 
vacationer from Chicago it is a wilderness adventure indeed… Wilderness, in short, is so 
heavily freighted with meaning of a personal, symbolic, and changing kind as to resist 
easy definition’  (Nash, 2014, p. 1) 
Mindful of this, this chapter does not aim to offer a singular definition of the wilderness, but instead 
argues that our understandings of this form of space are the product of a variety of competing and 
contradictory social and spatial mythologies. Short (1991, p. 10) offers one useful example of this 
perceptual dualism, differentiating between the ‘classical’ and ‘romantic’ approaches to wilderness 
spatialities. These understandings, together with their manifestations in contemporary culture, are 
explored below: -  
The Classical Conceptualisation of the Wilderness  
Until the eighteenth century the wilderness was perceived in a primarily negative manner, as a place 
of danger which provoked only fear and anxiety. At a most primal level this sense of fear paralleled 
that of the early settlers, who ‘could hear the call of the wild beasts, the sound of the wind in the 
trees, or the thunderstorms circling around the mountain tops. These were not reassuring noises to 
an agrarian population with limited knowledge of nature and an even more limited ability to control 
it. The fear of the wilderness was a rational response’ (Short, 1991, p. 9). The construction and 
representation of the notion of the wilderness was less about the assignation of specific, measurable 
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characteristics, but rather reflected both the perceived productive value of a particular place and the 
level of control that humanity was perceived to have over that environment. As the wilderness was 
viewed as a desolate place, without value to civilisation and civilised people, the classical perspective 
suggested that progress could be achieved through the creation of a usable space and the 
implementation of agrarian norms of land management (Short, 1991, p. 7; Woods, 2011, p.18).  
 Despite an ever-increasing control over the rural periphery, this fear-laden imaginary has 
remained an enduring part of our cultural narratives. Murphy, for example, notes the tendency of 
American horror and gothic narratives to return modern audiences to the wilderness environments 
that so troubled the early settlers: -   
 ‘It is no coincidence that when American authors and film-makers fantasise about the 
end of civilisation as they know it, they so often produce narratives which unconsciously 
evoke the beginnings of European settlement. In their imaginings of an American end… 
they return to where it all began’ (Murphy, 2013, p. 2) 
Short offers one potential explanation for this, noting that the fear of becoming “lost” in wilderness is 
notably more pronounced in societies that have moved away from the worship of earth-bound god 
figures: -  
‘When gods and spirits are in the earth and on the bough and all around, wilderness as a 
place to fear cannot exist. But when there is tamed and untamed nature and when gods 
are shifted from the earth to the sky… then uncultivated places become the wilderness 
beyond human control, a place to fear’ (Short, 1991, p. 8)  
We can see early examples of this form of wilderness imaginary in biblical accounts of both the 
expulsion of Adam and Eve from Eden, as well as the trials of Jesus. The wilderness space takes on a 
symbolic role in such accounts, standing for one’s distance from the divine and the loss of a spiritually 
pure sense of Self (Short, 1991, p. 8; Cronon, 1996a, pp. 8-9). The encounter with the wilderness 
spaces represents a spiritual lacking, a de-civilising or bewildering experience that exposes the true, 
primal human. Represented in such a way, the concept of the wilderness serves as a spatial metaphor 
that symbolically sets the civilised (urbanised) human against those who live in the wilderness, outside 
of our acknowledged social order. Further examples of such a narrative are legion, evident in the many 
‘tales of evil spirits, monsters and savages resident in the forest, marshes and mountains’ (Woods, 
2011, p.18). Although one’s refusal of the constraining effects of society has the potential to be 
presented in a positive manner, as is evident in ‘the myth of Robin Hood and his merry (oppositional) 
band in Sherwood Forest’ (Short, 1991, p. 9), we are more commonly told of the dangers that result 
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from one’s interaction with these unconstrained and uncivilised Others. Enduring tales such as Little 
Red Riding Hood, which tells the story of a vulnerable girl encountering a literal predator in the 
woodland wilderness, may even be updated in order to more directly appeal to the fears and 
vulnerabilities of a modern audience: -  
‘Consider Red Riding Hood, who strikes off into the wilderness only to be captured and 
eaten by a wolf (whom she foolishly trusts), though she is saved by a passing woodsman. 
Multiply and humanise the wolf, read “rape” for eat, skip the woodsman (let Red save 
herself), and you have I Spit on Your Grave’ (Clover, 1992, p. 124) 
This form of popular culture, which includes films such as Lord of the Flies (1954), The Blair Witch 
Project (1999) and YellowBrickRoad (2010), suggests that we should fear the influence of wilderness 
on the people that enter into such regions (Murphy, 2013, p. 1; Short, 1991, p. 9). As well as containing 
a dangerous and peripheral Other, who does not share our values and renders us vulnerable, the 
wilderness also exposes the potential impermanence of civilisation, the worry that our civilised selves 
can somehow be ‘burned off by contact with the wilderness to reveal the dark underside of the human 
condition. Wilderness becomes an environmental metaphor for the dark side of the psyche’ (Short, 
1991, p. 9). It is represented as a place on the margins, freed from the constraints of civilisation, where 
the individual is free to connect with their wild and primal unconsciousness (Cronon, 1996a, p. 8).  
The Romantic Conceptualisation of the Wilderness 
Whilst the classical conceptualisation suggests that one’s encounter with the undeveloped and 
untamed wilderness will engender only fear and bewilderment, the romantic conceptualisation 
suggests that such encounters offer ‘a rejection of imposed social values and a return to the moral 
authority of a Self [that is] closer to God’ (Short, 1991, p.10; see also Cloke, 2006, p.10). This 
romanticised notion of wilderness spatiality is particularly evident in the characterisation of the 
American frontier. Here, the wilderness is both a site of religious and spiritual renewal, as well as a 
place for personal growth and nationalist revival. Whilst the urban, industrialised society came to be 
regarded as a unnatural and feminising space, one’s entry into the wilderness or “frontier” allowed 
for the recovery of a conventional, unconstrained masculinity through participation in activities such 
as hunting, foraging and camping (Cloke, 2006, pp. 14-15; Cronon, 1996a, p. 20; Woods, 2011, p. 20) 
This meant that the destruction of the wilderness – which would once have been viewed as a form of 
cultural progress – was instead reframed as an act of civic vandalism (Cloke, 2006, p. 13; Short, 1991, 
p. 39). The protection and preservation of the wilderness became a national imperative, with areas of 
natural beauty that were deemed to be particularly emblematic of the “wilderness experience” 
subsequently designated as national parks. Our encounter with this form of rural wilderness often still 
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shows the imprint of a masculinised perceptual framework, however, as these are imagined as 
“female” spaces that are to be controlled, explored and enjoyed by strong men: -  
‘[T]he enjoyment of rural recreation has been equated with sexual pleasure, the aesthetic 
appreciation of rural landscape with the voyeuristic objectification of female beauty, and 
the exploitation of the countryside by walkers, or cyclists, or motorists with sexual 
discovery’ (Woods, 2011, p. 20) 
In being reshaped as these natural sites, offering past masculine freedoms, the notion of the 
“wilderness” risks becoming as false and unnatural as the “urban” society from which people are 
seeking to separate themselves. In dividing the “divine” rural from the “human” urban, we risk leaving 
no space for people as a part of “natural” landscapes and also exclude the imprint of nature upon our 
day-to-day urban environments. The wilderness becomes little more than the fetishisation of rurality 
and divine experience, perpetuating the broader illusion that humanity can escape from the 
consequences of modern life and our shared history and can flee out into the periphery (Cronon, 
1996a, p. 22). Wilderness spaces are not therefore natural, but rather are warped to fit the wilderness 
imaginary that is demanded by the various urban-centric practices of consumption – including those 
of both tourism and rural recreation – manifesting an urban vision of what these peripheral spaces 
ought to look like. This means, as Cronon highlights, that ‘there is nothing natural about the concept 
of the wilderness. It is entirely a creation of the culture that holds it dear, a product of the very history 
it seeks to deny’ (1996a, p. 16). This is particularly evident in the characterisation of the American 
frontier as a place of unaltered, unspoilt natural wilderness, which obscures the displacement of the 
Native American peoples: -  
‘The myth of the wilderness as ‘virgin’, uninhabited land has always been especially cruel 
when seen from the perspective of the Indians who had once called that land home. Now 
they were forced to move elsewhere, with the result that tourists could safely enjoy the 
illusion that they were seeing their nation in its pristine, original state, in the new morning 
of God’s own creation’ (Cronon, 1996a, p. 15; see also Woods, 2011, p. 23) 
One’s experience of the wilderness is a state of mind – a representation of the prevailing construction 
of the natural landscape – and is not limited to a fixed, territorially-bounded locale. If we recognise 
this, then we can draw upon the wilderness in our experience of the urban “home” space (Cronon, 
1996b, p. 50). This is not an abandonment of the role of emotive natural spaces, but rather serves as 
a recognition of the conceptual limitations that are imposed when we evoke the notion of the 
wilderness (Cronon, 1996a, p. 17; Cronon, 1996b, p. 55). The contemporary reverence for the 
wilderness, including the American frontier, is not the result of some reversion to a bygone age, but 
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rather serves as the romantic valorisation of a masculinised and supposedly “natural” state of being 
that has never actually existed within the real world.  
3.2.3. Analysing Rural Space through Military-Themed Video Games 
The preceding literature review has explored the extent to which the notion of “rurality” can be seen 
as a social construction, offering a postmodern and poststructuralist form of analysis that seeks to 
collapse the distinction between material rurality and the fictional representations of rural spatiality 
that are contained within popular culture. Such an perspective resonates with prevailing approaches 
to political spatiality within both International Relations and critical geopolitics which, as discussed in 
Chapter Two, suggest that both politics and national identity are constructed with reference to both 
real and imagined forms of space. Applied to the analysis of military-themed video games, the 
underlying question is therefore not how we ought to define “rurality”. Instead, I focus upon how we 
construct the “meaning” of rurality through our engagement with the various different framing 
mechanism that are used in popular culture, examining the consequences of these representations 
for broader geopolitical structures. Whilst the “reality” of different forms of rural spaces cannot simply 
be “read” from the virtual environments that are contained within video games, the medium can 
nonethless be seen to manifest specific values and ideals as either integral to, or apart from, the 
accepted values of the nation. The literature in the preceding subsections has highlighted some of the 
conceptual frameworks that are particularly salient for this engagement, examining the notions of the 
rural idyll, the anti-idyll or backwoods, and the wilderness. These understandings of rural space are 
used in order to structure the analyses of video games undertaken in Chapter Six.   
 Section 3.2.1 addresses the formation of contrasting versions of the iydllic rural imaginary. 
The “idyllic” imaginary is shown to valorise rural regions, holding them as representative of the 
collective values and ideals that have been undermined by the increasingly urbanised nature of our 
every day lives. This is shown to reinforced by the ciruclative of affirmative representational precepts 
within a range of different forms of popular culture, including print media, painting, films, and 
televison programmes. These different imaginaries, in whatever form, are shown to ‘all converge 
around a normative nostalgic ideal which is embedded in social and economic structures’ (2003, p. 
25). The idyllic rural periphery is not an external reality, but a marketable nostalgic commodity. As 
highlighted in Chapter Six, this is a representational pattern that is uncommon with video games – 
idyllic values of harmonious community, where they are depicted at all, tend to be implied, rather 
than overly shown. This is a medium which more closely corresponds to the backwoods or anti-idyllic 
imaginary, prevalent within the horror genre, within which rural regions are portrayed as sources of 
fear and danger. Like the rural idyll, the representation of the “backwoods” is also achieved through 
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the representation of a series of spatial stereotypes that are unlikely to correspond directly to any 
recognisable peoples or real-world locations. The rural backwoods has been shown to be a gendered 
framework, placing the civilised (and thus feminised) Self in juxtaposition to the violent and animalistic 
Other that is shown to occupy rural regions. Indeed in many cases, as Bell notes, ‘the horror is already 
there [and] waiting for the city folk to arrive’ (1997, p. 99). In military-themed video games, as in 
horror, the sense of fear that is created by peripheral regions is instilled both through the possibility 
of encounter and, more broadly, through the possibility that one might not survive to return to the 
urban home. 
 Section 3.2.2, meanwhile, examines some of the prevailing perspectives on “wilderness” 
rurality, contrasting classical and romantic conceptualisations of untamed space. Whilst the former 
conceptualisation suggests that this is a place to be feared, the latter treats the rural periphery as both 
a divine space – in which one can find God – and a space for the restoration of one’s national identity. 
These themes are particularly salient for the analysis of military-themed video gaming, in which the 
untamed peripheral spaces often provide both the source of danger and the crucible in which the 
identity of the soldier becomes fully formed. Such spaces, as Chapter Six will show, allow for freedoms 
of individual action – taken against a universally hostile periphery – whilst also necessitating perpetual 
movement and one’s eventual department for the safety of the civilised urban core.    
3.3 Making Time? Understanding the “Event” 
The final section of this literature review chapter focusses on the role of temporality and mediation in 
the construction of the violent “Event”, engaging with some of the key issues which animate the 
discussion of ‘revisionist’ and ‘proleptic’ spatialities in Chapter Seven11. Until comparatively recently, 
much of the academic research conducted into terroristic violences had taken a problem-solving and 
actor-centric approach that ‘was animated by three intimately-related and long-standing questions: 
how to define terrorism, how to explain terrorism and how to prevent it’ (Jarvis, 2009, p. 12). Whilst 
this approach to the analysis of terrorism can offer potential practical insights, functioning as a form 
of risk identification and management, it is also argued to have a number of associated methodological 
and conceptual shortcomings. The majority of the primary research into terroristic violences has been 
                                                          
11  Smicker outlines the notions of ‘revisionism’ and ‘prolepsis’ as a part of a framework for the analysis 
of video games, in order to account for ‘the differences in gameplay narration, gameplay design, 
markets of authenticity’ and [the] performance of military history’ (2010, p. 113). These concepts are 
discussed in more detail in Chapter Seven, where they are used to justify the video games that are 
chosen for analysis in that chapter.   
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carried out by so-called “one-timers” – rather than by an established body of researchers – meaning 
that the field lacks an overall theoretical coherance (Gunning, 2007, p. 371). This has also created a 
tendency for the views, interpellations and inferences that are expressed within this limited primary 
research to be reproduced as unchallenged and unchecked “facts” within secondary analyses 
(Gunning, 2007, pp. 365-367; Hulsse & Spencer, 2008, p. 573). This conventional analytical approach 
has also been challenged by the development of a more “critical” subfield of terrorism studies, 
focussed on the extent to which the different meanings that are ascribed to  the key concepts – such 
as “terrorist” or “terrorism” – are the product of the different acts of construction, mediation and 
interpretation that occur within popular and political discourse (Gunning, 2007, pp. 376-378; Hulsse 
& Spencer, 2008, p. 572; Jarvis, 2008, p. 245; Stump & Dixit, 2012, p. 207). Such an approach does not 
deny the existence of terrorism or terroristic violence per say, but suggests that the critical 
examination of different discursive formulations can allow for the ‘exposure of moments of bias, 
selectivity, exclusion, aporia, or inaccuracy within terrorism discourse’ (Holland & Jarvis, 2014, pp. 
189-190; see also Jarvis, 2009, p.11). This process has, amongst other critical emphases, begun to 
acknowledge the important role of time and temporality in the formation of the broader discursive 
frameworks that are used in the construction of “terrorism” and one’s understandings of the 
terroristic “Event”: -   
‘[R]epresentations of terrorist violence and groups, and likewise representations of 
counter-terrorism campaigns, are dependent on and filled with claims to particular pasts, 
presents and futures, and the relations between them’ (Holland & Jarvis, 2014, p. 190)  
Such an emphasis is particularly notable within examinations of the various different forms of political, 
cultural and academic discourses that sought to mediate the terrorist hijackings of September 11 
2001. These attacks represented a significant challenge to previously prevalent conceptualisations of 
the act of warfare, as a sub-state group without either conventional weapons or significant financial 
resources was able to succesfully bypass extensive systems of national defence in its targeting of key 
symbols of American economic, military and governmental power. The prevalent political discouse 
subsequently became one of a ‘War on Terror’ which, rather than signifying resistance to a 
conventional and spatially-definable foe, denoted a more general opposition to both a tactic and a 
state of being. This response to the attacks, which were framed as a ‘new kind of warfare’ (Bush, 
2001), necessitated that they be represented within broader political discourse as a ‘singularity’ 
(Ouellette, 2008) – a defining moment of temporal rupture occurring outside of the bounds of history 
and the discursive context of relatable socio-cultural experiences (Der Derian, 2009, p. 230; Holland & 
Jarvis, 2014; Spigel, 2004, p. 239; Weber, 2006, pp. 2-3). This became a moment which individuals 
were invited to map onto the temporalities of their own lives, serving as ‘a sacred moment in time 
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among the individual and collective memories of the American public’ (Grusin, 2010, p. ix). Whilst 
September 11 2001 came to be perceived as the day on which ‘night fell on a different world’ (Bush, 
2001) there were, however, multiple intepretations of this “Event” in circulation within the political, 
academic and cultural discourses of this period: -  
‘First, the notion that 9-11 was a date on which everything changed, and second, the 
notion that 9-11 was a date on which nothing changed at all. Time then seems to be 
central to thinking and talking about 9-11, even when temporal conceptualisations are 
left implicit’ (Holland, 2009, p. 275) 
The exposure of these conflicting narratives invites a closer examination of the mediation of the 
“Event”, through an examination of some of the different mechanisms by which some understandings 
come to be privileged over others. As already highlighted, the critical perspective on acts of 
unconventional and terroristic violences suggests that what actually happens might be of a lesser 
importance that the processes by which we come to understand what happens, thus imbuing the 
events with meaning. Indeed, as Feldman surmises, it would seem that ‘the event is not what happens. 
The event is that which can be narrated. The event is organised by culturally situated meanings’ 
(Felman, cited in Smicker, 2010, p.106). The remainder of this subsection examines some of the logics 
that structure the mediation of the “Event”, tracing a transition from an established logic of 
‘remediation’ (Bolter & Grusin, 2000) to one of ‘premediation’ (Grusin, 2004; 2010; 2011): -   
3.3.1  Popular Culture and Remediation 
The process of “remediation”, which was prevalent at the end of the twentieth century, centres on 
the extent to which one form of mediation can be seen to be appropriated within another (Bolter & 
Grusin, 2000, p. 45). This is a visually-orientated process, which calls attention to the various ways in 
which different forms of new media – including computer graphics, video games, virtual reality and 
the internet – can be seen to ‘define themselves by borrowing from, paying homage to, critiquing and 
refashioning their predecessors, principally television, film, photography and painting, but also print’ 
(Grusin, 2004, p. 17). Such a process also emphasises the extent to which the conventions of emergent 
media forms can be integrated into existent practices. As Weber highlights, ‘television news 
broadcasts that are transformed into other media like documents, documentaries or feature films are 
examples of remediation. So too are feature films that recycle actual television broadcasts or use 
digital media effects’ (2008, p. 139; see also Bolter & Grusin, 2000, p.48). Such practices can, however, 
be seen to rely upon conflicting processes of mediatisation. On the one hand, we have become more 
aware of the role of signs and signification in the processes of cultural mediation and the artificial 
creation of “meaning”. At the other extreme, however, we can still be seen to treat the process of 
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mediation as a “real” and effective presence with ‘the same claim to reality as more tangible artefacts; 
photographs, films and computer applications are as real as airplanes and buildings’ (Bolter & Grusin, 
2000, p. 19). This conceptualisation suggests that there are two contradictory, yet interdependent 
logics that are at work in the process of mediation, which can be seen to ‘oscillate between immediacy 
and hypermediacy, between transparency and opacity’ (Bolter & Grusin, 2000, p. 19). Whilst Bolter 
and Grusin (2000, p. 21) focus specifically on the manifestation of these logics within new media, they 
emphasise that these are enduring logics which may have manifested in different ways, within a 
variety of media forms, and over a long period of time. Although this places a full review of the 
different manifestations of such logics beyond the scope of this enquiry, it remains useful to provide 
both an overview of each of these concepts: -  
The Logic of Transparent Immediacy  
The desire for immediacy refers to the attempted subversion of the process of mediation, which has 
the effect of offering an apparently unrestricted and unfiltered level of access to the “reality” of that 
which is being represented (Bolter & Grusin, 2000, pp. 5-6). The form of the mediation is made to be 
something that is transparent – something that is “seen through” rather than “seen” – meaning that 
the phenomenon is encountered as though it were seen live. As Weber surmises, such representations 
‘feel live to viewers because viewers are so interfaced with events and characters that viewers seem 
to be experiencing these events at the same time and in the same place as the characters on the 
screen. As such, viewers cease to be mere observers and become virtual participants in the event’ 
(2008, p. 139; emphasis added). This is a particularly common objective within popular culture, 
evident in the wide-range of different television shows which place the viewer alongside police officers 
(e.g. Road Wars, Police Interceptors), inside failing businesses (e.g. The Hotel inspector; Kitchen 
Nightmares) or amongst groups of “celebrities” (e.g. I’m a Celebrity… Get Me Out of Here!; Big 
Brother). Whilst the desire to achieve a sense of immediacy is particularly evident in the content of 
new media, this process relies upon the techniques of linear perspective, erasure and automaticity 
that are also common within older and more established forms of mediation such as painting and 
photography (Bolter & Grusin, 2000, p. 24). The use of perspective refers to the aim to create a 
continuity between the world of the viewer and the depicted space that is represented within, for 
example, a work of art (Bolter & Grusin, 2000, p. 25). The process of erasure, meanwhile, refers to the 
obliteration of the physical space of a canvas. The term is used to denote the subversion of the creative 
process (such as the act of painting) in favour of the final finished product (in this case, the painting 
itself) (Bolter & Grusin, 2000, pp. 24-25). Finally, the process of automaticity – which is commonly 
associated with photography – references the ways in which a particular medium may reproduce its 
subject in the ways in which our eyes are accustomed to seeing it. This promotes a sense of realism 
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by rendering both the creator and the process of creation absent, whilst acting to integrate the viewer 
into the consumption of the represented image (Bolter & Grusin, 2000, p. 28). 
Although aiming to subvert the experience of mediation, the logic of transparent immediacy 
does not demand that the viewer (or player) actually be fooled by the content of the represented 
image. Whilst this remains an ultimately desirable outcome, each form of mediation – though offering 
a claim to be an unfiltered representation of “reality” – unavoidably still draws attention to the 
different ways in which it makes and relays such claims (Bolter & Grusin, 2000, p. 19). We become 
accustomed to, for example, the role of editing, computer graphics and special effects, and more 
aware of what these might mean for our interpretative processes. As such, the pursuit of transparent 
immediacy is paradoxically both responsible for, and dependent upon, both an increased awareness 
of the practices of mediation and the ongoing multiplication of its different forms (Bolter & Grusin, 
2000, pp. 33-34; Weber, 2008, p. 139). This is referred to as the logic of hypermediacy: - 
The Logic of Hypermediacy 
Whilst the ultimate aim of immediacy is to bypass the experience of mediation entirely, the logic of 
hypermediacy instead calls attention to the fragmented nature of this representational process (Bolter 
& Grusin, 2000, pp. 327-328). Different forms of mediation draw upon different combinations of 
words, images and sounds to offer multiple representations of a subject within a single space. Many 
websites, for example, contain text, photographs and digital graphics, whilst television news reports 
can be seen to have adopted a distinctive visual style which combines ‘ribbons of text, photographs, 
and even audio without a video signal’ (Bolter & Grusin, 2000, pp. 6-9; see, for example, Figure 7). 
These technologies are used to grant their viewers a level of immediacy and access to the “real world”, 
even as that same viewer is also confronted with the artificial nature of that process of mediation. 
This dualism is illustrated with reference to the windows and icons that are used in computing (Bolter 
& Grusin, 2000, pp. 23-24). Although aiming to achieve a “transparent” form of interaction, 
experienced as unnoticed and automatic, text windows cannot offer the singular point of view that 
facilitates the subversion of mediation. This form of representation is not a window onto the real 
world, but rather is “windowed” – offering a multiplicity of views of other forms of mediation (Bolter 
& Grusin, 2000, p. 34). The prevailing logic could be thought of not as one of immediate access, but 
rather as a form of replacement – for example, the clicking of a link can replace one tab with another, 
which is then the form of mediation which take our attention (Bolter & Grusin, 2000, p. 44). Moreover, 
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through the action of interaction with the apparatus that governs this encounter (i.e. the physical 
process of interacting with the interface) the user is forced to return to and confront the constructed 
nature of such software. This is true of the representative icons associated with computing, such as 
those which are used to represent word processing software or graphics editing tools. As Bolter and 
Grusin highlight, these icons and folders ‘function in two spaces: the pictorial space of the desktop 
and the informational space of the computer and the internet’ (2000, p. 35). They both identify that 
certain spaces exist, in which particular actions can and cannot be performed, whilst highlighting the 
artificiality of such spaces and that they are not “present” in the real world. Such a process is also 
evident in non-digital forms of mediation, including the practices of woodworking, painting and 
photography (Bolter & Grusin, 2000, pp. 35-38). We are, for example, encouraged to recognise the 
role of hypermediacy in the creation of a cabinet on which physical space is masked by images of rural 
landscapes. Such an artefact is shown to be both real, physical space and representative, conceptual 
space in combination. Whilst the conceptual space depicted on the cabinet drawer might evoke rural 
sentimentality, the user is brought back to the “real” experience by opening the drawer in order to 
behold the physical space that lies within. A similar form of hypermediacy is also identified in 
modernist artworks, including collage and photomontage (Bolter & Grusin, 2000, pp. 38-39). Whilst 
such productions call upon the viewer to regard the image that is represented by, for example, pieces 
of different photographs or magazines, they also call attention to the fact that the artwork is “not 
real” and is comprised of pieces of something else.    
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Figure 7: CNN News Report (CNN, 2018) 
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 In engaging in an examination of hypermediacy, we are invited to consider the process that 
underpins the act of “vision” – together with how and why one form of mediation may be privileged 
over another. This is of a particular saliency to an analysis of post-9/11 forms of mediation, as this was 
not experienced as a single “Event” – but rather as the experiential, hypermediated amalgamation of 
both the various precursor forms of discourse and the multiplicity of remediations of the event itself. 
Indeed, as Grusin highlights, the coverage of the 9-11 attacks could be seen to demonstrate both of 
the logics of remediation, ‘simultaneously multiplying mediation in the familiar collage-like look 
pioneered by CNN… and erasing the evidence of mediation in presenting the immediacy of the 
extreme close-up of the Twin Towers in flames’ (2010, p. 11). The following section examines the role 
of remediation, examining the extent to which the familiar mechanisms and motifs of popular culture 
were influential in shaping the post-9/11 discourse.  
3.3.2 Popular Culture, Remediation and the 9-11 Attacks 
Prior to the 9-11 attacks, the prevalent American security discourse centred upon a presumption of 
invulnerability, as it was believed that the country was protected by the surrounding oceans (Holland, 
2009, p. 281). The attacks, occurring at the heart of a major American city, were not only experienced 
as a dramatic violation of this perception, but also lacked coherent mediation in elite discourse. This 
was not because the events themselves lacked meaning, but rather because this was a moment at 
which ‘language failed to adequately or consistently regulate the meaning of the surrounding events’ 
(Holland, 2009, p. 275; see also Holland, 2011, p. 89). Both during and immediately following the 9-11 
attacks, the surrounding media coverage could be seen to draw upon a wide range of different 
technologies and techniques, including the use of split-screen images, radio feeds, and a variety of 
amateur footage (Grusin, 2010, p. 11). Although a fragmented, hypermediated form of discourse, such 
coverage sought to deny that this was anything other than the direct and unmediated reality of an act 
of incomprehensible terroristic violence. Such a framework precluded the possibility of analysis or 
interpretation, with any such attempts dismissed as futile or attacked as unpatriotic (Holland, 2009, 
p. 278). Whilst such coverage was largely successful in relating what had happened, this did little to 
account for precisely what that event had actually meant for the general public. As a result of this 
absence of mediation, the attacks were experienced as the ‘first live global media event’ (Grusin, 2010, 
p. 11). It is in such profoundly traumatic circumstances that the cultural industries can be seen to take 
on a more significant role in the creation and recreation of the national political narrative, as ‘musical 
and artistic representation may capture certain emotional dimensions that remain out of reach for 
prevalent forms of communication and analysis. They are an essential element of how tragic events 
are viewed, interpreted and remembered’ (Bleiker, 2005, p. 189). In the period following the 9-11 
attacks, the general public could be seen to draw from an amalgamation of personal knowledge, 
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unofficial sources and “lower” levels of cultural discourse. There was, however, some notable initial 
discomfort surrounding the “proper” role of popular culture in the post-9/11 space, which resulted in 
an initial drive towards tastefulness in the production and promotion of cultural content and the 
exclusion of any potentially insensitive themes (Ouellette, 2008; Spigel, 2004, p. 235). This was 
evident, for example, in the palpable nervousness that surrounded the use of comedy and satire as 
political commentary, as ‘the weekly late-night comedians hewed closely to the patriotic frame of the 
events as tragic [which] circulated in official discourse [and] which, for the time, required comic 
restraint or silence about the attacks’ (Achter, 2008, p. 275). This heightened sense of political morality 
also resulted in changes to the scheduled release dates of terrorism-themed films, including Collateral 
Damage (2002), whilst heroic war films such as Black Hawk Down (2001) and Behind Enemy Lines 
(2001) were accelerated through the pre-production phase (Dodds, 2008b, p. 1625).  
Despite such attempts to protect consumer sensibilities, however, it is notable that many still 
sought out terrorist-themed entertainment, such as The Towering Inferno (1974), Die Hard (1988), 
The Peacemaker (1997) and The Siege (1998). Others sought to trademark both prominent phrases, 
including “shock and awe” and “let’s roll” and also more tasteless terms (Giroux, 2004, p. 218; Spigel, 
2004, p. 234; Stahl, 2006, p. 120). This may, at least to some extent, represent the attempt to recover 
comfortable narrative conventions from the disorder of the political world. Through our consumption 
of popular culture (whether video games, films, television programmes or something else entirely), 
we are able to restructure political phenomena around the frameworks, conventions and storied 
structures that we use when we tell each other, and ourselves, about the world and our place within 
it (Shepherd, 2013, pp. 4-5). A reliance upon popular culture permitted a reassertion of narrative 
control, offering a familiar shared language and imagery through which a traumatised populous could 
begin to make sense of the attacks and articulate its experiences (Power & Crampton, 2007; van 
Veeren, 2009, p. 368).  
Popular culture offered a means by which it was made possible to confront and combat shared 
fears (Power, 2007, p. 284), albeit by the naturalisation of a violent response to the violation of 
American territoriality and identity. Within these narratives, catastrophe is shown to fuel acts of 
patriotism and heroism, but as a part of the quest for revenge – a goal that is portrayed as the rightful 
response of ‘a wounded, vengeful, but still very imperialistic nation prepared to set the world straight’ 
(Boggs & Pollard, 2008, p. 566). The official narration of terrorism could also be seen to lean on the 
remediation of conventional tropes, drawing upon the stories that we have already told, whether in 
history, politics or popular fiction. Devetak, for example, argues that the Bush administration 
borrowed from the conventions of the gothic narrative form, associated with Edgar Allan Poe, 
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observing that ‘in both cases, ineffable and potentially violent and cruel forces haunt and terrorise the 
civilised, human world’ (2005, p. 621). 
It is also worthwhile to consider what this fragmented process of cultural mediation may have 
acted to obscure. Payne, for example, suggests that the continued remediation of a hero narrative 
was representative of a broader reluctance to engage with the underlying cause of the attacks: -  
‘Rather than asking questions about why America’s technology might be turned against 
it by well-funded, non-state terrorists, the response was to laud ‘cultural’ artefacts from 
a “simpler time” that reproduced ideas from supposedly halcyon days gone by. 
Americans quickly embraced fantastic entertainment that promised Manichean moral 
universes and frontiersman heroes, which could reaffirm our national mythology as the 
world’s lone and righteous superpower’ (Payne, 2016, p. 27) 
Whilst the critical analysis of the role of time and temporality has often focussed on the temporal 
logics that underpinned the 9-11 attacks and the subsequent undertaking of the ‘War on Terror’, it is 
also important to acknowledge that these frameworks convey ‘rather more about the politics of 
identity, security and violence more broadly… [P]erceptions of who we are, what we are – be that 
‘Americans’, ‘civilised’, ‘freedom-loving’, or whatever – are necessarily, inherently rooted in specific 
understandings of temporality. Perceptions of whom and what we fear – be that ‘new terrorism’, 
‘evildoers’, ‘barbarians’, and so forth – emerge, similarly, from particular engagements and writings 
of time’ (Jarvis, 2009, p. 16).  
Whilst the conceptualisation of 9-11 as a moment of rupture suggests that the attacks ought 
to be regarded as something new and different, this was not the first occasion on which America has 
experienced a profound disturbance to both its hegemonic sense of national identity and its prevailing 
security culture. It is for, example, notable that the loss of Soviet Russia as an antithetical “Other” 
compounded the pressure on an American security identity that was already reeling from the declining 
utility of Total War as a security strategy (Engelhardt, 2007, p. 10). These attacks were, however, 
particularly notable for their influence upon the prevailing conceptualisations of security and the 
commensurate logics of mediation, prompting the intensification of a logic of premediation12.  
                                                          
12 Whilst this commodification of the uncertain future may have intensified in the period following the 
9-11 attacks, it is nonetheless worthwhile to note that such a logic is not assumed to have emerged at 
this point (de Goede, 2008, pp. 160-161; Grusin, 2010, p. 13). Instead Grusin (2010, p. 13) suggests, 
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3.3.3 Premediation: Managing Risk after 9-11 
As de Goede (2008, pp. 161-162) highlights, the subject of contemporary security concerns is not a 
rational and evaluative individual, but rather a “neurotic” citizen that seeks a zero-risk mode of being 
in the world. This need to control even the so-called “unknown unknowns” is a response to the sense 
of trauma and helplessness that accompanied the lack of a coherent post-Event discourse. Grusin 
suggests that this has prompted the contemporary prevalence of a media logic of premediation, which 
‘works to prevent citizens of the global mediasphere from experiencing again the kind of systematic 
of traumatic shock produced by the events of 9/11 by perpetuating an almost constant, low level of 
fear or anxiety about another terrorist attack’ (2010, p. 1). Such a logic is representative of a broad 
shift in temporal emphasis, from the past and near-present into the future, prompted by a desire to 
reduce the potential for there to be any further unforeseen and unmediated traumatic events. Indeed, 
as de Goede highlights, ‘it is not so much the catastrophe that is to be avoided at all costs, but the 
immediacy that accompanies the unexpected catastrophe’ (2008, p. 171; Grusin, 2010, p. 12; 2014, p. 
56). Such a logic shares some of the preemptive language associated with the risk management 
practices employed by the financial sector and the military, bodies which aim ‘to “securitize” the 
future and empty it of contingency and potentiality’ (Ash, 2015, p. 293; see also de Goede, 2008, p. 
159). Each envisages potential future events, whilst decrying the success of past terrorist attacks as 
representative of a ‘failure of imagination’ (The 9/11 Commision , 2004, p. 339). Such a focus is 
particularly evident in the extent to which simulations of future, imagined terrorist atrocities continue 
to feature prominently within contemporary political policy structures. This includes the development 
of simulations, which ‘test the “preparedness” of emergency services… [and] entail the detailed 
imagination of, for example, “dirty” bomb attacks, the explosion of radiological devices or anthrax 
spreads’ (de Goede, 2008, p. 160). Whilst the practice of premediation is distinct from that of risk 
management, this imaginative premediation of risk can be seen to create the specific social conditions 
through which a potential risk can be envisaged and mediated. De Goede (2008, p. 168), for example, 
reflects on the production of risk management documentation that indicates the perceived level of 
“risk” that is faced in different types of urban areas, noting that these predictions would be invaluable 
to both terrorists (as a guide for their actions) and to governments (as guides for investment and the 
implementation of preventative measures). This mediation of “potential” futures not only creates 
anxieties - by identifying the potential vulnerabilities that exist within real-world locations - but can 
also be seen to prescribe action. Unlike the practice of risk management however, the logic of 
                                                          
with the benefit of hindsight, that a logic of premediation was evident in the 1990s and may even have 
served as a structural counterpart to the logic of remediation.  
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premediation is not dependent upon one’s ability to correctly forecast or predict the occurrence of 
specific future events: -  
‘[B]y trying to premediate as many of the possible worlds, or possible paths, as the future 
could be imagined to take, premediation works something like the logic of designing a 
video game; it is not necessarily about getting the future right as much as it is about trying 
to imagine or map out as many possible futures as could plausibly be imagined’ (Grusin, 
2004, p. 28; see also Grusin, 2010, p. 47) 
Whilst the practice of risk management attempts to prevent the occurrence of future trauma by 
preventing the occurrence of traumatic future events, the logic of premediation aims to create the 
sense that such events have already occurred. Premediation facilitates the creation of a conceptual 
framework within which a series of actions, reactions or interactions can emerge pre-mediated, 
visualising a multiplicity of futures in a way that would be indistinguishable from the manner in which 
such futures would be mediated upon their appearance in the present day: -  
‘Premediation deploys multiple modes of mediation and remediation in shaping the 
affectivity of the public, in preparing people for some field of possible future action, in 
producing a mood or a structure of feeling that makes possible certain kinds of actions, 
thoughts, speech, affectivities, feelings, or moods, that might not have seemed possible 
before or that might have fallen flat or died on the vine or not produced echoes and 
reverberations in the public or media sphere’ (Grusin, 2011, p. 47; see also de Goede, 
2008, p.159)  
Reflecting on the coverage of the so-called “Amerithrax” attacks on US senators and media outlets in 
2001, for example, Grusin observes that the scare ‘became an obsession of the media not for the 
damage it had done (which was minimal) but for the damage it might do, for the extreme threat of 
what it might become in the future’ (2010, p. 41). The news media sought to outline the worst possible 
potential future – depicting a series of increasingly apocalyptic attacks – with the intention of 
stimulating action and reflection within the present day. A similar process is also noted with the media 
coverage of the then-future Iraq War, as the mediation of multiple potential futures served to 
constrain the path of political discourse. The war in Iraq had been premediated so many times, and in 
so many different ways, that it became impossible to conceive of a future in which the conflict did not 
actually occur (de Goede, 2008, p. 171; Grusin, 2010, p. 4). A further example of premediation is also 
evident in the early successes of the #occupywallstreet movement, which demonstrated the potential 
for sites such as Wall Street and Times Square to be taken over: -   
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‘While some veterans of earlier protest movements have argued that occupation involves 
going inside buildings and taking possession… it is the potentiality of these occupations… 
their premediation of greater and more numerous and powerful occupations in the 
future, that vitalises the Occupy movement and marks its continued success’ (Grusin, 
2011) 
In the absence of (and continued refusal to formulate) a list of specific demands, the movement was 
made able to explore both a wide range of potential economic futures and the specific circumstances 
that would shape those futures and facilitate their coming into being. The movement aimed to disrupt 
the sense of “business-as-usual”, together with the inevitable future that a continued and 
unchallenged sense of normalcy would create. Instead, it aimed to ‘change the mood or collective 
affective tone in the media, in public discourse, in social networks, and in the public sphere so that 
talking about amnesty for college or mortgage debt or demanding increased taxes on the wealthiest 
individuals and corporations or thinking about restructuring property relations and economics 
becomes not only possible, but indeed begins to appear as common sense or received wisdom’ 
(Grusin, 2011). Such concerns aimed to facilitate the public vocalisation of shared concerns, with the 
aim of making action to address such concerns appear not only possible but likely. Indeed, Grusin 
concludes that the movement ‘made it possible for mainstream media figures and politicians to take 
positions they could not have taken before, by providing cover or clearing the ground, by means of 
the shaping of collective moods or structures of feeling out of which more intense feelings about 
economic injustice are generated’ (2011). This process of premediation can also be seen to function 
through the content of popular culture. One example of this process is evident in the cultural discourse 
that surrounds the threat of the terroristic “sleeper-cell” and the resultant impact of this imaginary 
upon contemporary security culture. It is, for example, argued to have had implications for the ways 
in which we conceive of the value of torture within US policy, resulting from the perceived ties 
between its supposed real-world efficacy and the mediation of such efficacy through the character of 
24’s Jack Bauer: -  
‘Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia suggested that no court in the US would convict 
Jack Bauer for torturing; Rush Limbaugh described 24 as “pro-America”; even staunch 
torture opponent, Senator and Presidential candidate McCain described himself as “a 
Jack Bauer kind of guy’ (van Veeren, 2009, p. 371; see also de Goede, 2008, p. 162) 
It is, however, also worthwhile to consider some of the limitations of this process of premediation. 
Although the logic of premediation aims to articulate as many potential futures as possible, in order 
to limit our exposure to future trauma, it is necessarily a process of inclusion and exclusion. An 
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adherence to a logic of premediation can result in a form of temporal myopia, encouraging action 
against the insecurities of the future whilst also discarding the victims of everyday, current societal 
failings (de Goede, 2008, pp. 172-173). As a consequence, any analysis of such mediation must 
acknowledge that the practice of premediation ‘includes some things into the symbolic order whilst 
leaving others out. In this sense, premediation draws “lines of sight” that are necessarily incomplete 
and insufficient in themselves’ (de Goede, 2008, p. 167). If left undetected then these may exacerbate 
current vulnerabilities and social divides, feeding an inflated, illusionary sense of insecurity in the 
present day.   
3.3.3 Analysing the Production of the “Event” through Military-Themed Video Games 
The preceding subsection began by exploring the extent to which the imaginative (re)construction of 
the “Event” – whether past or future, fictional or factual – can be remediated in apparently familiar 
terms, allowing a viewer, reader or player to make sense of the political present and the apparently 
perpetual state of insecurity that afflicts the contemporary Western security discourse (Heath-Kelly, 
2018a, p. 1). In Chapter Seven, such a process is shown to be underpinned by the familiar logics of 
immediacy and hypermediacy. Military-themed video games seek hypermediacy as a part of their 
attempts to ‘transport the gamer into immersive, gut-wrenching virtual battlefields. They persuade 
the gamer that, in a echo of WWII era journalism, “you are there” – on the beaches of Normandy, in 
the jungles of Vietnam, in modern military hotspots [like the deserts of Iraq]’  (Cowlishaw, cited in 
Power, 2007, p. 272). Such a representation is produced through several familiar forms of mediation, 
including first and third person representation, text and the ludic apparatus.  
 The representation of the “Event” is, however, also tied to a broader logic of premediation, 
which suggests that popular culture functions as a part of a future-orientated process of mediation 
that aims to guard against all sources of potential future trauma (Grusin, 2004, p. 28). Video games 
are well positioned to create a similarly low-level sense of risk through their mediation of the future. 
This is evident in the player’s engagement with the temporal logics of the military video game genre, 
which ‘immerses the player into an environment of combat, competition, looming threats and 
recurring catastrophes, and the player’s engagement with the screen events is primarily anticipatory 
and pre-emptive by nature (Where is the enemy? How can I catch them before they catch me? How 
can I prevent them from getting ahead of my step?)’ (Ash, 2015, p. 293). In viewing risk management 
through the lens of premediation, it is possible to identify that there exists both an economy of anxiety 
– centred on one’s desire to achieve a zero-risk mode of being in the world – and an economy of desire 
in which this demand acts as a key commercial premise (de Goede, 2008, pp. 161-162). It is this 
economy of desire that has created a continued market for these militaristic games, which allow the 
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player the pleasures of a near-active participation in the process of pre-emptive securitisation. Such 
games are not just backwards looking, however, but look to the potential for future catastrophes.  As 
Chapter Seven will show, video games rely upon specific constructions of temporal futures in order to 
premediate and prescribe the behaviours that will prevent or mitigate the damage that world be 
caused by forthcoming, but as yet unforeseen, traumatic events. In doing so, they facilitate the 
continued construction and reconstruction of the national identity, including the redefinition of what 
it may “mean” to be a national subject in the aftermath of a shared traumatic event. They allow the 
player the possibility of a pleasurable, performative response to the underlying sense of anxiety that 
is unavailable in the viewership of television and film, offering the impression that the “next” 9-11 
might end differently than it did this time (Payne, 2016, p. 29). 
Conclusion 
This chapter has offered an examination of a number of different literatures pertaining to the ways in 
which we understand the spaces around us, engaging with the construction of the urban core, the 
rural periphery, and a broader temporally-driven process of mediation. This chapter has also sought 
to link this material to the various chapters, exploring the ways in which the arguments within each 
section have emerged from an engagement with existing theoretical perspectives.   
 In actually undertaking an analysis of the video game medium, however, a level of 
methodological rigour is required in order to combat the vagaries that have often accompanied such 
research. The following chapter, therefore, outlines my own perspective, which aims to address the 
concerns of both ludological and narratological analyses. In so doing, I also acknowledge the inherently 
personal, subjective nature of such research, as is highlighted in Rose’s salient observation that a 
successful engagement with visual images can ‘depend on the pleasure, thrills, fascination, wonder, 
fear or revulsion of the person looking at the images and writing about them. Successful interpretation 
depends on a passionate engagement with what you see’ (2016, p. xxiii). The analysis of video games 
should not lose sight of the fact that these games are a popular, engaging media form that is enjoyed 
by players in all parts of the world. Each of these different players will be influenced by a plethora of 
social, cultural and political factors, all of which will influence the ways in which they each engage with 
the games and the various iterations of meaning that are contained within them. Although this 
analysis is grounded within both IR theory and popular geopolitics, any proposed method should not 
obfuscate the varied experience of video game play that makes this medium so engaging for so many.  
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Chapter Four: Playing Games? Towards Method 
Introduction   
Chapter Two highlighted the increasing critical importance that is afforded to popular cultural 
imaginaries, emphasising their ability to influence the ways in which we are able to conceptualise the 
“reality” of international politics. These imaginaries were shown to be a pervasive aspect of our 
modern lives, meaning that a potentially persuasive form of political discourse can be seen to emanate 
from within a wide variety of both formal and informal sites: -  
‘[R]ecently, images from Abu Ghraib, Islamic State’s beheadings, cartoons of the prophet 
Muhammad, the protests in Ferguson, and the young Syrian refugee who drowned on a 
Turkish beach in September 2015 have all been seen as decisive in reframing political and 
social debates’ (Robinson & Schulzke, 2016, p. 1) 
In its focus upon the practices of spatial representation that are evident within video games, this 
analysis was shown to share a critical focus with both International Relations (IR) and popular 
geopolitics. Such approaches can be seen to have engaged with the ways in which deterministic and 
prescriptive approaches to political spaces may be formed by, and circulate within, the content of 
popular cultural artefacts. However, whilst these fields have offered fruitful explorations of the 
practices of spatial representation that are utilised within mediums such as film (Dodds, 2008a; 2015), 
comics (Dittmer, 2005; 2007a), and magazines (Sharp, 1993; 1996), it is notable that the spatialities of 
video games have remained comparatively under-explored. Such an absence feels somewhat myopic, 
particular when mindful of the clear onus that the medium places on the twin practices of spatial 
representation and exploration:- 
‘More than time (which in most games can be stopped), more than actions, events and 
goals (which are tediously similar from game to game) and unquestionably more than 
characterisation (which is usually non-existent) the games celebrate and explore spatial 
representation as their central motif and raison d'être (Aarseth, 2012, p. 161) 
Video games have long relied on the generation of compelling and authentic-feeling locations, ranging 
from the mysterious building where Donkey Kong takes place (full of jumps and stairs and barrels and 
dangers for our little Mario) to the terrifying village of Silent Hill’ (Egenfeldt-Nielsen, et al., 2016, p. 
205; see also von Borries, et al., 2007, p.11). Of a particular interest here, however, is the simulation 
of “real world” environments as a setting for current or near-future conflicts. As discussed in Chapter 
Three, this analysis will centre on the ways in which military-themed video games manipulate urban, 
rural and temporal forms of spatiality in order to both engage in, and foreclose upon, different forms 
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of political discourse and geospatial ordering practices. Whilst the analysis of such sites will necessitate 
the formation of a clear method, it is notable that there has been a long-standing rejection of the 
utility of prescriptive approaches in the analysis of other popular cultural artefacts: -  
‘Popular culture can be considered as a point at which the investigative techniques of the 
social sciences and the humanities may converge… There is, then, no single, approved 
methodology for the study of popular culture, but several… We should be able to choose 
that method of investigation which allows us to find out what we want to know. What 
works best is the best methodology’ (Nye, 1971, p. 1036) 
The analysis of video games has been correspondingly diverse in nature, drawing upon insights from 
within fields such as psychoanalysis (Kirkland, 2005; Tew, 2001) and architecture (Nitsche, 2008; Von 
Borries, et al., 2007). Whilst this range of different approaches can create the sense that the medium 
is being ‘analysed willy-nilly, with tools that happen to be at hand’ (Aarseth, 2003, p. 1), this 
methodological pluralism has proven to be desirable for the continuing health of this field of study: -   
‘It is incomprehensible that any single theory could do justice to a form as rich and vivid 
as the video game. The variety of these games calls for a diversity of analytical 
approaches: no one approach is sufficient, but many offer different yet interconnected 
perspectives. The more this analytical spectrum grows in width and depth, the richer our 
picture of the video game becomes’ (Nitsche, 2008, p. 1; see also Egenfeldt-Nielsen, et 
al., 2016; Lammes, 2007, pp. 24-26; Mäyrä, 2008) 
This methodological pluralism has also provided a means by which to address the complex nature of 
the video game form. As Jennings (2015) highlights, video games ‘are wildly tangled amalgamations 
of features that appear (or not) in varying degree: code, software, hardware, rules, visuals, sounds, 
narrative, gameplay mechanics, player activity (both physical and in-game), and experience and 
interpretation’.  A similar range of features are identified by Konzack, who organised the complexities 
of the medium into a series of interrelated layers: ‘hardware, program code, functionality, meaning, 
referentiality, and socio-culture’ (2002, p. 90). Rather than treating these numerous different features 
as a step-by-step guide to the analysis of video games - as Konzack does in his analysis of the Soul 
Calibur video game – these are instead ‘best used as an open framework, where the analyst can 
choose any 2-4 of the seven layers to work with, and ignore the rest’ (Aarseth, 2003, p. 2).  Approached 
in such a way, these layers provide a multiplicity of different ways in which to “read” video games, 
depending on the ways in which one chooses to engage, or indeed not to engage, in the analysis of 
these different factors.  
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As the choice to focus on specific aspects of a video game will necessarily create ‘only a limited 
and incomplete understanding of the text as a comprehensive whole’ (Jennings, 2015), such an 
approach can be thought of as the decision to operate within a particular analytical site. Rose offers a 
useful means of categorisation here, as she suggests ‘thinking about visual material in terms of four 
sites: the site of production, which is where an image is made; the site of the image itself, which is its 
visual content; the site(s) of its circulation, which is where it travels; and the site where the image 
encounters its spectators or users’ (2016, p. 24). This chapter will outline a specifically object-focussed 
approach to video game analysis, which prioritises the study of a game’s narrative and ludic content 
above the analysis of its production, marketing or audience reception. In doing so I echo the 
perspective outlined by Pötzsch and Šisler, in that I ‘do not argue for a determinate impact of games 
on players or historicopolitical discourse, but describe the textual features through which certain 
responses and particular subject positions are systematically invited and certain understandings 
encouraged, before these are actively negotiated in situated practices of reception’ (2016, p. 2; see 
also Dittmer, 2007, p. 401). Mindful of the emphasis that is placed upon the need for a personal, 
hands-on engagement with the video game text (see, for example, Aarseth, 2003, p. 3) – as this is an 
approach which respects the centrality of play to the medium – this analysis will utilise a process of 
qualitative close reading. This approach has a familiar broad form, similar in nature to that which is 
outlined by Robinson: -  
‘Best practice involves playing the respective game several times while taking notes and 
screenshots in order to capture relevant visual signifiers, record the story and narrative, 
and analyse the structure of the gameplay. The first playthrough is designed to capture 
the broad meaning and feel of the game, with subsequent playthroughs focused on 
specific levels/incidents in order to consider the alternative narratives, examine the visual 
and aural signifiers, and explore the scope of the gameplay options available to the 
player’ (Robinson, 2015b, p.93; see also Šisler, 2008, p. 206)  
Whilst such an approach is commonplace in the examination of video game texts, such analyses are 
often ‘broadly divided into the ludic dimension, or the elements of gameplay, game design, and game 
mechanics, and the narrative dimensions, where story, character design and other thematic elements 
are key’ (Harper, 2011, p. 4). This has been a complex and often polarising discussion, with the 
conflicting perspectives on the value of narrative theory perceived to have resulted in a ‘war’ 
(Egenfeldt-Nielsen, et al., 2016, p. 22), or a ‘blood feud’ (Jenkins, 2004, p. 118) between the 
proponents of the so-called ‘ludological’ and ‘narratological’ perspectives. Whether the apparent 
controversy that has surrounded the role of narrative in video games has been real or imagined 
(Egenfeldt-Nielsen, et al., 2016, p. 224; Frasca, 2003; Pearce, 2005), it should be acknowledged that 
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this methodological debate has reflected a broad desire to critically engage with the medium’s 
increasing capabilities and influence (Aarseth, 2012, p. 129; Egenfeldt-Nielsen, et al., 2016, p. 224; 
Schut, 2003, p. 1). It has also served to highlight some of the potential issues that result from the 
importation of familiar concepts, such as interaction and narration, suggesting that there is a need to 
rehabilitate conventional notions of narrative analysis for use in the examination of video game space 
(Egenfeldt-Nielsen, et al., 2016, p. 226). These arguments are discussed in the following section, 
forming a basis for the subsequent formulation of my own analytical approach: -  
4.1 Telling Stories? Insights from the “Ludology-Narratology” Debate 
The creation and consumption of narrative is widely regarded to be a ubiquitous part of human 
behaviour, alongside our use of language. Barthes, for example, argues that ‘there has never been 
anywhere, any people without narrative; all classes, all human groups have their stories, and very 
often these stories are enjoyed by men of different and even opposite cultural backgrounds’ (1977, p. 
79). Similarly, Abbott describes our participation in narrative formation as a shared and intuitive 
practice, one in which we can be seen to engage ‘many times a day, every day of our lives. And we 
start to do so almost from the moment we begin putting words together’ (2015, p. 1). Whilst some 
analyses have sought to identify narrative structures within video games – borrowing terms such as 
“text”, “narrative” and “story” from within literary theory (Kücklich, 2006, p. 92) – this has not been 
an uncontested practice. As a result, the analysis of video games can be divided into two broad 
methodological camps with different and distinctive emphases: - 
‘[L]udologists foreground formal gaming qualities, characterising video games as abstract 
rule-based systems or interactive simulations; whilst narratologists emphasize more 
static storytelling aspects, regarding video games as texts to be read, often in relation to 
other media forms’ (Kirkland, 2005, p. 167) 
The narratologists express concern that ‘the idea that games are first and foremost games – an 
argument bordering on the tautological – can be taken to mean that the formal properties of video 
games are important, more intrinsic, than the stories in the games (or the graphics, or the social 
activity that games promote’ (Egenfeldt-Nielsen, et al., 2016, p. 23). They, like other critiques of 
ludology (see, for example, Consalvo, 2003, p. 325; Jenkins, 2004, p. 118), express concern that the 
approach would dispense with the insights that are offered by narrative theory. 
 The proponents of ludological forms of analysis, however, argue that the importation of 
narrative theory is a form of theoretical imperialism (Egenfeldt-Nielsen, et al., 2016, p. 223; Kücklich, 
2006, p. 92), one which is perceived to have resulted in the imposition of imported and unquestioned 
terminologies and approaches at the expense of appropriate levels of theoretical innovation (Aarseth, 
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2012, p. 129; Frasca, 2003, p. 6; Juul, 2001). They suggest that the field of ludology was a necessary 
‘reaction to sloppy scholarship (in which key terms are not defined), one-sided focus and poor 
theorising’ (Aarseth, 2012, p. 130) and refute the notion that it is necessarily hostile to the practice of 
storytelling: -   
‘[G]ames and narratives do not live in different worlds, but in some ways can work 
together: a narrative may be used for telling the player what to do or as rewards for 
playing. Games may spawn narratives that a player can use to tell others of what went 
on in a game session. Games and narratives can on some points be said to have similar 
traits. This does mean that the strong position of claiming games and narratives to be 
completely unrelated… is untenable’ (Juul, 2001; see also Aarseth, 2012, p. 130; Frasca, 
2003, p. 7; Schut, 2003, p. 2) 
Some of the issues surrounding the perceived utility of narrative theory are the result of the conflation 
of the concept of “narrative” with that of the “story”. Whilst these two terms are often used somewhat 
interchangeably within popular parlance (Sicart, 2011, p. 3), they are separated within literary 
analysis. As Abbott highlights, a conventional narrative is to be regarded as ‘the representation of 
events, consisting of story and narrative discourse; [the] story is an event or sequences of events (the 
action); and narrative discourse is those events as represented' (2015, p. 19; emphases in original). 
Each of these different aspects has a different relationship with time and the temporal order, 
necessitating a distinction between ‘the story time, denoting the time of the events told, in their 
chronological order, and the discourse time, denoting the time of the telling of the events (in the order 
in which they are told)’ (Juul, 2001; emphases in original). This distinction can allow for the distortion 
of temporality, with years of “story” occurring within just a short period of “narrative discourse”. A 
scene in a book, for example, may jump backwards and forwards over hundreds of years, but unfold 
over the course of just a few paragraphs of written prose. As Abbott surmises, this means narrative 
discourse ‘can expand and contract, leap backward and forward, but as we take in from the discourse 
we sort it out in our minds, reconstructing events so that we can see the story. The story can take a 
day, a minute, a lifetime, or eons. It can be true or false, historical or fictional. But insofar as it is a 
story, it has its own length of time and an order of events that proceeds chronologically from the 
earliest to the latest’ (2015, p. 17). Conventional notions of narrative, therefore, assumed the 
existence of a continually forward-moving trajectory, as the representation of events forms ‘a 
continuous line that plays with a reader’s (or viewer’s) expectations and orchestrates their emotional 
trip from beginning to end, controlling important points’ (Egenfeldt-Nielsen, et al., 2016, p. 211). Each 
stage of this process is assumed to be carefully scripted by the author, with a distinctive function as a 
part of a broader whole, necessitating ‘tight control over the design and implementation of details’ 
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(Bizzocchi, 2007, p. 3). This would, however, be a problematic approach to the creation of a video 
game, as this level of experiential control would necessarily limit the overall agency that is enjoyed by 
the player. Video games must, by their nature, be interactive and involve the input of the player, but 
the varied nature of this input undermines the potential construction of a single, “narrative” text and 
diminishes the level of control an “author” could expect to have over the progression of the narrative 
arc. Whilst conventional notions of narrative assume the existence of a crafted, perpetually forward-
moving form of storytelling, periods of gameplay are instead often defined by periods of ‘interruption, 
repetition and redundant wandering, as players, die, retrace their steps, and search for illusive doors, 
keys and objects’ (Kirkland, 2005, p. 170; see also Egenfeldt-Nielsen, et el., 2016, p.21; Schut, 2003, p. 
7). This means that video games cannot offer the same structured forms of narrative that we have 
come to expect in our consumption of other media forms: -  
‘No matter how many times a book is read, by no matter how many different people, the 
text is always the same; but in a video game, no two game sessions will be exactly the 
same’ (Egenfeldt-Nielsen, et al., 2016, p. 203) 
This loss of authorial control can also be seen to impact on the ways in which we perceive temporal 
structures in games, as the agency that is afforded to the player collapses the distinction between the 
story and the narrative discourse: -  
‘It is clear that the events represented cannot be past or prior, since we as players can 
influence them… In this way, the game constructs the story time as synchronous with 
narrative time and reading/viewing time: the story time is now. Now, not just in the sense 
that the viewer witnesses events now, but in the sense that the events 
are happening now, and that what comes next is not yet determined’ (Juul, 2001) 
Egenfeldt-Nielsen et al, however, have suggested that a level of ‘reconciliation is possible through a 
re-examination of our terminology… [T]he idea that narrative and interactivity oppose each other 
springs from a definition of narrative as a linear unfolding of events; whilst this is true in many 
instances, it is not very interesting’ (2016, p. 226). Indeed, this contested focus on the role of the event 
is evident with Abbott’s analysis, as he argues that ‘without an event or action, you may have a 
‘description’, an ‘exposition, an ‘argument’, a ‘lyric’, some combination of these or something else 
altogether, but you won’t have a narrative. ‘My dog has fleas’ is a description of my dog, but is not a 
narrative because nothing happens. ‘My dog was bitten by a flea’ is a narrative. It tells of an event’ 
(2015, p. 13). Egenfeldt-Nielsen et al, however, offer a different conceptualisation of the non-linear 
nature of gameplay, predicated upon Tosca’s engagement with the Resident Evil: Code – Veronica 
video game: -  
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‘[T]he player is simply using the information that she has at that moment, as she tries to 
fill in the gaps. The player will eventually fill the gaps in the right way and find the right 
sequence of actions to perform (alone or with help of a walkthrough); or, perhaps, she 
will quit the game in frustration. And here is a remarkable feature of narrative in video 
games: it is perpetually unfolding, constantly folding back on itself, full of false starts and 
restarts, as the player contributes to the story’s creation with each action’ (Egenfeldt-
Nielsen, et al., 2016, p. 220).  
Like Bizzocchi (2007) and Jenkins (2004, pp. 120-121; 2007), they suggest that the more linear model 
of narrative prioritises the rules and conventions of classic linear storytelling at the expense of the 
consideration of the other potential forms of narrative meaning. This forms the basis on which to 
renegotiate the meaning of key terms, defining the “story” as the fictional worlds that the game 
creates and the “plot” or “narrative” as the ‘scripted succession of events that the player has to 
perform in a specific order’ (Egenfeldt-Nielsen, et al., 2016, p. 203). This approach suggests that there 
are fixed moments of narrative that occur within video games, despite the fluid forms of the player’s 
overall engagement. These ‘narrative moments’ may be contained in un-interactive, movie-like 
cutscenes, or enforced through tasks that must be completed in order to facilitate player progression. 
In his analysis of Escape from Monkey Island, for example, Schut reflects that ‘the plot points are not 
alterable: this is not a game with multiple endings. In other words, within a chapter, the player might 
be able to wander around and solve puzzles in whatever order he or she wants, but all of the puzzles 
must be complete before the next chapter can start. In this way, the player unveils the plot rather 
than creates it’ (2003, p. 7). This approach correlates with an alternative theoretical formulation of 
the distinction between the concepts of narrative and story: -  
‘The narrative text is a text in which an agent or subject conveys to an addressee (‘tells’ 
the reader) a story in a particular medium, such as language, imagery, sound, buildings, 
or a combination thereof. A story is the content of that text, and produces a particular 
manifestation, inflection and ‘colouring’ of a fabula: the fabula is a series of logically and 
chronologically related events that are caused or experienced by actors’ (Bal, 2009, p. 5) 
Such an approach suggests that whilst a narrative can reasonably be said to have a storied form, the 
study of such stories cannot be reduced to the occurance of choreographed “events” and must 
acknowledge a raft of other representational practices. This has opened up a variety of sites for 
potential narrative analysis. Roland Barthes, for example, famously argued that narratives are ‘able to 
be carried by articulated language, spoken or written, fixed or moving images, gestures, and the 
ordered mixture of all of these substances; narrative is present in myth, legend, fable, tale, novella, 
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epic, history, tragedy, drama, comedy, mime, painting… stained glass windows, cinema, comics, news 
items [and] conversation’ (1977, p. 79). To such sites, Catherine Riessman adds ‘memoir, bibliography, 
autobiography, diaries, archival documents, social science and health documents, other organisational 
documents, scientific theories, folk ballads, photographs, and other art work’ (2008, p. 4). We can also 
identify narrative aspects to political discourse. Klinke for example, notes that German geopolitics is 
structured around narratives that ‘have the characteristics of stories and therefore include 
protagonists and a tripartite plot, made up of beginning, middle and end’ (2011, p. 720). This is also 
reflected in the growing tendency to speak of a ‘narrative turn’ in the study of international relations 
(Jackson, 2015).  Here, the implication is that the theories of international relations can be understood 
as a form of narrative, rather than as the provision of the objective ‘truths’ about the world around 
us. In placing video games amongst these other forms of representational practice, it becomes 
necessary to examine the ways in which the label of ‘narrative medium’ is made meaningful. Indeed, 
as Pearce has noted, ‘the more interesting question is not Are they/are they not narrative? but In what 
ways are they narrative?’ (2005). Like Egenfeldt-Nielson et al, I argue that ‘many video games are 
stories as well as games. Some games contained more narrative than others, but even the most 
abstract usually contain the sketched elements of a fictional world’ (2016, p. 234). Schut, for example, 
reflects on the commonalities that are shared between the Escape from Monkey Island video game 
and more conventional forms of narrative media: -  
‘[Escape from Monkey Island] has characters and a clash between a protagonist (with his 
allies) and his antagonists, a conflict that escalates to a climax and then gets resolved. It 
has a timeline of events or plot points that the game presents as belonging to chapters. 
Escape from Monkey Island also relies heavily on a set of stock characters from popular 
narratives: the mysterious voodoo prophetess, the evil old heartless capitalist Scrooge-
type, the airheaded receptionist, etc.’ (Schut, 2003, p. 6) 
It is, however, notable that analyses of video games which do not demonstrate these same elements 
as clearly, have been subject to criticism for their subjective nature and their apparent imposition of 
a favoured interpretation onto a subject artefact. Poole, for example, argued that we can read the 
classic video game Pac-Man as a satirical representation of ‘a different kind of consumption… For Pac-
Man, consumption cannot end; no conceivable quantity of dots is enough. He will continue to search 
them out and eat them until he dies’ (2004, pp. 312-313). Similarly Murray argued that Tetris ought 
to be regarded as ‘a perfect enactment of the overtasked lives of Americans in the 1990s – of the 
constant bombardment of tasks that demand our attention and that we must somehow fit into our 
overcrowded schedules and clear off our desks in order to make room for the next onslaught’ (1999, 
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p. 144). For ludologists, such as Eskelinen, this approach to the act of “reading” a video game is an act 
of interpretative violence, rather than a meaningful act of critical analysis: -  
‘[I]t would be equally far besides the point if someone interpreted chess as a perfect 
American game because there’s a constant struggle between hierarchically organised 
white and black communities, genders are not equal, and there’s no health care for the 
stricken pieces’ (Eskelinen, 2001) 
It is, however, possible to argue that both of these perspectives are act of interpretative violence, as 
whilst Murray and Poole aim to generate meaning at all costs, Eskelinen is seen to be equally 
passionate about its subversion (Bogost, 2008b, p. 100). By way of mitigation, Voorhees (2009) instead 
suggests that there is a need to account for the role of both visual and narrative forms of 
representation, as well as the role that is played by a game’s underlying procedural structures. As 
such, I aim to provide a middle-ground approach that accounts for both the storied aspects that are 
evident in the content of video games and the role of their unique structural forms. The following 
section outlines the form that such an engagement will take within this analysis: -  
4.2 Outlining an ‘Object-Focussed’ Approach to the Analysis of Video Games 
In constructing my own qualitative framework for the analysis of video games texts, I acknowledge 
that ‘games can be several different things, depending on how one approaches them. Looking for 
 General Focus Specific Research Considerations  
Narrative 
Discourse 
The use of space 
in the creation of 
storied meaning. 
 How does the game seek to script the world that it 
presents? What “events” occur in particular spaces?  
 How is the narrative presented within the game’s 
content? What practices of ‘environmental 
storytelling’ are present in the game? 
 The use of metaphor/symbolism: are these 
environments provided alternative textualities? 
Characters The role of player 
and non-player 
characters. 
 Which characters/perspective does the player adopt?  
 How do the different characters interact with each 
other? How do the characters interact with their 
adversaries?  
 How do the different characters interact with the 
landscape?  
 Which characters are included in, and excluded from, 
the representation of specific spaces and landscapes?  
Space 
 
The 
representation of 
space.  
 Setting: Real world or fictional backdrop?  
 Scale: local, national or international space?  
 Type: What places are represented in the game? 
Town and cities, or villages and countryside?  
 Architecture: Official buildings/installations, or local 
dwellingscapes?  
 Functionality: Do such spaces appear habitable? 
Figure 8: Summary of Thematic Aspects to the Video Game Medium 
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narrative, one can find (or construct) them, and it is equally possible to search and find the essence of 
game in their interactive character – in their gameplay’ (Mäyrä, 2008, p. 10). As such, this analysis 
deliberately eschews the binarizing approach that is offered by a focus on exclusively either ludological 
or narratological concerns, accounting for both the practices associated with ‘environmental 
storytelling’ (Carson, 2000a; 2000b; Jenkins, 2004, pp. 120-121; 2007; Zakowski, 2016) and the 
function of video games as ‘procedural’ texts (Bogost, 2007). The first of these foci necessitates an 
engagement with the aspects within video games which can be seen to serve a storied function, 
offering a form of thematic analysis which is ‘sensitive to the symbols and messages conveyed by the 
game’s operation as a cultural medium’ (Mäyrä, 2008, p. 166). These aspects, which are summarised 
in Figure 8, include the role of the narrative discourse, the role of the characters, and the 
representation of particular forms of spatiality: -  
Whilst the above factors largely address narratological concerns, a structural analysis instead 
attends to the medium-specific structures and rules systems that act to control the ways in which the 
player is able to interact with these virtual worlds. These factors, which are summarised in Figure 9 
address ludic aspects such as ‘positions, resources, space and time, goals (sub-goals), obstacles, 
knowledge, rewards or penalties’ (Konzack, 2002, p. 93): - 
My examination of the above thematic and structural variables is predicated upon my own 
engagement with a range of different video game texts. As Aarseth highlights, this form of “hands-on” 
analysis leaves the researcher well-positioned to understand the intricacies of the medium: -   
 General Focus Specific Research Considerations 
Gameplay 
 
The role of the 
rules system 
 How is the player’s engagement constrained, or 
enabled, by the rules systems?  
 What is the player being asked to achieve in order to 
bring the game to a conclusion?  
 Are certain actions subjected to punishment/penalty?    
Scripting The level of 
player agency 
 Does the player have control over their engagement 
with the virtual world?  
 What are the interactions that are available to the 
player within a given space? 
 Do the actions of the player change the surrounding 
gameworld? Do different actions have different 
effects?  
 What role do cutscenes and FMVs play in the 
simulation of space? 
Visual 
Mechanics 
The existence 
of non-narrative 
visual aspects 
 What details are shown on the screen?  
 What additional visual aspects control the player’s 
engagement?  
Structure 
 
Use of Genre 
Conventions 
 Do the games adhere to, or subvert the ‘shooter’ 
genre conventions?  
Figure 9: Summary of Structural Aspects to the Video Game Medium 
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‘If we have not experienced the game personally, we are liable to commit severe 
misunderstandings, even if we study the mechanics and try our best to guess at their 
workings. And unlike studies of films and literature, merely observing the action will not 
put us in the role of the audience. When others play, what takes place on the screen is 
only partly representative of what the player experiences’ (Aarseth, 2003, p. 3) 
All observations that were made during the act of gameplay were recorded using Dragon Dictate 
software. Whilst this posed some initial challenges, mostly pertaining to the maintenance of proper 
diction during the act of gameplay, this process proved to be more efficient than either the creation 
of manually-recorded notes (which disrupted the natural immediacy of gameplay) or a more 
conventional audio-recording (a process requiring long transcription time). This audio transcription 
allowed for the identification of recurrent themes, both within individual game texts and between 
different titles. This meant that, where necessary, individual levels could then be targeted for more 
detailed analysis. Whilst subsequent sections of this chapter will offer a more detailed exploration of 
these different theoretical emphases, drawing upon pertinent methodological literatures, it is 
important to first acknowledge some of the practical aspects that are associated with such an 
engagement. Such factors include the criteria that were used in order to select particular video games 
for analysis, the stated parameters of the video game text, and the potential issues arising from the 
subjective nature of research into popular cultural artefacts. The following subsection addresses how 
these variables were managed in the undertaking of this analysis, whilst acknowledging that other 
examinations of video games may choose to take a different approach: -  
4.3 Playing Games? Addressing Practical Concerns 
One initial practical issue surrounding the implementation of a potential qualitative methodology is 
the process by which one identifies the appropriate targets for such an analysis. As Nitsche notes, 
whilst ‘the prophets of cyberspace were restricted to relatively few digital artefacts, often available to 
the selected few with access to high-tech research labs, the field of game studies today faces an 
overabundance of games to analyze’ (2008, p. 1). It is, as a result, important that the selection of 
specific video game texts reflects the broader aims and objectives of the analytical engagement. 
Aarseth, for example, argues for the incorporation of a broad-ranging sample of video games, 
suggesting that ‘too often generalizations are made on the basis of a few examples that are neither 
representative nor popular’ (2003, p. 8). Similarly, Schwartz argues that a ‘variety in terms of genre, 
year of publication, gaming hardware, and country of origin, allows for a broader analysis of gaming… 
than an examination of only one or two specific games’ (2006, p. 314). For my own analysis however, 
which aims to engage with the ways in which video games produce a specific form of geopolitics, a 
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more detailed analysis of a smaller range of texts is a more appropriate research strategy. The games 
that are addressed in each chapter are summarized in Figure 10: -   
Chapter Five: 
Monuments & the Mundane 
  Chapter Six: 
Reading Rural Space 
Chapter Seven: 
Temporality and the ‘Event’ 
Call of Duty 4: Modern 
Warfare (Infinity Ward, 2007) 
Call of Duty: Modern Warfare 
2 (Infinity Ward, 2009) 
Call of Duty: Modern Warfare 
3 (Infinity Ward, 2011) 
Splinter Cell: Conviction 
(Ubisoft Montreal, 2010) 
Battlefield: Hardline (Visceral 
Games, 2015) 
Call of Duty: Ghosts (Infinity 
Ward, 2013) 
Ghost Recon: Wildlands 
(Ubisoft Paris, 2017) 
Homefront (Kaos Studios, 
2011) 
Spec Ops: the Line (Yager 
Games, 2012) 
Splinter Cell: Blacklist (Ubisoft 
Toronto, 2013a) 
Homefront: the Revolution 
(Dambuster Studios, 2016) 
Tom Clancy’s the Division 
(Ubisoft, 2016a) 
Figure 10: Video Games Included in Subsequent Chapters 
Whilst the specific rationale for the inclusion of each of the above titles is discussed within the 
individual chapters, it is important to acknowledge the broader boundaries that were used in order to 
guide this selection process. In the first instance, the focus of the analysis was restricted to the study 
of military video games. More specifically, I chose to engage with proleptic video games, which 
commonly offer ‘a focus on individual or small groups of Special Forces soldiers conducting clandestine 
missions, rather than platoons taking part in a broader, mass-military engagement’ (Smicker, 2010, p. 
113). This is a genre of video games which has allowed the player to engage in a variety of present and 
near-future forms of conflict, set in a variety of time periods and – in some cases – even on other 
planets. Here, however, the aim is to utilise the chosen selection of video game spaces in order to 
force a level of critical reflection on the constructed nature of the various theoretical tools that we 
use to conceptualise the nature of our post-9/11 “real world” politics. As such, this analysis is 
thematically restricted to games that (a) offer either a simulation of a real-world location, or a 
convincing facsimile, (b) model current or near future conflicts, and (c) model human characters and 
adversaries, rather than aliens or robots. I have also chosen to limit my focus to video games that have 
been released for the Xbox 360 (Microsoft, 2005) or Xbox One (Microsoft, 2013) home console 
systems on the UK market. Whilst any particular in-depth discussion of the technical aspects of such 
hardware is placed beyond the scope of this analysis, such a restriction does serve a number of 
practical purposes. Firstly, as Nitsche highlights, ‘the restriction to available consumer products ties 
the study to a de facto analysis of existing worlds and serves as a reality check that prohibits any overly 
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enthusiastic prophecies. It avoids the danger of promising unrealistic future wonders’ (2008, p. 5). 
Secondly, this ensures that the chosen texts are freely accessible to the reader, allowing for the 
potential duplication or development of this research. Thirdly, this restriction serves to ensure a 
uniformity of encounter that would not be possible across multiple forms of hardware. Indeed, as 
Konzack notes, ‘the computer in question may be very different depending on whether it is a mobile 
cell phone, home game console, or personal computer wired to the Internet or other network 
facilities’ (2002, p. 91). Different video game consoles, PC systems and handheld devices often use 
different control schematics (including touchscreen input) which would complicate any direct 
comparison of the process of simulation. Different video games may also be released into different 
markets, reflecting specific cultural norms and sensibilities – such alterations may be as minor as 
changes in the characters’ names or nationalities, or may be as broad as the removal of entire plot 
arcs or factions. Finally, I must acknowledge that such a focus allows for me to benefit from my ludic 
competencies as a long-time Xbox console gamer. Video game play demands a level of individual 
competency with the medium’s mechanics, in order to achieve progression, in a manner that is not 
required in the analysis of film, television or literature (Robinson, 2015b, p. 93). The player-researcher 
must meet the conditions that are required for advancement through the gamespace, overcoming 
enemies and/or solving puzzles, or else will not be able to view the artefact in its entirety. This is, as 
Aarseth surmises, ‘analysis practiced as performance, with direct feedback from the system’ (2003, p. 
5). My familiarity and competency with such systems will allow for an easier progression through these 
games than that which would be faced by a less experienced researcher.  
 As well as outlining the process by video games were selected to serve as the foci for this 
analysis, it is also important that the parameters of my engagement with these texts is clearly defined. 
Many of the “shooter” video games that are the target of this analysis have a both a central campaign 
and a multiplayer mode. In the former, the player engages with the game’s core story and must 
complete a series of objectives in order to progress. Whilst the structure of the text may afford the 
player a number of potential ways of achieving these goals, progress and movement are very much 
guided, re-structured and moulded by the game (Carr, et al., 2004, p. 27). In the multiplayer mode, 
however, the player battles with and against other users. 
Here, I have chosen to focus specifically on the campaign mode, and to exclude the 
multiplayer portions of these games from consideration. This has permitted a focus on the ways in 
which these games make specific geopolitical truth claims through their content, whilst removing the 
need to ‘contend with the influence of multiple transformational players [and] social interactions’ 
(Jennings, 2015).  In engaging with this game mode, it must be acknowledged that the player will 
commonly be allowed to vary the level of difficulty that is experienced during the act of gameplay. 
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This has the potential to influence the ways in which the underlying rules system constructs the 
player’s engagement with the text through, for example, the addition of extra enemies or a reduction 
in the amount of damage that the player-avatar can sustain before “dying” (see Figure 11). For the 
purposes of this analysis, I elected to focus the analysis on the ‘second-hardest level of difficulty, 
because in the hardest level often some a-typical game play elements are included, and because in 
the less difficult levels often a lot of features are not elaborated with as much detail’ (Malliet, 2007). 
This engagement, therefore, is likely to be the most representative of a game’s content.  
It is, however, unclear to what extent the player must engage with a video game text in order to be 
able to claim to have accessed it in its entirety. This form of qualitative analytical play can prompt a 
wide variety of different levels of user engagement, ranging from superficial play, through light play 
and partial completion, through to total completion, repeated play and expert play (Aarseth, 2003, p. 
7). It is also questionable whether it is sufficient to complete the main campaign mode, as some 
aspects of the text may be hidden, may require repeated or alternative forms of play, or may simply 
be sold separately:  
‘Does epilogue DLC or extra episodes count towards the original game or do you 
subconsciously think of them as different games? For the actual end, if you put in the 
work, but couldn't quite get to the very last spot is it enough to watch someone else play 
the game? If there are multiple endings, is one good enough or do you have to play it 
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Figure 11: A Difficulty Menu (Ghost Recon: Wildlands, 2017) 
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through multiple times? And now with achievements and trophies, is complete all the 
points or the platinum trophy?’ (Swain, quoted in Jennings, 2015; see also Harper, 2011, 
p.6) 
For my own analysis, each of the games was initially played through to “total completion”. By this, I 
mean that each campaign mode was played through to its conclusion, without the attempt to either 
collect all the “achievements” associated with each title or to access any hidden levels and/or 
collectibles other than those that were encountered organically during gameplay. This allowed me to 
approximate the experience of an “average” gamer, without distorting the encounter through the use 
of walkthrough guides or cheat codes. Such an approach does, however, require a continued 
awareness that ‘the object of the analysis is partly a construction of the motivations and preferences 
a researcher carries into the play experience’ (Malliet, 2007). This does not simply mean that the act 
of video game research is subjective, which is true of all analyses of popular culture, but rather that 
the specific ways in which the player-researcher interacts with the video game will unavoidably 
influence the nature of the audio-visual output that appears on the screen: -  
‘There may or may not be failures, restarts, or modifications. The critic’s performative 
skills may improve or worsen, influencing play experience, the unfolding of a narrative, 
and access to further sections of the game. The critic may make choices that open up 
certain paths through the game and close off others’ (Jennings, 2015). 
Most video games do, however, now offer the ability to replay chosen sections of content – such an 
option that provides the player-researcher with the means to consider an interesting section of 
gameplay from a different perspective. As a result, my own analysis utilises a combination of both 
targeted repeat play and extra-textual resources (such as YouTube videos) in order to both review any 
particularly notable sections, as well as to account for the possibility of alternative playstyles and 
multiple, branching narratives (Egenfeldt-Nielsen, et al., 2016, p. 212). Such an encounter also served 
to highlight the wide variety of ways in which a player’s engagement with a particular gamespace may 
be broader than the content that is contained on the game disk itself, encompassing a wide variety of 
external referents. These might include video game trailers (aired both on television and online), 
advertising hoardings, interviews, reviews, walkthrough guides, gameplay videos, companion or 
source fictions, fan art, official and unofficial forms of memorabilia, and plethora of both official and 
fan-made websites (Jennings, 2015; Kirkland, 2005, p. 168). In the example of Tom Clancy’s The 
Division (Ubisoft, 2016), which is discussed in Chapter Seven, there are not only a raft of official game 
trailers – which can be accessed via the YouTube streaming site – but also a companion novel called 
‘New York Collapse’ (Irvine, 2016; Ubisoft, 2016b) and a companion website entitled ‘Collapse: the 
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End of Society Simulator’ (Ubisoft, 2016a). The latter website invites the player to participate in the 
simulation of a virus outbreak, similar to that which is encountered in The Division, placing themselves 
in the position of ‘patient zero’ and modelling the subsequent decline of the surrounding ‘real world’ 
(see Figure 12). This simulation is an effective tool by which the game can establish the apparent 
authenticity of its core premise (a biological attack), whilst also serving to premediate the total failure 
of the established systems of globalisation and international order.  
Some analyses have opted to exclude such materials. Šisler, for example, conducts an analysis of the 
portrayal of religion in video games which opts to ‘consciously exclud[e] interpretations and meaning 
depending on the materials outside the work under scrutiny’ (2016, p. 4). Whilst the external texts are 
not a primary source for my own analysis, I nonetheless acknowledge the role that these may play in 
establishing the broader narrative discourses of video game worlds. As a result, I utilise some of the 
surrounding trailers to provide broader context for my observations on the ‘thematic’ and ‘structural’ 
content of the video games that have been subjected to my analysis. The following section of this 
chapter examines how these variables emerge from an engagement with the associated 
methodological literatures, ahead of their implementation in Chapter Five: -  
4.4 Video Games as Environmental Storytelling 
As emphasised earlier in this chapter, analyses of video games can be seen to disagree on the role of 
narrative aspects. This is due, at least in part, to a perceived conflict between interaction and 
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Figure 12: Result from the Collapse simulation (Ubisoft, 2016e) 
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narration, which disrupts the ability of video gaming to offer a clear and controlled narrative arc. 
Zakowski, however, suggests that this focus on a linear narrative arc is representative of ‘the relative 
theoretical neglect of the experiential capacity of space in favour of time’ (2016, p. 1). Whilst time is 
conceptualised as a fundamental category of narrative, with the story understood as the linear 
progression of a sequence of events, the surrounding space is treated as though it is merely the 
“setting” or “background” in which such events take place. This section argues that space is more 
important to the process of narrative formation than this narrow conceptualisation suggests, echoing 
the suggestion that the analysis of video games risks becoming ‘preoccupied with the rules and 
conventions of classical linear storytelling at the expense of considerations of other kinds of narrative’ 
(Jenkins, 2004, p. 121). In accounting for the role of narrative within video games, there is a need to 
re-focus the terminologies that form the basis of such an enquiry, moving beyond the blind 
importation of the approaches and concepts that are used in the analysis of film, television and 
literature  (Aarseth, 2003; 2012; Frasca, 2003). Here, this is achieved through reference to the concept 
of ‘environmental storytelling’, a reformulated conceptualisation of narrative meaning which has its 
roots in the design of immersive theme-park attractions (Carson, 2000a; 2000b; Jenkins, 2004, pp. 
120-121; 2007; Zakowski, 2016). Such a concept does not rely on a temporally-driven model of 
narrative, but implies the existence of a process which can ‘tell a story through the experience of 
travelling through a real, or imagined, physical space’ (Carson, 2000a). The “story” is not told in any 
conventional manner, but rather is infused into the surrounding space through the creation of a series 
of environmental “rules” that are used to control the user’s experience. This approach is applied to 
video games by Jenkins (2004; 2007), in order to better understand the ways in which video game 
spaces can be used in the service of narrative goals. He suggests that the narrative potential of video 
games is only diminished through a comparison to film or television, instead likening the medium to 
‘a much older tradition of spatial stories, which have often taken the form of hero’s odysseys, quest 
myths and travel narratives’ (2004, p. 122). He suggests the process of environmental storytelling, 
occurring within video games, creates the preconditions of an immersive narrative experience in at 
least one of four specific ways. These are described as the creation of evocative space, enacted 
narrative, embedded narrative, and emergent narrative. The consequences of these different forms 
of narrative creation require closer consideration: -       
Evocative Spaces 
The creation of an “evocative” space relies upon the pre-established narrative competencies of the 
consumer, drawing upon the knowledge a reader, rider, viewer or player brings into a particular space 
when they arrive within it. One way in which this may be achieved is through the utilisation of a 
familiar story or narrative universe as a primary point of reference. Reflecting on the video game 
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American McGee’s Alice (2000), for example, Jenkins suggests that its creator could ‘safely assume 
that players start the game with a pretty well-developed mental map of the space, characters and 
situations associated with Carroll’s fictional universe, and that they will read his distorted and often 
monstrous images against the background of mental images formed from previous encounters with 
storybook illustrations and Disney movies’ (2007, p. 57). The value of this process is contested by Juul, 
however, who compares the narrative of the Star Wars films to that of the Star Wars themed racing 
games: -  
‘Star Wars the game cannot be said to contain a narrative text that can be recognised 
from Star Wars the movie: most characters from the movie are missing, and the few 
events that are included in the game have become simulations where the player can 
either win or fail’ (Juul, 2001)  
In outlining the concept of an evocative space, however, Jenkins (2004) suggests that the creation of 
a video game story (even one which is directly adapted from a book, film or television program) need 
not necessarily be a direct retelling. Instead, he argues that the aim of an evocative space is not to 
reproduce a particular story, place or piece of literary work, but rather to evoke its essence in a way 
that makes it relatable to the audience. Such an approach is supported by Egenfeldt-Nielson et al who 
argue, in response to Juul’s criticism, that the players of the Star Wars racing games will require only 
the barest thematic similarities in order to situate their play as part of the Star Wars universe (2016, 
pp. 201-202). A similar process was also evident in some of the games that were studied as a part of 
this analysis -  the Spec Ops: the Line (2K Games, 2012) video game, which is discussed in Chapter 
Seven, can be seen to draw on the narrative structures associated with the book Heart of Darkness 
(Conrad, 1902) and the film Apocalypse Now (1979). 
In addition, it must be noted that the use of a familiar ‘story’ is not, however, the only form of 
narrative competency that can be drawn upon in the manufacture of these worlds. They may also play 
on our genre competencies, utilising our familiarity with the conventions of different fictions in order 
to situate the player within their worlds. This form of evocative space is, for example, discussed in 
Chapter Six, in order to reflect on the narrative role that is played by the depiction of the ‘Cabin in the 
Woods’ within Ghost Recon: Wildlands (Ubisoft, 2017). Egenfeldt-Nielson et al (2016) refer to this as 
the activation of the ‘literary repertoire’, describing the mobilisation of the conventions of the horror 
genre within the Resident Evil – Code: Veronica video game: -  
‘[T]he repertoire is activated by ‘clues’ in the game (everything from the creepy sounds 
when you go up the stairs to the dark rain on the fresh tombs) and outside the game 
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(such as the game cover, which shows a zombie reflection in the eyes of the protagonist) 
which indicate that we are immersed in a survival horror game’ (2016, p. 217)  
Players may also draw on more specific “game-competencies”, drawing meaning from the elements 
(or combinations of elements) that are specific to a particular video game genre type. Kirkland, for 
example, notes in his analysis of the Silent Hill franchise, that the ‘survival horror might be understood 
as: an action-adventure game employing a third person perspective, and drawing on horror film 
iconography, in which a typically average character navigates a maze-like landscape, solving puzzles 
and fighting off monsters with limited ammunition, energy and means of replenishing it’ (2005, p. 
172). These different aspects can be used to immerse the player in the game world, conveying its 
overarching logics and structuring expectations of coming events. These same aspects can also be 
used in order to subvert the expectations of the players, as is evident in the ways in which Spec Ops: 
the Line (2K Games, 2012) manipulates the user’s familiarity with the conventions of military-shooter 
video games (see Chapter Seven). Indeed, as Payne suggests, ‘the experiential realism of Spec Ops 
derives not from the game’s fidelity to some worldly reality; its experiential realism emerges from the 
game’s troubling of the aesthetic relationship that we typically enjoy in first- and third-person 
shooters. The game critiques the attempt by any war game—itself included—to pleasurably immerse 
users in war’s horrors’ (2014, p. 268). The title challenges the familiarity of the “shooter” conventions, 
such as the “evil Other”, whilst also repeatedly breaking the fourth wall in order to talk directly to the 
player about the nature of the content that they are consuming (Figure 13). 
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Figure 13: ‘You are still a good person’ - Breaking the Fourth Wall (Spec Ops: the Line, 2012) 
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Understood in such a way, the spaces that are depicted within video games can be considered to exist 
as a part of a broader cultural intertextuality. Jenkins, for example, suggested that ‘one can imagine 
games taking their place within a larger narrative system, with story information communicated 
through books, films, television, comics, and other media… [with]… the richest understanding of the 
story world coming to those who follow the narrative across multiple channels’ (2004, p. 124). This 
referentiality, as Konzack highlights, requires that we pay attention to the existence of the ‘signs, 
ornaments or game structures that have originally been used in other media or other games, and 
which have been put to use in the game we are about to analyse’ (2002, p. 96). These different aspects 
of a gameworld are a form of ‘narrative’ in the sense that they are used to facilitate a process of 
meaning-making. As Nitsche surmises, ‘the argument here is that game spaces evoke narrative 
because the player is making sense of them in order to engage with them. Through a comprehension 
of signs and interaction with them, the player generates new meaning’ (2008, p. 3). Such a process 
should be used to reflect upon the ways in which other aspects of our relationship with space are 
‘evocative’ and intertextual in nature. This can include the formation of a nationalistic attachment to 
certain spaces (Chapter Five), or the sensation of being out in ‘the wilderness’ (Chapter Six). In his 
reflection on national identity, for example, Edensor highlights the existence of ‘dense spatial, 
material, performative, embodied and representative expressions and experiences of national identity 
which are inextricably linked with each other, which constitute a shared compendia of resources, akin 
to a vast matrix into which individuals can tap to actualise a sense of national belonging’ (2002, p. vii). 
Whether we are in-game or in the real-world, evocative processes of meaning-making draw on 
accumulated knowledges to generate a sense of our relationship to that space – a relationship that 
represents a natural-feeling, commonsensical mode of existence.   
Enacted Narrative 
As noted earlier within this chapter, it is often suggested that the interaction of the player with the 
gameworld is a threat to the ability of the game to construct a meaningful narrative – either the 
actions of the player disrupt the development of the story, or the narrative devices overly constrict 
the sense of freedom enjoyed by the player. Such an argument relies on the notion that this underlying 
story ‘is a controlled experience [and that] the author consciously crafts it, choosing certain events 
precisely, in a certain order, to create a story with maximum impact’ (Costikyan quoted in Jenkins, 
2004, p.124; see also Bizzocchi, 2007, p.3; Egenfeldt-Nielsen, et al., 2016, p.211). Within video games, 
however, some control over the events is ceded to the player and cannot be pre-scripted. Whilst their 
actions may result in the formation of individual narrative moments, insofar as the player is allowed 
(or forced) to perform or witness narrative events, these events are arguably not clearly integrated 
into the broader narrative arc. This has often meant, as Jenkins notes, that video games are ‘dismissed 
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as episodic – that is, each episode (or set piece) can become compelling on its own terms without 
contributing to the plot development and, often, can be reordered without significantly impacting our 
experience as whole’ (2007, p. 58). Such an accusation is not without some merit. It is, for example, 
common for popular discussion of video games to centre on compelling moments of gameplay – such 
as the so-called “boss fights” – without these necessarily being placed within any form of broader 
narrative context. Jenkins, however, suggests that ‘the tension between performance (or game play) 
and exposition (or story) is far from unique to games. The pleasure of popular culture often relies on 
spectacular performance numbers and self-contained set-pieces’ (2004, p. 124).  He likens video game 
play to the viewing of musicals or martial arts films, mediums which contain ‘memorable moments’ 
(songs and fights respectively) but which have an ‘accordion-like’ narrative framework through which 
these moments are rendered meaningful: -  
‘Certain plot points are fixed, whereas other moments can be expanded or contracted in 
response to audience feedback without serious consequences to the overall plot. The 
introduction needs to establish the character’s goals or explain the basic conflict; the 
conclusion needs to show the successful completion of those goals or the final defeat of 
the antagonist’ (Jenkins, 2004, p. 125) 
This flexible structure is particularly evident in open-world games, in which the player is permitted a 
less structured interaction with the world. Writing about the Mass Effect video games series, for 
example, Zakowski argues that the series deliberately manufactures a ‘fuzzy temporality’ and 
challenges the player to configure the narrative form for themselves (2014, p. 76).  A similar focus is 
evident in both Tom Clancy’s The Division (Ubisoft, 2016) and Homefront: the Revolution (Deep Silver, 
2016). In the former of these titles, for example, the player must piece together the narrative 
surrounding a terrorist attack on Manhattan. Whilst some “fixed” story moments remain, the player 
is left to address the remaining side-missions in almost any order (or, in some cases, not at all). The 
structure of the core narrative, as a result, is provided by the player’s progression through a series of 
broadly-defined objectives, which are usually realised by the movement of the character through the 
surrounding space.   
 This is where the examination of the surrounding environment can be particularly relevant, as 
‘organising the plot becomes a matter of designing the geography of imaginary worlds so that 
obstacles  thwart and affordances facilitate the protagonist’s forward movement towards resolution’ 
(Jenkins, 2007, p. 58). Whilst a linear narrative may be present, Jenkins argues that video games also 
‘respond to alternative aesthetic principles, privileging spatial exploration over plot development’ 
(2007, p. 58). Such an idea can usefully be extended even further, to instead suggest that spatial 
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exploration – at least in some cases – is plot development. As the player explores the environment, 
they will encounter ‘localised incidents’ or ‘micronarratives’ that – whilst not always contributory to 
the main “plot” – permit the player to better understand their relationship with the surrounding 
space. Jenkins (2004, p. 125) notes a variety of different forms that such micronarratives may take, 
discussing the use of stock characters, sensations (e.g. fear and speed) and emotions (e.g. anger and 
sadness). This analysis draws on some of these micro-narrative encounters, such as the discussions 
overheard to take place between characters in Ghost Recon: Wildlands (see Chapter Six). I also seek 
to extend a similar understanding to the role that is played by significant and symbolic buildings, such 
as the representation of recognisable urban landmarks (see Chapter Five).  
Embedded Narrative  
Whilst literary theory evokes the notion of the linear story, most works are also believed to contain a 
non-linear form of narrative discourse that can jump backwards and forwards during the process of 
exposition. One of the most overt examples of this narrative form can be found in detective fiction, 
which tells the story of both the investigation and the events that led up to the commission of the 
crime  (Jenkins, 2007, p. 58). Despite the suggestion that video games are unable to engage in this 
process of narration (see, for example, Juul, 2001), Jenkins argues that the medium is ‘no more locked 
into an eternal present than films are always linear. Many games contain moments of revelation or 
artefacts that shed light on past actions’ (2004, p. 127). One particular clear example of this is evident 
in the Call of Duty: Ghosts (2013) video game, as a part of the level Ghost Stories. Not only is this level 
introduced through a more conventional narrative, in the form of a campfire story shared between a 
father and his sons, but we then experience a missile attack before we then witness its cause. Jenkins 
describes this as a process of narrative comprehension, ‘an active process by which viewers assemble 
and make hypotheses about likely narrative developments on the basis of information drawn from 
textual cues and clues’ (2004, p. 126). In engaging with the simulation of a space, the viewer or player 
is invited to continuously test their knowledge of the world around them, formulating and 
reformulating their ideas of what both places and peoples are like, as well as what has happened and 
what will happen next. In video games, this can occur in a number of sites. These include the game’s 
initial exposition and ‘training’ levels, which offer ‘a space for rehearsal so that we can make sure we 
understand our character’s potential moves before we come up against the challenges of navigating 
narrational space’ (Jenkins, 2004, p. 126). The player may also see their actions impact on the 
environment itself, which may symbolise a broader struggle (Jenkins, 2004, p. 124; see, for example, 
the Fable franchise).  
  Conceptualised in such a way, we can view a story (and the resultant story world) as a body 
of information, rather than a temporal structure (Jenkins, 2004, p. 126). In video games this process 
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must, however, operate in a different manner to that in books or films. Whilst an author or a filmmaker 
can control the order in which we receive such information, a game designer controls the narration 
by distributing narrative material across and even outside13 game space. Henry Jenkins suggests that, 
‘with an open-ended and explanatory narrative structure like a game, essential narrative information 
must be presented redundantly across a range of spaces and artefacts, because no one can assume 
the player will necessarily locate or recognise the significance of any given element’ (2004, p. 126)14. 
These embedded narrative aspects can take a variety of forms. This is noted by Kirkland in his analysis 
of Silent Hill, in which he identifies a variety of ‘pictures and photographs, fragments of newspapers, 
inscriptions on monuments, diary entries, graffiti, writing on collectible objects, radio transmissions, 
audio-tape recordings [and] background conversations, [that] all contribute to this second-level 
storytelling process’ (2005, p. 169). In Ghost Recon: Wildlands (2017), some of these collectibles take 
                                                          
13 Jenkins (2004, p. 127) notes the example of the game Majestic (2000), in which the embedded 
narrative is spread across a variety of documents, webcasts, faxes, email and phone calls. Whilst this 
title is outside the scope of this analysis, this does highlight some interesting question about the 
boundaries of any particular text.   
14 Although, as Jenkins (2004, p. 126) highlights, this is not unique to games. Serialised fiction, such 
as TV soaps, must also repeat information for the benefit of those who may have missed episodes.   
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Figure 14: Locating “Intel” in Ghost Recon: Wildlands (2017) 
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the form of civilians and militia members that can be found and interrogated (see Figure 14). Whilst 
this interrogation process is not represented onscreen, the player can still conceptualise the passage 
of time and the potential actions that may have occurred during that moment.    
Conceptualised in such a way, the gameworld functions as a form of ‘memory palace’ (Jenkins, 
2007, p. 58) with narrative information embedded in the surrounding space. Whilst some of this 
information is created by the players, made important as they explore the gameworld and formulate 
their impressions of the space based upon this encounter, other forms of information are pre-
structured and left to await the player following the completion of specific tasks.  
Emergent Narrative 
A final narrative form, that of the ‘emergent’ narrative, refers to the creation of narrative that is not 
in any way pre-structured or pre-planned, but one which is instead created through the act of 
gameplay  (Jenkins, 2004, p. 128; Kirkland, 2005, p. 169). One example of this can be seen in The Sims, 
in which the player guides an on-screen person, or ‘Sim’, through a variety of everyday activities and 
interactions. The game leaves it open to the player to decide how to treat their Sims and, ultimately, 
what success and failure mean to the player - whilst one player may derive satisfaction from their 
Sim’s successful life, another player may choose to deprive their Sim of food and water. In doing so, 
the game offers ‘a kind of authoring environment within which players can define their own goals and 
write their own stories’ (Jenkins, 2004, p. 128). Here, the interaction between the gameplay and the 
underlying rules systems is afforded narrative value only insofar as the player can project their own 
‘meaning’ onto a more directionless form of play that is facilitated and constrained by the rules and 
characteristics of the surrounding gameworld. 
Whilst a focus on this ‘free play’ is of less value to the analysis of military simulations, which 
will commonly include inbuilt goals and objectives in their contest, Jenkins does offer a useful 
reflection on the ways in which the formation of meaning through player interaction is tied to a series 
of spatial and contextual rules. Although generating the illusion of narrative freedom, The Sims offers 
a mechanically limited range of behaviours and controls the ways in which specific objects and spaces 
are used: ‘characters sleep in beds. Bookcases make you smarter. Bottles are for spinning and thus 
motivating lots of kissing. Such choices result in a highly legible narrative space’ (Jenkins, 2004, p. 129). 
Rather than seeking to recover a specific narrative, or storied meaning, from the interactions 
permitted by a particular gameworld or object, we can instead examine the ways in which the 
affordances and constraints that are offered by a particular rules system act to create or foreclosure 
specific interpretations of the ‘reality’ of a spatial system.  This has clear ties to the notion of 
procedural rhetoric, a term which is used in order to denote the ways in which process-based systems 
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such as video games can be seen to engage in ‘the art of persuasion through rule-based 
representations and interactions rather than the spoken word, writing, images, or moving pictures’ 
(Bogost, 2007, p. ix). Whilst such a perspective does not discount the potential for narrative processes 
to operate within video games, it instead places the critical focus on the ways in which the existence 
of the underlying rules-based systems that structure gameplay act to control a player’s interaction 
with a video game in a manner which creates ‘frames’ that control the conveyance of political 
meaning. Whilst accounting for the role of narrative is important, I also argue that there is a need to 
understand how the procedural processes that operate within video games may influence their ability 
to convey political argument. As Bogost highlights, ‘when video games represent things – anything 
from space demons to long-term debt – they do so through procedurality, by constructing rule-based 
models of their chosen topics’ (2008a, p. 123). As a result, the following subsection focuses on the 
‘procedural’ nature of video gaming, examining the ways in which their specific nature can potentially 
allow video games to offer a form of political argumentation that is unavailable to other forms of 
entertainment media.  
4.5 Video Games as Procedural Texts  
Whilst the previous section focussed on narrative aspects to the analysis of video games, this section 
engages with the various different ways in which  arguments ‘are embedded in the rules of the games, 
and how the rules are expressed, communicated to and understood by a player’ (Sicart, 2011). Here, 
the concept of procedural rhetoric is used to highlight the specific ways in which video games are able 
to create discourse of value as a result of their procedural representational mode: -   
 ‘Procedurality refers to a way of creating, explaining or understanding processes. And 
processes define the way things work: the methods, techniques and logics that drive the 
operation of systems, from mechanical systems like engines, to organisational systems 
like high schools to conceptual systems like religious faith. Rhetoric refers to effective and 
persuasive expression. Procedural rhetoric, then, is a practice of using processes 
persuasively. More specifically, procedural rhetoric is the practice of persuading through 
processes in general and computational processes in particular’ (Bogost, 2007, p. 3) 
It is a conceptualisation of the ‘meaning’ of video games that is rooted in the notions of ‘rhetoric’ and 
‘procedure’: -  
Rhetoric  
The contemporary use of the concept of rhetoric is often profoundly pejorative, used in order to assail 
a form of ‘elaborate and well-crafted speech that is nevertheless devoid of actual meaning’ (Bogost, 
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2007, p. 15). The meaning of the term has, however, changed substantially over its history. In its 
classical formulation, rooted in Athenian society, the concept of rhetoric was used in order to refer to 
the art of oratory, and the various forms of persuasive speech act (Bogost, 2007, p. 15). The concept 
of rhetoric, in such a context, offered the speaker a means by which to convert the listener to a 
particular perspective, with the hope of influencing their subsequent actions. This conceptualisation 
has since been broadened, however, as the concept of rhetoric was expanded to address the 
significance of visual representation within photography, film and other forms of non-oral rhetoric 
practices: -    
‘Effectively, rhetoric was extended to account for new modes of inscription – especially 
literary and artistic notes. Rhetoric in writing, painting, sculpture, and other media do not 
necessarily make the same direct appeals to persuasion as oratory’ (Bogost, 2007, p. 19) 
The focus on these mediums offered a conceptual departure from the prior focus on the ability of 
rhetoric to generate influence, instead privileging the role of ‘elegance, clarity, and creativity in 
communication’ (Bogost, 2007, p. 20).  Bogost argues that there is a need to further develop this 
conceptualisation of rhetoric, arguing that it does not currently account for the uniquely ‘procedural’ 
model of inscription that is offered by computational technologies. He suggests that the current notion 
of a ‘digital’ form of rhetoric often simply abstracts the process-driven nature of the computer, 
inserting computational forms of rhetoric into the place of more conventional practices. One example 
of this is the substitution of the e-mail for the practice of letter writing (Bogost, 2007, pp. 25-26). He 
argues for the need to offer an account of rhetoric that addresses the claims and ideas that are made 
through process, rather than through speech, ideas, images, or any combination of those aspects. 
Thus procedural rhetoric can be understood as a form of rhetorical argumentation that is dependent 
upon ‘the practice of using processes persuasively, just as verbal rhetoric is the practice of using 
oratory persuasively and visual rhetoric is the practice of using images persuasively’ (Bogost, 2007, p. 
28). Procedural representation, meanwhile, requires a medium in which processes are enacted, rather 
than simply described. Human behaviour is one such medium, as individuals enact rule-sets in even 
basic behaviours (e.g. crossing the street, setting the table, playing rules-bounded card games), but it 
is difficult to study its arbitrary expression - people require rest, and incentives (Bogost, 2007, p. 10). 
Computerised systems, including video games, have no such limitations.   
Procedure 
In computer science, a procedure ‘is sometimes used as a synonym for a subroutine – a function or 
method cell’ (Bogost, 2007, p. 11). Within more general parlance, we tend to think of procedures in 
the context of bureaucracy. They may have their obvious manifestations (such as ‘company policy’), 
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or they may be subverted (such as the use of torture in military interrogation). In each case, the 
concept of procedure is thought of as something fixed, that is ‘tied to authority, crafted from the top 
down, and put in place to structure behaviour and identity infringement’ (Bogost, 2007, p. 3). In either 
form, a ‘procedure’ is something that acts to control the actions that can be performed at particular 
instances.  
 Murray (1999) argues that procedurality is one of the core properties of digital artefacts, 
alongside participation, spatiality and encyclopaedic scope. Here, the concept of a ‘procedural’ system 
is used to highlight the computer’s ‘defining ability to execute a series of rules’ (Murray, 1999). 
Although some procedural aspects can be identified within non-computational structures, it is this 
‘ability to execute a series of rules [that] fundamentally separates computers from other media’ 
(Bogost, 2007, p. 4).  Whilst written and visual rhetorics may be driven by the desire to represent 
human and material process, it is only procedural systems – such as computer software and 
videogames – that represent process with process (Bogost, 2007, p. 14). As in the example of company 
and bureaucratic procedure, the procedural nature of computational systems – including video games 
- permits them to establish ‘rules of execution, tasks and actions that can and cannot be performed’ 
(Bogost, 2007, p. 4). This means that video games can be understand as ‘models of experience, rather 
than textual descriptions or visual depictions of them. When we play a game, we operate these 
models, our actions constrained by their rules’ (Bogost, 2011, p. 4; see also Šisler, 2016).  This focus 
on the rules systems that underpin video game play acts to make specific claims about the ways in 
which things work, often with the effect of either reproducing or contesting the nature of particular 
social, political or cultural processes and practices. One example of this is offered in Bogost’s account 
of the teaching simulation Tenure (1975), a program which models the various decisions that academic 
personal might face over the course of the school year. He suggests that the game subverts notions 
of pedagogical purity, in order to make ‘claims about how high school education works. Most notably, 
it argues that educational practice is deeply intertwined with personal and professional politics’ 
(Bogost, 2007, p. 2). A further example is identified in The MacDonald’s Videogame (2006), which 
affords the player control over the farm, processing factory, retail arm, and corporate office. For 
Bogost, this game ‘mounts a procedural rhetoric about the necessity of corruption in the global fast-
food business, and the overwhelming temptation of greed, which leads to more corruption’ (2007, p. 
31). The game makes a procedural claim about the nature of corporate business, but does so in a way 
that intends to disparage and undermine the ethics of the fast food industry. It is important to note 
that procedural claims are not restricted to these smaller independent titles. Bogost notes that, ‘in 
Doom’s model of the world, emphasis is placed upon the trajectory and power of weaponry. In Animal 
Crossing’s model of the world, emphasis is placed on work, trade, and arrangement of the 
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environment’ (2008a, p. 123). Wendler argues that the Portal video game ‘relies on psychological 
models of identity, identification, organisational interaction, and sociological bond formation in the 
player, not in any of the game’s characters, in order to rhetorically craft a narrative that is co-created 
by the players of the game during gameplay’ (2014, p. 352). Voorhees (2009), meanwhile, examines 
the influence of the party creation system within the various different iterations of the Final Fantasy 
video game franchise. He suggests that the more recent entries in the franchise procedurally foreclose 
upon an engagement with race, ethnicity and nationhood, as a result of the exclusion of character 
backgrounds, individual personalities or identities. 
The ability of video games to make claims about the ways in which things work is the result of 
a series of procedural figures (Bogost, 2007) or ‘operational logics’ (Mateas & Wardrip-Fruin, 2009) 
that underwrite the act of gameplay15. Such processes take on a similar role in computational systems 
to that of metaphor or metonymy in literature, acting as ‘strategies for authoring unit operations for 
particularly salient parts of many procedural systems’ (Bogost, 2007, p. 13). These different logics may 
include textual, graphical, or resource management forms. Textual logics are most evident in games 
such as Zork, in which typed commands are used to generate a response from the software system.  
Graphical logics are more common processes in contemporary games, used to ‘underwrite the 
simulation of spaces and objects within spaces’ (Mateas & Wardrip-Fruin, 2009, p. 2). This may 
include, for example, the simulation of movement, the imposition or absence of gravity, or the role of 
collision detection: -   
‘In many videogames, the player controls an object, agent, or vehicle that he must pilot 
in a particular manner – toward a goal or to avoid enemies or obstacles. Graphical logics 
frequently encapsulate procedural representations of material phenomena, such as 
moving, jumping, or firing projectiles. Object physics and lighting effects offer additional 
examples, meant to depict changing environments rather than character movement. In 
the video game industry, sets of graphical logics are often packaged together as a game 
engine, a software toolkit used to create a variety of additional games’ (Bogost, 2007, p. 
13) 
The final form - that of the resource management logic - is a form of process that is often found in the 
real-time strategy or turn-based forms of video gaming. This is a practice that is ‘concerned with 
representing finite resources, resource production and consumption, resource trade-offs, and so 
                                                          
15  As Mateas and Wardrip-Fruin highlight, ‘operational logics are more general, and more 
fundamental,than game rules or mechanics’ (2009, p. 3) 
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forth’ (Mateas & Wardrip-Fruin, 2009, pp. 3-4). Such process are evident in resource-management 
games such as Civilisation and Oregon Trail. We can think of clusters of these figures as procedural 
genres: -  
‘Procedural genres emerge from assemblages of procedural forms. These are akin to 
literary, filmic, or artistic genres like the film, the lyric poem, the science fiction novel. In 
videogames, genres include the platformer, the first-person shooter, the turn-based 
strategy game, and so forth. When we recognise gameplay, we typically recognise the 
similarities between the constitutive procedural representations that produce the on-
screen effects and the controllable dynamics we experience as players’ (Bogost, 2007, p. 
14) 
Approaching the study of computational systems in this way invites a reconceptualization of what is 
meant by the act of play. As Sicart (2011) highlights, ‘game designers are supposed to create play, that 
is, a particular behaviour in the players. Proceduralists believe that those behaviours can be 
predicated, even contained, by the rules, and therefore the meaning of the game, and of play, evolves 
from the way the game has been created and not how it is played, not to mention where and when it 
is played, and by whom’. Video game environments serve a mechanistic function, based upon their 
ability to channel and constrain the act of gameplay. They are used to establish and impose a series 
of rules that govern both the conditions that the player must meet in order to ‘win’ the game, as well 
as the behaviours that are (and are not) available to the player in their pursuit of such objectives. The 
player engages with these constructs, becoming ‘more skilful as he/she masters increasing levels of 
difficulty whilst overcoming threats and challenges’ (Anderson & Kurti, 2009, p. 50). The player fills in 
the missing portion of the game through the act of play, but the ‘meaning’ of the text is controlled by 
pre-set procedural constraints. As Schwartz highlights, whilst the video game player retains some 
control over their movements, they must ‘interact with environments in forms foreseen and coded by 
the game designers’ (2006, p. 318). This means that ’for the proceduralists, a game means what the 
rules means, and understanding what games are is to understand what their rules describe’ (Sicart, 
2011). The act of play retains an overall importance, but only in the sense that it serves to ‘activate’ 
the forms of procedural argumentation that are embedded within a game’s rules. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has offered an analytical approach which aims to balance both narrative and ludological 
concerns. This chapter also addresses a number of more practical concerns. I have outlined the broad 
process by which video games were selected for analysis, noting issues pertaining to genre, thematic 
relevance and commercial prevalence. I have also sought to delineate the extent of my own 
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engagement, outlining my perspective on the role of the game mode, potential downloadable content 
and supplementary missions, and the plethora of extra-textual, non-playing sources that surround 
each title. Such an engagement is designed to contribute to my own analytical objectives which, as 
outlined in Chapter One, include the exposure of a video game geopolitics and the provision of a 
means by which to challenge the established practices and theoretical discussions used in the analysis 
of real-world spatialities.  
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Chapter Five: Monuments and the Mundane  
Introduction 
As highlighted in Chapter Two, critical forms of analysis have served to destabilise some of the various 
different taken-for-granted ways in which we conceive of the Self, both as indivdiduals and as a part 
of a broader collective. The continuing prevalence of the nation-state has served to provide one such 
source of fixity, acting as a ‘pre-eminent constituent of identity and society at theoretical and popular 
levels’ (Edensor, 2002, p. 1; see also Billig, 1995, p. 53; Cubitt, 1998, p. 1; Dittmer, 2005, p. 630). 
Despite this, however, it is notable that nationalism has come to be regarded as a peripheral 
phenomenon. It is often seen as something that is uncivillised, occurring within people and places that 
are somehow not “like us”, whilst ‘the ideological habits by which “our” nations are reproduced as 
nations, are unnamed and thereby, unnoticed’ (Billig, 1995, p. 6). The challenge, therefore, is to find 
ways in which these nationalistic sentiments can be made visible within one’s own nation and own 
people, necessitating that we remain attentive to the variety of different ways in which such ideologies 
are re-coded and redistributed as unchallenged commonsense.  
 Such a process is not simply the product of “high” forms of political discourse, but is also 
created and consumed within the various forms of popular cultural entertainment that we read, watch 
and play. Prior analyses have, as a result, engaged with the construction of nationalistic geopolitical 
imaginaries within a range of different cultural artefacts, including those that are found within 
magazines (Sharp, 1993; 1996; 2000), cartoons (Dodds, 1996; 1998), comics  (Dittmer, 2005; 2007a), 
and popular film (Dodds, 2005; Doucet, 2005; Power & Crampton, 2007; Weldes, 1999). These 
analyses have engaged with the construction of the national space at a variety of different scales, 
examining the role of popular culture in shaping our understandings of the world and our place within 
it. Sharp, for example, reflects on the extent to which ‘the Soviet Union became a negative space into 
which The Reader’s Digest [magazine] projects all those values which are antithetical to its own 
(“American”) values. It is not possible to have coexisting but different values in this system; one set of 
values is right, the other exists in opposition and is thus wrong’ (1993, p. 496; see also Sharp, 1996, 
pp.567-568). The magazine is shown to have become part of a broader process of political 
spatialisation, aiding in the exportation of hegemonic forms of American national identity to a global 
audience. Dittmer (2005; 2007a; 2011), meanwhile, examines the ways in which American national 
identity has been narrated through the embodiment of American values in the character of Captain 
America, a Marvel Superhero who is afforded enhanced athleticism and combat abilities by an 
experimental serum. The character is treated as a part of a broader moral geography, which seeks to 
create and recreate “America” in juxtaposition to the appearance and values of a variety of non-
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American places and peoples. For example, the character of Captain America is represented as 
conventionally physically attractive – desirable to women and envied by men – whilst the German 
characters, who often played the role of the antagonists, were shown to have ‘big teeth, a large 
mouth, a pointy nose, greasy hair, and a monocle’ (Dittmer, 2007a, p. 414). The role of these “hero” 
characters in the embodiment of the nation is also evident within Dittmer’s examination of the 
Captain Britain comics, within which the relationship between Captain America and Captain Britain is 
utilised as a cultural proxy for the nature of the “special-relationship” between the UK and the USA. 
Eschewing many of the characteristics that were ordinarily associated with the heroic American 
archetype, presumable for the benefit of a British market, this comic is instead shown to juxtapose 
‘American brashness and power versus British circumspectness and concern for the lives of others’ 
(Dittmer, 2011, p. 83). Whilst such analyses have demonstrated the political potential of popular 
culture (see also Chapter Two), it is notable that there has been a more limited consideration of the 
ways in which nationalistic geopolitical imaginaries are created and relayed within the content of 
military-themed video games. This chapter addresses this imbalance and will argue that the 
(re)production of a national geopolitics – together with the conterminous sense of national identity 
and spatial situatedness – is achieved through both the representation of, and engagement with, 
different forms of “monumental” and “mundane” environments. Drawing from an examination of the 
surrounding literature, offered in Chapter Three, this analysis differentiates between the spaces which 
function as an overt appeal to a collective national identity and those which resonate with the 
quotidian, banal forms of experience that characterise our day-to-day lives. These spaces are shown 
to be produced at a variety of different scales and through many different processes of individual 
encounter.    
5.1 Taking Place? Reading Nationalist Spatial Imaginaries in Video Games 
The popularity of military-themed video games is, in part, derived from the extent to which the 
medium can claim to offer a “realistic” or “authentic” experience of warfare and conflict. This can 
potentially be achieved in a variety of different ways. This may, as King highlights, be the result of a 
‘functional form of realism, in which gameplay is said to be modelled on the embodiment of real-world 
military tactics’ (2015). This form of realism is particularly evident within video games that were 
originally created for use within military training exercises (e.g. Full Spectrum Warrior, 2004), as well 
as commercial titles that were developed with the direct input of military organisations (e.g. America’s 
Army, 2001). This sense of “functional” realism is further bolstered by the simulation of recognisable 
military technologies, which allows video game players to utilise the weaponry, equipment and 
vehicles that feature in contemporary “real-world” combat (see, for example, Robinson, N. 2016).    
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 Payne, meanwhile, emphasises that military-themed video games offer ‘ever-increasing levels 
of visual and aural realism, and computational verisimilitude’ (2012, p. 306). Here, an underlying sense 
of “realism” is achieved through the myriad of different ways in which an in-game environment is 
made to look and sound right, behave in expected ways, and have familiar-feeling physical properties. 
This may include, for example, the potential for the player to able to break glass, splinter wood, make 
pipes explode, or even bring down entire buildings (Figure 15). 
Of a particular interest for this analysis, however, are the ways in which these video games generate 
a sense of geopolitical realism through their ability to ‘recreate real-world events and spaces, making 
tangible connections to the outside world. In doing so [video games] use real peoples, places and 
cultures as their referents, opening new forms of representation’ (Šisler, 2014, p. 109). These video 
games cannot claim to offer a direct, mimetic representation of the reality of the “real world”, but 
rather (re)present selected aspects of this world in a way that is made to feel intuitively plausible and 
familiar. This means that, as Payne highlights, that ‘the advertised pleasures of playing wars past, 
present or future is, in actuality, the pleasure of playing with a delimited textual realisticness, and not 
a contextual realism that connects the gamer and the game to the lived realities of an outside world’ 
(2012, p. 309). The sense of realism is generated by the extent to which the scenarios, places and 
peoples that are represented within these video games correlate with our prevailing understandings 
of the world and our place within it, offering an immersive and visceral facsimile of selected aspects 
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Figure 15: Destructible Environments (Battlefield Hardline, 2015) 
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of our surrounding political environments. They may, for example, correlate with hegemonic ideas of 
what the Self looks like, or with anxieties about where the next existential “threat” might potentially 
come from. Within this chapter, however, these video games are argued to be co-constitutive of 
particular geopolitical imaginaries, as a result of their representation of particular types of national 
space and spatial encounters.  
 This chapter will examine some of the different ways in which military-themed video games 
are made able to produce an authentic-feeling form of national Selfhood through the simulation of 
different encounters with national spatiality, differentiating between spaces which function as an 
appeal to collective identity and those which occur as mundane aspects of everyday life. As a result, 
this chapter focusses primarily upon military-themed video games which foreground different forms 
of political and spatial discourse as a means by which to distinguish between the domestic “patriot” 
and the foreign “ultranationalist”. These video games include the Call of Duty: Modern Warfare 
franchise (2007-2011), as well as Tom Clancy’s Splinter Cell: Conviction (2010)16. Some background 
information on these different titles is offered below: - 
(1) The Call of Duty: Modern Warfare series (2007-2011) 
The Call of Duty franchise is one of the most well-known and successful brands of military-themed 
video game, routinely generating high sales figures and enduring levels of consumer engagement. 
According to Bobby Kotick, the chief executive at the video game publisher Activision Blizzard, the Call 
of Duty video games are ‘now amongst that rarefied group of sustained franchises like Star Wars, Harry 
Potter and [the] Lord of the Rings, and the National Football League, that attract or engage tens of 
millions of people every year or every new release’ (The Telegraph, 2011). The Modern Warfare series 
is an individual sub-franchise which, as of 2018, is comprised of three video games - Call of Duty 4: 
Modern Warfare (2007), Call of Duty: Modern Warfare 2 (2009) and Call of Duty: Modern Warfare 3 
(2011). These titles marked a significant stage in the evolution of both the Call of Duty franchise and 
the first-person shooter more broadly, marking the beginning of an initial transition away from a 
prevailing focus upon a historical, World War setting17.  
                                                          
16 Within this chapter, other supporting examples are also drawn from within similar forms of military-
themed video game, including Homefront (2011) and Turning Point: Fall of Liberty (2008). 
17 It is, however, notable that both the Call of Duty and Battlefield franchises can be seen to have taken 
some steps towards reversing this trend. Call of Duty: WWII released in November 2017, whilst 
Battlefield 1 released in 2016. Whilst these titles are beyond this scope of this analysis, which focuses 
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Call of Duty 4: Modern Warfare (2007) 
The first entry into the Modern Warfare franchise was both a financial and critical success, achieving 
total cross-format sales of 18.33 million units (VGChartz, 2018f)18. This particular title, which is set in 
the then-future year of 2011, charts British and American attempts to contain the outbreak of both 
civil war in Russia and a separatist uprising occurring within an unnamed Arabic nation. This analysis 
will focus specifically on the construction of the extremist ideals and actions of the “ultranationalist” 
Other, represented by the characters of both Khaled Al-Assad and Imran Zakhaev. These figures are 
used to reproduce the commonplace assumption that ‘the separatists, the fascists and the guerrillas 
are the problem of nationalism’ (Billig, 1995, p. 6). Of a particular interest is the nationalistic rhetoric 
that surrounds both the execution of President Al-Fulani (Level Three: Coup), which is contrast to the 
“patriotism” associated with the character of Shepherd (Call of Duty: Modern Warfare 2). It is also 
notable that the game’s central conflict is shown to be a global endeavour, leading allied forces to 
foreign nations such as Azerbaijan and Russia. The portrayal of such spaces allows for a consideration 
of the extent to which different allied and enemy characters act to embody “national” values and are, 
as a consequence, shown to be either “in” or “out” of place within particular areas. This is particularly 
notable during The Sins of the Father (Level Sixteen), during which members of the SAS disguise 
themselves as Russian soldiers.  
Call of Duty: Modern Warfare 2 (2009)  
The second instalment of this franchise has also achieved strong sales figures, with cross-format sales 
of 25 million units (VGChartz, 2018b). The game’s narrative resumes in 2016, following the death of 
Imran Zakhaev at the hands of SAS Sergeant John “Soap” MacTavish. Russia is shown to have fallen 
under the control of an ultranationalist regime, whose forces treat the fallen Zakhaev as a martyr. 
Following a series of terrorist attacks against Western targets, led by the charismatic Vladimir 
Makarov, an American military force (codename ‘Taskforce 141’) is mobilised. After an agent is killed 
during a controversial undercover mission in Russia, during which he participates in an attack on a 
civilian airport, diplomatic tensions between the USA and Russia give way to open warfare. Whilst 
                                                          
on the practices of representation utilised in both revisionist and proleptic forms of video gaming (see 
Chapter Four), they represent a viable target for future analyses.  
18 Call of Duty 4: Modern Warfare has also been re-released, in a remastered form, alongside special 
edition copies of Call of Duty: Infinite Warfare (2016). Although given a graphical upgrade, this new 
version of the game does not otherwise represent a departure from the content of the original Xbox 
360 release. 
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again highlighting the extremes of foreign nationalism, Call of Duty: Modern Warfare 2 also 
emphasises the extremes of American patriotism. As the central plot unfolds, it is eventually revealed 
to the player that a corrupt US military official – Lieutenant General Shepherd – helped to engineer 
the conflict between America and Russia, with the aim of bolstering the declining rates of military 
spending and civilian enlistment. His involvement also includes the murder of Simon “Ghost” Riley and 
Gary “Roach” Sanderson, two members of Taskforce 141 (Level Fifteen: Loose Ends). This chapter 
focusses specifically on some of the ways in which the notion of the “nation” is scaled to the level of 
the body, engaging with the promotion and subversion of identity during the airport attacks (Level 
Four: No Russian) and Shepherd’s attempted justification of American hyper-nationalism (Level 
Eighteen: Endgame). This juxtaposition is also evident in the contrast between the deaths of “Ghost” 
and “Roach”, whose passings are largely unmarked, and the eventual interment of Lieutenant General 
Shepherd at Arlington cemetery. This chapter also highlights some of the different ways in which a 
nationalistic form of geopolitics is evoked through the representation of both different forms of 
monumental spatiality - including the White House (Level Thirteen: Second Sun, and Level Fourteen: 
Whisky Hotel) - as well as more mundane, everyday environments (Level Six: Wolverines; Level Eight: 
Exodus).     
Call of Duty: Modern Warfare 3 (2011) 
The most recent Modern Warfare video game has achieved sales of 30.97 million units (VGChartz, 
2018h). The game resumes directly after the events of the previous titles, as Price and Nikolai take the 
wounded “Soap” to a loyalist safe-house in Northern India. In the meantime, an American Delta Force 
team, codenamed Metal, forces the withdrawal of Russian forces from the East Coast of America. 
Months later, however, Vladimir Makarov kidnaps the Russian president in an attempt to force the 
official to reveal the country’s nuclear launch codes. He is also responsible for a series of chemical 
attacks across Europe, which allows Russian military forces to gain control over of much of the 
continent. Price and Yuri, in conjunction with Metal team, eventually rescue the President from a 
Siberian diamond mine, allowing for a peace-treaty that brings an end to the conflict. Despite this, 
however, Yuri and Price pursue Makarov to a Dubai hotel. Whilst Yuri is killed, Price hangs Makarov 
from the roof with a steel cable. The contrast between foreign and domestic space is again evident 
within this game. Call of Duty: Modern Warfare 3 depicts a series of attacks on domestic spaces, 
including an assault on the American stock exchange (Level Two: Black Tuesday) and a chemical attack 
on central London (Level Seven: Mind the Gap, and Level Eight: Davis Family Vacation). These levels 
provide an opportunity to explore the usage of different forms of “monumental” and “mundane” 
spatial encounters as a means by which to discipline our relationship with the notion of nationhood.  
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(2)  Splinter Cell: Conviction (Ubisoft, 2010)   
The Splinter Cell: Conviction video game is part of a broader franchise that is inspired by the works of 
the thriller-writer Tom Clancy. Whilst lacking the high profile associated with the Call of Duty: Modern 
Warfare franchise, achieving comparatively modest sales of 2.16 million units (VGChartz, 2018d), this 
title also provides a spatially-orientated narrative of nationality and belonging. The player takes on 
the role of the elite military operative Sam Fischer, who is shown to have left military service in order 
to investigate the circumstances surrounding his daughter’s death. Whilst in Malta, Fischer is 
contacted by his former handler – Anna Grímsdóttir – who warns him that he is the target of a group 
of hitmen. Whilst attempting to capture their leader, Fischer is captured and drugged by members of 
a government sanctioned strike-team codenamed Third Echelon. After Fischer is subsequently rescued 
by Grímsdóttir, who reveals herself to be working undercover on the behalf of the US President, he 
becomes instrumental in uncovering plans for an EMP attack against Washington DC.  
 This analysis focuses specifically upon the contrasting notions of the “home”, represented 
through both Fischer’s discussion with his daughter (Level One: Merchant’s Street Market) and his 
subsequent return to the Third Echelon headquarters (Level Eight: Third Echelon HQ). The analysis will 
also highlight the representation of mundane areas, including the presence and absence of civilians, 
within several different levels (Level One: Merchant’s Street Market; Level Two: Kobin’s Mansion).  
As the above overviews have shown, these video games are notable for their mediation of 
national identity. This is achieved through the representation of specific forms of space and spatial 
encounter, which are used in order to either emphasise or blur the distinction between “our” 
patriotism and “their” nationalism. Within Call of Duty 4: Modern Warfare, for example, the 
phenomenon of nationalism is shown as a peripheral affliction – the player travels to a range of foreign 
locations in order to target the ultranationalists, separatists and zealots that are held up as an 
existential threat to the national order. Call of Duty: Modern Warfare 2 blurs this distinction between 
the Self and the Other, showing the extremes of patriotism and nationalism to be two sides of the 
same whole. Whilst the visible existential threat remains external, embodied by the charismatic 
Makarov, the game also calls attention to the dangers posed by the ultranationalist ideologies of the 
domestic Self. Despite this particular narrative conceit, however, the distinction between the Self and 
the Other is maintained through specific codes of spatial representation, including the progressive 
governance that is symbolically represented by monumental spaces such as the White House. A similar 
spatial pattern of spatial representation is also evident within Call of Duty: Modern Warfare 3, within 
which a foreign ultranationalist is again evoked as a threat to the Western, “civilised” way of life. This 
distinction between Self and Other is once again blurred within Splinter Cell: Conviction, however, 
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which utilises a senior American political figure – here, the Vice President of the USA – in order to 
question the externalisation of the potential “threat”. In an attempt to address the creation of this 
internal insecurity, the player – as Fischer – is guided through a variety of monumental and everyday 
spaces that stand as emblematic of different aspects of American political identity and experience.  
 Taken together, this chapter will argue that these military-themed video games can be used 
to illuminate the ways in which national identity and a commensurate sense of belonging or 
estrangement is mediated through the representation of, and encounter with, a variety of different 
forms of both symbolic and everyday spaces. With this in mind, the remaining sections of this chapter 
will offer three broad readings of the representation of different forms of “national” spaces within 
video games: -  
(i) Capture the Flag – Mission and Encounter 
The first section of this chapter focuses on the role of different forms of monumental national space 
in the “flagging” of national identity, examining the extent to which the simulation of such 
environments is constitutive of particular ideas of nationalism and national identity. There are two 
distinct aspects that are targeted within this section, which differentiates between the broader 
military mission and the process of spatial encounter. The first of these aspects – that of the “mission” 
examines the overt use of macro-level forms of spatial representation in the creation of a broader 
context for video game narratives. This section focuses on some of the representations of national 
and international spaces, examining how these processes work to provide a broader sense of spatial 
situatedness. The subsequent focus, meanwhile, is upon the notion of the “encounter”, engaging with 
the specific representation and experiential utility of individual, localised monumental spatialities. The 
section will also reflect on the relationship between monumental and mundane spaces, examining the 
extent to which the former, symbolic form of spatiality is made able to impose itself on the 
surrounding environment. Here, this analysis will examine the influence of monumentality upon the 
space that the player must pass through and progress towards, as well as examining the ways in which 
the transition from “mundane” to “monumental” forms of space is represented. 
(ii) Press X to Pay Respects: Monumental Spaces, Bodies and Nationalist Sentiment 
The subsequent section of this chapter examines the interaction between spaces and particular 
national bodies. This subsection begins with a focus on some of the limited instances on which video 
game space is used in practices of memorialisation and commemoration, engaging with the examples 
of both the Hereford Clock Tower and the Arlington National Cemetery. In examining the 
representational practices that surround such spaces, this subsection highlights the difference 
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between the veneration of Lieutenant General Shepherd (ostensibly a traitor that is treated as a 
national martyr) and the lack of commemoration that is extended to the characters of “Roach” and 
“Ghost”. This contrast is used to highlight the ways in which venerated, monumental forms of space 
can be used in order to control the public perception of historical events. This section then continues 
by examining the various ways in which national spaces and identities are scaled to the level of the 
individual living body. Such an examination considers both the role of nationalistic rhetoric, as well as 
the various ways in which national identity is linked to the inclusion and exclusion of specific bodies.  
(iii) Ghost Hunting? Exploring “Ruined” Mundane Spaces  
The final section of this chapter focusses on the extent to which a sense of spatial situatedness is both 
(re)produced and challenged through our encounters with different forms of mundane environment. 
The representations of these familiar dwellingscapes, which are commonly comprised of the 
environmental aspects that we would expect to see within our own homes and neighbourhoods, are 
here liked to the construction of the ‘urban ruins’ (Edensor, 2005; see Chapter Three). Whilst the 
representation of these areas retains familiar architectures and infrastructural elements, they are 
stripped of their familiar spatial flows. This section begins by focussing on the intertwined concepts of 
“home” and “house”, reflecting on the ways in which the portrayals of individual dwellings can 
prioritise some spaces over others. This section then engages with the exclusion of civilians from urban 
and suburban spaces, examining the role of this representational practice in producing specific forms 
of space as the target for military violence.   
5.2 Capture the Flagː Mission and Encounter  
When we attempt to envisage the phenomenon of nationalism or national identity, we tend to think 
of the open, overt and passionate displays that accompany either periods of intense trauma or shared 
spectatorship. There is, therefore, a tendency to assume that nationalistic sentiment ‘only comes in 
small sizes and bright colours’ (Billig, 1995, p. 6), restricted to its evocation within these particular 
moments, movements and events. As highlighted in Chapter Two, these brief and highly visible 
moments of nationalistic sentiment can be thought of as the “waved flags” of nationhood, not unlike 
the waving of a physical flag at a sporting event. These are moments which directly and overtly hail 
our own membership of a national collective and a body of associated values. A similar process of 
visual symbolism is also evident in the role of the national flag within video games, where it is used to 
signify one’s presence within a particular national space. In Splinter Cell: Conviction, for example, the 
American national flag is frequently used to spatially situate the player and their actions (Figure 16). 
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Such an approach is not restricted to the representation of American spatiality. In the level ‘Diwaniya’ 
(Splinter Cell: Conviction), for example, the presence of the flag of Iraq  serves as just one of a number 
of signifiers of foreign national space (Figure 17).  
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Figure 16: Flying the American Flag (Washington Monument, Splinter Cell: Conviction, 2010)) 
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Figure 17: The flag of Iraq (Diwaniya, Splinter Cell: Conviction, 2010) 
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One’s treatment of the national flag can be used as a form of shorthand for shared social and cultural 
values. Within the real-world, for example, the flag may be flown at half-mast as a sign of shared 
respect that marks the passing of a notable person or the occurrence of collectively-experienced 
tragedy. In recent years, the colours of stricken countries have also been projected onto national 
moments as a sign of national solidarity. The flag is also physically manipulated within video games, 
within which it may be flown upside or burnt in order to indicate contempt or distress. Call of Duty: 
Modern Warfare 2, for example, uses the American flag in order to signify collective trauma as, 
although still flying, this symbol of American identity is shown to be damaged, tattered, or even on 
fire (Figure 18) 19.    
A further – somewhat unsubtle - example of the symbolic value of the “waved” American flag is 
evident in Splinter Cell: Blacklist, during one the game’s scripted “interrogation” sequences (Third 
Echelon HQ). As the characters of Fischer and Kobin vie for physical control, Kobin attempts to strike 
Fischer with a flag pulled from within the surrounding environment (Figure 19). Fischer, however, as 
a figure sanctioned by the state, is shown to be able to resist this act of violence. The presence of a 
national flag can also be sufficient to visually reproduce the dangers that are associated with the 
involvement of foreign “Others”. One clear example of this process is evident within the level Crew 
Expendable (Call of Duty 4: Modern Warfare), during which the player is tasked with retrieving an 
                                                          
19 A further example of this form of symbolism is evident within Spec Ops: the Line, within which an 
image of an upside-down American flag is used in order to generate an immediate sense of disquiet 
(see Chapter Seven). 
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Figure 18: Burnt America flag (Of Their Own Accord, Call of Duty: Modern Warfare 2) 
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unspecified “package” from a boat in the Bering Strait. When this package is located, within the boat’s 
hold, is quite literally “flagged” as dangerous by the presence of the Vietnamese flag, as well as the 
revelation that the accompanying shipping manifest is written in Arabic and therefore cannot be read 
by the Western protagonists (Figure 20). This system of “flagging” is not, however, limited to this 
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Figure 19: A “Waved Flag” During the Interrogation of Kobin (Third Echelon HQ, Splinter Cell: 
Conviction, 2010) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This image has been removed by the author of this thesis for copyright reasons. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 20: ‘It’s in Arabic…’ – Retrieving the Package (Crew Expendable, Call of Duty 4: Modern 
Warfare) 
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particular national symbol, and is also evident in the different ways in which we engage with urban 
spaces. As highlighted in Chapter Three, our surrounding environments are integral to the production 
of national memory and identity – a process which can be seen to occur on a variety of different scales. 
This literature highlighted the role of both collective “monumental” forms of shared spatiality in the 
representation of collective national values, as well as the influence of the more “mundane” 
environments that we encounter within our day-to-day lives. The remainder of this subsection 
examines some of the specific ways in which video games offer an appeal to a collective geopolitical 
imaginary, centred on the role of the state and state power, before the subsequent section then 
focuses on the use of different forms of spatiality in the practices of commemoration and 
memorialisation. This process begins with a specific focus on the notion of the mission, examining the 
ways in which video games represent national and international spaces in a manner which serves to 
provide a context for the actions that then subsequently constitute the core narrative: -  
5.2.1 Mission: Creating a Context for Military Action  
Within military-themed video games, the representation of national and international spaces is used 
to produce specific spaces as the current or potential future sources of geopolitical instability. Call of 
Duty 4: Modern Warfare, for example, represents the international arena as characterised by conflict 
and turmoil, opening on the openly facetious claim that ‘the world’s in great shape. We’ve got a civil 
war in Russia – government loyalists against ultranationalist rebels – and 15,000 nukes at stake’ (Gaz, 
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Figure 21: Surveillance Map (FNG, Call of Duty 4: Modern Warfare) 
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FNG, Call of Duty 4: Modern Warfare). The game’s opening cut-scene switches rapidly between the 
accompanying areas of the world, represented through a combination of broad-scale satellite images 
of international space and smaller-scale video footage of the events occurring within each area (Figure 
21). The representation of these regions in such apparent detail, including the accompanying 
observation that military intelligence organisations have a key target under continued observation, 
implies that it is possible to access a totality of “knowledge” about what the surrounding world is like. 
Different regions of the world are produced in a somewhat binary manner, as the sources of either 
security or insecurity. This representation has much in common with the phenomenological forms of 
geopolitical mapping, common to classical geopolitics, in which different spaces are defined by the 
nature of the events that are expected to occur within each. This representation of political spatiality 
is - like the broader depiction of conflict - a form of spatial imaginary, rather than the accurate 
representation of specific forms of real-world experience. This is a process of inclusion and exclusion, 
which shows “our” space to be quiet, calm and civilised, whilst “other” spaces – presumed not to 
contain people and places that are like us – are shown to pose an existential threat to the nation and 
to “our” (usually white, usually Western) everyday life.  
A similar form of representational practice is also evident within Call of Duty: Modern Warfare 2, 
within which the representation of international space is used in order to pinpoint perceived areas of 
high risk. In Cliffhanger, for example, the depiction of civil war in Russia is lent a level of authenticity 
through its presentation alongside similar forms of real-world conflict in Kosovo, Rwanda, and Sierra 
Leone. This sequence also offers a brief commentary on Kazakhstan (Figure 22), a region which is 
established to be both environmentally and politically inhospitable: -  
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Figure 22: Cliffhanger (Call of Duty: Modern Warfare 2) 
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PFC Allen: ‘When do I meet the rest of the team?’ 
Shepherd: ‘They’re on a mission recovering a downed ACS module behind enemy lines’ 
PFC Allen: ‘Their feet wet?’ 
Shepherd: ‘Imagine they’re just about freezing right now’ 
Within Call of Duty: Modern Warfare 2, however, a further representation of global space is also 
offered. This imaginary (Figure 23) centres upon a stylised representation of the world map, overlaid 
with a series of implied national and international connections.   
This form of spatial representation has the effect of highlighting the networked nature of the 
contemporary nation-state, a process which emphasises ‘the transformation of the material 
boundaries of life, space and time, through the construction of a space of flows and of timeless time, 
as an expression of dominant activities and controlling elites’ (Castells, 2010, p. 1). Rather than 
showing places to be independent, serving as the singular hosts for specific actions, activities and 
events, this representation of global interconnectivity offers a vision of collective insecurity. What 
happens in one place cannot be confined there and, potentially, may have broader consequences for 
other peoples and places. This theme is further reinforced within the prologue of Call of Duty: Modern 
Warfare 3, within which the globe is represented as a fragile glass ball (Figure 24). Here, the surface 
of the world is quite literally ruptured by the conflicts that are occurring within the different places 
throughout the world, with each fractured shared used to show images of the characters, events and 
conflicts that have been central within the previous titles in the franchise. Each is shown to have both 
a literal and metaphorical impact on the appearance of the earth’s surface, which all extend well 
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Figure 23: World Map (Prologue, Call of Duty: Modern Warfare 2) 
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beyond the sites where these things originally happened. This is a representational process that 
highlights the illusionary sense of security that is afforded through the perception of nationalism and 
nationalistic passions as ‘not merely an exotic force, but a peripheral one’ (Billig, 1995, p. 5). We are 
instead shown our shared fragility, which is exposed as a result of the activities of, and 
interconnections between, a myriad of geographically disparate peoples, places and actions.  
5.2.2 Encounter: Monumental Forms of Spatial Representation 
Whilst the broader context for the military mission may be constructed through a national or 
international spatial imaginary, the commensurate operations are nonetheless shown to be 
undertaken at a local or regional scale. Individual progress is commonly marked by personal mobility, 
as the player is required to navigate a series of peripheral, mundane environments in order to reach 
the location of some specific landmark or “monument” at which a particular objective can then be 
accomplished. The representation of national spaces and identities, therefore, is closely linked to the 
ways in which we perceive of the value and utility of different forms of monumental spaces. As 
highlighted in Chapter Three, there are two distinctive ways in which we can conceptualise our 
individual encounters with monumental forms of space. Firstly, we can observe that these are spaces 
that we would expect to have imposing physical and formal properties (Stangl, 2008, p. 246). Secondly, 
we might also regard these structures as having broader symbolic significance, offering collective 
expressions of identity and belonging that can potentially link together the past, the present and the 
future (Edensor, 2002, p. 46). The imposing physicality of these monuments plays an important role 
in the ways in which urban spaces are structured within video games, as these are locations which 
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Figure 24: Breaking Globe (Prologue, Call of Duty: Modern Warfare 3) 
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demand attention, recognition and respect from the player. These monuments, which often serve as 
the destinations for the gameplay, can be seen to impose themselves upon the surrounding space. 
This is particularly evident in the representation of either American or allied forms of spatial 
situatedness, within which monumental spaces are framed by the surrounding environment in order 
to “flag” the player’s engagement with a particular national landscape. Within the level Mind the Gap, 
for example, the player’s route through the surrounding environment repeatedly frames the nearly 
Canary Wharf at the end of narrow alleyways and through windows (Figure 25). A similar process is 
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Figure 25:  The Canary Wharf Skyline (Mind the Gap, Call of Duty: Modern Warfare 3, 2011)  
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Figure 26: Davis Family Vacation (Call of Duty: Modern Warfare 3, 2011) 
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also evident in Davis Family Vacation (Call of Duty: Modern Warfare 3), within which the Big Ben clock 
tower serves a one of a myriad of different signifiers of a quintessentially English urban landscape 
(Figure 26). These monuments not only provide a sense of location, but can also be used in the 
production of a sense of spatial scale. In Splinter Cell: Conviction, for example, the representation of 
different forms of distant “monumental” spatiality serves to add a sense of authenticity to the 
representation of Washington as a singular space, whilst also connecting together the disparate 
events that occur at the different locations that are depicted within each individual level. This is 
particularly pronounced during Downtown District (Level Ten), within which an aerial representation 
of a number of different American monuments – caught within a series of EMP explosions – is used to 
indicate the widespread, regional reach of the terroristic incident that the player is shown (Figure 27). 
Within these video games, familiar forms of monumentality are often represented as particularly 
privileged forms of national spatiality. Like their real-world equivalents, some such structures are 
placed at the centre of the urban core – often providing a backdrop to more mundane landscapes – 
whilst others are afforded a level of separation and spatial seclusion (Donohoe, 2002, p. 235; Mitchell, 
2003, p. 445; Stangl, 2008, pp. 246-247). This means that the boundary between monumental and 
mundane spaces is constructed and maintained in a number of different ways, which influence the 
player’s movement from one form of environment to another. In some instances, the boundary 
between monumental spaces and the surrounding mundane environment is made particular clear. In 
the level Whiskey Hotel (Call of Duty: Modern Warfare 2, 2009), for example, the player must fight 
their way across the grounds in order to regain control of the protected structure (Figure 28). 
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Figure 27: EMP Detonation (Downtown District, Splinter Cell: Conviction, 2010) 
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In other levels, meanwhile, the border between monumental and mundane spaces – although still 
present – is shown to be more fragile. Within Splinter Cell: Conviction, for example, the player must 
bypass a fortified checkpoint at the White House entrance. This is shown to be a somewhat simple 
matter, however, as the player can simply detonate a nearby petrol tanker (Figure 29). 
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Figure 28: Fighting for Control of the White House (Whiskey Hotel, Call of Duty: Modern Warfare 
2, 2009) 
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Figure 29: At the White House gates (The White House, Splinter Cell: Conviction, 2010) 
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These representations of the boundary between monumental and mundane spaces can blur the 
distinction between these different forms of urban environment, placing monumental spaces amidst 
the broader struggle for territorial control. The monumental structures can, however, be seen to have 
a broader symbolic significance than the everyday urban environment, serving as a commentary upon 
both national identity and the role of the urban core. Whilst mundane spaces may connect on an 
individual level, the representation of different symbolic forms of monumental spatiality can be used 
in order to imbue specific regions with specific values. Salter, for example, reflects that ‘the city is 
represented in [Civilisation and Grand Theft Auto] as the seat of power, the centre of politics, and a 
particular spatial centre from which exclusive territorial control emanates. On the other hand, in 
[America’s Army] the city is rendered as the complex space of particular war operations, filled with 
accessible and dangerous places (often driven through at speed or infiltrated and dominated)’ (2011, 
p. 383). This is particularly evident in the conflation of entire spatial regions with the specific forms of 
monumental architecture that are used in order to signify such spaces to the player base. In Call of 
Duty: Modern Warfare 3, for example, the retention of New York is not defined by control over the 
broader territory or through the fulfilment of any humanitarian objectives – as the player moves 
quickly through the surrounding streets, shops and suburbs – but rather in the defence of specific 
symbolic buildings such as the Stock Exchange (Level One: Black Tuesday). This representation of acts 
of contemporary warfare and counter-terrorism rarely acknowledges the impact of such conflicts 
upon the lives of the people that would be found in such regions, instead rendering the urban spaces 
of daily life as fundamentally indistinguishable from the broader battlefield. 
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Figure 30: The Destruction of the Statue of Liberty (Turning Point: Fall of Liberty, 2008) 
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These spaces can also be used as a form of symbolic shorthand for the notion of the nation, as their 
capture or destruction is used to signify an existential threat to the established national order. This 
form of visual signification, which is also popular in disaster films, has several analogues within the 
military-themed genre of video games. Within Turning Point: Fall of Liberty (2008), for example, the 
destruction of the Statue of Liberty serves as a dramatic visual metaphor for a foreign attack upon 
American freedoms and laws (Figure 30). In some instances, the monuments are even destroyed by 
allied forces, serving as expressions of national sacrifice. In Homefront (2011), for example, the 
personal sacrifice of Connor – who uses his own body in order to designate a target for the delivery of 
vital American ordinance – is mirrored by the national sacrifice of the Golden Gate Bridge (Figure 31). 
This treatment of monumental space is, however, in direct contrast to the representation of the Eiffel 
Tower within Iron Lady (Call of Duty: Modern Warfare 3). Here, it is notable that the national discourse 
is one of loyalty to people, rather than to specific places or symbols. At the start of the level, for 
example, the US President instructs Overlord to take all possible measures to ensure the success of 
the mission, reflecting that ‘I don’t care what it takes. You bring those men home in one piece’. After 
their primary evacuation site is compromised, the members of Delta Force unit are forced out onto a 
bridge near the Eiffel Tower. Here, once again, the imposing monument is used to frame individual 
progress, as the player must move across the bridge and towards its base in their attempt to escape. 
As the American troops encounter increasingly fierce resistance, hampering their movement, they call 
for additional air support: -  
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Figure 31: Fighting on the Golden Gate Bridge (Golden Gate, Homefront, 2011) 
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Sandman: We’re dead centre on the bridge! Hit anything north of us with everything you’ve got!’ 
Odin 6-1: Overlord, bomb run is going to level everything in that area. Requesting clearance. 
Overlord: Odin, you do whatever you have to, to get those men back home. 
The decision is represented as a form of common-sense, privileging the lives of combatants over the 
enduring French monument. As Berents and Keogh (2014) surmise, ‘the player’s squad has no choice… 
Melancholic music plays as it falls and the player, successful but bitter, is lifted out by helicopter. These 
acts, as extreme as they are, are always justified by the righteous goals of the Western protagonist’s 
fight’ (Figure 32). 
The player cannot choose not to trigger the airstrike, or to search for another way to resolve the 
situation, but must – on each encounter with the level – choose to sacrifice this high profile symbolic 
structure in the name of continued national and international security. Whilst presented as a 
somewhat bittersweet moment, leaving the player caught between the significance of the destruction 
and the impressive spectacle that results from it, this sacrifice of monumental structures is not 
repeated elsewhere within the Call of Duty: Modern Warfare franchise. Locations such as the stock 
exchange (Black Tuesday, Call of Duty: Modern Warfare 3) and the White House (Whiskey Hotel, Call 
of Duty: Modern Warfare 2), which serve as symbols of a specifically American form of identity, are 
instead shown as locations which are to be fought for and reclaimed. At the conclusion of the Whiskey 
Hotel level, for example, during which the player fights to reclaim the White House, they also witness 
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Figure 32: The Eiffel Tower falls (Iron Lady, Call of Duty: Modern Warfare 3, 2011) 
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the use of green smoke to indicate American military successes at a variety of different landmarks 
around the city (Figure 33).  
These different forms of monument can, however, also be rendered banal or mundane through this 
process of spatial encounter. In some instances, this is simply because the representation of particular 
forms of monumentality are either excluded or passed by unnoticed and unhailed. In the level 
Scorched Earth (Call of Duty: Modern Warfare 3), for example, the player attempts to rescue Alena 
Vorshevsky (the daughter of the Russian president) from a hotel in central Berlin. Here, it is the more 
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Figure 33: Green smoke indicates American successes (Whiskey Hotel, Call of Duty: Modern 
Warfare 2, 2009) 
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Figure 34: Damage to the Victory Column landmark (Scorched Earth, Call of Duty: Modern 
Warfare 3, 2011) 
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mundane aspects of the environment that are given precedence. During one initial exchange, for 
example, Delta team navigate through the environment based on the description of ‘a building across 
the road… Sign on the roof says Reisdorf’. As they move through the area, however, the damage to 
German monuments is often rendered both distant and unremarkable. The damage to the Victory 
Column, for example, passes by unacknowledged (Figure 34). Even where a monumental form of 
space is directly acknowledged by the game, its symbolic value is often derived from its external 
appearance. Its interior, however, can be reduced to a more mundane series of everyday systems and 
the recurrence of their accompanying ghosts. This is, for example, evident in the representation of the 
White House interior in both Whiskey Hotel and Of Their Own Accord (Call of Duty: Modern Warfare 
2), as well as The White House (Splinter Cell: Conviction). This environment shows traces of the 
‘poltergeist’ (Edensor, 2005) - a presumably once-ordered space is shown to be in disarray with 
furniture strewn around the room, papers on the floor and holes in the walls. It is made to appear as 
though some other (potentially even otherworldly) force has gone ahead of the player, to tip over 
furniture, set fire to the furnishings and demolish brickwork (Figure 35).  
This sense of disorder is directly hailed within Splinter Cell: Conviction, with one unseen adversary 
heard to remark that the encounter with the White House building ‘isn’t a guided tour. Move it!’ (Level 
11: The White House). The player’s experience with the environment is not a conventional encounter 
with monumental spaces, within which one could expect that the environment would be arranged in 
a manner which provides a singular coherent narrative of identity and memory (Atkinson, 2008, p. 
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Figure 35: Environmental Damage in the White House (Of Their Own Accord, Call of Duty: 
Modern Warfare 2, 2009) 
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382; Edensor, 2005, p. 832). Whilst the exteriors of monumental buildings may provide for a sense of 
national-level situatedness and shared selfhood, their interiors are often – like many representations 
of mundane spatiality – represented as a series of damaged rooms which contain the now-
indistinguishable clutter that marked banal routines and performances. This detritus does not inspire 
a singular, uniform reading of nationality or identity, but rather a sense of vague familiarity based 
upon a few recognisable objects, movements and routines.   
5.3.  “Press X to Pay Respects”: Space, Bodies and Commemorative Practice  
The examination of the role of “monumental” forms of spatiality in Chapter Three served, in part, to 
highlight the extent to which such spaces are linked to acts to commemoration and remembrance. 
Whilst the notions of monument and memorial are not necessarily synonymous (Stangl, 2008), it is 
nevertheless worthwhile to explore the representational practices that surround the overt acts of 
memorialisation that occur within the content of military-themed video games. Whilst the use of 
digital space in acts of remembrance and commemoration remains comparatively rare within this 
genre of video games, some examples are nonetheless evident. The character of Captain John Price 
alludes to one such space following the death of “Soap” MacTavish, noting that ‘there’s a clock tower, 
in Hereford, where the names of the dead are inscribed. We try to honour their deeds, even as their 
faces fade from our memory. Those memories are all that’s left, when the bastards have taken 
everything else’ (Stronghold, Call of Duty: Modern Warfare 3). This site, which actually exists in the 
real world, is used in the commemoration of specific actions and their associated ideals, whilst 
acknowledging that the other aspects associated with these individuals – even including some as basic 
as their appearance – are lost to history, preserved only by those individuals that knew them directly. 
The act of commemoration, more broadly experienced, is shown to be about the control of history – 
who it is that deserves to be remembered and what it is that they deserve to be remembered for.  
This theme is echoed by some of the different characters, who also discuss the ways in which 
national political histories are created and remembered. Lieutenant General Shepherd, for example, 
highlights the modernity of the American military and its role in constructing the way in which the 
past is remembered in the future, describing this as ‘the most powerful military force in the history of 
man. Every fight is our fight – because what happens over here, matters over there. We don’t get to 
sit one out… This is a time for heroes, a time for legends. History is written by the victors’ (Team Player, 
Call of Duty: Modern Warfare 2). Here, the use of military violence in the present is initially 
represented as an act in defence of a correctly-remembered future. Shepherd, however, is revealed 
to have manipulated conflict between American and Russia, in an effort to promote a particular form 
of future remembrance that would ensure that ‘there will be no shortage of volunteers, no shortage 
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of patriots’ (Endgame, Call of Duty: Modern Warfare 2). The conflict between Shepherd (as a national 
elite) and the members of the Taskforce 141 (disavowed by their nation) is, therefore, presented as 
an attempt to control the conveyance of history in order that it be “correctly” remembered in the 
future: -  
‘This is for the record. History is written by the victor. History is filled with liars. If 
[Shepherd] lives and we die, his truth becomes written – and ours is lost. Shepherd will 
die a hero, ‘cause all you need to change the world is one good lie and a river of blood. 
He’s about to complete the greatest trick a liar ever played on history. His truth will be 
the truth. But only if he lives, and we die’ (Price, Endgame, Call of Duty: Modern Warfare 
2; emphasis added)   
These attempts to control the future are again codified in the different ways in which the bodies of 
the various characters are commemorated. Shepherd - following his death during Endgame (Call of 
Duty: Modern Warfare 2) - is shown to have been interred at Arlington, a real-world American military 
burial site.  This is commemorated through the production of a fictional front cover for Time magazine, 
which was both distributed to player in real-life and made evident throughout the game’s mundane 
spaces (Figure 36). 
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Figure 36: The Fictional Cover of Time Magazine.  
Left: The alternative cover, released with the game (Gayomali, 2011) 
Right: The cover, used in the gameworld (Activision, 2012) 
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Although ostensibly shown to be a traitor, having masterminded events that have caused American 
deaths, Shepherd is – through his interment at Arlington Cemetery – remembered as a hero and a 
symbol of American values and identity. The members of Taskforce 141, specifically the characters of 
Simon “Ghost” Riley and Gary “Roach” Sanderson, are shown to have been discarded by Shepherd. 
Once they have served their part in his plan, they are shot, set on fire and discarded into a ditch. Their 
deaths leave no marker of their lives and values, nothing that can be called upon by future 
generations.  
 The link between national space and bodily integrity is not, however, limited to the 
representational of commemorative practices and can also be rescaled to the level of the individual 
“live” body. This is evident within other forms of cultural mediation. In his analysis of the Captain 
America comics, for example, Jason Dittmer argues that ‘the impact of Captain America on readers is 
different than other symbols of America, such as the bald eagle or the flag, because of his ability to 
both embody and narrate America in ways that the bald eagle, flag and other symbols cannot. Such 
static, non-human symbols represent and construct the nation but do not allow for a personal 
connection to it in the same way that Captain America does’ (2005, p. 630; emphasis in original). His 
analysis highlights the relationship between national and non-national bodies, as well as the ways in 
which national bodies might be expected to behave in both familiar and unfamiliar surroundings. The 
interaction between bodies and spaces plays a similar role in the formation of national identity and 
national spaces within military-themed video games, offering both a personal connection to the values 
of the nation and a utility as a broader form of political signifier.  
The relationship between national space and individual bodies can, for example, be accessed 
through the different ways in which the characters demonstrate forms of “patriotic” or “nationalistic” 
ideologies through their speech and actions. As Billig highlights, ‘those in established nations – at the 
centre of things – are led to see nationalism as the property of others, not of us’ (1995, p. 6). This 
distinction is particularly apparent within the Modern Warfare games, within which “their” 
nationalism is rendered dangerous in comparison to the righteous “patriotism” of Western soldiers 
doing their national duty. The series frequently alludes to the thin line between their nationalism 
(viewed as dangerous and peripheral) and our patriotism (which often passes by unnoticed). This is 
particularly evident in the assignation of ultranationalist motivations to the “Other”, embodied by 
characters such as Al-Assad, and the subversion and perversion of these qualities in the form of 
patriotism that is attributed to Shepherd.  These Call of Duty: Modern Warfare games offer a familiar 
caricature of foreign nationalism, showing this quality through the apparently dangerous and 
malevolent rantings that commonly mark the dictator or tyrant: -   
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‘Today, we rise again as one nation, in the face of betrayal and corruption… We all trusted 
this man to deliver our nation into a new era of prosperity… But like our monarchy before 
the Revolution, he has been colluding with the West with only self-interest at heart! 
Collusion breeds slavery! And we shall not be enslaved! The time has come to show our 
true strength. They underestimate our resolve. Let us show that we do not fear them. As 
one people, we shall free our brethren from the yoke of foreign oppression… Our armies 
are strong and our cause is just… As I speak, our armies are nearing their objectives, by 
which we will restore the independence of a once great nation. Our noble crusade has 
begun… Just as they lay waste to our country, so we shall lay waste to theirs… This is how 
it begins’ (The Coup, Call of Duty 4: Modern Warfare) 
This lead to the continued evaluation and re-evaluation of everyone that is encountered within 
peripheral spaces, meaning that foreign nations and national bodies are portrayed as either good (i.e. 
potentially, but not currently violent actors) or bad (i.e. violent and irrational actors). This is 
epitomised in the level Blackout (Call of Duty 4: Modern Warfare), in which two characters have the 
following exchange: -  
Gaz: ‘Loyalists, eh? Are those the good Russians or the bad Russians?’ 
Price: ‘Well, they won’t shoot us on sight, if that’s what you’re asking’ 
This notion of “good” and “bad” Others is also evident in the way in which Price treats Yuri – a former 
Russian Ultranationalist – after he finds out that he knew Makarov (Blood Brothers, Call of Duty: 
Modern Warfare 3). Following the death of Soap, Price turns on Yuri over his prior association – here, 
his shared nationality is enough to mark Yuri as suspicious and a potential enemy. Yuri, in his defence, 
argues that he ‘was a soldier with Russia, not a taker of innocent lives. In [Makarov’s] eyes, that 
marked me as the enemy’. He differentiates between the willing use of violence in protection of the 
nation and the use of indiscriminate violence against civilians in pursuit of political power. It is only in 
demonstrating his strict adherence to this moral code - as he details his attempt to stop the airport 
terrorist attack depicted in No Russian (Call of Duty: Modern Warfare 2) -  that the distinction between 
the “good” and “bad” Other is re-established sufficiently for him to be grudgingly admitted back into 
the allied fold.   
 The distinction between nationalist and patriot is, however, entirely subverted through the 
character of Shepherd, who is shown to have masterminded conflict between Russian and America in 
order to bolster military enlistment and spending after he ‘lost 30,000 men in the blink of an eye, and 
the world just fuckin’ watched’ (Shepherd, Endgame, Call of Duty: Modern Warfare 2). Although 
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claiming to be acting in the interests of the nation, Shepherd’s actions are shown to be incompatible 
with the values of the nation that he claims to represent.   
 An alternative role for the national body is evident in Call of Duty: Modern Warfare 2, as the 
player takes control of the undercover agent Joseph Allen and prepares to participate in a mission 
alongside Russia ultranationalist operatives. Here, much is made of the ability of the American agent 
to pass as a Russian solider – an objective that Soap, himself, had proven unable to achieve. Shepherd, 
for example, can be heard to tell Allen that he looks ‘like one of the bad guys. Perfect for your 
undercover mission’ (SSDD, Call of Duty: Modern Warfare 2). This attempted subversion of 
“Americanness” is not the only such deception, however, as the members of the ultranationalist cell 
attempt to avoid being identified as Russian nationals. The group are, for example, forbidden from 
using Russian to communicate, as a part of a broader plan for the attacks to instead be traced to 
America. At the end of their mission, Makarov kills Allen and leaves the body behind for the security 
services to find. As he escapes, concealed within an ambulance, Makarov can be heard to remark that 
Allen’s execution will serve as ‘a message. The American thought he could deceive us. When they find 
that body, all of Russia will cry for war’ (No Russian, Call of Duty: Modern Warfare 2). Here, the 
presence of the dead American body is sufficient to “flag” American involvement in the airport attacks, 
meaning that – in shooting Allen – it will take only ‘one bullet to unleash the fury of an entire nation’ 
(Takedown, Call of Duty: Modern Warfare 2). 
 This incompatibility between particular bodies and places is evident in other interactions, 
albeit without the same consequences. In Call of Duty: Modern Warfare, for example, the game’s 
Western protagonists impersonate Russian soldiers in an effort to capture Viktor Zakhaev. Whilst they 
wait for their target to arrive, Griggs reflects that John “Soap” MacTavish offers an unconvincing 
facsimile of a Russian soldier: -    
‘Man, you look like a clown in that outfit. It’s a good thing that you’re up here, because 
you look nothing like a Russian’ (The Sins of the Father, Call of Duty 4: Modern Warfare) 
The extent of Soap’s bodily displacement is further emphasised within the contents of his journal, an 
extra-textual resource that shipped with special edition copies of the Call of Duty 4: Modern Warfare 
video game. Within it the character is not only shown to be out of place, but his bodily capability is 
also shown to be poorly matched with that of the Russian – even in a physical battle that the powerful 
Western is implicitly expected to be able to win: -  
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‘How the hell did a scrawny Russian on a vodka/borscht diet outrun me? Victor Zakhaev 
might have been 39, but he sprinted like he was 22 – the 3rd horseman had the endurance 
of a colt’ 
Similarly, in Call of Duty: Modern Warfare 3, Soap reflects on the difficulties of undertaking a mission 
in Somalia, noting that the team will ‘stick out like bollocks on a bulldog. Stealth’s not an option’ 
(Return to Sender). The national identity, therefore, not only dictates how it is that specific events are 
to be preserved and remembered in the future – controlling which specific bodies are preserved or 
discarded – but also is shown to constrain individual action and interaction in the present day.  
5.4.  Ghost Hunting? Encountering “Ruined” Mundane/Vernacular Spatialities  
Whilst the previous sections of this chapter have focussed on some of the more overt appeals to our 
sense of collective identity, many of the “flags” that sustain national identity are much less obvious. 
Billig, for example, notes the existence of ‘the uncounted millions of flags which mark the homeland 
of the United States [and yet] do not demand immediate, obedient attention. On their flagpoles by 
the street and stitched onto the uniforms of public officials, they are unwaved, unsaluted and 
unnoticed. They are mindless flags’ (1995, p. 40). A similar process is also evident in the construction 
of national landscapes, as our encounters with mundane or vernacular spatialities can serve to 
maintain a low-level sense of national situatedness and belonging without there necessarily having to 
be any conscious level of apprehension or reflection (see, for example, Edensor, 2004, p.108). These 
everyday environments look and feel familiar, simply because they contain the various infrastructural 
aspects, spatial flows and everyday clutter that we expect to encounter within the spaces that we 
inhabit. Unlike the more conscious appeals to the notions of nationhood and national belonging, 
encountered at symbolic monumental sites, these “unwaved” flags will often pass by unnoticed until 
they are removed or threatened (Billig, 1995, pp. 40-41). Then, they may become symbolic 
representations of our “way of life”, providing a hitherto unspoken of framework that disciplines and 
structures “our” national identity and sense of individual belonging. The integration of these familiar 
landscapes into familiar forms of warfare and counterterrorism practices can, therefore, provide a 
means by which to evoke an otherwise dormant nationalistic sentiment through the sense that we 
are participating in the defence of the Self and the others that are somehow “like us” in some 
significant way. This section examines both the construction of familiar mundane environments - 
including the notions of “house” and “home” – and also what is achieved through the removal of 
civilians from within these environments.  
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5.4.1. Nobody Home? The Role of Familiar Urban Environments 
As highlighted in Chapter Three, our understandings of the notion of the “home” play an important 
role in the formation of our individual identities. In these video games, however, the representation 
of a direct and personal connection to one’s “home” is comparatively rare. Within the video games 
examined for this analysis, for example, the only instance occurs during Splinter Cell: Conviction. 
Fischer experiences a flashback to a conversation with his young daughter, after she becomes scared 
of the dark: - 
‘When’s its light, you can’t see into a place that’s dark. But when it’s dark, you can see 
what’s around you much better… So, if there’s monsters or bad people around, you can 
see them. And if you’re in the dark, they can’t see you’ (Fischer, Merchant Fish Market 
Level, Splinter Cell: Conviction) 
Finding her to be unconvinced he highlights her mobile, telling her that he could drop it into onto the 
“monsters” and make them leave. This explanation, which serves as a transparent analogy for Fischer’s 
ability to manipulate the real-world environment during his missions, has the effect of linking the 
protection of the private home-space to the protection of the national realm. The home, like the 
nation, is established as a protected zone, with an architecture that is designed to benefit those who 
ought to be within its limits and which will punish those who are unwelcome visitors. This is 
subsequently reinforced during gameplay as the player – whilst responding to a prompt to “Protect 
 
 
 
 
 
This image has been removed by the author of this thesis for copyright reasons. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 37: ‘Protect Your Family’ from the burglars (Splinter Cell: Conviction) 
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Your Family” – confronts and executes a small group of burglars (Figure 37). The only other allusion to 
the notion of the “home” uses the term in a more general sense, as Fischer returns to the Third 
Echelon headquarters (Figure 38).  
Here, the notion of the “home” is used to provoke specific issues pertaining to identity and belonging, 
as the player – as Fischer – must confront the fact that this former place of employment, which would 
once have offered a sense of security and familiarity, has instead become a place of individual 
estrangement and danger. This is further reinforced by the subsequent encounter with this space, 
within which a combination of opposing bodies and elaborate security systems act to make even the 
most apparently banal of spaces into a potential hazard (Figure 39). 
Our understandings of the “home” – when mobilised through video games – are, however, 
often more closely associated with the structure of the “house” or the surrounding dwellingscapes. 
As these domestic realms are conscripted within the portrayal of warfare and counterterrorism, the 
“normal” patterns of use that would be associated with particular buildings and infrastructures are 
reduced to a variety of ghostly traces that haunt the act of military combat. This form of spatial 
representation and comprehension resembles that which is exposed in the analysis of industrial ruins, 
former manufacturing sites which serve as ‘an intersection of the visible and the invisible, for the 
people who managed them, worked in them and inhabited them are not there. And yet their absence 
manifests itself as a presence through the shed and silent things that remain, in the objects we half 
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Figure 38: Sam Fischer returns “home” to Third Echelon (Level Eight, Splinter Cell: Conviction) 
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recognise or surround with imaginings’ (Edensor, 2005, p. 842). Our ability to connect with such 
environments is created and disciplined by the ability of these environments to engender a familiar 
mode of spatial being. When we enter houses within other countries, for example, these spaces are 
often portrayed as quite barren. They are often badly damaged – with collapsed staircases, roofs and 
ceilings – and lack any trace of the luxuries of Western consumerism. These spaces are only 
identifiable as “houses” through very basic symbols – they may contain, for example, damaged 
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Figure 39: A mundane office space made hazardous by laser tripwires (Third Echelon HQ, 
Splinter Cell: Conviction) 
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appliances or furniture, may display a few – usually unidentifiable - books and pictures, or have a single 
line of clothing pegged to a washing line outside (Figure 40).  
These environments, however, lack the clutter that we associate with our own lives, which marks the 
potential for people “like us” to inhabit a particular space. The level Charlie Don’t Surf (Call of Duty 4: 
Modern Warfare), for example, offers a form of urbanity that is comprised of indistinct foreign 
businesses, unintelligible Arabic writing and graffiti, and road signs that warn of crossing camels 
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Figure 41: Foreign Urbanity (Charlie Don’t Surf, Call of Duty 4: Modern Warfare, 2007) 
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Figure 40:  Simplistic Signifiers of the “Foreign” Home (Diwaniya, Splinter Cell: Conviction, 2010) 
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(Figure 41). Here, the unfamiliar architectures and narrow streets are made to feel different and 
threatening, often used in order to lure the Western “outsider” into an ambush. 
The representation of the Western home, meanwhile, is often strikingly different. These video 
games show the influence of warfare upon affluent-looking, aspirational suburban areas, excluding 
more economically and socially deprived residential areas. One such environment is depicted in the 
level Wolverines (Call of Duty: Modern Warfare 2), which is set in the remains of a once-idyllic 
suburban neighbourhood in Virginia, USA. Here, the dwellingscape is afforded a familiar appearance 
– as the stereotypical “white picket fence” neighbourhood – meaning that it can instantaneously 
evoke familiar forms of spatial engagement for the player through the representation of familiar 
everyday urban clutter. In Figure 42, for example, there are familiar forms of American housing and 
infrastructural elements (speed limit signs, electricity wires and even roads and pavements). 
This sense of spatial familiarity is further enforced by the representation of high-end consumer goods, 
which offer a stark contrast to the barren and largely unfurnished spaces that are encountered in 
foreign urban areas. Within the Exodus level, for example, the player fights through environments 
which contain pool-tables, large-screen televisions, and a wine collection (Figure 43). These 
contrasting representational practices afford the two forms of residential space different perceived 
values. Whilst the Western home is shown to be a space that is in need of protection – as it contains 
traces of lives that resembles ours – foreign dwellingscapes are shown to be primitive and unworthy 
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Figure 42: Entering the “White Picket Fence” Neighbourhood (Wolverines, Call of Duty: Modern 
Warfare 2, 2009) 
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of protection because we are made unable to conceive of the possibility that “normal” people could 
live there. This is, at least in part, because we are rarely shown that these are environments that could 
potentially contain ordinary people, rather than combatants. This representation is not only applicable 
to the domestic interior, but also in the ways in which specific forms of banal urban dwellingscapes 
are targeted for military violence. 
5.4.2 The Shade: The Absent Presence of the Civilian  
Whilst “monumental” spaces play a significant role within military-themed video games, often 
providing the focus for the narrative, it is important not to overlook the significance of more mundane, 
everyday spaces in constructing a broader sense of spatial engagement. Such spaces are, as discussed 
in Chapter Three, the locations in which the unremarkable routines and familiar practices of everyday 
life can be seen to take place. The representation of acts of warfare or counter-terrorism is, however, 
an imposition on these spaces of urban flow, subverting everyday forms of engagement in the creation 
of a clean and sanitised form of conflict. In their analysis of the Full Spectrum Warrior video games, 
for example, Berents and Keogh (2014) reflect that ‘this is war where no one lies for hours gut-shot 
and shrieking for his mother, has his testicles blown off, or wakes in the hospital finding that he has 
lost a limb. It is war without mutilation or post-traumatic stress disorder. It is also war without moral 
dilemmas. And there are almost no civilians. The miracle of [Full Spectrum Warrior] is that its streets 
are deserted and houses empty, apart from the ubiquitous Tangos (who all die instantly when hit)’. A 
similar representational pattern is also evident within the various video games examined within this 
chapter, within which the citizenry is frequently shown to be absent, quickly removed from danger, 
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Figure 43: The American Home (Exodus, Call of Duty Modern Warfare 2, 2009) 
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or else to have been killed prior to the player’s arrival within a particular region. Within Splinter Cell: 
Conviction, for example, Fischer is initially encountered amidst a highly populated, mundane 
environment (Figure 44). 
Although it initially appears that these civilians will impede gameplay (the character can be overheard 
to remark that ‘I’d rather not risk a firefight where there’s citizens around’) the subsequent exchange 
of gunfire clears the civilians from the area entirely, leaving the player free to navigate the surrounding 
environment without risk of collateral damage. A similar process is also evident in the Kobin’s Mansion 
level, as Fischer pursues an arms dealer to his urban stronghold. The player is initially located in a 
mundane, everyday environment, surrounded by civilians going about their everyday lives: -  
Civilian NPC: ‘If I don’t get a few in me I don’t dance anyway, so what’s your point’   
Whilst the player can interact with these civilians to a limited extent, as bumping into them or walking 
between them provokes a reaction, this is a space that is defined by the absence of violence. Whilst 
the player cannot progress the game without moving beyond it, this remains a space that is free of 
the conflict between Fischer and the then-unseen “Other”. The player is also prohibited from using 
violence and is unable to raise their weapon in this space. Once inside the mansion grounds, however, 
it is made clear that this is a zone that is inhabited exclusively by the violent and dangerous Other. The 
player is able to raise their weapon and the various bodies within it can be “marked” for violent force 
(Figure 45). 
 
 
 
 
This image has been removed by the author of this thesis for copyright reasons. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 44: Fischer, first encountered amongst mundane space (Merchant’s Street Market, 
Splinter Cell: Conviction, 2010) 
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Similar practices are evident within the Call of Duty: Modern Warfare franchise. In the level Bag and 
Drag (Call of Duty: Modern Warfare 3), for example, the player overhears a soldier report that ‘all 
civilians at the Louvre are dead. Request decon units and MedEvac’. This is then visually reinforced, as 
the player encounters the bodies of dead civilians within both the surrounding house and at the tables 
of a stereotypically Parisian street café (Figure 46). Whilst the player is clearly supposed to be affected 
by the scene, as mournful string music plays, it is nonetheless apparent that there is nothing that can 
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Figure 45: Inside the Mansion Grounds (Kobin’s Mansion, Splinter Cell: Conviction, 2010) 
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Figure 46: Fatalities at a Café (Bag and Drag, Call of Duty: Modern Warfare 3, 2011) 
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be done except to continue moving forwards. The removal of citizens from urban environments has 
the effect of reproducing warfare as a virtuous act, reducing it to the use of “our” violence against 
“their” deserving bodies. This is often further disciplined within the broader ludic structures. In the 
training level SSDD (Call of Duty: Modern Warfare 2), for example, the player’s level of success in 
navigating “The Pit” is dependent upon their efficient “killing” of the representation of the correct 
bodies as they proceed through a simulation of a foreign dwellingscape. Within this environment, the 
terroristic “Other” is always represented as a man. It is, however, notable that the civilians are 
represented as either women or children (Figure 47).  
This video game, it would seem, has very clear opinions about the kinds of people that engage in war 
against the West, constructing an archetypal imaginary of the terroristic “Other” against whom 
violence is not only accepted but desirable. The killing of a “civilian”, meanwhile, does not generate a 
fail state, as the game simply imposes a time penalty and a depreciation in the player’s estimated level 
of ability as a soldier.  
Although subsequent levels may imply the existence of civilians and a commensurate 
potential for collateral damage, this is usually precluded through the act of gameplay. This is, for 
example, particularly evident within the level Death From Above (Call of Duty 4: Modern Warfare), 
during which the player takes on the role of a gunner aboard an AC130 aircraft (Figure 48). Here, the 
player is presented with an image of Russian suburban space – albeit through the mediation of the 
technologies of vision that are associated with the aircraft’s weaponry. There is little apparent regard 
for the various different forms of infrastructure in this region – including the buildings, water towers 
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Figure 47: Training Level (SSDD, Call of Duty: Modern Warfare 2, 2009) 
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and roads – which serve as navigational markers, rather than as signs of civilian habitation.  Here, only 
the church is identified as a protected structure by the surrounding dialogue.  
There is similarly little regard for the people that are presented within this area. Allied personal and 
vehicles are marked with flashing strobe lights, which exempt them from acts of violence, but other 
than this the player is largely free to act as they choose. Though the player is briefly prohibited from 
targeting civilian vehicles, this is merely because the allied soldiers intend to co-opt those vehicles for 
their own ends and not because there is any stated desire to minimise the effects of the attacks on 
the local people. All targets that are struck by the player are shown to be valid, reinforcing the broader 
sense that ‘air and artillery strikes do not hit wedding parties. There is no collateral damage. War is 
peace’ (Berents & Keogh, 2014)20. An apparently different approach, meanwhile, is offered through 
the representation of Paris in the level Iron Lady (Call of Duty: Modern Warfare 3). Whilst the player 
again takes on the role of an aircraft gunner in this sequence, it is notable that they are told that they 
are ‘not clear to fire on the buildings. We suspect that there are still civilians inside at this point’. 
Whilst this contrast appears to privilege the preservation of allied spaces during times of war, this is 
not reinforced through the broader ludic structures. Whilst the player is frequently told not to strike 
the buildings – a process which is reinforced by verbal prompts if the player should breach this 
                                                          
20 This understanding is, however, dramatically subverted by the use of White Phosphorous in Spec 
Ops: the Line (2012). This sequence is discussed in Chapter Seven.    
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Figure 48: Playing as an AC130 Gunner (Death from Above, Call of Duty 4: Modern Warfare, 
2007) 
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directive – the game does not impose a fail-state for even the most persistent of violations. These 
representations of mundane urban space - absent of civilians – have the effect of reproducing all urban 
spaces as an extension of the contemporary battlefield, serving as legitimate targets for acts of 
violence.  
Conclusion  
This chapter has explored some of the ways in which the representation of national space – in both 
its “monumental” and more “mundane” forms – is used to manufacture specific spatial imaginaries 
within both the Call of Dutyː Modern Warfare franchise and Splinter Cellː Conviction. These different 
understandings of national spaces, which can be presented at different scales, allow for specific 
values, actions and bodies to be connected to, or disconnected from, different geographical locations.  
The initial stages of this chapter focussed specifically on the representation of a “monumental” 
form of space, here understood to refer to the forms of space that appeal to a collective sense of 
national identity and shared Selfhood. Section 5.2 highlighted the representational role of such a 
space at two contrasting scales, differentiating between the representation of national and 
international space in the provision of context for the military mission and the more local or regional 
forms of spatiality that are evident during the actual process of encounter. The foremost of these 
frameworks – that of the mission – was used to highlight the representation of the international arena 
as fundamentally interconnected, whilst also maintaining the classical geopolitical conceptualisation 
that “foreign” places are somehow defined by the events that occur within them (see Chapter Two). 
The concept of the encounter, meanwhile, was used to highlight the variety of different ways in which 
individual “monumental” spatial sites are experienced within these video games. The sites are shown 
to be representative of shared identities, values and common experiences and, as a result, may be 
damaged or destroyed in order to indicate that an established – usually Western – form of political 
order is somehow at risk. This section also sought to problematize the reliance on monumental forms 
of spatial imagery, noting that these symbolic systems tend to deteriorate once the player is past the 
symbolic façade and amongst the ruins of recognisable everyday processes. Here, the player gains 
their sense of situatedness from the familiar nature of particular objects and routines, rather than 
from the overt signifiers that are offered by the structures themselves. 
The utility of these “monumental” spaces is not, however, limited to this surface-level form of 
visual symbolism, as these spaces are often tied to the bodies that inhabit or move through them. 
Section 5.3 examined both the connection between national bodies and spatially-orientated forms of 
commemorative practice, as well as the extent to which different characters can be seen to “embody” 
specific national characteristics. This analysis began by examining the role of monumental forms of 
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spatiality in more conventional forms of commemoration and memorialisation, noting the specific 
examples of the Hereford Clock Tower and the Arlington National Cemetery. This subsection 
contrasted the formal interment of Shepherd with the uncommemorated and unmarked disposal of 
the bodies of “Roach” and “Ghost”, using this as a means by which to problematize the tacit 
assumption of objectivity that often accompanies practices of commemoration and the writing of 
national histories. Noting that the portrayal of national identity is also commonly linked to “live” 
bodies and their interactions with different forms of space, this analysis was then extended to 
encompass the embodied construction of the spatial imaginary and the commensurate practices of 
inclusion and exclusion that are represented within military-themed video games. This section 
specifically highlights the extent to which these video games can be seen to both reproduce and 
critique the thin diving line between “safe” patriotism and “dangerous” nationalism. This analysis also 
emphasised the role of the surrounding space in the perception of specific individual bodies, noting 
that specific forms of action and interaction are permitted and precluded when the conditions that 
are required for one’s “belonging” are not met.  
It is, however, also worthwhile to highlight that not all forms of space – whether “real” or 
“virtual” in nature – are afforded the same status as the “monumental” forms of space that are 
discussed within these sections. There are also a plethora of everyday, “mundane” forms of space that 
are used to convey a more unremarkable sense of belonging, providing a constantly forgotten 
reminder that we are “in place” when we are amidst the familiar clutter that we take for granted 
(Billig, 1995, pp. 49-50). Although the labelling of such spaces as mundane implies that this is ‘the 
realm of dull compulsion and habit, boredom and oppression’ (Edensor, 2003, p. 155), these spaces 
are a vital means by which spatial situatedness and belonging is produced in the periods between the 
more overt evocations of identity and nationalistic sentiment (Billig, 1995). Section 5.4, therefore, 
focusses specifically on the representation of these forms of space within military-themed video 
games, highlighting the production of a nationalistic geopolitics through the player’s defence of an 
individually recognisable way of life. As Graham surmises, these spatial imaginaries can potentially 
‘affect collective notions of what cities and urban life actually are, or what they might actually become’ 
(2004, pp. 109-110;ˑemphasis added). Here, our encounters with mundane urban sites are produced 
by our encounters with their associated “ghosts” (see, for example, Edensor, 2005; see also Chapter 
Three). Unlike the “ghosts” that are more commonly associated with the supernatural realm, 
however, the spectral traces that are evident within military-themed video games serve to threaten 
the corporeality of the player. The player is not witnessing the unearthing of some bygone time – 
preserved within the excesses of urban decay – but rather the potential entombing of their own spaces 
and routines, which are subsumed by the practices of counterterrorism and warfare. The aim for the 
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player, within these video games, is to prevent one’s own present and its accompanying way of life 
from becoming the marginalised “ghosts” of the national past. Whilst such a practice can have the 
potential effect of rendering monumental spaces banal – highlighting the everyday nature of the 
routines that surround them – this form of representational practice elevates personal, everyday 
experience to the realm of national political practice.  
This analysis of mundane spaces began with a focus on the related notions of “home” and 
“house”, examining the ways in which the representation of contrasting forms of everyday urban 
space can be used in order to mark particular places for acts of violence. This was then reinforced with 
an examination of the presence or absence of civilians, highlighting the extent to which the presence 
or absence of “normal” peoples (i.e. non-combatants) is used to rationalise the use of military force. 
These different patterns of representation are used to reinforce the perceptual difference between 
the notions of “space” and “place”. Through the inclusion or exclusion of specific environments, 
objects and flows, we are shown that “they” live in dangerous and unrecognisable spaces, which are 
to be subjected to violent action in order to render them safe. “We”, meanwhile, are shown to live in 
recognisable places – characterised by the remnants of familiar routines and spatial practices – and 
may justifiably draw upon violence in the preservation and continuation of “our” way of life.    
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Chapter Six: Reading Rural Space  
Introduction  
In Chapter Two, I examined some of the prevailing conceptualisations of the relationship between 
political phenomena and popular culture. Drawing on approaches from within both IR and critical 
geopolitics, I argued that video games can be seen to be ‘constitutive’ of particular geopolitical 
imaginaries - the ‘collections of facts and stereotypes about places in the world that together compose 
an individual’s (or a group’s) worldview’ (Dittmer, 2010, p. 18). Such an approach suggests that 
popular culture does not simply provide a blind facsimile of space, but rather that it serves to 
naturalise or destabilise the ideas about such spaces that are prevalent at a given moment. Chapter 
Three addressed some of the different ways in which political spaces are theorised, differentiating 
between the urban, rural and temporal emphases that are evident within the surrounding literatures. 
Noting the particular prevalence of urban imaginaries, Chapter Five engaged with the different ways 
in which the simulation of urban and suburban spaces within video games can be seen to be 
constitutive of different forms of national identity. Within this chapter, however, the focus of this 
thesis shifts away from the urban core, out to the rural periphery. As Chapter Three highlighted, the 
field of rural geography has begun to acknowledge the prospect that the notion of rurality ‘does not 
describe a fast, hard and indisputable material object, but rather refers to a loose set of ideas and 
associations that have developed over time and which are debated and contested’ (Woods, 2011, p. 
16; see also, Cronon, 1996a; Cronon, 1996b; Halfacree, 1993; Halfacree, 2006; Lewis, 2007, p. 5). The 
study of popular culture provides a site within which different, competing imaginaries can be 
subjected to scrutiny, facilitating reflection upon the ways in which different spatial meanings are 
created and sustained. This has prompted critical reflection on the representation of peripheral, rural 
spaces with a variety of different forms of popular culture, including film (see, for example, Bell, 1997; 
Dalby, 2008; Eriksson, 2010; Fish, 2007; Murphy, 2013; Woodward and Winter, 2007) and television 
(Horton, 2008a; 2008b).  
These analyses have focussed on a variety of different imaginaries of peripheral and rural 
spatiality, using these as the basis on which to access the prevailing geopolitical scripts. Dalby, for 
example, argues that ‘combat movies have been an integral part of the production of geopolitical 
spaces which construct identities of heroes and villains on the one hand, but also provide both fictional 
and mimetic discourses of the terrains of danger on the other’ (2008b, p. 441). Woodward and Winter 
afford a similar role to the rural representations that are contained within British and American war 
films, highlighting the ways in which these imaginaries have been ‘used as a scenic device for narrative 
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and plot purposes, and as metaphors for broader anxieties about national identity and the morality of 
armed conflict’ (2007, pp. 91-92). Murphy, meanwhile, traces the evolution of a ‘rural gothic’ 
imaginary within the horror genre, observing that ‘whilst Americans in real life have a high opinion of 
rural areas and their inhabitants, they have a fondness for watching horror films in which rural and 
wilderness locales are depicted in a deeply negative light’ (2013, p. 9). It is, however, notable that 
comparatively little attention has been paid to the role of rural imaginaries within video games.  
This chapter aims to address this lacuna and will argue that the different conceptualisations 
of rurality – used as analytical lenses – are productive of specific ways of thinking about forms of 
spatial and political identities. Whilst there are a myriad of different forms and uses of the concept of 
the rural, this thesis can necessarily engage with only a limited number of such imaginaries. Drawing 
from the examination of the literature in Chapter Three, this chapter considers three particularly 
prevalent conceptualisations of rural spaces – the concepts of the rural idyll, the backwoods, and the 
wilderness. In taking this approach, I acknowledge not only that these terminologies are not 
universally accepted, but also that these are predominately English and American notions that may 
not easily translate into other contexts. Eriksson, for example, highlights that ‘the term countryside 
has different connotations in Sweden than in the US and UK. In Sweden, rural areas far from the large 
cities are rarely termed ‘countryside’ (in Swedish: ‘landsbygd’) but merely as a ‘sparsely populated 
area’ (in Swedish: ‘glesbygd’), and ‘glesbygd’ has no idyllic connotations’ (2010, p. 96). Nonetheless, 
these terms provide a useful framework for my own analytical approach: -   
6.1 Playing [the] Outside? The “Spectre” of the Rural Idyll  
As Chapter Three explores, the rural idyll is a manufactured and culturally-contingent form of 
representation which ‘imagines the rural to be a place of peace, tranquillity and simple virtue, 
contrasted with the bustle and brashness of the city’ (Woods, 2011, p. 21). Idyllic representations 
within popular culture often pay little attention to the lived realities of rural culture, instead 
reproducing common stereotypes about the people that inhabit these regions, the activities they 
undertake, and the lives that they lead. These positive imaginaries of rural life are evident in games 
such as Animal Crossing, in which ‘players move into a town filled with cartoonish animal creatures 
and buy a house, then work, trade, and personalise their microenvironment. The game offers a series 
of innocuous, even mundane activities like bug catching, gardening, and wallpaper designing; like The 
Sims, Animal Crossing’s primary metaphors are social interaction and household customisation’ 
(Bogost, 2007, p. 267). In the ‘shooter’ genre of video games, however, this ‘idyllic’ form of rurality is 
much less evident. This may, to some extent, be the result of the requirements of the genre type, 
which uses imaginaries of violence and conflict as a means by which to control player progression and 
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advance the core narrative. It is, however, worthwhile to note that comparable, combat-themed 
media forms can be seen to have drawn on the representation of the ‘idyllic’ as a means by which to 
either emphasise aspects of identity or to outline what it is that is somehow ‘at stake’ in the central 
conflict. Jason Dittmer, for example, reflects on the origin story of the Captain Britain comic book 
character, concluding that the figure garnered political legitimacy ‘from his connection to an 
essentialised primordial British nation, symbolised by the trans-historical figures of Merlin and the 
Round Table’ (2011, p. 78). As a result it is important to question what role – if any – notions of an 
‘idyllic’ form of space can be seen to play in the formation of particular geopolitical imaginaries within 
the ‘shooter’ genre of video games.  There were some, albeit limited, examples of idyllic imaginaries 
evident in the video games that were analysed in the construction of this thesis. Particularly notable 
is the representation of the Oasis encampment within Chapter Three of Homefront (2011), which 
serves as a symbolic starting point from which American soldiers can seek to restore their way of life 
following Korean occupation: -   
‘From the outside it’s just more boarded up suburban failure. But inside we’ve built 
ourselves a safe haven’ (Boone, Chapter Three, Homefront) 
The camp serves as an analogy for the idyllic conceptualisation of the relationship between rurality 
and the early American settlers. The rural protections afforded to nations by mountains and seas 
(Edensor, 2002, p. 40) are rescaled to fit ‘our little piece of America’ (Boone, Chapter Three), as the 
camp is hidden from view by the surrounding trees. The camp exists in harmony with nature, growing 
its own food, generating electricity from the wind and solar power, and collecting rain water. Despite 
its modest resources, the inhabitants of the camp emphasise the value of freedom, having somewhere 
to call home, and the importance of hands-on labour (one inhabitant, for example, patches into 
Korean radio signals). The camp is the new homely space, following the erasure of conventional daily 
life, one that is occupied by families undertaking ordinary, day-to-day tasks such as cooking. Imbued 
with this symbolic value, the subsequent GKR attack (in which Boone is killed) garners a much greater 
emotional impact. That he is hung from the children’s swing set only serves to heighten the affectivity 
of this destruction of the rebuilt American domestic sphere.  
 It is also worthwhile to note the way in which the space is treated by the game’s ludic 
structures. This is one of the few sections in which violent actions are not available to the player – the 
only permitted means of interaction is to move through the camp, talking to the various residents. 
The gameplay also highlights the narrative significance of the area, as a hidden zone away from the 
Korean gaze. It is only through the player’s actions that Korean violence is brought into the Oasis. The 
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player could have instead chosen to stay in the camp, amongst friendly faces, but would have played 
no further part in the war effort that forms the game’s narrative.    
The above examination highlights the extent to which idyllic notions of space may be 
incompatible with the violence that underpins the ‘shooter’ video game. Such games more commonly 
focus on ‘backwoods’ or ‘wilderness’ imaginaries, producing externalised spaces that stand in 
opposition to the Self.  The analysis of these backwoods and peripheral spaces could conceivably focus 
on a wide range of different video games, as many titles call upon the player to venture beyond the 
limits of the urban core. Here, however, this thesis will focus specifically on video games in which the 
simulation of rural, peripheral forms of space – whether internal or foreign – is afforded a key role 
within the narrative. To this end, four games were selected for a closer scrutiny – Battlefield: Hardline 
(2015), Call of Duty: Ghosts (2013), Ghost Recon: Hardline (2017) 21, and Homefront (2011). Some 
background information on the different titles is required: -  
i. Battlefield: Hardline (2015) 
Unlike the other games considered here, Battlefield: Hardline takes the form of an episodic crime 
drama. The player takes on the role of Nick Mendoza, a Miami police detective tasked with fighting 
the drug war in and around the city. After he is framed by a group of corrupt police officers, led by 
Captain Julian Dawes, Mendoza is convicted of laundering drug money. After an escape from jail, with 
the help of his former partner, Mendoza works to expose his former captain’s corrupt private security 
business. After eventually tracing Dawes to a private island, Mendoza shoots him – only to discover 
that he has been handed full control over the operation. This game, which was a departure from the 
normal focus of the broader Battlefield franchise, has achieved only modest cross-format sales of 4.29 
million units (VGChartz, 2018a). Although placing an emphasis on policing – rather than military 
conflict – Battlefield Hardline offers a compelling example of the supposed corruption of peripheral 
space, predicated upon a series of powerful imaginaries of peripheral spaces. Of a particular interest 
to this analysis is the simulation of an anti-government commune (Episode Eight: Sovereign Lands). 
Such representations are crucial to the game’s ability to situate the player’s sense of Self, visually 
documenting Mendoza’s journey from urban public servant to peripheral wanted criminal.  
                                                          
21 To a lesser extent, I also acknowledge the role of similar symbolism within earlier games in the Tom 
Clancy franchise, acknowledging some of the spatial codes that are offered in Ghost Recon: Advanced 
Warfighter (2006) and Ghost Recon: Advanced Warfighter 2 (2007).  
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ii. Call of Duty: Ghosts (2013) 
Call of Duty: Ghosts (2013) was a greater commercial success, achieving 28.78 million cross format 
sales as a part of the broader Call of Duty franchise (VGChartz, 2018d). The game offers an alternative 
timeline in which a powerful group of rogue states conducts an attack on America using a hijacked 
orbital weapon.  As the game opens, US Army officer Elias Walker recounts the legend of the formation 
of the titular ‘Ghost’ unit to his sons, Logan and David. After the attacks, the timeline advances to 
show the two boys now involved in a war of attrition between America and the forces of the 
‘Federation’.  The game is notable for its focus on a core ‘Ghost’ identity, held to epitomise the core 
sense of American selfhood. The game’s various missions, which see the brothers’ reconnaissance 
units strike out into insecure peripheral spaces, are revealed to be ‘test missions’ in order for the 
brothers to prove themselves worthy of adopting the ‘Ghost’ mantle for themselves. The antagonist 
is also notably a former Ghost team member, corrupted by Federation torture. Logan is eventually 
kidnapped and incarcerated in a jungle pit, presumably being ‘broken’ in just the same way. The 
analysis of this game will focus on the formation and loss of self-identity, noting that a clear premium 
is placed upon the need for the soldier to return from their engagement with the ‘uncivilised’ 
periphery.  
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Figure 49: The Structure of Santa Blanca in Ghost Recon: Wildlands  
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iii.  Ghost Recon: Wildlands (2017) 
In Ghost Recon: Wildlands (2017), the player is tasked with disrupting the activities of a Mexican drug 
cartel that has seized control of the coca production in Bolivia. Spurred into action by the murder of 
an American DEA agent, Ricky Sandoval, the player is charged with undermining the cartel’s security, 
distribution, influence and production activities – each of which is represented by a sprawling web of 
influence (see Figure 49). In this game, the player once again takes on the mantle of the ‘Ghost’, 
developing on the broader mythology of the previous titles in the franchise. This concept, referring to 
the elite unit featured in the game, forms a prominent part of both the game’s marketing (see Figure 
50) and broader narrative structure. As one of the more recent titles considered, Ghost Recon: 
Wildlands has posted only 4.49 million units of cross-format sales (VGChartz, 2018e), but remains 
relevant for consideration here as a result of its clear focus on identity formation through engagement 
with the rural periphery. The game is also notable for the use of rural and peripheral spatiality in the 
creation and maintenance of numerous non-American others, using its representation of Bolivian 
spatiality in order to script roles for the cartel, the Bolivian citizenry, and the ongoing resistance 
movement.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
This image has been removed by the author of this thesis for copyright reasons. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 50:  Promotional Communication for Ghost Recon: Wildlands 
Source: https://twitter.com/ubisoft/status/736206281610928128 
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iv. Homefront (2011) 
The Homefront (2011) video game is set in the near future, following the invasion and subsequent 
occupation of the USA by a unified ‘Greater Korean Republic’ (‘GKR’). It offers a dystopian imaginary 
of future politics, building from the real-world geopolitical tensions between North Korea and other 
global political powers. Its core narrative begins in 2011, charting both the unification of Korea and 
the economic decline of the USA. In 2024, as America becomes increasingly insular, the Greater Korean 
Republic launches ‘their latest communication satellite, claiming that it will bring a message of peace 
to the entire world’ (Pre-Game Cinematic). Instead it transpires that the satellite is the carrier of a 
massive EMP weapon, which cripples American infrastructure and scatters military forces.  The player 
takes on the role of combat pilot Robert Jacobs, who is recruited by the American resistance forces to 
aid in the fightback. Although including a number of notable urban environments, some of which were 
discussed in Chapter Five, the game also offers several encounters with peripheral rural spaces. One 
such sequence details a confrontation between American resistance fighters and the occupants of a 
survivalist farmland encampment. Taken as a representation of the internal Other (Eriksson, 2010), 
this environment is used to understand the role in the cultural and political imaginary for those that 
detach themselves from their responsibility to the civilised core of the nation.  
Within these video games, the rural periphery is uniformly presented as a zone of corruption and 
hostile encounter. In Battlefield: Hardline (2015), the rural periphery becomes a primary front in the 
war on drugs. In Call of Duty: Ghosts (2013) the player pursues a Rourke (a former ally) into the rural 
periphery, losing themselves in the process. In Ghost Recon: Wildlands (2017), the player must survive 
the periphery in order to prevent cartel drugs from reaching the American heartland. In Homefront 
(2011), the player must strike out beyond the perimeter walls erected by the occupying Korean forces 
in order for the resistance forces to push the invaders back. Taken together, the following subsections 
of this chapter will argue that these different approaches to the simulation of the rural imaginary can 
be used to understand the way in which such spaces are used to facilitate the production of a core 
identity dialectic – these games, like broader political society, draw upon rural spaces and imaginaries 
in a way that scripts particular roles for both the core, national Self and the peripheral, excluded 
Other22. With this in mind, the following sections are used to present two different readings of the 
role of rural spatiality within video games: -  
                                                          
22 It should be noted that I do not claim that these imaginaries encompass all potential interpretations 
of the role of video game rurality, but rather that this is indicative of some of the more prevalent 
themes identified within this material.   
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1. The role of rural space in the production of an (Americanised) sense of Self identity.  
The first of these readings will explore the ways in which rural representations are afforded a role in 
the production of a sense of Self identity.  In the first instance, this chapter examines the role of rural 
representations in the production of a sense of Self identity. Of a particular interest here is the notion 
of the ‘Ghost’ identity, which is advanced in Call of Duty: Ghosts (2013) and Ghost Recon: Wildlands 
(2017). Such characters are warrior figures, central to the process of ‘physically securing the West, 
and simultaneously securing its identity as a repository of virtue against barbaric threats to civilisation’ 
(Dalby, 2008b, p. 440). These figures are produced as strong, virtuous protectors through their entry 
into, and engagement with, peripheral places and peoples that are somehow not ‘like us’. As a part of 
the examination of the creation of these identities, I argue that the maintenance of these identities is 
constructed as an act of willing subversion -  the ‘Ghost’ must subvert its own identity in order to be 
able to operate successfully within the rural periphery. This reading engages with themes of control 
and violence, before also examining the ways in which the virtue of the ‘Ghost’ is threatened by a lack 
of mobility. Many of these games feature narratives in which the potential cause of corruption is one’s 
permanent residence, willing or otherwise, in regions beyond the reach of urban civilisation. These 
games share narrative commonalities, addressing notions of ‘becoming’ through an engagement with 
peripheral forms of spatiality. Here, I examine how such developments are framed and what the 
consequences are for the ways in which we view peripheral regions.  
2. The role of rural space in the  creation of the barbaric Other, standing in contrast to the exalted 
national Self 
In examining the theorisation of rurality in Chapter Three, it was notable the extent to which our 
understandings of peripheral places and peoples are constructed in juxtaposition to those associated 
with the urban core. As a result, in addition to examining the production of the Self, I also examine 
how rural spaces are used to facilitate the creation of geopolitical Others that are not ‘like us’ in some 
way. This may be the national Other (such as a country or foreign power) or an ‘internal’ Other (a 
marginalised offshoot of the core national identity that serves to provide a repository for denied 
maladies and malformations). Here, I focus particularly on the relationship between peripheral spaces 
and peoples and their perceived status as outside of modernity and civility. This process examines the 
ways in which anti-modern themes are evoked in the creation of peoples and places that are deemed 
to be in some way deviant or dangerous. This section offers an initial reflection on Ghost Recon: 
Wildlands (2017), noting the use of horror themes and tropes in characterising the violence and 
torture associated with the characters of La Yuri and El Polito. This section then discusses the 
representation of ‘Prepper’ imagery in the representation of survivalist compounds in Battlefield: 
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Hardline (2015) and Homefront (2011). To conclude this section I examine the construction of 
Hardline’s cartel more broadly, suggesting that this portrayal confounds the common association 
between peripherality and anti-modernity.  
In the concluding section of this chapter I emphasise the tensions in the representation of the 
rural periphery, arguing that they are not only implicated in the reproduction of naturalised, ‘common-
sense’ notions of internal and peripheral spaces, but also that these representations have implications 
for the way in which we are invited to think about the process of securing different forms of national 
and international space. The use of the rural as trope is used to highlight the problematic equivocation 
between rurality and, at best, anti-modernity and at worst savagery and the loss of (a particularly 
masculine) sense of self identity. 
6.2 The ‘Ghost’ in the Machine: Rurality and the Formation of the Self 
The nature of the rural periphery has historically been encountered and understood in a variety of 
conflicting ways. As Woods notes, ‘rural areas are celebrated variously both as wilderness and as a 
bucolic ideal. Yet, they can also be portrayed as remote, backward, under-developed places, in need 
of modernisation’ (2011, p. 1). For the early settlers, the experience of the rural ‘wilderness’ was one 
of a profound loss of control. More recently, however, that same peripheral space has been 
reconceptualised as a form of restorative refuge that acts to ease the pressures associated with city 
life (Murphy, 2013, pp. 6-7). This section explores how these spaces are presented and experienced 
within video games, examining how such experiences manipulate our understandings of selfhood and 
our relationship to peripheral regions.    
 In the video games examined for this analysis there were a number of notable attempts to 
portray the rural periphery as a zone beyond the control of urban civilisation. One example of this is 
evident in Episode Three of Battlefield: Hardline (2015), which is entitled Gator Bait. In this section, 
the player is tasked with electronically tagging bundles of drugs that are being dropped into the 
Everglades National Park. Although we would commonly think of such areas as managed rural space, 
subjected to control measures, here we are shown that attempts to integrate the region into urban 
American culture have failed. This is visually signified by the dilapidated and disused stadium which, 
through an embedded narrative moment, is revealed to have been the site of a major accident: -  
‘There was a motor boat pulling ten girls in a pyramid. They were, like, on the side of the 
lake and then there was boat pulling a tiger on the other side of the lake. Well… 
unfortunately their paths crossed. Tiger’s rope crossed over the girl’s rope… Next thing 
you know, girl loses her hand. All the other girls, they dove in, they’re trying to find her 
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hand, and of course, the tiger swam into the mix and… that kind of messed stuff up’ 
(Episode Three: Gator Bait)  
There is also evidence of the lawlessness of this peripheral zone in the integration of formerly 
productive infrastructural elements into an ongoing drug-smuggling operation. As such, the area is 
shown to be an un-tameable borderland, valuable only to those with less than moral aspirations for 
its use. It is a space which is populated only by criminals and aggressive wildlife. 
 There is, however, a clear tension between the representation of rural regions and the ways 
in which the player will interact with these environments. Whilst desiring to manufacture a sense of 
isolation and distance, the player is routinely still led through these environments by their heads-up-
display (or ‘HUD’). This visual apparatus places the player on the map, as well as highlighting the 
position of any threats that may be occupying this peripheral space. In this sense, there is little 
difference between the player’s engagement with urban and rural spaces. In the above example, the 
Everglades functions primarily as a narrative sphere – the player drives for long, uninterrupted 
stretches whilst entering into dialogue with a supporting non-player-character. Ghost Recon: 
Wildlands (2017) also contains ludic structures that undermine this sense of vulnerability. It is, for 
example, impossible for the player to become separated from his/her team, as the non-player 
characters will simply warp to the player’s location.  
This level of control does, however, contribute to the broader creation of a ‘warrior’ like identity 
for the protagonist. A comparable example is provided by Woodward and Winter (2007) in their 
analysis of Rambo. Here, they reflect on the level of control over wilderness spatiality that can be 
attributed to the film’s titular character: -  
‘Through his qualities and skill, we see him utterly at home in the jungle. A mere twenty-
four seconds after he is parachuted into hostile territory, he proves this to us by strangling 
a snake bare-handed. He’s so at home here that he runs (runs!) through the jungle – no 
silent, stealthy advantage to battle here’ (Woodward & Winter, 2007, p. 95)  
This ‘warrior’ identity is key to the formation of the player’s sense of self-identity in these games, as 
the protagonist – and their relationship to their environment – functions as a direct extension of the 
player’s own identity. Of a particular significance is the concept of the Ghost, an ethereal warrior 
identity that is used to signify a level of control and professionalism. These are elite warrior figures, 
often members of covert operations teams.  
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6.2.1 The ‘Ghost’ Mythology 
One early example of the ‘Ghost’ mythology is evident in the Ghost Recon: Advanced Warfighter series 
(2006-2007), during which the team often discuss their status as urban legends. In the first game in 
this franchise the protagonist, upon being told the antagonist is a man that is without fear, remarks 
that ‘he’s about to see a Ghost’. Like the vengeful ghosts of scary stories, Ghost team members are 
believed to be able to pass through their environment invisibly and reach the target for their wrath 
unnoticed. Like such ghosts, we are also led to believe that the Ghost team benefits from a denial of 
its existence. In one instance, when asked to identify himself by a Mexican commander, the 
protagonist responds that ‘I have no name Captain. I am a Ghost and I was never here’. In the absence 
of a given name and national identity, the Mexican commanders address the team leader as ‘Senior 
Ghost’ – the player formally takes on the primordial national identity and ‘becomes’ the Ghost.  The 
role of the ‘Ghost’ identity is expanded in Ghost Recon: Wildlands (2017). In one of the trailers for the 
game, entitled ‘We are Ghosts’ (Ubisoft, 2017), the significance of this identity is explored in detail: -  
‘We are travellers, going miles through mud and muck. We are survivors, equipping the 
right gear to survive for months in the harshest conditions. We are strangers, far away 
from home. We are hunters, blending so deep into the environment we become part of 
it. We are adventurers, doing what no one else dares. We are watchers, seeing everything 
– leaving no trace. We are scholars, studying our enemies – so we can hit ‘em where it 
hurts. We are judges, deciding who will live and who will die. We are Ghosts, and we do 
not exist’ (Ubisoft, 2017; emphasis added) 
The ethereal nature of the ‘Ghost’ continues to be identified in Ghost Recon: Wildlands (2017). This 
‘Ghost’ identity is created in contrast to the rebel and cartel factions, which are portrayed as different 
forms of ideological extremism. El Sueno, leader of the cartel, is described as having ‘a religious streak 
that reads pretty close to delusional. He’s taken vows of poverty, chastity – he’s not in it for the chocha 
or the money, he’s in it for the power’. Even the allied Bolivian faction, the rebel group referred to as 
Kataris 26, are characterised as being fundamentally untrustworthy and self-interested: -  
‘Bolivians have a long history of hating us Yankees, but this time let’s hope the enemy of 
my enemy will be my friend. But don’t turn your back on him, I’m not going to’ (‘Karen 
Bowman’, opening cutscene) 
This is further reinforced during an incidental moment of dialogue, heard whilst exploring the Itacua 
Bravo base, during which one of the Ghosts says that he’s not comfortable working with the rebels as 
‘that sort of ideology tends to lead to more bodies’. The ‘Ghosts’ meanwhile, seem to have no 
ideology, subverting their own self-interests and self-identity in pursuit of the mission objectives. This 
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is emphasised in the game’s dialogue, as the team evade discussions of their past missions and 
discussion of their status as ‘urban legends’: -  
Karen Bowman: ‘I was a rookie field officer in Moscow when the coup went down. There 
was talk you were involved’ 
Ghost: ‘Na, it must’ve been someone else, we were never there’ 
Karen Bowman: ‘It’s not every day that you get to meet an urban legend in the flesh’ 
Ghost: ‘Ha, you should tell that to my kid. Maybe, he’d listen when I tell him to take the 
trash out’ 
The ’Ghosts’, whilst extraordinary soldiers, have lives and families that are safe back home – well away 
from the frontlines that they themselves defend. Their denial of recognition continues throughout the 
game, reflected in moments of embedded narrative. One such sequence occurs as the team discover 
some of the lavish tombs in which the cartel inters its fallen soldiers. When one of the Ghosts professes 
a desire for such a monument, he is scolded by his teammates: -  
‘What are you, a Seal? Because I don’t know any quiet professionals who’d need 
something like this’  
They do not maintain the characters that might be expected of seasoned warriors, often disrupting 
serious moments of action with moments of group banter. Some such exchanges include the ways in 
which they wear their underpants whilst on mission and the stories surrounding their worst injuries – 
‘’Boston Elementary Academy 1991: Cindy Margolan caught my fingers in a door – thought I was gonna 
die’ (Background exchange) – as well as the stories surrounding the professional misconduct of other 
personnel: -  
‘[S]quad leader didn’t feel like humping the minimum safe distance from the 
explosion…so when they blew the cache we were dodging goddamn rocks… two kids got 
concussion, one fucker’s ankle got smashed to hamburger – all because one squad leader 
was too lazy to hump two clicks… That’s when we knew we had to join the secret squirrel 
squad’ 
Although these characters do not acknowledge their own influence themselves, this is reinforced in 
key moments within the game’s dialogue: -  
Pac Katari: ‘Four soldiers? This is the help you promised? That Sandoval promised? A 
single Yankee died, so you send a handful of soldiers. Hundreds of Bolivians have died 
from Santa Blanca’s bullets, where will my hundreds of soldiers come from?’ 
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‘Karen Bowman’:  ‘As Americas, we aren’t here remember? These soldiers are the best 
covert ops team our country has to offer. With their help, you won’t need hundreds of 
soldiers’  
This is also reinforced through the use of visual shorthand. Whilst the arrival of the Ghosts in Bolivia 
is masked by rain and the darkness of the night sky, the commencement of their mission is marked by 
a time-lapse montage of the sun rising over Bolivia. The emphasis of this particular sequence - which 
incorporates the game’s opening title sequence – is not subtle, the arrival of the Ghosts is symbolically 
represented by the dawning of a new day for Bolivia. In Ghost Recon: Wildlands (2017), the depiction 
of rural space is used to discipline our understandings of the ‘Ghost’ identity. This relationship, which 
implies a symbiotic relationship between the soldier and their environment, is not confined to this 
one particular title. 
 A similar imaginary is also evident within Call of Duty: Ghosts (2013). This mythology is 
established within the game’s opening narrative, in which the player is told what is supposedly an 
urban legend surrounding the formation of an elite ‘Ghost’ military unit. This story says that, whilst 
fighting back against an overwhelming number of enemies, a group of fifteen soldiers became covered 
in blood and sand. This is described as being form of baptism, ‘changing them, anointing them’ (Ghost 
Stories, Call of Duty: Ghosts), and affords these fighters a distinct advantage in combat. One’s ability 
to ‘become’ a Ghost is, as a result, presented as the logical consequence of the communion of the 
national guardian and an innate natural power. One is stripped of one’s own identity, and becomes 
an extension of the environment itself – no different to the wide oceans, high mountains and deep 
ravines that protect national territories.  
This ‘Ghost’ identity is, however, more nuanced that this initial reading might suggest. At one 
level, the synergy between man and nature has the effect of feminising these regions, as they are 
made the subject of masculine, American penetration and reclamation. At the same time, however, 
there is an implied sense of risk. Whilst the wilderness landscape is initially depicted as unproblematic, 
relegated to the status of something that ‘used to freak the hell out of your mother’ (Ghost Stories, 
Call of Duty: Ghosts), it is also shown to threaten the moral compass of the ‘Ghost’. We are told of the 
torture of Rourke, a former Ghost team member corrupted by ‘Amazonian’ torture techniques: -  
‘There are ancient tribes, deep in the Amazon, who have perfected the art of torture over 
hundreds of years. The Federation embraced this heritage, enhancing it with more 
sophisticated methods. They kept Rourke in a hole for months, feeding him food mixed 
with the poisons of exotic plants. As they broke down his body, they went to work on his 
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mind. When his mind broke, they went to work on his soul’ (Elias, The Hunted, Call of 
Duty: Ghosts)  
Whilst it is made clear that the individual can become a better protector as a result of their interaction 
with the wilderness, they too risk being lost unless they can come home to the urban centres that they 
are sworn to defend. Rourke loses himself, after months of torture in the jungle and, at the end of the 
game, stands ready to inflict the same fate upon Logan: -  
‘You’re good. You’d have been a hell of a Ghost. But that’s not going to happen. There 
ain’t gonna be any Ghosts, we’re gonna destroy ‘em together’ (The Ghost Killer, Call of 
Duty: Ghosts) 
Rourke’s actions serve to interrupt the process of Logan’s ‘becoming a Ghost’. Instead, Logan is 
forcibly removed from his team and - it is implied - is held in captivity in a pit in the Amazonian jungle. 
By preventing Logan from returning home, he renders him unable to fulfil the greater purpose that 
underpinned his journey. This narrative repurposes the wilderness as a place where the monsters 
skulk in the bushes. Here the monster ‘out there’ is shown to be just like you, but disconnected from  
the urban core that provides the foundation for the formation of our sense of Self. This need for a 
Ghost to be able to return to his home, to remain involved in the defence of his home country, explains 
the treatment of the bodies of Ghost team members who are killed in action: -  
‘In the event a Ghost is killed, his remains are placed face down, with his head pointed in 
the direction of his home [and] his weapon next to him. We do it this way, so that when 
our fallen are taken to the other side they can watch over us and keep an eye on the 
enemy. Dad was gone. Nothing could change that. But Logan and I, we were still here. 
The Federation was still here. Rourke was still here. This war wasn’t over, not by a long 
shot. Goodbye dad. I’ll never take your place, but I’ll die trying to fill it’ (Hesh, All or 
Nothing, Call of Duty: Ghosts) 
Whilst a dead Ghost might physically remain in the wilderness, his role transcends the limitations of 
his physical form. When buried, the Ghost is returned to nature and symbolically regarded as a part 
of the broader, ‘natural’ systems of territorial defence that protect the members of the family, and 
the nation, that are left behind.    
6.2.2 Fighting in the Periphery: Space, Violence and Identity 
It is also worthwhile to consider how these games approach the use of violence against these 
peripheral regions. In many ‘shooter’ video games, the potential for collateral damage is simply coded 
out through the removal of civilians from the simulation of the space. This is noted by von Zwieten, 
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whose analysis of Medal of Honor (2010) highlights that ‘the region of Afghanistan modelled into the 
game appears to be populated by thousands of Taliban and Chechen fighters, and one lonely sheep 
herder, who is taken out of the player‘s consideration by having him taken care of by one of the 
player‘s teammates in a cut-scene’ (2011, p. 8). A similar approach is evident in both Homefront (2011) 
and Call of Duty: Ghosts (2013), which simply remove the possibility for the player to take violent 
action against civilian targets. Whilst Battlefield: Hardline (2015) can also function as a straightforward 
‘shooter’ video game, in which the player eliminates all opponents before progressing, the use of a 
non-violent approach is promoted by the game’s underlying ludic structures. The game provides 
additional rewards for the use of non-lethal takedowns – its so-called ‘Arrest’ mechanic – in the form 
of ‘Expert’ experience points that are used in order to unlock new weapons and attachments. This 
mechanic is not without narrative issues however, as it somehow remains available to players even 
after their character becomes a wanted fugitive.  In contrast to these approaches, the Ghost Recon: 
Wildlands (2017) video game is one of the few ‘shooters’ in which civilian avatars are routinely 
included throughout the gameworld. In this title, the avoidance of collateral damage is represented 
as being a core part of being a professional military operative. The non-player characters constantly 
highlight the proximity of civilian avatars, reminding the player that we ‘don’t want to shoot anybody 
by accident’. At one point, after a slipup driving between missions, one of the team can be heard to 
exclaim: ‘What the hell? You just hit a civilian’. As an isolated incident, however, the game allows this 
mistake to go unpunished. This game even affords other combatants some protections, as the game’s 
loading screen informs us that ‘killing surrendering enemies can lead to a game over’. Some embedded 
narrative moments even attempt to humanise the cartel members. In one of the game’s radio 
broadcasts, the character of DJ Peralta berates the Ghosts for the murder of a cartel member who had 
‘three kids and a fourth on the way. She’s gonna be a girl, and her name’s Paula. Hope you remember 
that name, I hope it haunts your dreams. I hope you choke on it and die!’. The Ghosts, for their part, 
differentiate between the killing of combatants as a part of their mission, and the actions that were 
necessary for Sandoval to maintain his undercover status: -  
‘Think of all the evil shit Sandoval had to do to be Sueno’s right hand – dropping bodies… 
All the stuff you have to do against the people you are supposed to protect, that’s what 
gets me, how do you live with it for that long?’‘  
Here, however, all sense of introspection is almost immediately disrupted as one of the Ghosts 
excitedly exclaims: ‘Assisting cartel-crushing rebels… I love my job!’. A more sombre analysis of the 
comparative use of Ghost and cartel violence is offered following the mission to terminate the cabal 
torturers La Yuri and El Polito. This aspect of these games is discussed in more detail in the following 
subsection, which will reflect on the use of gothic tropes in the formulation of the ‘Other’.   
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6.3 Rurality and the Role of the Rural ‘Other’  
The process of creating an ‘Other’ is one of inclusion and exclusion, necessitating ‘a process of 
reflection by which other people, cultures and environments are everything our cultures are not; 
‘their’ otherness contains ‘our’ sameness. This implies that meanings of places are constructed as 
bounded enclosed spaces defined through difference, and that the construction of place attempts to 
establish a relationship between place and identity’ (Eriksson, 2010, p. 96). The rural - where 
constructed in opposition to the urban - is often valorised for its apparent masculinising effect, 
perceived to act as a tonic for the feminising effect of the city and of ‘civilisation’ (Cronon, 1996a). 
Here, however, I suggest that the representation of rurality is a means by which to represent a 
perceived difference between the disciplined and modern Self, and a backwards (and backwoods) 
Other that is shown to participate in behaviours that would be unacceptable within the confines of 
urban, supposedly civilised, space. Such a binary is particularly common within horror fiction, including 
films such as Lord of the Flies (1954), Deliverance (1972), The Blair Witch Project (1999) and 
YellowBrickRoad (2010). Indeed, as Murphy notes, this is a medium which has long depended on rural 
imaginaries in order to remediate ‘the long-standing historical sense that those who dwell in 
backwoods are prone to savagery and degradation’ (2013, p. 8). Similar themes are also noted by 
Eriksson in her analysis of the film The Hunters, in which she suggests that ‘racism, sexism, tax evasion 
and other phenomena disassociated with the discourse of Swedish modernity can, via the logics of 
internal orientalism, be geographically situated in places such as Norrland (but also other places 
dislocated from ‘urban modernity’) since these places and peoples remain accepted targets for the 
elite’ (2010, pp. 102-103). These rural imaginaries provide a simple shorthand for our fears of what 
might happen if we leave civilisation and risk an encounter with the ‘uncivilised’ evil that lurks beyond 
the walls. In Ghost Recon: Wildlands (2017) we are introduced to two “uncivilised” rural monsters – 
cabal torturers La Yuri and El Polito, described as ‘demons… [whose] talk of love made me want to 
vomit’ (Pac Katari). Here, rural Bolivia becomes a place in which the pair are able to act on a sexualised, 
fetishistic enjoyment of physical violence. In one audio recording, a collectible discoverable by the 
player, La Yuri can be heard to overtly sexualise the genitals of one of her victims: -  
‘Look at that boner… ‘That’s a big boner - I’m taking his pants off’ 
This imaginary of the abject Other is reflected in the representation of the environment. When the 
team eventually trace the pair to a hunting lodge, ‘the audience doesn’t need to have it explained to 
them that the isolated cabin in the midst of the deep, dark forest is a locale in which horrific events 
will take place: they’ve seen it all before’ (Murphy, 2013, p. 15). Unlike the deconstructive Cabin in the 
Woods horror film that is explored by Murphy, the ‘Cabin in the Wildlands’ offers no such subversion 
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of this classic trope. Even before the Ghosts encounter the pair in the building’s basement, there are 
a series of familiar visual signifiers that mediate a particular understanding of the environment. As the 
player progresses into the lodge, they encounter rooms that are filled with antique weaponry and 
mounted hunting trophies – including endangered animals such as lions and tigers – as well as a 
television that shows only static. In the bedroom, a human skull and macabre images of human 
anatomy are juxtaposed against a glossy picture of a couple in love. Moving towards the basement, 
the player encounters representational imagery associated with the so-called ‘Prepper’ movement – 
including a large amount of toilet roll and tinned food.  Once in the basement, the imagery becomes 
more overtly gothic. The player encounters a series of holding cells – including one in which a 
mutilated body has been hanged – as well as a series of dismembered bodies, strapped to morgue 
tables. When they eventually reach the two cabal members, the pair are ‘working’ on another victim. 
Here, the discussion of the violence continues to have a sexual tone: -  
El Polito:  ‘Just now, when I was breaking that man’s hands, I was imagining that he had 
tried to touch you…’ 
La Yuri: ‘…when he was lying there whimpering, I almost felt pity for him. I wanted to 
take care of him, put my arms around him’  
In addition to the representation of La Yuri and El Polito, as well as their hunting cabin, it is also 
important to highlight the ways in which the perceptions of violence and torture are managed within 
this game. After killing the two torturers, a subsequent dialogue sees the Ghost unit reflect on the 
mentality of the pair and the utility of torture as a tool: -  
‘Obviously it’s nothing as softball as waterboarding right?’ ‘I mean, we’re talking 
permanent damage and death here’ ‘They were also medically trained, so you have to 
figure that there’s some pharmaceuticals involved to keep their victims awake’ ‘You see, 
back in the days, the real torturers didn’t need tricks to keep their victims awake’ ‘So, 
they’re amateurs?’ ‘That’s obvious from how few people survive their interrogations – a 
real torturer, a professional, he or she is in control, he or she understands what’s needed. 
Yuri and Polito were sloppy. They can get carried away, they do it for the fun of it – not 
because it’s a job, not for the art. They’re brutal – not because they try to be. They’re 
brutal because they’re incompetent’  
This rumination on the nature of torture is revealing. Here, the cartel torturers – the abject Other – 
are imagined as brutal, uncontrolled and sloppy. The torturers aren’t good at their jobs, because they 
aren’t truly working – they are engaging in acts of violence, because such acts give them pleasure. In 
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contrast, it is implied that the American agent is a professional – a civilised person who gets no 
gratification from the act of torture and shows a distaste for the infliction of permanent harm. Despite 
such moralising, it should be noted that the Ghost team are shown to be simply accepting of the value 
of violent action. One revealing exchange, after La Yuri and El Polito are dispatched, reflects on the 
actualisation of this revenge mission. Bowman notes that, in films, vengeance is often not fulfilling, 
before reflects that she feels ‘fucking great… Taking out that lovey-dovey horror show also earned us 
some points with the locals’. This primal violence is also evident in other interactions with cartel 
members: -  
‘Here’s the deal asshole, you answer my questions or I put a bullet in your gut and leave 
you to die in your own shit’ (Interrogation of the cartel boss as part of the rescue of 
Amaru) 
The threat of violence against these lieutenants is shown to be effective, always yielding results. It is 
notable that the actualisation of such threats of violence is not facilitated by the game’s ludic 
structures, however, as the player simply knocks the lieutenant unconscious and moves on.  
 More broadly, then, the periphery becomes a place in which people – even the members of 
the Ghosts – can act in accordance with the primal urges that are forbidden to those in ‘civilised’ urban 
regions. This is foregrounded in one later level, in which the player aims to expose a high-profile 
Argentinian politician, who is known to be ‘using Carzita’s resort to hide his flings with local escorts’. 
Using the drone, the player is able to capture footage of a bizarre sex session in which the politician is 
talking to a prostitute about how he ‘stole a cat’s leg… it had a wooden leg, and I stole it’.  
In engaging with the construction of the ‘Other’ within these games, it is important to highlight 
that such an emphasis implicates more than the boundary between the national and the non-national. 
As Eriksson highlights, it ‘is often ignored that the construction of national distinctiveness produced 
by the elite to identity the inside of the nation from the outside, also produces internal exclusions 
(2010, p. 95). Such a practice is refered to as internal Orientalism, a term which denotes ‘the deeply 
embedded practices and tradition of representing a subordinate region as afflicted with various vices 
and deficiencies so as to produce an exhaulted national identity’ (Eriksson, 2010, p. 96). There have 
been a number of different ways in which this internal ‘Other’ has been represented with culture, 
including as the American hillbilly, the redneck, and white trash (Eriksson, 2010, p. 97; see also 
Jansson, 2005; Jarosz & Lawson, 2002; Murphy, 2013; Williamson, 1995). The following section 
examines some of the ways in which these stereotypes are produced in video games, focussing on 
particular sections of Homefront and Battlefield Hardline: -  
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6.3.1 Rurality and the Internal Other 
The examination of an internal Other implies a different form of political geography, as the Othered 
region remains a part of the national whole and retains access to the national institutions that are 
enjoyed by the Self (Eriksson, 2010, p. 96). The creation of such an Other has found a variety of 
different targets. Stewart (1996), for example, focussed on the characterisation of Appalachia as both 
a region of both an old-fashioned authenticity and a regressive backwardness. Similarly Murphy 
(2013), in her analysis of horror films, highlights the frequency with which the American South is 
constructed as an abhorrent Other that is held apart from the rest of the USA. Eriksson notes a similar 
characterisation of specific regions of Sweden, evident in films such as The Hunters. In doing so, she 
suggests that our engagement with the portrayal of such regions in popular culture ’is structured by 
certain principles to evoke feelings and emotions toward characters according to values we are 
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Figure 51: Promotional Communication for Far Cry 5 (Ubisoft, 2017a) 
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expected to share. We are spoken to as though we already hold the same field of vision. Through these 
processes, individuals are grouped into categories of ‘we’ with a given set of values and identities, and 
of ‘others’ – groups of individuals who are represented as different with traditional and primitive 
values we not are expected to identify with. The groups of ‘we’ and ‘others’ are social constructions 
but have distinct and factual material consequences; filmmakers contribute to these social constructs 
whether it is intentional or not’ (Eriksson, 2010, p. 102). The representation of the internal Other is 
gaining increasing traction in video games. The then-forthcoming Far Cry 5 (Figure 51), for example, 
caused some controversy by apparently making white, Christian men the enemy in its narrative. Other 
types of ‘internal’ Others are evident within both Homefront (2011) and Battlefield: Hardline (2015). 
In Chapter Five of Homefront, the resistance fighters go to collect a helicopter that had been promised 
to them by Americans living on nearby farmland. In Episode Eight of Battlefield: Hardline, entitled 
Sovereign Lands, the player goes to a similar encampment in order to collect a safe-cracking robot. 
Each of these environments represents a perversion of the ‘idyllic’ notions of country life, relying on 
some of the stereotypical conceptualisations of the prevalent (and particularly American) survivalist, 
or ‘Prepper’, movement. The following readings examine how the representations of rurality that are 
contained within these sections are influential in the formation of an internal Other: -   
Homefront (2011): On the Farm 
Before the player leaves the urban core, the underlying narrative structures our expectations. In one 
radio broadcast, the player is told that ‘after the EMP went off and the electronic grid that sustained 
us broke apart, our nation fell into a kind of madness… People turned on each other… Many beyond 
the Wall have no allegiance to any cause, other than their own survival. If you must deal with them, 
be advised that they can be unpredictable, and a fair number are outright insane’ (The ‘Voice of 
Freedom’ Radio Station, Chapter Five). This broadcast serves to render these individuals, and the 
environments in which they can be found, as being somehow disconnected from the American, 
masculine values that a return to nature would otherwise be expected to stimulate. Although the 
surrounding farmland is shown to be occupied by Americans, who display the American flag and 
therefore are ‘supposed to be on our side’ (Rianna, Chapter Five), they are lack the expected values 
of American citizens. Once they are told of Boone’s death, they renege on the prior agreement to aid 
the American resistance movement. They offer to spare Connor’s life, but only if he will allow them to 
lynch Hopper and keep Rianna for their ‘entertainment’: - 
‘Well shit, I guess the deal’s off… You know, I’ll tell you what – I’ll take the bitch, and 
scarface hiding over there, and you can walk away without a bullet in you’ (Chapter Five, 
Homefront)   
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Here, the player is confronted with a form of violent hyper-nationalism that is commonly attributed 
to the ‘foreign’ Other or to the mentally ill. This manifests in both the violence that the survivalists 
direct at the protagonists, as well as that which is directed at captured Korean fighters. In one section 
of the level, two survivalists are shown shooting at the ground around the feet of a captured KPA 
soldier23. Although this violence is committed by Americans, against Korean soldiers, it is identified by 
the resistance team members as being un-American.  One exclaims ‘I can’t watch, they’re toying with 
him’, whilst another protests that ‘this isn’t right, we [Americans] don’t kill for sport’. The underlying 
message here is that these environments do not provide spiritual enlightenment, but rather that they 
result in a loss of Self due to one’s distance from civilising urban structures. The perceived lack of 
American values demonstrated in this region not only causes the resistance members to question the 
morality of their fellow Americans, but also that of Boone – their ally – who had helped to set up the 
meeting with this group in the first place.   
 In this space, then, we see a form of rurality that is devoid of the spiritual connection to one’s 
‘better’ Self that is promised by the idyllic and pastoral mythologies, instead experiencing the rural 
periphery as a morally barren place of betrayal, violence, torture and murder. This framing of rural 
inhabitants is not specific to Homefront (2011). Some similar approaches are also evident in the 
portrayal of rural space in Battlefield Hardline (2015).  
Battlefield: Hardline (2015): Going to Camp 
Two particularly interesting examples of the internal Other are evident in Episode Five (‘Gauntlet’) and 
Episode Eight (‘Sovereign Lands’).  In Episode Five, rural space serves a clear symbolic purpose. In the 
early stages, with Mendoza travelling on prison transport, the surrounding wilderness represents both 
unreachable freedom and considerable isolation. Indeed, when Mendoza is eventually freed, he then 
must navigate the borderland town and head for the hills. Everything in the interim space is 
expendable and valueless – indeed, as part of his escape Mendoza can create a distraction by blowing 
up a meth lab. In Episode Eight, meanwhile, the representation of the hostile external space relies on 
similar stereotypes to those evident in the Homefront farm. Here, the player must retrieve a safe-
cracking robot from a survivalist encampment (Figure 52). Unlike Homefront however, in which the 
background narrative is provided by the faceless Voice of Freedom radio station, the setting for this 
encounter is established through an interim narrative space – the American diner serves as the last 
bastion of civilisation, whilst the long and dusty roads are used to indicate the region’s isolated and 
                                                          
23 This sequence can be viewed online at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lG5-oSpVduU, from 8 
mins and 23 seconds onwards.   
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unproductive nature. The characters call attention to the region’s inhospitable climate, with one of 
the group – Dune Albert – remarking that ‘if I wasn’t covered in dust, then I’d need like SPF5800 out 
here’ (Episode Eight). As they travel to the encampment, the dialogue between Marcus and his former 
girlfriend hints at a perceived racism24: -  
‘He didn’t approve – I’ll give you one guess why’ (Marcus, Episode Eight) 
The girl shows the pair a GPS tracking bracelet, given to her by her father after Marcus supposedly 
tried to ‘kidnap’ her from the commune. Again, this aspect speaks to some broader tropes surrounding 
the status of women in communes – like Rianna in Homefront, they are perceived as possessions that 
are to be kept and enjoyed. Also similarly to Homefront, the inhabitants of the commune are shown 
to be treacherous – they sell out Nick Mendoza for a $250,000 bounty and imprison Boomer against 
the agreement made with Dune.  Their break with the broader national identity is also signified in the 
ways in which these characters act towards the government – they discuss the possibility of false flag 
attacks and the need for martial law. Following some exploration, the player can also discover a 
secondary narrative pertaining to the abduction, torture and subsequent murder of a law 
enforcement official. 
Both of these depictions of survivalist encampments serve to reinforce the centrality of the state to 
American identity, noting the need for the civilising structures that it provides. Those who settle in 
wilderness regions are shown to lose humanity, replacing the structures of governance with violence 
                                                          
24 Although this is later subverted, as the group’s leader clarifies that ‘race is not a factor here… My 
dislike for you is strictly personal’.  
 
 
 
 
This image has been removed by the author of this thesis for copyright reasons. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 52: Survivalist Compound (Episode Eight, Battlefield Hardline, 2015) 
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and brutality. Whilst alternative systems of self-governance are evident, drawing upon widely held 
cultural fantasies of survivalism and self-reliance, these are shown to be an insufficient means by 
which to preserve cultural values. In both Homefront and Battlefield Hardline, the absence of state 
intervention into wilderness areas is shown to result in the decline of one’s moral integrity. Unlike 
idyllic or pastoral models of peripheral spaces, in which rural life is shown as something admirable, 
rural/wilderness space is used within these games to symbolically represent a group of people that 
choose to withdraw from the state and its laws and social norms of behaviour.  
6.3.2 Modernity and Traditionalism 
As a final focus, it is worthwhile to consider the ways in which our notions of modernity unduly 
influence our formulations of the notion of the Other. As Eriksson highlights, ‘the apparent others of 
“progressive” and modern nations are those who fail to meet the standards of what is considered 
modern’ (2010, p. 95). A similar form of representational shorthand is often evident within video 
games, as the analyses of Homefront and Battlefield: Hardline demonstrated, in which rural regions 
are commonly constructed as anti-modern, backwards regions. Rather than valorise rural life, video 
game environments visually demonstrate a degraded standard of living. These games show rural 
dwellingspaces to be simplistic, lacking the trappings of modernity that are identifiable within their 
urban and suburban analogues. Buildings often lack basic amenities and are made from cheap 
materials (including corrugated metals), and have often suffered significant structural damage. The 
rigidity of this framework is complicated in Ghost Recon: Wildlands (2017), which contains multiple 
prevalent ‘Others’ against which American identity is balanced. In this game, the nature of the 
American identity – represented by the ‘Ghost’ identity that is discussed earlier in this chapter – is 
constructed in contrast to the Mexican cartel, the Bolivian paramilitary and the Bolivian citizenry.  
As Eriksson highlights in her analysis of Swedish film, belonging to Western modernity ‘means, 
to a great extent, having the means for and knowledge of which commodities and symbols to desire 
and consume’ (2010, p. 95). Here, the narrative is driven by the conflict between the modern, capitalist 
influence of the cartel and the agrarian ideology of the Bolivian resistance movement. In Ghost Recon: 
Wildlands, the Mexican drug cartel is shown to share many of the characteristics that we would more 
commonly attribute to the allied fighting force – mobility, modernity and tech-savvy. This 
interpretation is frequently reinforced through the game’s emergent narrative aspects. On the in-
game radio station, for example, cartel broadcasts describe Bolivia as ‘a backwards corner of mud and 
muck’, claiming that the arrival of the coca trade has advanced standards of living in the country. The 
cartel members position themselves as businessmen, individuals fulfilling the needs of the market. 
This hard-line capitalism, predicated on the continuing production and exportation of Bolivian coca, 
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allows the group to position themselves as ‘Bolivia’s partner in bringing our traditions into our future’ 
(Radio broadcast). Consumption is blurred with spirituality, with addiction described as the provision 
of a sense of spiritual meaning – it provides a purpose for being a part of the world. Other aspects of 
the narrative also reflect the seductive role of the trappings of Western modernity.  
Reflecting on the cartel’s recruitment of the torturers La Yuri and El Polito, Bowman highlights that 
the cartel ‘showered them with gifts… even a new car’ (Bowman Briefing). The pair are even likened 
to lovesick teenagers, shown corresponding via the messaging functions of social media (Figure 53). A 
further example of this is also evident in the Bowman briefing on Carzita: -  
‘He’s a Meppy – a Mexican preppy – or a Prepxican if you prefer. His main achievement 
in life was to win the sperm lottery… Son of a telecoms billionaire, who gave his son 
everything – money, cars, education - BA from Harvard, MA Warton Business, DPhil from 
Oxford to acquire a little sophistication and some good English clothes’ 
If, as Eriksson suggests, modernity can be measured through consumption, then the cartel are clearly 
intended to represent a modern security threat. They are able to rely on the symbols of modern life 
in order to lure recruits, including status symbols – including vehicles and vast personal wealth – as 
well as media icons, such as narcocorridos singers: -  
‘His fans are so nuts for him that, this past August, when he refused to go onstage in 
Anaheim over some pay dispute… the audience rioted. Wrecked the venue’  
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Figure 53: La Yuri and El Polito converse on Facebook (Ghost Recon: Wildlands, 2017) 
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The cartel are even heard to offer a doctrine of female empowerment, telling of the potential for 
strong women to rise to positions of power: -  
‘How did I rise through the ranks to become one of the most feared and respected women 
in the cartel? I act like I am afraid of nothing, like I have the biggest [balls] in the room… 
Like nothing, and no one, is going to stop me from getting what I want. I tell you, do the 
same damn thing – it’s the only way a woman can win in our world. If you live a life like 
ours, and you don’t win, you’re fucking dead’ 
The cartel modernity is, however, displayed as somewhat toxic. Modernist cartel ambition is shown 
to have disrupted the way of life in the country, as national parks are taken over by tourists, route-
ways are blocked by checkpoints and fences, and peaceful homes are subjected to cartel attacks.  
This representation of the cartel as a modern, progressive business stands in stark contrast to 
that of the rebel group, whose ideology centres on notions of an agrarian proletariat. Whilst there this 
little evidence that the citizenry have enjoyed any of the trappings of wealth promised by the cartel, 
there is a suggestion that these peoples might at least share moral values with the American fighting 
forces. Following one early mission, the player is told that a rebel lieutenant escaped and was 
concealed by Bolivian villagers. Rather than give the man up to the cartel, the village chose to hide the 
individual – sacrificing their own lives as the cartel burnt the village to the ground.  
The resistance members, meanwhile, seem to be treated as a little more than a means to an 
end – they lack both the mobility and modernity of the Ghosts or the cartel, or the inherent moral 
values of the peoples that they represent. The Ghosts have not entered into the conflict in Bolivia to 
join a moral cause, as the rebels had ‘been fighting Santa Blanca and corrupt Bolivian officials for six 
years’ (Opening Cutscene), but rather are shown to be acting in retaliation for the torture and murder 
of an American agent. Indeed, as one of the team surmises, ‘we need to focus and get this done quick 
– before we get stuck between local politics and a firestorm of cartel bullets’. The internal politics do 
not seem to matter to the group, at least not as much as avenging the death of the one American. This 
representation of the resistance is reinforced through a series of side missions, during which the player 
electronically tags a variety of different resources for resistance use. These objectives serve no ludic 
function other than to unlock special abilities, such as a resistance-led attack on the enemy, offering 
little in the way of narrative development. As a result, the needs of the resistance have little narrative 
resonance, becoming merely another tool in the American military arsenal.  
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Conclusion 
This chapter has explored some of the ways in which the representation of different forms of rural 
spatiality within video games acts in the formation of particular political imaginaries, ordering such 
spaces and naturalising specific behaviours. Whilst we have difficulty distinguishing between rural and 
urban space within the “real” world, video games often make plain this division. Within these video 
games, the experience of rural space is shown to be central to the formation of the “proper” national 
identity and national values. As this imaginary is tied to movement – advocating one’s swift “return” 
to civilisation – the representation of peripheral spaces can also be used in order to highlight the 
dangers that are associated with immobility and stasis.  
 Section 6.1 explored the diminished role of the rural idyll, noting that the representation of 
peripheral space within video games often seems to be devoid of either the productive value that is 
assigned to it by the “pastoral” conceptualisation or the restorative value that is afforded to it by the 
resurgent “romantic” conceptualisation. Though noting the exceptional example of Oasis – an idyllic 
survivor encampment in Homefront – this section highlights that the idyllic imaginary is usually made 
absent from direct practices of representation and is, instead, used as a tacitly implied state of being 
against which it is possible to ground the more dystopian imaginaries that we consume.  
Section 6.2, meanwhile, explored the role of rural space in the creation and maintenance of 
the Self. Focussing specifically on Call of Dutyː Ghosts (2013) and Ghost Recon: Wildlands (2017), this 
section examines the ways in which the encounter with rural spaces is made integral to the 
maintenance of the hyper-masculine “Ghost” identity that is ascribed to the protagonists within these 
games. These video games offer some imaginaries that correlate with the characterisation of rural 
regions within the surrounding literatures, balancing notions of masculine renewal against more 
primitivistic notions of fear, danger and loss. The romanticised aspects of such an engagement are 
evident within the process of “becoming” a Ghost. The player’s journey into the wilderness is shown 
to facilitate access to the best possible version of the Self, a process that is essential to becoming a 
better soldier and national guardian. This is shown to be a space within which men can become “real” 
men, engaging in primal behaviours in a consequence-free environment. It is implied that rural space 
is necessary for the manufacture of stronger national subjects. Individuals who enter into rural or 
wilderness regions are shown to become an extension of the protections that are afforded to urban 
centres by natural environments. Such a process is, however, shown to be dependent upon continued 
movement, as ‘too much time in the wilderness, it is suggested, makes a people resentful, savage and 
degenerate’ (Murphy, 2013, p. 11). The monster that lurks in the periphery is not something that leaps 
from the bushes, but rather is an aspect of the human psyche that is corrupted by prolonged 
204 
 
engagement with this uncivilised sphere. This notably includes the brainwashed “patriot” – an 
individual who has been turned against their former values of duty and sacrifice. The implication is 
that ‘when you leave “civilisation”, you will inevitably become less civilised, often as a result of a 
process of transformation that turns you into something partially or wholly monstrous’ (Murphy, 
2013, p. 11). A successful engagement with the rural periphery is shown to be one in which the 
masculine hero attends to their duties, before returning home to be ignored when they tell their 
children to put the rubbish out.  
Whilst there is a focus on the role of mobility in the creation of the Self, the inverse 
relationship is also evident. The mobility of the soldier, free to travel through peripheral zones, is 
constructed in contrast to those who dwell within such regions. It is the construction of this rural Other 
that is the target of Section 6.3, which further highlights the apparent incompatibility of urban values 
and rural life. As highlighted in Chapter Three, the rural periphery can be viewed as a place for living 
out one’s fantasies, facilitating a range of behaviours that are not normally possible within the bounds 
of so-called “civilisation”. Within these rural spaces, however, the player witnesses numerous 
behaviours that transgress established moral codes – including sexual violence, torture and murder. 
Represented in this way, these “backwoods” rural spaces serve as a form of visual shorthand for 
regressive, anti-modern attitudes. These video games can be seen to distinguish between the value of 
the productive urban centre – which contains identifiable patterns of everyday life – and the failing, 
corrupted rural zones that are shown to be in a state of crisis. This makes the “rural” into a zone of 
encounter, within which one’s own identity is pitted against the people and places that are not “like 
us”. Some of these devices are, however, somewhat subverted in the narrative offered by Ghost Recon 
Wildlands. Here, the Mexican cartel is afforded many of the same characteristics that are afforded to 
a modern military force. The Bolivian nationals, represented through the traditional and “natural” 
ways of being on the land, are shown to be the desirable alternative to the modern, capitalist Mexican 
outsider.   
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Chapter Seven: Mediation and the “Event”  
Introduction  
As highlighted in Chapter Two, critical forms of analysis have suggested that the practice of geopolitical 
analysis does not provide an objective, scientific mediation of the “reality” of the real world (see, for 
example, Bassin, 2004; Dalby, 1991; Dittmer & Dodds, 2008; O’Tuathail, 1996). Instead, critical 
geopolitics is shown to expose the means by which a variety of different characteristics – including 
both virtues and weaknesses – can be “written” onto the map, in order that they might either be 
claimed for oneself or else assigned to others (see, for example, Dittmer, 2010; Kelly, 2006; O’Tuathail, 
1999). This thesis has sought to explore some of the different ways in which these characteristics are 
represented within popular culture, focussing on some of the key binaries that are evident in the 
manufacture of political spatialities within the content of military-themed video games. Chapter Five 
offered an examination of the construction of the urban imaginary, distinguishing between the 
deployment of a commemorative, monumental form of spatiality and the use of more mundane, 
everyday environments. Chapter Six, meanwhile, focussed on the construction of contrasting 
imaginaries of rural spatiality, exploring the distinction between the representations of the idyllic 
countryside, the backwoods and the wilderness. The focus of this chapter shifts to the role of the 
“Event”, examining the use of both forwards and backwards looking practices of mediation in the 
representation of unconventional forms of violence and their commensurate forms of militarised 
space.  
 As discussed in Chapter Three, critical terrorism studies postulates that our understandings of 
unconventional and terroristic forms of violence is created by our engagement with a raft of different, 
yet interconnected discursive forms (see, for example, Gunning, 2007; Hülsse and Spencer, 2008; 
Jarvis, 2009). Whilst the analysis of this terrorism discourse is often still focussed on the examination 
of its official, “high” manifestations, this shift has nonetheless facilitated the analysis of artefacts of 
popular culture as available and more accessible sites for contemporary study. Terrorism, 
counterterrorism and the consequences of terroristic violence are popular discursive themes within 
cultural artefacts, evident in the continuing proliferation of the television shows, films and video 
games that explore these topics 25  This has prompted wide-ranging critical reflection on the 
                                                          
25 The website IMDB, for example, lists 406 individual film and television programmes matching the 
keyword “terrorism” released in the period 2013 – 2018 (IMDB, 2018a). This is a considerable increase 
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representation of traumatic and terroristic “Events”, using these artefacts as the basis upon which to 
examine the mediation of the prevailing geopolitical scripts. Dittmer, for example, focusses on the 
Captain America comics, noting that the ‘readers witness the disciplining of characters and ideas so 
that they understand how Americans behave and do not behave’ (2007a, p. 414). Other analyses have 
focussed on the artefacts of popular culture that engage in the direct remediation of real-world 
events. Holland (2011), for example, examines the fictionalised representation of the 9-11 attacks 
within a special, non-cannon episode of the television show The West Wing. Weber (2008), 
meanwhile, examines how the attacks were selectively recreated and remediated in both television 
and film.  
It is, however, notable that there has been a more limited consideration of the role of the 
“Event” in the configuration of political space within video games. Salter, for example, observes that 
‘what is missing is an analysis of the particular configurations of the political future in large video game 
franchises… which imply very imaginative premediations of the geopolitical future’ (2011, p. 383). This 
chapter will explore the mediation of the “Event” in video games, examining the process by which the 
representation of current and near-future conflicts is imbued with geopolitical meaning by a series of 
different, temporally-inflected processes of mediation. Here, video game spaces are explored with the 
specific intention of uncovering the ways in which temporal discourses and practices of mediation 
influence the ways in which national identities and practices of spatial securitisation are constructed, 
performed and understood. Whilst these forms of space are not physical realities, with some lacking 
even real-world analogues, these can nonetheless still be understood as competing, multi-layered 
forms of political discourse whose mediation of particular logics and value systems can be subjected 
to critical scrutiny. This chapter will address the ways in which the representation of the specific 
spatio-temporality of the “Event” can be utilised to expose the prevailing geopolitical imaginary, as 
well as the potential for it to offer an insight into the role that is afforded to both the state and civilian 
actor during times of trauma. Drawing upon the examination of the literature in Chapter Three, this 
examination of the portrayal of the “Event” is guided by the interrelated concepts of ‘remediation’ 
(Bolter & Grusin, 2000) and ‘premediation’ (Grusin, 2010). Whilst the former concept is used to 
address the ways in which the representation of the “Event” can offer a form of temporal therapy, 
drawing on the logics of immediacy and hypermediacy, the latter is used to examine the incitement 
to action that is prompted by the representation of an imagined and uncertain future.  
                                                          
on the comparable list of 235 titles that match the same search for the period 1995 – 2000 (IMDB, 
2018b).    
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7.1 Playing for Time? Temporality and Video Games 
This examination will require a broader understanding of the function of temporality in the formation 
of distinctive sub-genres of military-themed video games. A framework for this engagement is offered 
by Smicker (2010), whose analysis distinguishes between video games which can be seen to either re-
enact history, re-envisage past conflicts, or engage in acts of prolepsis. Re-enactments are historically-
orientated video games, such as Call of Duty: WWII (Sledgehammer Games, 2017) and Battlefield 1 
(EA Dice, 2016), which ‘try to recreate and reproduce, as accurately as possible, specific wars, battles, 
armies and equpment’ (Smicker, 2010, p. 113). Such titles raise interesting potential issues 
surrounding the role of popular culture in the process of commemoration and memorialisation. Gish, 
for example, observes the extent to which the re-enactment video game ‘continually and uniquely 
raids and re-appropriates cultural and international history in the interest of providing foundational 
narrative structures for individual games’ (2010, p. 168). Focussing specifically on video games within 
the Call of Duty franchises, he concludes that this type of video game can allow for the negotiation of 
the multiple, conflicting ways in which we understand our shared military histories. Rejack, however, 
focusses on the linear narrative that is presented within Brother in Arms: Road to Hill 30 (Ubisoft, 
2005), arguing that it offers ‘a view of history as a straightforward sequence of events, with no sense 
of competing interaction or multiple viewpoints’ (2007, p. 421). Whilst such a focus represents a 
potential area for future research, this analysis is more concerned with the ways in which more 
imaginative representations of political spatiality are used to structure our geopolitical imaginaries26. 
As a result, this thesis focuses specifically on the practices of mediation that are evident within 
revisionist and proleptic forms of military-themed video game.  
 Within revisionist video games, past conflicts can be restaged with a different outcome. These 
games often focus on infamous defeats or failures, allowing for these to be reintegrated into the 
broader national narrative. A number of the missions that are available in Kuma\War (2004) facilitate 
this revisionism: -   
‘[T]he 1980 Iran hostage rescue can be successful, Osama Bin Laden can be captured in 
1998 (or captured in Tora Bora in 2001), [and] the Iraqi and Afghan national armies can 
be existent, functional, and efficient’ (Smicker, 2010, p. 112). 
Whilst many contemporary military-themed video games aim to mirror current or near future forms 
of conflict, such narratives often remain dependant on the re-scripting of the logics and frameworks 
                                                          
26 For a broader discussion of the selection of video games for this analysis, see the corresponding 
section of Chapter Four.  
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that were evident within past conflicts. This process of remediation is made one of the primary focuses 
of this chapter, examining the extent to which our engagement with the present and future is still 
partly constructed through this backwards-looking focus. As such, I argue that the notion of historical 
revisionism can be meaningfully broadened in order to incorporate the manipulation or evocation of 
past conflicts as a means by which to generate a more dystopian representation of the geopolitical 
“reality” of the present day. Homefront: the Revolution, for example, envisages what the world might 
have looked like if the American digital revolution of the 1970s had instead ‘started with the APEX 
corporation… and the birth of the Silicon River in North Korea’ (Introductory Cinematic). In broadening 
the notion of revisionist video gaming in this way, I utilise the term ‘compliant history’ in order to 
emphasise the malleable nature of our geopolitical knowledges.  
 Proleptic video games, meanwhile, are those which are ‘set in the present or near future and 
present possible future interventions into present day “hot spots” (e.g. North Korea, Iran, Nigeria, 
Cuba, etc.) as necessary and unavoidable realities’ (Smicker, 2010, p. 113). The video game medium 
has proven to be particularly adept at the creation and mediation of these fictitious futures, offering 
‘sites where the post-9/11 dreams of victory and nightmares of oppression are embodied’ (Annandale, 
2010, p. 98). This process is one of ‘premediation’ (Grusin, 2010), allowing the player to envisage, 
experience and combat the attacks of the future before they emerge unmediated into the present 
day. Such video games provide a means by which to think about future “worst-case” scenarios, 
allowing the player to consider both how such events might come to fruition and what forms of 
response may be necessary. These future “Events” can, therefore, be used to examine the role of both 
the state authority and the national citizen in the process of spatial securitisation.   
 This analysis of revisionist and proleptic forms of video gaming could conceivably engage with 
a wide-range of different video games, as many titles address – either directly or indirectly – the role 
of the “Event” in the mediation of particular forms of political spatiality. Here, however, this chapter 
will focus specifically on a series of video games in which the simulation of different forms of 
temporality – through both backwards-looking and more future-orientated processes of mediation – 
is integral to the overall narrative. To this end, four video games were selected for closer examination:  
Spec Ops: the Line (2K Games, 2012), Tom Clancy’s Splinter Cell: Blacklist (Ubisoft, 2013), Homefront: 
the Revolution (Dambuster Studios, 2016), and Tom Clancy’s The Division (Ubisoft, 2016a). Some 
background information on these different titles is offered below: -  
i. Spec Ops: the Line (Yager Games, 2012) 
The Spec Ops: the Line video game is notable for its use of evocative narrative (Jenkins, 2004; see 
Chapter Four), drawing from both the book The Heart of Darkness (Conrad, 1996) and the film 
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Apocalypse Now (1979). The game centres on American military incursions into Dubai, amidst a series 
of worsening sandstorms. Prior to the commencement of the gameplay, it is established that both a 
decorated American colonel and his unit have gone missing whilst attempting to lead a civilian convoy 
out of the city. The only subsequent contact is a looped radio message, which conveys that the 
‘attempted evacuation of Dubai ended in failure. Death toll: too many’ (Opening Cutscene). The player 
takes on the role of Captain Walker, the leader of a team of Delta operatives that is subsequently sent 
into the stricken city in order to both search for the missing unit and to check for any civilian survivors. 
Once inside, they become embroiled in the battle between a group of armed survivors – referred to 
as the Insurgents – and the remnants of the ‘Damned’ 33rd Battalion.  
Although well-received both by critics and the general public (Metacritic, 2018), Spec Ops: the Line 
has currently achieved just 1.2 million units in cross-format sales (VGChartz, 2018c). Nonetheless, the 
title remains relevant as one of the first mainstream anti-war military video games (Payne, 2014, p. 
266).  Unlike the various other video games that are considered within this analysis, Spec Ops: the Line 
utilises the player’s familiarity with the various narrative and ludic conventions that are commonly 
associated with other forms of military fiction in order to offer an overt critique of violent 
interventionism27.    
ii. Tom Clancy’s Splinter Cell: Blacklist (Ubisoft Toronto, 2013a) 
Splinter Cell: Blacklist offers a narrative of preventative global counterterrorism, beginning amidst an 
attack on the Anderson Airbase in Guam. An organisation identified as The Engineers subsequently 
claims responsibility and threatens the commission of a series of further strikes on American targets 
(the game’s titular ‘Blacklist’) unless all military personnel are recalled from overseas deployment. The 
player takes on the role of the elite military operative Sam Fischer, the commander of ‘the newly 
authorised Fourth Echelon, a deep black agency reporting only to the Oval Office’ (Ubisoft, 2014b), 
and is charged with preventing these attacks. Like its real-world counterpart, Fischer’s War on Terror 
is a global effort, as his Fourth Echelon team infiltrate overseas territories to dismantle terror cells or 
to achieve the interrogation or rendition of strategic targets. The team must also respond to threats 
within the domestic realm, contending with a variety of attacks upon the American infrastructure. 
Whilst Splinter Cell: Blacklist has achieved only modest commercial success, with cross-format sales of 
2.32 million units (VGChartz, 2018g), it nonetheless exemplifies the role of the “Event” in the creation 
                                                          
27 Some other examples of this criticality include This War of Mine (11 bit Studios, 2014), modelled on 
civilian experiences during the Bosnian war, or less mainstream releases such as September 12th 
(Newsgaming, 2003). Whilst such titles represent potentially interesting subjects for future analyses, 
these video games are beyond the scope of my own critical enquiry (see Chapter Four).    
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of specific practices of action and reaction. Of a particular interest for this chapter are the different 
ways in which the characters justify their respective uses of violent or other immoral actions in order 
to engage with the geopolitical uncertainties of the present and near future world.  
iii. Homefront: The Revolution (Dambuster Studios, 2016) 
Like Homefront (THQ, 2011), which is examined in Chapter Six, Homefront: the Revolution also depicts 
a Korean occupation of the USA. Unlike this prior title however, Homefront: the Revolution offers a 
revisionist narrative in which the USA has become heavily indebted to a technologically-dominant 
Korea. With this financial situation exacerbated by continued wars overseas, America defaults on its 
payments for Korean munitions. By way of response, the Korean government utilises a technological 
backdoor in order to disable American hardware and, under the guise of providing humanitarian relief, 
is able to subsequently invade and occupy the American mainland. In stripping this alternate universe 
America of the copious armaments that are wielded by its real-world counterpart, this game acts to 
subvert any form of security doctrine that is predicated upon the conventional mass mobilisation of 
troops and munitions. Rather than taking the role of the global aggressor, backed by technology, this 
fictional America is instead reduced to the waging of small-scale guerrilla warfare (see Figure 54).  
The game itself begins in the year 2029, which is four years after the beginning of the occupation, and 
places the player within a guerrilla resistance movement that is operating in Philadelphia. Following a 
raid upon a resistance stronghold, which results in the capture of the group’s charismatic leader by 
the Korean military, the player must continue the resistance effort. This narrative, which resembles 
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Figure 54: 'Thank You' Trailer  (Deep Silver, 2015) 
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one of resistance to wartime Nazism, notably addresses different perspectives on the role of both of 
soft-power and violent uprising during times of crisis. This chapter will examine some of the different 
ways in which the practices of remediation and premediation are utilised in order to support this core 
narrative theme.  
iv. Tom Clancy’s The Division (Ubisoft, 2016) 
Like the other games produced as a part of the Tom Clancy franchise, The Division also ‘centres on 
high-technology military interventions set in the near future and extrapolated out of current concerns 
and conflicts’ (Smicker, 2010, p. 106). The game is set in a near-future imaginary of New York City, 
following the release of a weaponised smallpox virus (referred to as the ‘Green Poison’) during the 
Black Friday sales. The player acts as a member of the game’s titular Division, a sleeper-style military 
unit which has ‘been activated and sent to Manhattan to save what remains of civilisation after the 
devastating pandemic’ (Ubisoft, 2016c). The player must address the decline of social order in the city, 
responding to the activities of the various violent and criminal factions that have developed as a result 
of this unstable situation (see Figure 55).  
Tom Clancy’s The Division offers a clear representation of the perceived role of power in the aftermath 
of the traumatic “Event”, juxtaposing the supposed heroism of the Division against the apparent 
criminality of the various other civilian and military factions. In doing so, however, the game offers a 
clear standpoint on the utility of military force in crisis situations and advances a narrative which 
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Figure 55: The Opposition Factions (Ubisoft, 2016d) 
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suggests that domestic rights can be suspended by the state. Whilst unlikely to have been intended 
as a tacit critique of geopolitical power structures, this is a narrative with an increasing political 
relevance in light of subsequent, ongoing debates about issues such as anti-terror legislation, 
surveillance, political freedoms and police brutality. 
 This selection of video games are unified by their mediation of the traumatic “Event” and, in 
creating their dystopian geopolitical imaginaries, offer logically consistent worlds. Spec Ops: the Line 
explores the role of American interventionism in the aftermath of a humanitarian crisis. In Splinter 
Cell: Blacklist, the player participates in a process of pre-emptive counterterrorism, designed to 
prevent the occurrence of future attacks. In Homefront: the Revolution, the player participates in a 
campaign of guerrilla warfare in order to repel an occupying military force. In Tom Clancy’s The 
Division, the player joins a unit of first responders that aim to restore order to Manhattan, following 
a biological attack. Taken together, the following subsections of this chapter argue that the mediation 
of these different forms of traumatic “Event” can be used in order to expose the production of a core 
identity dialectic. These video games draw upon familiar spaces and imaginaries, from both the past 
and future, in order to produce the “Event” in a way that provokes both familiarity and a sense of low-
level anxiety about our role in the world. With this in mind, the following sections present two 
different readings of the role of temporally-inflected mediation in the production of political spatiality 
within military-themed video games.  
1. The Remediation of the “Event”  
This first subsection of this chapter focuses on the temporally-inflected processes of mediation that 
are influential in the production of geopolitical order within military-themed video games. This is 
initially achieved through a focus on the concept of ‘remediation’ (Bolter & Grusin, 2000), which 
examines the extent to which the composition of an event or media form can be seen to rely upon 
different forms of mediatory precedent.  Section 7.2.1. examines how the construction of the “Event” 
in military-themed video games is faciliated by the logics of immediacy and hypermediacy. Within the 
video games examined as a part of this analysis, there were a number of points at which these logics 
were especially evident. This subsection offers an examination of some of these instances, identifying 
their consequences for the ways in which we are invited to conceive of the worlds that these video 
games represent.  
Section 7.2.2. will then engage with the remediation of some familiar cultural frameworks and 
tropes, including those evident within other military-themed video games, examining how these 
experiences can be used to manipulate our relationship to the spaces that we are asked to inhabit and 
the broader geopolitical order in which we are located.  
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2. The Premediation of Action and Reaction 
The following subsection - labelled 7.3. - will then examine the process of premediation, which 
engages with the extent to which the process of mediation can be used to mitigate the impact of 
traumatic future events (Grusin, 2010). In doing so, I argue that the “Event” – as depicted within 
military-themed video games – is a moment in time that is portrayed as both inevitable and yet 
endlessly deferred into the future by correct, preventative action in the present day. The 
representation of the “Event”, therefore, can encourage a low-level of fear by forcing the player to 
remain aware of the wide variety of different threats to the current political order. This section is also 
used to explore the premediation of the “moral” national citizen, exploring some of the different ways 
in which different characters are shown to respond to the various challenges and opportunities that 
accompany future, post-Event forms of spatiality. Here, I examine the ways in which the 
representation of acts of unconventional and terroristic violence is used to legitimise and delegitimise 
particular ways of acting and reacting in times of crisis. Each of the video games selected for this 
analysis interrogates the utility of particular security measures when faced with an existential threat: 
military interventionism in Spec Ops: the Line, guerrilla warfare in Homefront: the Resistance, the ‘Fifth 
Freedom’ in Splinter Cell: Blacklist, and violence without trial in The Division. These not only ‘provide 
accounts of what the War on Terror is like, why it is being fought, and what its effects are’ (Schulzke, 
2013, p. 587), but also allow for an exploration of the premediation of “right” action and reaction to 
such developments.  
The chapter then concludes by examining the potential consequences for the ways in which 
we understand the role of the “Event”. I argue that the application of the salient theory to the study 
of video games highlights the extent to which the “Event” is simultaneously mediated in different and 
conflicting ways. The process of ‘remediation’ serves to highlight the problematic level of dependency 
upon culturally and politically familiar imaginaries that is involved in the simulation of the future. I also 
emphasise the role of premediation in disciplining present and future action, noting that it works to 
discipline the level of political power that is afforded to both the state government and the individual 
citizen. These representations, as such, have clear implications for the ways in which we are invited to 
think about the geopolitical present and future, and the nature of our involvement in such a world.  
7.2  Looking Back? Remediation in Military Video Games  
The examination of the broader theoretical literatures in Chapter Three highlighted two interrelated 
processes of mediation that structure the ways in which we understand popular culture: remediation 
(Bolter & Grusin, 2000) and premediation (Grusin, 2010). Whilst the  past primacy of remediation has 
been challenged in the post-9/11 period, the notion retains an influential role in understanding the 
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ways in which we engage with the representation of the “Event”. As Bolter and Grusin highlight, the 
process of remediation refers to the extent to which the representational practices that are evident 
within digital media can be seen to ‘oscillate between immediacy and hypermediacy, between 
transparency and opacity’ (2000, p. 19). It is these contradictory logics that are responsible for the 
creation of a connection to the worlds that are represented within popular culture. The logic of 
immediacy reflects the desire that the representation of an “Event” be experienced as though it were 
occurring live, rather than as filtered or mediated. As Kirkland highlights, digital media can achieve 
this sense of immediacy through the suppression of the process of mediation, allowing the viewer or 
player to ‘experience the world as if untouched by media technologies’ (2010, p. 231). In video games, 
this effect can be achieved through the use of a first person perspective. This allows the player to see 
the world through the eyes of character that they are controlling, as though physically inhabiting the 
body of that character. Such a perspective is, for example, utilised in Homefront: the Revolution (Figure 
56). This has the effect of making the player an embodied presence in the game world, rendering them 
a part of the events that occur on screen. 
Even where a third person perspective is used, where the player views the action from behind the 
represented body of the protagonist, the player-camera can still be integrated into the game world as 
a physical object. In Splinter Cell: Blacklist, for example, the camera is affected by the environment – 
in both the American Power and Abandoned Mill levels, for example, raindrops can be seen to fall 
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Figure 56: The First-Person Perspective (Homefront: the Revolution. 2016) 
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across its “lens” (Figure 57). A similar effect is also evident in Spec Ops: the Line, within which the 
third-person player camera is splattered with blood. 
This creation of a sense of immediacy can also be both promoted and subverted by the imposition of 
temporal frameworks. These environments, and the events that occur within them, are experienced 
in real-time. This means that the threat is experienced as though it is occurring now, even when the 
narrative may be set at a point in time that is far into the future. This can generate a sense of player 
engagement, offering a sense that something can potentially be changed within the game world. This 
reliance on time and temporal frameworks can, however, also serve to highlight the mediated 
unreality of the experience, emphasising the processes of mediation that are at work within video 
games. This is particularly evident in timed sections of gameplay, which are a common inclusion within 
action-orientated video games (Bolter & Grusin, 2000, p. 93). In Splinter Cell: Blacklist, for example, 
the player is given just under ten minutes of gameplay in order to turn off two valves at a water 
treatment facility. Here, the player is supposedly attempting to avert the release of a biological agent 
as a part of a terrorist attack codenamed American Consumption. Whilst the temporal restriction has 
the effect of highlighting the immediate nature of the threat, failure to achieve this objective within 
the time merely resets the game state and exposes the mediated, consequence-free nature of video 
game play. The player does not bring about the end of the game, but simply resets for another try at 
stopping the attack. As this suggests, the creation of a continued sense of immediacy is paradoxically 
dependent upon the hypermediated nature of the video game text. Such a process is afforded a 
narrative significance in Splinter Cell: Blacklist. In this game, the Engineers seek the subversion of 
mediation by uploading both first person footage of their attacks on the Guam airbase and their 
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Figure 57: Visual Representations of Rainfall (American Power, Splinter Cell: Blacklist, 2013) 
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subsequent demands to both social media and video streaming websites. Such a process is shown to 
allow the group to bypass the remediation of their message through the twin filters of the political 
establishment and the mainstream media, instead providing direct access to the American people 
(Figure 58, Top).  A subsequent image of a YouTube style website is used in order to affirm the efficacy 
of such an action, showing a rapidly increasing number of “views”. Such an imaginary also garners 
further credibility from its stylistic remediation of similar videos attributed to the real world pressure 
group Anonymous (Figure 58, Bottom). This has the effect of visually tying together the actions of the 
fictional terrorist group and the real-world, sub-state pressure group. 
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Figure 58: Online “Threat” Videos 
Top: Engineers threat video (American Power, Splinter Cell: Blacklist, 2013) 
Bottom: Video attributed to ‘Anonymous’ (Anonymous Belgique, 2015) 
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The representative integration of familiar forms of mediative technologies, including those which are 
common in our day-to-day lives, is also a key means by which these games are able to manufacture a 
broader sense of spatial authenticity. The representation of these other technologies acts in much the 
same way as the technique of linear perspective, associated with painting, insofar as it serves to 
extend the parameters of the represented world beyond those which are directly shown to the player 
on screen (Bolter & Grusin, 2000, pp. 24-26). This is, for example, particularly evident within Splinter 
Cell: Blacklist, in the phonecalls that the player – in the role of Sam Fisher – can make to the 
protagonist’s daughter in between the campaign missions (Figure 59).  
Whilst Fisher and the other members of the Fourth Echelon team are shown to be somewhat detached 
from the outside world, these phonecalls – which function as a form of embedded narrative (Jenkins, 
2004; see also Chapter Four) - provide a means by which the player can situate themselves as a part 
of a responsive and reactive world. The player is made able to access an alternative, non-military 
perspective on the significance of the Blacklist attacks for the civilian population. Whilst his daughter 
remains merely a voice on the other end of the phone, and is never directly represented on screen, 
this practice of mediation – which centres on an interaction between two family members – provides 
an opportunity for the player to be reminded of alternative sites and sights of terroristic violence. The 
division between these military and civilian perspectives is subsequently collapsed entirely within LNG 
Terminal, during which the Fourth Echelon team are denied access to their electronic equipment by a 
sophisticated computer virus. Once back online, the team learn about the successful undertaking of 
the American Fuel attack in the same way as the wider citizenry – through its representation in the 
news media as a “breaking” story (Figure 60).  
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Figure 59: Making a Phone Call from Paladin (Splinter Cell: Blacklist, 2013) 
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This process of hypermediacy is also evident in other forms of embedded environmental storytelling, 
which are facilitated by the recovery of conventional forms of narrative media from within the game 
world. These collectable artefacts can take on a variety of different forms, and can serve a variety of 
narrative and nonnarrative ends. In Splinter Cell: Blacklist, the player is able to collect information 
from  so-called ‘dead-drops’, as well as from enemy laptops. Whilst these collectables have no direct 
impact on gameplay, they serve to provide more information about the surrounding world. A similar 
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Figure 61: Collectable Journals in Homefront: the Revolution (2016) 
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Figure 60: Splinter Cell: Blacklist  (Ubisoft, 2013b) 
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system is evident in the Homefront franchise. In Homefront, for example, the player can collect a series 
of newspaper clippings, which are used in order to relate the manner in which the conflict is perceived 
by the wider world. In Homefront: the Revolution, meanwhile, the player can find a series of electronic 
journals, which convey different individual engagements with the lived “reality” of the conflict 
between the American resistance and a unified, occupying Korean military (Figure 61). 
The representation of this hypermediated, artificial construction of reality is also used to 
demonstrate the extent to which supposedly objective forms of information and “intelligence” can be 
exposed as misleading, manipulated, or otherwise imperfect. Within Splinter Cell: Blacklist, for 
example, the flow of “intelligence” is shown to indicate that the American Consumption attack will 
occur at a different location to that which is eventually attended by the Fourth Echelon team. In 
Homefront: the Revolution, meanwhile, the content of the news media – which is controlled by the 
occupying Korean military – is shown to be little more than propaganda, mirroring the content 
produced by North Korean authorities in the real world. In Spec Ops: the Line, even the authenticity 
of one’s own vision is challenged. Although the player, as Captain Walker, is shown to encounter a 
dystopian Dubai, some aspects of this imaginary are eventually attributed to the lead character’s 
ongoing battle with psychosis and post-traumatic stress disorder. 
7.2.1 Remediation and the Creation of a “Compliant” Geopolitics 
Whilst Bolter and Grusin (2000) emphasise the role of the logics of ‘immediacy’ and ‘hypermediacy’ in 
the process of mediation, it is worthwhile to note that the function of remediation is not constrained 
to these specific processes. The remediation of an “Event” is also achieved through a broader reliance 
on the various narrative and ludic tropes that are commonly found in popular culture, including video 
games, and also the familiar frameworks that are drawn from our experiences of real world places, 
politics and past events. One clear example of this process is evident in the level Black Tuesday (Call 
of Duty: Modern Warfare 3)28. Here, as the player emerges from an overturned army vehicle, a missile 
can be seen to strike a nearby skyscraper (see Figure 62, Top). Such an imaginary clearly evokes the 
visual language of the 9-11 attacks, displaying a similar perspective to that of the footage that was 
recorded by nearby bystanders during the attacks (see, Figure 62, Bottom). Other representational 
practices speak to commonly understood forms of cultural symbolism. In Spec Ops: the Line, for 
example, the image of an inverted American flag that is shown at the start of the game is a universally 
                                                          
28 Call of Duty: Modern Warfare 3 is discussed in more detail in Chapter Five, which focusses on the 
representation of the urban imaginary within military-themed video games.  
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understood signifier of either distress or disrespect (Figure 63). Whilst this process of remediation has 
the potential to allow for the mitigation of contemporary anxieties, facilitating the mediation of 
contemporary warfare and conflict through familiar frameworks, this process of historical revisionism 
commonly takes on a more dystopian tone. Here, the familiar imaginaries that are associated with the 
present, or near past, are changed in order to manipulate the present-day geopolitical “reality” that 
is presented within a particular title. In order to achieve a sense of plausibility, video games can be 
seen to utilise elements that are associated with past conflicts. These representations allow for a 
familiar historical narrative to be brought into the present day, but altered in a manner which suits 
particular contemporary geopolitical sensitivities. In the Homefront video games, for example, the 
representation of internment camps, mass graves, and the use of chemical gas, are all clearly intended 
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Figure 62: Ground Level Footage of Aerial Attacks 
Left: A Missile Strikes (Black Tuesday, Call of Duty: Modern Warfare 3, 2011) 
Right: Amateur Footage of the 9-11 Attacks (Retrieved from https://tinyurl.com/pgo35d3 
221 
 
to evoke the historic actions of Nazi Germany during World War II. In situating the narrative within 
North America, however, it is possible for this game to substitute in the contemporary geopolitical 
animosity between the USA and North Korea, whilst still also evoking the prior historical knowledge 
of its audience. The game also inverts the accusation that the USA was late to become involved in 
World War II, acting only after they themselves became the subject of the Pearl Harbor attacks. It 
allows for the rescripting of the initial lack of American involvement in the military conflict, instead 
representing the continued absence of European intervention. It is this creation of a compliant 
geopolitics that allows for the manufacture of a sense of American vulnerability and geopolitical 
instability, contrary to all the evidence of the present day real-world. 
 This process of remediation can also draw upon more contemporary cultural and political 
references. In Homefront: the Revolution, for example, the Korean APEX corporation are introduced 
through the remediation of imaginaries familiar to a global audience from the real-world launch of 
Apple products (Figure 64). This representation of Korea, which rescripts past American technological 
dominance, can be seen to represent broader socio-economic anxieties surrounding the rise of 
competitors in Asian markets and their potential influence on the American economy: -  
‘We bought everything they could sell, from phone to tablets, to just about anything… As 
the dollar tanked, our debt to North Korea spiralled. Unemployment rocketed and the 
country was on its knees’ (Homefront: The Revolution, 2016, Intro Cinematic)   
 
 
 
 
 
 
This image has been removed by the author of this thesis for copyright reasons. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 63: Title Screen (Spec Ops: the Line, 2012) 
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Whilst the country of North Korea is unlikely to provide real-world competition, this fictional 
representation provides a means by which to address such anxieties without provoking any real-world 
backlash. 
Tom Clancy’s The Division, meanwhile, offers a remediation of the 2001 ‘Dark Winter’ security 
simulation, which sought to explore a range of potential responses to a biological attack against the 
USA. Whilst an in-depth review of the original simulation is beyond the parameters of this analysis, it 
is notable that O’Toole, Mair and Inglesby concluded that the exercise offers ‘instructive insights and 
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Figure 64: Technology Launches 
Left: Homefront: the Revolution Introductory Cinematic 
Right: The Launch of the IPhone in 2007  
(Retrieved from  (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x7qPAY9JqE4)  
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lessons for those with responsibility for bioterrorism preparedness in the medical, public health, 
policy, and national security committees and, accordingly, helps shine light on possible paths forward’ 
(2002, p. 983). Within The Division, however, the remediation of ‘Dark Winter’ is instead used to 
legitimise a geopolitical present in which such attacks have not only happened, but have brought 
about a decline in social order in a major American city: - 
‘Within just a few days, the simulation spiralled out of control. The operation predicated 
a rapid breakdown in essential institutions, civil disorder and massive civilian casualties. 
Dark Winter has revealed how vulnerable we’ve become’ (Ubisoft, 2013c) 
The process of revisionism within these video games does, however, show some recognisable 
congruency with the real world. In Homefront: the Revolution, for example, American financial 
difficulties are exacerbated by the fact that the country’s ‘wars in the Middle East had been getting 
worse, one leading us straight into the next’ (Introductory Cinematic). Although offering a revisionist 
approach to global geopolitics which portrays America as the victim of nationalistic aggression, this 
game retains as plausible the suggestion that the USA and Middle East remain locked in military 
conflict. Though never directly addressed, the game implies that these two regions are natural 
enemies and that war – as a consequence of American interventionist foreign policy – remains 
unavoidable. 
 It is also notable that Spec Ops: the Line utilises our familiarity with the common tropes and 
conventions associated with military shooter video games to offer a critique of the violent 
interventionist action that is common within this subgenre. Whilst this title is reliant on many of the 
same mediative processes as other video games, demanding similar competencies from its audience, 
these are utilised in pursuit of a different experiential objective. This is particularly evident in the 
game’s simulation of a post-Event Dubai, which promotes a sense of estrangement and the uncanny 
above a more authentic feeling sense of presence. Spec Ops: the Line does not attempt to subvert the 
artificial, constructed nature of the “Event”, but rather encourages the player to remain aware of the 
manufactured nature of contemporary war-gaming. This includes, for example, the depiction of the 
red explosive barrels that were a common feature of early first person “shooter” video games.  This is 
also evident in the range of ‘achievements’ that the player can collect for specific in-game actions, 
many of which are named after either prominent works of military fiction (including for example, 
Three Kings or We Were Soldiers) or common military phraseology (including, for example Friendly 
Fire and All You Can Be). Spec Ops: the Line also dispenses with some of the narrative conventions that 
are normally associated with video games, breaking the fourth wall in order to talk directly to the 
player. The loading screens, for example, which are more commonly used to offer gameplay prompts 
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or inspirational quotes, are instead used in order to hold the player to account for the events that take 
place as they play through the game (Figure 65).  
The game also offers a direct deconstruction of the repetitive nature of military gameplay, through 
the direct repetition of a sequence in which the player takes control of a helicopter-mounted machine 
gun. Here, finding himself in this situation for a second time, the player character can be heard to 
briefly voice a sense of déjà vu: - 
‘This… This isn’t right… We did this already…’ (Chapter Seven, Spec Ops: the  Line) 
This comment serves as a reflection on both the repetition of the sequence, as well as the broader 
process of repetition within this video game genre. It is, for example, not uncommon for the player to 
experience a particular level multiple times, as they may become lost, die, or search for collectables. 
Other levels of this game also question the forms of interaction that are common to more mainstream 
video game titles. Throughout this game, there are a number of decision points at which the player’s 
actions influence the manner of their progression. These are used to highlight both the linearity of 
conventional military themed games, as well as the level of immediacy that is associated with decision-
making in this genre.  
In one such instance, the player must choose how to deal with an angry mob of civilians that 
have attacked the unit and lynched one of its members (Figure 66). Here, the player is afforded a sense 
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Figure 65: “The US military does not condone the killing of unarmed combatants. But this isn’t 
real, so why should you care?” – One of the loading screens in Spec Ops: the Line (2012) that 
speaks directly to the player. 
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of agency that is somewhat uncommon. The player can choose to fire on the mob, alleviating the risk. 
Whilst the player can also choose to fire into the air, dispersing the mob without causing injury, there 
is no ludic prompt that suggests that this is a possible course of action.  
A similar scenario is encountered when the player is faced with two people that are suspended from 
a bridge (Figure 67). The player is informed of the “crimes” of each individual and is given the choice 
of which to shoot dead: -   
 ‘The civilian on the right stole water – a capital offence. The solider on the left was sent 
to apprehend him. Which he did… Killing the man’s family in the process. Five innocent 
people are dead, because these two animals couldn’t control themselves… They are 
guilty. But what is justice? And how would you see it dealt?’ (The Road, Spec Ops: the 
Line) 
Whilst the game appears to invite a moral judgement, forcing the player to choose between the life 
of a desperate civilian and that of a duty-bound soldier, there are other options available. The player 
can choose to fire through the ropes binding the captives, or can shoot at the surrounding snipers in 
a difficult and dangerous act defiance.  
Once again, however, it is notable that these options are not signposted by either the game’s 
narrative or ludic structures.  
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Figure 66: Captain Walker faces down an angry mob (Chapter Eight, Spec Ops: the Line, 2012) 
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In contrast to the above narrative instances, it is also notable that the game’s most graphic moment 
of violence cannot be circumvented. In this section, the player is tasked with utilising the banned 
chemical weapon White Phosphorous against an enemy encampment. Whilst the player can stall the 
use of the chemical weapon, instead shooting the enemy soldiers from the raised platform, they 
cannot climb down the rope to proceed through the level. It is also impossible to clear the camp of 
adversaries from this raised position, as the enemy soldiers continue to spawn. The only way to 
continue the game is to utilise the chemical weapon against the camp. This lack of choice is highlighted 
as a part of the game’s dialogue in Chapter Eight (The Gate): -  
SSG Lugo: You’re fucking kidding right, that’s White Phosphorous. 
Capt. Walker: Yeah, I know what it is.  
SSG Lugo: You’ve seen what this shit does, you know we can’t use it. 
Cpt Walker: We might not have a choice, Lugo. 
SSG Lugo: There’s always a choice. 
Capt. Walker: No, there’s really not. 
At this stage, there is initially little to warn the player that anything untoward is about to happen. The 
enemy soldiers are represented as merely a series of thermal images (see Figure 68, Bottom), serving 
as a remediation of similar sequences within military-shooter video games such as Call of Duty (see, 
Figure 68, Top). In this case, however, the game does not separate the hypermediated act of violence 
from the immediacy of its consequences. The face of the protagonist remains visible during the attack, 
reflected in the computer display, and sounds of screaming can be heard from the camp. 
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Figure 67: An Apparent Moral Dilemma at ‘The Road’ (Spec Ops: the Line, 2012) 
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Once the player has decided to commence the attack, they are then free to proceed down into the 
camp. Here, however, they are forced to face the consequences of their actions. The game uses this 
section in order to create a heightened sense of immediacy, to exacerbate the sense of shock that is 
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Figure 68:  Aerial Assaults 
Top: Death from Above (Call of Duty 4: Modern Warfare, 2007) 
Bottom: The Gate (Spec Ops: the Line, 2012) 
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caused to the player. The player is made to walk through the affected area, witnessing the attempts 
of wounded soldiers to crawl to safety. This is uncommon in military-themed video games, in which 
dead bodies will often simply disapper. The player is forced to look at the bodies of their victims, some 
of whom are shown to be civillians and young children, making it apparent that they have acted against 
a humanitarian convoy (Figure 69). 
Here, the supposed adversaries were actually attempting to protect the civilian population of Dubai 
from the actions of the player. This means that, unlike the conventional video game narrative in which 
the player assumes the role of the rightious protagonist, the player is instead shown to have taken on 
a role that is more commonly associated with the violent and destructive Other. This is reinforced at 
the conclusion of the game, where the character of Konrad reminds the player that ‘you’re here 
because you want to feel like something you’re not. A hero’ (Chapter Eleven: Alone). Whilst the 
representation of the geopolitical event is ordinarily utilised to allow the player to play through their 
anxieties, acting as the hero, Spec Ops: the Line subverts this expectation through unconventional 
processes of mediation and subject positioning. The perspective of the player, therefore, is made 
dangerous and threatening by their dogged commitment to violent interventionism. 
7.3 Planning for Judgement Day? Premediating Action and Reaction in Times of Crisis 
In the aftermath of the 9-11 attacks, members of the various cultural industries were invited to 
envisage other, similar vulnerabilities in an attempt to predict the next attack that could potentially 
occur on such a scale. This process of attempted prediction and foresight is particularly evident in the 
video games that are examined in this chapter, which offer representations of future “Events” that 
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Figure 69: Civilians Found After the Gas Attack (The Gate, Spec Ops: the Line, 2012) 
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serve as plausible-feeling extensions of our current-day fears about the world around us. In Splinter 
Cell: Blacklist, for example, the player must attempt to prevent the occurrence of a series of 
timetabled and codenamed attacks that are threatened by an organisation referred to as the 
Engineers (Figure 70).  
In this particular video game, the player occupies the spaces that exist immediately before, during, 
and after, the occurrence of a series of terrorist attacks against mainland America. As highlighted in 
Figure 70, various different codenames are used in order to obscure the nature of the planned attacks. 
This representation of forthcoming “Events” is used to magnify current instabilities, emphasising that 
in the real world - just as in these games - we cannot know what form the “next” attack might take. 
Some of these attacks are eventually realised, with each successive action shown to have a higher 
death toll than those before it. The American Consumption attack, for example, is described as being 
‘biological in nature, with the potential for over two million casualties in the Greater Chicagoland area’ 
(Private Estate, Splinter Cell: Blacklist). The final attack - codenamed American Dust – is, however, left 
unexplored and unexplained. This makes it is unclear whether this future action has truly been 
subverted or simply deferred into the future, and what form it might have been expected to take. 
Such a representational pattern has the effect of questioning the true role of 
counterterrorism, suggesting that true prevention may not be possible and that the goal is to defer 
the inevitable act of future violence as far into the future as possible. This foregrounds the uncertain 
nature of the political future, showing that the world – as we know it now – is fundamentally unstable 
and prone to dramatic change, if it is not defended correctly in the present-day. This sense of fragility 
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Figure 70: The Blacklist (Ubisoft, 2013b) 
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is also emphasised in Tom Clancy’s The Division, which highlights our tendency to assume that 
catastrophic events only happen to other people, elsewhere in the world: -  
‘It’s hard to watch something you love destroy itself, to see it fall apart. Disaster always 
seems so distant and detached – someone else’s struggle in some faraway place. It’s not 
until it’s in our city, at our doors, that we realise how fragile we are. All of us. All of this’ 
(Ubisoft, 2014a) 
In being shown future acts of terroristic and unconventional violences occurring in familiar feeling 
places, to people that we identify as being similar to ourselves, we are invited to consider questions 
of how we might be expected to respond to similar scenarios. As such, the geopolitical utility of these 
“Events” is not necessarily predicated on the representation of the inciting violent incident, but can 
also encompass the process by which the resultant spaces are used to prescribe and proscribe certain 
subsequent forms of behaviour. As Jason Dittmer highlights in his analysis of the Captain America 
comics, this is a representational process which ‘territorialises American identity from the inside 
through a bonding process that not only perpetuates certain values such as loyalty to the nation, 
commitment to the status quo social system, and courage in the face of oppression, but also contrasts, 
through a process of differentiation, American identity from various others’ (2007a, p. 414). The 
process of premediation allows the creation of a sense of security by pre-scripting certain behaviours 
that can be undertaken in response to events that haven’t actually happened yet. This allows for the 
exploration of a range of different potential actions and their associated moral and political 
consequences, which can facilitate commentary on the perceived role of both the state and the 
individual civilian actor during times of collective crisis. 
One particularly common representation is evident in Splinter Cell: Blacklist, within which the 
player takes on the role of Sam Fischer. This character is portrayed as a heroic, self-sacrificing 
individual, prepared to risk his own life in the furtherance of a utilitarian common good. This 
characterisation evokes elements of the Hegelian social contract, in which ‘civil and political rights 
were guaranteed in exchange for paying taxes and fighting in wars… In wartime, the citizens became 
part of a collectivity – the nation – and had to be ready to die for the state’ (Kaldor, 2000). One example 
of this can be seen following Fischer’s exposure to nerve gas, whilst attempting to place an electronic 
tracker insight a biological weapon. Although in need of urgent medical assistance, having been made 
aware of an ‘elevated BP, tachypnea, tachycardia … consistent with symptoms of nerve gas exposure’, 
he continues to pursue the game’s antagonist. Even on the point of death, Fischer orders a support 
character to continue the pursuit in his place - an action that would certainly have resulted in his 
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death. Although rescued, Fischer repeatedly then chastises Briggs for valuing his life above those of 
the wider population placed at risk by Sadiq’s escape: -   
‘Finish the job Briggs. Nothing comes before that. Not me, not you. Nothing’ (Abandoned 
Mill) 
Over the course of Splinter Cell: Blacklist, the character and actions of both Sam Fischer and Fourth 
Echelon are constructed in direct contrast to both Kobin (a captured arms dealer, see Figure 71) and 
Sadiq (the leader of the ‘Engineers’). The character of Kobin, who is presented as neither adversary 
nor ally, is morally complicated. He can be bought, which makes him somehow unacceptable to both 
Fourth Echelon and The Engineers. 
Despite his prior involvement in the staged death of Fischer’s daughter in Splinter Cell: 
Conviction, however, Kobin self-identifies as a better person than the other individuals connected to 
the series of attacks on American targets. He demonstrates particular outrage at the moral standards 
of the terrorist leader Sadiq, referring to the man as ‘a monster. He’s a fucking ghoul’ (Safehouse). He 
defends his actions as an arms dealer, arguing that ‘capitalism was around long before I showed up. 
Besides, compared to the other assholes in my line of work, I’m a saint’ (Transit Yards).  The character 
represents himself as a product of contemporary geopolitics – simply someone that is providing a 
service that is in demand. Furthermore, he self-identifies as a part of Fourth Echelon, frequently 
referring to himself as ‘part of the team’. Despite this, he is frequently belittled by Fischer who 
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Figure 71: Fischer begins the interrogation of Kobin (Splinter Cell: Blacklist) 
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threatens to ‘take him skydiving’ (Private Estate) and treats the man as an asset of little more value 
than a laptop. In the original extraction of Kobin during the Safehouse level, Fischer differentiates 
between saving Kobin and saving what he knows. He is treated roughly, made to walk on broken glass 
in bare feet, and lands hard after riding a makeshift zip-line. He is also afforded little meaningful 
agency, notably dismissed as ‘too stupid to set that trap, and too smart to risk his life sending us into 
it’ (Insurgent Stronghold). Splinter Cell: Blacklist, therefore, constructs a post-Event narrative of 
identity in which the Self is elevated to the near-superhuman and the external, violent Other is 
irredeemably different and dangerous. Individuals like Kobin, meanwhile, who fail to pick a side, are 
as shown as almost irredeemable.  
Unlike Splinter Cell: Blacklist, Tom Clancy’s The Division does not ask the player to save the 
world, or even to contemplate how such a rescue might be achieved. Instead, the game asks the player 
to consider - after the occurrence of a catastrophic “Event” - ‘what would it take to save what 
remains?’ (Ubisoft, 2016b). In a clear inversion of the sleeper cell narrative that has been popularised 
by television shows such as 24 (2001-2010), The Americans (2013- ) and Homeland (2011- ), the 
members of The Division are highly trained, yet dormant agents that are inserted into the general 
public. The initial discussion suggests similar, familiar themes of self-sacrifice and duty to those 
discussed in the analysis of Splinter Cell: Blacklist, highlighting that the members of the Division ‘are 
your co-workers. We are your neighbours. We might even be your friends. But when we get the call… 
We leave everything behind’ (Tom Clancy's The Division, 2016, Intro Cinematic). The player’s 
involvement with the Division is portrayed as form of civic duty, undertaken in order to faciliate a 
return to normal, everyday life and to minimise the impact of any disruption to the prevailing political 
order:-  
‘It’s hard knowing that you belong here – that your purpose lies amongst all this pain. But 
someone’s gotta be there. To pick it up. To push back. To put the first piece back together. 
Put us all back together’ (Ubisoft, 2014a) 
Success, in this game, is measured by the ability of the player to return the city to the status quo 
enjoyed before the biological attack. Following one mission to stabilise the city’s power supply, for 
example, one character can be heard to reflect that ‘it looks like Times Square again, and that’s going 
to mean something to a lot of people’. Another, meanwhile, remarks that his neighbourhood 
delicatessen is on the brink of reopening, reflecting that ‘if I squint, I can see New York again’. Just 
before the completion of the final mission, Lau offers a similar summation of the progress that the 
actions of the Division unit have made towards achieving this objective: - 
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‘[R]esidents are feeling safe enough to come out onto the streets again. JTF was able to 
help CERA get their [medical] tents up and running. They’ve got people lining up around 
the block, getting food and medical attention. We’re finally starting to get some traction’  
The representation of this process of state interventionism is, however, highly problematic. The 
Division are represented as trained personnel, rather than as surviving members of the general public, 
which has the effect of legitimising a military response to a threat to the established political order. 
Though described as being people that that are somehow supposedly “like us” - our co-workers, 
neighbours and friends – the game makes no secret of the fact that this unit is a covert military force 
with ‘no rules, no limits… Our job is to protect what remains’ (Tom Clancy’s the Division, 2016, Intro 
Cinematic). This is, however, not a conventional battlefield or a zombie infested wasteland. Unlike 
games such as Splinter Cell: Blacklist and Homefront: the Revolution, in which the enemies are either 
terrorists, traitors or members of a foreign military, Tom Clancy’s The Division pits the player against 
groups of American citizens - the player is called upon to shoot and kill the survivors of a biological 
attack. As such, the game notably lacks the veneer of legitimate military conflict, guerrilla or 
otherwise, that is evident within other similar titles. This representation of a post-Event America has 
consequences for the ways in which we are invited to conceive of the role of state and the use of state 
violence, a debate with broader resonance following high profile incidences of real-world police 
violence in the USA and an ongoing debate surrounding police militarisation. The Cleaners, for 
example, are a group of former sanitation workers, who aim to purge the virus from the city by any 
means necessary. The members of this faction are shown to congregate in large groups and are easily 
identified by their heavy armour, distinctive full-face gas masks and flamethrower weaponry (see 
Figure 72). The Cleaners are utilised as an analogy for religious extremism, espousing a doctrine of 
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Figure 72: The Cleaners (Ubisoft, 2014a) 
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purity and cleanliness. The members of this group also visually Stormtroopers, as a representation of 
their status as adversaries. It is, however, unclear how their actions are in any way different to those 
of the Division members, as each side seeks to limit the spread of the virus through the use of violent 
action. This representation of the Cleaners, as resembling firefighters, also acts as a subversion of the 
hero narrative that is associated with the first responders that went into the Twin Towers following 
the 9-11 attacks. 
A similar comparison can be also drawn between The Division and the members of the Last 
Man Battalion. This group were formerly members of a private military contractor that was hired by 
Wall Street firms in order to protect their assets during the smallpox outbreak. These were veteran 
soldiers, some called in from overseas deployments, who were diverted to Manhattan. Once the scale 
of the outbreak became apparent, the group originally opted for a diplomatic solution and requested 
extraction. When this was denied their commander, the charismatic Charles Bliss, disobeyed orders 
and executed a government official. Whilst the members of The Division regard the Last Man Battalion 
as predators, dispensing violence without trial, there is little to distinguish between the actions of the 
two groups. Like The Division, for example, the LMB claims to act in the interests of the stricken city, 
doing what is necessary to aid in its recovery. In one piece of found footage, for example, Charles Bliss 
can be heard to order the faction to ‘do what the cowardly government and its fearful, weak soldiers 
were too afraid to do. To cut down all the liars, murderers and thieves that stand in the way of peace’. 
While the morality of this use of force is disputable, this doctrine is not a significant departure from 
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Figure 73: Opening Fire on the ‘Rioters’ in Tom Clancy’s The Division (2016) 
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that which the player embodies – through gameplay – as a member of the Division forces. The game’s 
protagonist engages in a number of acts of sanctioned assassination and sabotage, including the killing 
of criminals, other soldiers, and business people. When the protagonist is sent to engage in supposedly 
humanitarian acts, these usually result in the killing of one group’s members in order to redistribute 
resources to another. In one example of this, during an initial tutorial, the player is called upon to 
retrieve some medication from a group of “Rioters”. Upon arriving at the scene, the player can see no 
direct evidence that a crime has been committed. Nevertheless, the player can open fire without 
warning and without consequence (Figure 73).  This has the effect of not only legitimising the use of 
violence by the state, but also ascertains that the conventional rights afforded to the citizenry - such 
as the right to due process - are secondary to concerns of securitisation. Such a framework does not 
remain entirely unchallenged within the game. Paul Rhodes, one of the Division’s engineers, reflects 
that ‘the country is set up so that no one can run things by themselves. Balance of powers… And then 
some asshole decides to create the Division. It breaks everything. All of the power, none of the 
accountability. It’s the opposite of everything this country stands for’. Here, the game offers a critique 
of the extent to which we have become prepared to surrender civil liberties to ensure our safety.  
An alternative commentary is provided by Homefront: the Revolution, which advocates for the role of 
individual resistance and accountability. This video game highlights the potential utility of soft power 
and insider action, though ultimately depends on the use of guerrilla violence. The Korean military, 
for example, are shown to treat the captured Walker as a propaganda tool, trading on his former 
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Figure 74: Ashgate Yellow Zone (Homefront: the Revolution, 2016) 
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celebrity status. This also becomes evident as the player is introduced to Crawford, who takes them 
to a collaborator district called the Ashgate Yellow Zone. This region of the city affords some of the 
American citizens a better standard of living, in exchange for their continued support of the occupation 
and assistance in suppressing the activities of their fellow citizenry:-  
‘Since they are so despised by the general populace, the authorities know they have to 
offer sufficient perks to make the job enticing’   
Whilst this is discussed in the narrative, the player’s experience of this level does suggest that the 
supposed distinction may be somewhat surface level. The region remains subject to stringent Korean 
controls, including military checkpoints, and the region’s housing remains comparably ramshackle 
(Figure 74).  
The American resistance also acknowledges the need for soft power, as a means by which to 
inspire people to rise up alongside them. This is all the more apparent following the capture of Walker, 
the group’s leader, which has the effect of denying the resistance movement its charismatic 
figurehead. This sparks discussion about how best to incite ordinary civilians to engage in meaningful 
political resistance in his absence: -  
‘The people are ready to rise up, they just don’t know it yet. I wish I could tell them, but 
I can’t… I don’t… I don’t have the words. Walker does, he knows how to reach people – 
how to make them understand that fear is the only thing that’s holding them back. Once 
they realise that, nothing’s gonna stop them’ (Parrish, Homefront: The Revolution)  
This is represented in the game’s side missions, which challenge the player to release prisoners, 
change radio stations to resistance frequencies, or take control of meaningful buildings in order to 
disrupt the Korea control infrastructure.  
An alternative approach is offered by the group’s doctor, Sam Burnett, a non-playable character 
who is shown to advocate a non-violent means of resistance, using what little power he possesses to 
help those around him. Burnett is shown to have developed a network of medical clinics and to have 
become involved in the distribution of aid. He notably also cautions the other characters against the  
mindless use of violence in pursuit of a cause, reflecting that he would ‘rather be a good man enslaved, 
than a monster in the name of freedom’. Whilst this generates a place for the use of soft power, 
Homefront: the Resistance is driven by acts of violent resistance and is clear what it is expects the 
player to do: ‘stand the fuck up! [Because] if you want out of this hell, we gonna have to fight our way 
out’ (Brady). The player cannot, as is possible in Splinter Cell: Blacklist, choose to use their own 
discretion in the level of the lethality of their violence. Here, the use of violence seems to serve as an 
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act of catharsis, offering a way in which to subvert feelings of powerlessness. The resistance member 
Dana is a key example of this. Readying herself for a raid on a resistance armoury, she reflects that ‘at 
least we have plenty of… explosives ready. There’ll be bits of NORK landing all the way over in 
Pyongyang’.  Dana’s violence is shown to be directed at all those connected with the occupation as, 
despite Burnett’s caution, she expresses the desire to ‘kill them all! Every lousy collaborator. Every 
NORK. Their wives, their kids… Just kill them all’. The use of violence, as a response to a future threat, 
is not entirely unproblematic. Whilst the game begins by showing the player the acts of torture that 
are committed by Korean forces in order to extract information, subsequent levels show the use of 
similar tactics by resistance members: -  
‘[C]aptured a few wounded NORKs. I’ve been interrogating them. I don’t speak Korean, 
but I’m sending back a message that’s universal’ (Dana)  
This creates a problematic representational equivalency, however, as the resistance members are 
shown to act in much the same way as the occupying Korean military. 
Conclusion  
This chapter examines the extent to which the representation of future spaces and events within 
military-themed video games can be used to reinforce cetertain assumptions about the appropriate 
practices of both collective securitisation and individual action during times of crisis.  
 Section 7.2 focussed specifically on the backwards-looking process of remediation, examining 
the extent to which the representation of political spatiality in military-themed video games is 
constructed through an engagement with the frameworks, logics and cultural tropes that are already 
familiar from our prior engagement with different forms of popular culture, politics and everyday 
events. This section also examines one video game which explicitly undermines these common 
conventions, focussing on the representational practices utilised within Spec Ops: the Line. Here, our 
familiarity with the tropes and conventions that operate within more conventional military-shooter 
video games is used to call into question the repetitive and immoral nature of the actions and 
interactions that are commonly depicted as a part of warfare and counter-terrorism.  
 Section 7.3, meanwhile, examines the role of the premediation of the future in the 
construction of present-day notions of security and right action. The representation of future events 
within these video games often depends on the exacerbation of current, real-world fragilities, offering 
the player the opportunity to quite literally play at responding to the developing threats of chemical 
weapons, financial collapse and terrorist action. This has the effect of generating a representation of 
the future in which another attack is somehow inevitable, whilst also inviting discussion about how 
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best to defer the date of its occurance. Within this subsection, a range of different securitisation 
practices are evident. The representation of a counterterrorist campaign in Splinter Cell: Blacklist 
serves to demonstrate the effiacy of contemporary tactics, legitimising the use of violence against 
those that would do harm to the state. Such a framework is, however, indirectly problematised within 
Tom Clancy’s The Division. In its representation of a post-Event Manhatten, this video game presents 
a traumatised civillian population as a legitimate target for extrajudicial state violence. This creates a 
framework which entirely neglects any discussion of the potential for negotiation, diplomacy or soft 
power, instead privileging the use of uniform and unreglated acts of violence in times of crisis. A more 
balanced represention of post-Event space, meanwhile, is offered in Homefront: the Revolution, which 
reinstates the distinction between the national Self and the foreign Other – a process achieved 
through the reimagining of the current emity between the USA and North Korea. Here, a doctine of 
civillian self-help is advanced, rather than a reliance upon a state or superstate entity.  Whilst games 
such as Homefront and The Division can be seen to directly challenge the use of violence as a response 
to new security hazards, each can also be seen to affirm its efficacy through its successful deployment 
in the neutralisation of hostile targets. In doing so, these games expose a developing conflict between 
the values of the traditional Clausewitzean warrior and the need for pre-emptive or retaliatory 
violences which may transgress these norms of conduct.   
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Chapter Eight: Conclusion 
Introduction 
Within this thesis, I have argued that the representation of different forms of political space within 
military-themed video games can be seen to create specific geopolitical imaginaries. Chapter Two 
began by exploring some of the prevalent theoretical approaches to the examination of popular 
culture, engaging with analyses grounded within both International Relations and critical geopolitics. 
As these literatures demonstrated, ‘it is simply no longer tenable to maintain that popular culture has 
nothing to do with world politics. The two are intimately and inextricably bound together’ (Caso & 
Hamilton, 2015, p. 4). This relationship between politics and popular culture was, however, shown to 
have taken a variety of different forms. Analyses within IR, for example, have highlighted the role of 
popular culture in the furtherance of pedagogical practices, theoretical development and data 
gathering (see, for example, Nexon & Neumann, 2006, pp.9-17). Critical geopolitics, meanwhile, has 
sought to destabilise the deterministic construction of different forms of space, identifying a variety 
of alternate sites at which spatial meaning is made and maintained. One particular subfield, referred 
to as popular geopolitics, ‘has provided rich insight into the ways in which our political world is 
mediated and made meaningful via a range of popular culture and media outlets’ (Bos, 2018, p. 216). 
This analysis has been located at the intersection of IR theory and popular geopolitics, contributing to 
the increasing levels of interdisciplinary cooperation between these two fields. Here, I have found 
common ground in the discussion of popular culture as constitutive of politics, a perspective which 
suggests that the practices of representation that are utilised within popular culture are productive of 
particular, common-sense understandings of space and spatial order (Kangas, 2009, p.323; Muller, 
2008, p.200; Nexon & Neumann, 2006, p.19).   
 It should, however, be noted that many such analyses of the representation of space within 
popular culture have focussed on the mediums of film and television. The representation of space 
within video games, meanwhile, is comparatively underexplored (Bos, 2018, p. 216; Grayson, 2018, p. 
48). As outlined within Chapter One, this lacuna is surprising, given the high-profile, profitable and 
often overtly-political nature of the video game form (Graham & Shaw, 2010; Ouellette, 2008). This 
type of entertainment is also, notably, one which specifically depends upon its ability to make and 
sustain a variety of claims about the world through the creation of compelling and authentic-feeling 
simulations, which are often predicated upon familiar places, peoples or events. As Bos highlights, 
video games ‘offer players escapism where they: enter historical, contemporary or futuristic conflicts; 
navigate and interact with simulated war-torn environments and virtually enact forms of military 
violence. Unlike other media, videogames present landscapes which players directly explore, interact 
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and perform in’ (2018, p.216; see also Leonard, 2004; Power, 2007). A review of the surrounding 
literatures was used to highlight some of the diverse ways in which we might understand the content 
of such spaces, focussing specifically upon urban, rural and temporal themes. In applying these ideas 
to my own experiences with military-themed video games, I was then able to offer an understanding 
of some of the ways in which geopolitical imaginaries are produced by – and productive of – different 
forms of space, focussing on some of the common narrative and ludic mechanisms that are used to 
structure our interpretations (see Chapter Four). The findings of these different analyses are 
summarised in the following section. This chapter, and this thesis, will then conclude by examining 
some of the potential areas within which further analyses of the video game medium could potentially 
be undertaken.  
8.1  Making a Contribution to Knowledge  
Through an analysis of the representation of different forms of urban, rural and temporally-inflected 
spaces within military-themed video games, this thesis has generated theoretical, methodological and 
empirical contributions to knowledge. This thesis has contributed to the theoretical debates 
surrounding the deployment of popular culture in the analysis of political and spatial phenomena 
through the increasing imbrication of approaches grounded within the fields of International Relations 
(IR) and critical geopolitics. As Chapter Two highlighted, IR analyses have often addressed the 
relationship between political theory and popular culture. Critical geopolitics however, through its 
focus on popular sites of political meaning-making, examines the broader processes through which 
we perceive the surrounding world as spatialized. An interdisciplinary perspective, therefore, 
acknowledges not only the production of a form of political power, but also interrogates the everyday 
mechanisms through which the associated assumptions, biases and cultural tropes are reproduced as 
a form of commonsense spatial “knowledge”. This examination of video game space has also resulted 
in a methodological contribution to knowledge, as a necessary response to the limitations that are 
associated with exclusively narratological or ludological approaches to the medium (see, for example, 
Aarseth, 2012; Jenkins, 2004; Juul, 2001; see also Chapter Three). The formation of an object-focussed 
methodological framework has allowed for the creation of a middle ground between these two 
different and often polarising perspectives, acknowledging both thematic and structural aspects to 
the representation of space within this medium (see Chapter Four). This thesis has also made an 
empirical contribution to knowledge, offering an examination of the different ways in which the video 
game medium both reflects, and develops upon, our prevailing conceptualisations of urban, rural and 
temporally-inflected spaces and spatial pheneomena. The following subsections provide an overview 
of the different empirical chapters, detailing how each of these diferent forms of spatiality were able 
to produce or preclude specific geopolitical imaginaries. These sections also reflect upon the ways in 
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which these encounters with military-themed video games illuminate – and even destabilise – the 
foundations of prevailing critical frameworks, offering the potential for introspection and future 
growth.  
Chapter Five: Monuments and the Mundane 
Chapter Five provided a detailed examination of both the Call of Duty: Modern Warfare franchise and 
Splinter Conviction. This analysis centred upon the ways in which the simulation of different forms of 
national space can be used to create specific geopolitical imaginaries. Here, I argued that one’s 
experience of “national” space and a commensurate sense of situatedness or estrangement are 
constructed at different national scales, which range from the more collective experience of the 
international or national, through to the more localised and individually apprehended environments 
that recur within our everyday lives (see also Chapter Three, pp.56-72). A particular emphasis was 
placed upon three specific ways in which national spaces are constructed and ordered within these 
video games, noting the role of monumental spaces, everyday environments and individual spatial 
embodiment.  
Section 5.2 focussed specifically upon the formation of different imaginaries of collective, 
“monumental” forms of spatiality. This subsection highlighted the production of national identity 
through the representation of both macro-level, cartographic representations of national space 
(Chapter Five, pp.147-150), as well as through the recreation of specific symbolic spatial sites (Chapter 
Five, pp.150-159). These different representational practices were shown to order space in different 
ways. The more macro-level, cartographic presentations of political spaces (such as the maps depicted 
in the Call of Duty: Modern Warfare franchise) were shown to create a conceptualisation of the Self 
as a part of a broader whole. These imaginaries are used to situate the player as both a national 
subject, as well as amidst a world comprised of national entities. In contrast, the representation of 
individual spatial sites – such as the White House and the Eiffel Tower – is shown to be more nuanced. 
Here, specific attention was paid to both the role of monumental structures in the organisation of 
urban space, as well as the manner in which such structures are symbolically representative of specific 
forms of national identity and territorial attachment. Monumental structures are shown to provide a 
form of spatial shorthand, used to locate the player within the boundaries of specific spaces (Chapter 
Five, pp.151-152). These structures are also shown to provide a sense of scale, generating the 
impression of a broader and more cohesive world (Chapter Five, pp.152-153). Monumental spaces 
can, however, also provide an ordering process through their conveyance of specific values and ideals, 
serving as “waved flags” of nationalism (Billig, 1995). The simulation of these environments provides 
the player with something to - quite literally - fight for, whilst also serving as a destination for the 
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player to reach through the act of gameplay. Whilst the destruction of such environments often serves 
as emblematic of the sacrifice of the Self (Chapter Five, pp.155-157), the reclamation of such spaces 
is key to the defence of one’s identity and way of life.  
Section 5.3 extended the focus on monumental evocations of spatiality, examining the 
production and destabilisation of specific common-sense forms of spatial order through the creation 
of a connection between individual bodies and the macro-level “national” identity. This analysis 
accounts for two specific interrelationships, noting the particular role of both “live” and “dead” 
national bodies in the production of a broader sense of Self. These different practices were shown to 
be interrelated. This subsection first highlights the specific role that is played by dead bodies in the 
construction of the national imaginary, focussing on the contrasting treatment of the characters of 
Shepherd, Ghost and Roach (Call of Duty: Modern Warfare 2, 2009; see Chapter Five, pp.159-161). 
Here, the formal interment of the traitorous Shepherd was argued to be representative of a specific 
attempt to control which bodies are honoured. The place of this character within the broader 
narrative, however, problematizes this act of commemoration and lamentation and, in so doing, 
undermines the assumption that it is possible to present a singular, “correct” interpretation of 
historical events. This analysis suggests that this process of bodily reproduction is key to maintaining 
or challenging the construction of specific forms of nationalism, representing peoples and places as a 
form of environmental clutter that is to be either organised or exorcized. This subsection also 
problematized the production of the “national” identity through an examination of the different forms 
of rhetoric that are advanced by different “living” characters (Chapter Five, pp.161-164). These figures 
are used to problematize the ways in which we externalise the extremes of nationalistic sentiment, 
undermining attempts to structure different spaces around the binary division between the “patriotic” 
national Self and the “ultranationalist” Other. 
Section 5.4, meanwhile, engaged with the construction of spatial order through the 
representation of the more mundane forms of domestic and everyday environments. Here, I argued 
that the representation of these spaces functions through an appeal to a more individual – but less 
consciously acknowledged – form of spatial knowledge, which is rooted in our ability to recognise 
everyday urban and suburban environments as being either like or unlike those that we encounter in 
our own lives. This subsection highlights two distinct ways in which such spaces are utilised within the 
games that are discussed within this chapter, differentiating between the structures that are present 
and the people that we would expect to inhabit them. Section 5.4.1 examines the role that is played 
by the house, which is treated as a physical extension of the Westernised notion of the home (see 
Chapter Three, pp.165-170). Whilst the home is understood more broadly as a personal sanctuary, 
such a space is rarely represented as anything other than a cluttered urban space within video games. 
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One of the few exceptions is evident in the interaction between Fischer and his daughter (Splinter Cell: 
Conviction; see Chapter Five, p.165), which is used to establish the use of force in the defence of 
familiar spaces and peoples. The representation of the home is, however, more commonly able to 
produce a sense of spatial situatedness through the reproduction of the clutter that we associate with 
our own lives, offering spaces within which “we” – as the player – are able to envisage (either directly 
or indirectly) the existence of the peoples, places and spatial flows that are familiar to us. The urban 
Other, meanwhile, is produced through the manufacture of a sense of spatial estrangement, as foreign 
spaces are represented in a way that places them beyond the remit of our own individual experiences. 
Section 5.4.2, meanwhile, examines the inclusion and exclusion of specific forms of spatial flow, 
highlighting the commonplace absence of civilians from the recreation of everyday urban 
environments (Chapter Five, pp.170-175). In removing civilians from urban areas, these video games 
render urban space a legitimate target for military violence. Foreign urban spaces are shown to be 
dangerous spaces, occupied only by adversarial and threatening bodies, meaning that they can be 
targeted by the extremes of military violence. Domestic urbanity, meanwhile, is shown as somewhere 
that is recognisable for a Western audience, necessitating the use of violence in the restoration of 
“our” way of life. 
 The above analysis has served to highlight some specific aspects of the representation of 
national and urban spaces that are potentially consequential for the ways in which we theorise the 
nature of such spaces within the real-world. The analysis of national space in Section 5.2, for example, 
has served to problematize the assumed centrality and inviolability of monumental structures and 
their associated symbolic meanings. This section also highlights the extent to which a preoccupation 
with monumental spatial structures can potentially generate a reading of urban spatiality that 
devalues individual interpretations, obfuscating the lives and lived experiences of the peoples that live 
within these environments. Within these video games, for example, the use of monuments allows for 
the presentation of warfare as a more straightforward clash of “good” against “evil”, allowing the 
player to overlook the absence of humanitarian intervention within these environments. 
Furthermore, these video games expose the ease with which symbolic monumental spaces can be 
rendered vernacular. Whilst the exteriors of these buildings carry a particular significance, offering the 
player something to fight for or towards – the interiors of these buildings are reduced to a series of 
indistinguishable, banal forms of spatial practice.  
 Section 5.3, meanwhile, problematizes the distinction between the national, patriotic Self and 
the ultranationalist Other. Here, the monumental “embodied” signifiers of national identity are not 
representative of the values that we would willingly claim for ourselves, but rather of the extremes of 
national identity that we would more commonly ascribe to others. This section, therefore, invites a 
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heightened awareness of the role of different perspectives in the construction of shared national 
history and identity, calling attention to the behaviours that – whilst radical in the Other – might pass 
by unnoticed in the representation of the Self. This perspective offers a particular challenge to the 
assumption of objectivity that is often afforded to the representation of national history. Here, the 
representation of different national bodies – and the various processes of commemoration and 
lamentation that are afforded to them – are used to highlight the impossibility of a singular 
authoritative national voice, emphasising the need to challenge those that lay claim to the 
representation of a particular “truth”. Instead we are encouraged to be aware of, and even seek out, 
the dissenting narratives that may lurk at the margins of a monumentally-presented representation 
of the national collective.  
 The final section of this chapter – Section 5.4 – highlighted the need for continued attention 
to the construction of space at a variety of different scales, going beyond elite-authored forms of 
collective national meaning. This section focussed specifically upon some of the smaller-scale ways in 
which individual identities are created, performed and internalised. This section also highlights the 
need for there to be an awareness of the different types of people or everyday spatial clutter that are 
included or excluded within the process of constructing “collective” notions of spatial meaning. This 
examination of the representation of everyday sites within video games – including the home and the 
surrounding dwellingscapes – emphasises the need to remain aware of aspects of the national Self 
that might otherwise pass unnoticed, subsumed beneath the more active performances of national 
“meaning” that are provided by formally structured, “monumental” spatial sites.      
Chapter Six: Reading Rural Space 
Chapter Six focussed on Battlefield Hardline, Call of Duty: Ghosts, Tom Clancy’s Ghost Recon: 
Wildlands, and Homefront. This analysis examined the extent to which the representation of different 
understandings of rural space can result in the formation of particular geopolitical imaginaries. Within 
this chapter, I argued that the rural periphery can be encountered in several different ways and that 
these can be seen to have varying consequences for the ways in which we perceive of both the Self 
and the Other. This chapter focused upon three particularly prevalent conceptualisations of rural 
spaces, distinguishing between the rural idyll, the backwoods and the wilderness (Chapter Three, 
pp.73-90). 
 Section 6.1 acknowledged the frequency with which the “idyllic” imaginary is made absent 
from the representations of rural space that are offered within military-themed video games, noting 
the lone example of the “Oasis” encampment (Homefront; see Chapter Six, pp.179-181). Though 
shown to be located within the bounds of suburban space, the Oasis encampment evokes several 
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idyllic signifiers: these include, for example, the natural protections that are offered by this space, as 
well as the ability of the occupants to live off the land. Whilst the player is potentially free to remain 
within this protected space, such an action would make it impossible to progress the broader narrative 
and would preclude any involvement in the commensurate resistance effort. This creates a specific 
imaginary within which the individual must leave behind any and all personal comforts in order to fulfil 
their duty to the broader national whole. Whilst this connection is made explicit here – through the 
characterisation and subsequent destruction of the idyllic, yet urban safe space – this interrelationship 
is more commonly implied rather than shown.  
 In Section 6.2, for example, this analysis examined the production of rurality as a form of 
untamed wilderness space. This section emphasises the externalisation of rural space, which is shown 
to lack the civilised systems and cultural values that one might expect within the urban core. These 
spaces are instead shown to be zones of decay - containing only decrepit buildings and failing 
industries – and are home to only criminals and wild animals. Such spaces are, however, also shown 
to be necessary for the formation of the hyper-masculine warrior identity – referred to within some 
of these video games as the “Ghost” identity. This identity, evoked through one’s contact with the 
wilderness, was used to highlight the role of mobility and modernity in the creation of the rural 
imaginary. As Section 6.2.1 highlights, the Ghosts are shown to achieve control over the wilderness 
through their mastery of the terrain and their continued movement through it. These individuals are 
represented as near-mythical figures, conceived of as an extension of the protections that are afforded 
by the natural environment. These are shown to be professionals, free of the extremes of ideology 
and the pursuit of individual validation. The virtue of the Ghost, however, is shown to be threatened 
by a lack of individual mobility. The rural wilderness, whilst key to the evocation of national identity 
and the fulfilment of one’s duties, is also shown to erode the civilised values that are associated with 
the urban core. A successful engagement with rurality, therefore, is shown to necessitate continued 
forward movement and one’s inevitable departure, as this is not somewhere where civilised peoples 
should hope to remain. Rather, as outlined in Section 6.2.2, this is a zone which is to be entered into 
and controlled – by violent means if necessary (Chapter Six, pp.191-193).  
 Though rural spaces are shown to play a role in the construction of the national identity, these 
regions are also shown to contain a hostile and violent Other. Section 6.3 examined some of the ways 
in which these groups are represented, highlighting both external and internal adversaries. This 
section highlighted the frequency with which rural spaces are shown to allow for behaviours that are 
not permitted within the confines of “civilised” urban society. The analysis of Ghost Recon Wildlands, 
for example, highlighted the use of torture and sexual violence by the rural Other, which disciplines 
our expectations about what the encounter with the rural is like and how it contrasts with our own 
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values and identity. Within Wildlands, the game differentiates between the violence of the Western 
soldiers – which is seen as a necessity – and the more recreational violence deployed by the Mexican 
Other (Chapter Six, 193-196). Section 6.3.1 highlighted similar representational practices in the 
formulation of different internal Others, used in the marginalisation of specific aspects of one’s own 
national community. Two specific examples were considered here, from within Homefront and 
Battlefield Hardline, which are each familiar as representations of the so-called “Prepper” movement. 
These groups do not utilise rural spaces to provide access to a better version of oneself, but rather as 
a means of isolation and the preservation of one’s own individual interests. These representations of 
internal rural Others each show groups that are unwilling to work together in the service of the 
national whole, meeting attempts to do with violence, sexism and racism. The final part of this section, 
labelled 6.3.2, aimed to destabilise the assumed correlation between rurality and a profoundly 
negative, anti-modern imaginary. Here, through the further analysis of Ghost Recon: Wildlands, 
modernity and its associated acts of consumption are shown to be the cause of the disturbance to the 
social order. The various members of the Mexican cartel, for example, are shown to have co-opted 
both traditional practices (e.g. the ‘narco-corrido’ musical form) and more progressive forms of social 
and political discourse (Chapter Six, pp.200-202). Even the supposedly moral and modern American 
forces are shown to be in pursuit of revenge, rather than the protection of Bolivian spaces and peoples 
(Chapter Six, p.202). The rural Bolivian way of life, meanwhile, which is represented through the 
agrarian ideologies espoused by resistance fighters, is shown as that which is to be defended from the 
intrusion of modern, immoral and fundamentally urban practices.  
These analyses have served to highlight several issues that are potentially consequential for 
the ways in which we theorise the nature and role of rural spaces. Thought of more broadly, these 
representations of rurality can be seen to reinstate a clear urban-rural binary that is often not available 
in the real-world (Chapter Three, pp.73-76). These images provide access to some of the prevalent 
ways in which we think about the relationship between the Self and the rural periphery, providing a 
common language through which it is possible to examine and interrogate different anxieties about 
these spaces. It is also made possible to examine how different, even conflicting, discourses of rurality 
and rural space can be applied to the same regions.  
The different imaginaries that are examined within this section can also be seen to have 
critical import. Section 6.1, for example, highlighted the extent to which even an implied “idyllic” space 
may be consequential for the ways in which we conceive of the validity of a range of different actions 
and interactions. The analysis of the wilderness in Section 6.2, meanwhile, was used to highlight the 
extent to which our pejorative conceptualisations of external places can be linked to issues 
surrounding mobility and individual freedoms. Whilst one’s entry into rural spaces is represented as a 
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key part of one’s responsibilities as a national subject – acting as a space in which an individual is made 
able to fulfil their potential – we are nonetheless shown that it is necessary to leave such spaces and 
return to the urban core. This is used to expose the tension that exists between the representation of 
rural space as a masculine playground and the coinciding suggestion that these are spaces where this 
identity is at risk. The final stage of this chapter, Section 6.3, highlighted the frequency with which 
rural spaces are shown to contain the aspects of society that cannot easily be reconciled with the 
national identity and its associated values, facilitating the construction of urban and civilised spaces 
in juxtaposition to the people and places that are encountered within these realms. This section, 
however, also serves to problematize this commonplace cultural equivocation between rurality and 
anti-modernity (Section 6.3.2). This section serves to expose the artificiality of the distinction between 
urban and rural spaces, showing each to have been the product of specific imported social and cultural 
values that are ascribed both to people “like us” (from which the nation is composed) and the excluded 
Other (representative of the denied and subverted aspects of the Self that would seek to ensnare us). 
Chapter Seven: Time, Temporality and the Event 
This final substantive chapter provided an examination of Spec Ops: the Line, Tom Clancy’s Splinter 
Cell: Blacklist, Homefront: the Revolution and Tom Clancy’s The Division. This analysis focussed on the 
logics of mediation that are evident within these military-themed video games, differentiating 
between the processes of remediation and premediation (Bolter & Grusin, 2000; Grusin, 2010; see 
Chapter Three, pp.93-104). This chapter argued that these different temporally-inflected processes of 
mediation serve to produce specific geopolitical imaginaries, manufacturing particular roles for both 
the state and the associated individual actors. The resultant analysis was divided into two distinctive 
sections, each with a different emphasis. Section 7.2 focussed specifically on the role of remediation 
in providing a form of temporal therapy, through the representation of the familiar and comfortable 
tropes associated with both past practices of mediation and past events. Section 7.3, meanwhile, 
engaged with the notion of premediation, examining how video games offer an incitement to action 
through the representation of unstable future spaces and events.  
 Section 7.2 focusses on the logics that are associated with the process of remediation. This 
subsection first highlighted the creation of a broader sense of immediacy (Chapter Three, pp.94-95), 
examining some of the ways in which these video games achieve a sense of authenticity and 
immersion through the denial of mediation. These techniques included, for example, the integration 
of the player-camera into the game-world as a physical object (Chapter Seven, pp.214-215). This 
subsection also examined the hypermediated production of these worlds, noting the use of a variety 
of different technologies of mediation. Some of these processes were shown to mirror the ways in 
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which we encounter political phenomena in the real-world, broadening the sense of spatial scale, 
including the use of online videos, phone calls and “breaking-news” television broadcasts (Chapter 
Seven, pp.218). Other examples highlighted the use of familiar forms of mediation as embedded 
narrative, including the variety of different collectibles that the player can retrieve from within the 
gameworld (Chapter Seven, p.218). The focus on remediation is extended in Section 7.2.1, which 
focuses on the similarities between military-themed video games and other forms of spatial 
representation, noting the influence of both real-world political events and other forms of popular 
culture. Examples of this process include the remediation of the visual and spatial language of both 
the 9-11 attacks and the “Dark Winter” military simulation, as well as the familiar cultural imagery that 
surrounds events such as the launch of Apple computer products (Chapter Seven, pp.222-223). These 
are shown to allow for the creation of a “compliant” geopolitics, predicated on past historical 
narratives, which allows for past imaginaries to be adapted for contemporary audiences.  
 This section also examines some of the ways in which these familiar forms of mediation can 
be subverted, drawing specifically upon the example of Spec Ops: the Line. Although ostensibly an 
outlier, as one of the few examples of an overtly critical mainstream military video game, the 
examination of this title served to expose some of the mechanisms that are commonly used to frame 
the act of gameplay. These include, for example, the manipulation of the player’s sense of agency, as 
this title offers the player a series of choices that are not normally available within this medium 
(Chapter Seven, pp.223-228). This subversion of remediated themes and tropes allows for a critique 
of the supposed morality and efficacy of violent interventionism during times of crisis.  
 In Section 7.3, the focus moves to the process of premediation. This section examines the 
extent to which the representation of future spaces within military video games can be used to 
normalise specific behaviours as the “correct” response to future “Events”. Within these video games, 
this future trauma is – like the “Judgement Day” of the Terminator universe – shown to be inevitable. 
It is not possible to stop the next attack from happening, but only to either endlessly defer its 
occurrence or else to soften the inevitable impact. There are several different representations of the 
future national “Self” that are considered here – these include, but are not limited to, the “heroic” 
counterterrorism officer, the state mercenary, and the traumatised soldier. An examination of these 
different characters and their actions is used to facilitate a closer consideration of the perceived role 
of national identity and duty within the post-Event space, informed by the premediation of different 
responses to events that have not actually happened in the real world (yet). The nature of these 
interactions varies from the overt reification of duty and sacrifice within Splinter Cell: Blacklist, to the 
devastation that is caused by simply following orders in Spec Ops: the Line (Chapter Seven, pp.230-
237). In each of these cases, these video games present different roles for both the individual and the 
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state in future practices of securitisation, presenting a range of actions that we are invited to either 
undertake for ourselves or else sanction on our behalf. These representations not only serve to 
naturalise specific responses to the occurrence of trauma – including the unconstrained use of violent 
force – but also preclude futures within which traumatic “Events” can answered through diplomacy, 
negotiation or other non-violent means.  
This analysis of military-themed video games offers several potential insights into the ways in 
which we mediate the world around us, in order to come to an understanding of our role in relation 
to present and future “Events”. In Section 7.2, for example, the analysis of military-themed video 
games highlights the role of familiar practices of spatial mediation in creating and recreating the world 
for the future. This analysis exposes the role of backwards-looking practices of mediation, emphasising 
that the political space is constructed by looking at the world as it was and not as it actually is or could 
be. Such a perspective serves to highlight the continued role of the imagination in addressing potential 
or future sources of insecurity. Popular culture can play a role in this process, exposing the instances 
on which familiar narratives and conventions fail or are subverted.    
 Section 7.3, meanwhile, calls specific attention to the mechanisms that are used to solicit 
consent for acts of securitisation, including warfare, inviting clear consideration of the ways in which 
we both form and maintain our ideas about duty, national identity and belonging within everyday life. 
These video games are representative of broader processes which discipline the attribution of 
personal and political power, often overriding otherwise cherished freedoms in the name of 
protection and security. This final section also exposes the limitations that are imposed upon present 
day discourse through the overwhelming representation of specific forms of action as an “inevitable” 
part of the future. In these video games, for example, the assumed centrality of violent action 
precludes the possibility for peaceful negotiation and diplomacy within this future space, exposing the 
tensions between the role of the more conventional soldier in symmetrical warfare and the role of 
pre-emptive violence in the prevention and deferral of future catastrophe.  
8.2 New Directions for Future Research  
By way of conclusion, this final section will highlight some of the other potential areas within which 
further research into the video game medium could be carried out.  
The Exploration of Alternative Genres 
My own analysis has focussed specifically upon the representation of different forms of space within 
the military-themed subgenre of video games. Whilst such an approach has facilitated the 
examination of a number of overtly political cultural artefacts, a similar approach could examine the 
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function of these spatial themes within other video game genres. Such an analysis could, for example, 
extend the focus on the role of different rural spaces (here discussed in Chapter Six) to encompass the 
various ways in which adversarial and hostile spaces are represented with the horror genre of video 
games, including titles such as Resident Evil 7: Biohazard (Capcom, 2017). Such an approach would 
resonate with critical examinations of the role of rural spaces in film and television, including those of 
Clover (1992) and Murphy (2013). Another alternative approach, meanwhile, could expand upon the 
mediation of the future “Event” (here discussed in Chapter Seven) to encompass the representation 
of a post-apocalyptic form of identity formation within Fallout 4 (Bethesda Softworks, 2015). This 
particular title would, through its representation of the aftermath of nuclear warfare, allow for an 
examination of a world in which concepts of duty and sacrifice are necessarily separated from one’s 
allegiance to the state.  
The Exploration of a Broader Cultural Intertext  
Within this analysis, I have focussed on the ways in which specific understandings of political space 
are produced by the various representational, narrative and ludic functions of the video game text. 
This is, however, only one of the potential ways in which the “meaning” of a cultural text is established 
(see Chapter Two). Further research could, for example, seek to examine the extent to which our 
understandings of political spaces are produced by the intertextual relationship between video games 
and other forms of popular culture. The characters and spaces contained with video games are, for 
example, now frequently adapted into films, television series and comic books. Future analyses of 
video game space could, therefore, consider the extent to which the understandings of the audience 
are manipulated by this broader assemblage.  
 Other analyses, meanwhile, could potentially account for the ways in which our 
understandings of political spaces are produced through the broader paratextual resources that 
surround such releases. These might include, for example, the role of video game journalism and fan 
made videos, each of which can be seen to construct their interpretations of particular characters and 
environments in relation to other cultural and political phenomena. Such an examination would, once 
again, correlate with an increasing interest in the role of the audience in the production of textual 
meaning, broadening the range of sites at which interpretations of political space are sought and 
studied.    
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